American strategic thinking has begun to look beyond the traditional hub-and-spoke model of postwar alliances.

Mead urges Washington to “enter into deep strategic conversations” with each of these powers, so as to start building effective partnerships.  The problem is, we’ve already tried that, with most of them.

The best thing the Obama Administration did for Asia did not happen in Asia. Sure it was important that the president announced the movement of troops to Australia.  Equally so was the announcement of the Trans Pacific Partnership which could lead to greater trade liberalization and is a powerful way to tie allies together.

The world usually turns out to work differently from what American presidents expected when they were campaigning.

The United States' most important Asian ally--Japan--proved a difficult relationship to manage during Robert Gates' tenure. While not resolving many outstanding issues in US-Japan relations, Gates did manage to keep ties on track and focused on constructive engagement.

Anew trilateral agreementin East Asia is necessarytoreduce themisunderstanding among friends and rivals alike.

Walter Russell Mead’s column in the Wall Street Journal last week praises America’s bipartisan policy in Asia, claiming that it may be as influential as NATO or the Marshall Plan. I’m a bit less optimistic than Mead on the depth of strength our policy has. It’s not a Potemkin village, but I think it falls short of the informally cohesive structure he sees.

The Obama administration is welcoming China's presumptive next leader, Xi Jinping. But how can it make good policy when the strategy is a mess?