The Japanese military is emerging from decades of pacifism. But do the country's political leaders have the vision and the will to make the country strong again?

Residentscholar Michael Auslin will study U.S.-Asia relations.

The British surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 should be instructive to U.S. policymakers eyeing China’s rise. War isn’t inevitable, but history is full of surprises.

Few in Japan today talk in such optimistic terms about China. None want a clash of any kind, nor a more confrontational relationship, but neither are Japanese willing to be forced into accommodating Chinese desires.

Commentators tend to assume that the Japanese constitution's strict constraints on military activity form an insurmountable barrier to vigorous defensive cooperation. However, three upcoming events show that Tokyo can play a greater security role in the region without having to revise the constitution.

This churn in Tokyo makes it almost impossible for U.S. and Japanese leaders to forge a stable working relationship. It is becoming a strain on ties between the two Pacific allies, and is one reason Japan has slipped off the radar in Washington. Yet the two partners need each other more than ever, given the common challenges they face, from economic stagnation to continued instability in East Asia.

If the Noda government relinquishes its claim to the joint exploration of the seabed around the Senkakus, hesitates to modernize Japan's military and cuts back on missile defense activities, a conservative backlash could emerge, heightened by perceived regional impressions that Japan is weakening relative to China.

In the face of this Chinese buildup, Washington needs to do more to maintain its air-power superiority. Its aging F-15s and F-16s increasingly will be unable to match more modern Chinese counterparts, and even the far superior skills of U.S. pilots can't make up for outdated aircraft.