These three studies are: 1. Sizing Total Exposure to Subprime and Alt-A Loans in the U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.2008, 2. Sizing Total Federal Government and Federal Agency Contributions to Subprime and Alt-A Loans in the U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.2008, and 3. High LTV, Subprime and Alt-A Originations Over the Period 1992–2007 and Fannie, Freddie, FHA, and VA‘s Role.

The mortgage meltdown and ensuing financial crisis were the result of an unprecedented accumulation of weak and risky Non-Traditional Mortgages (NTMs). By mid-2008 about one-half of outstanding all loans were NTMs. The early 1990s is the appropriate benchmark since shortly thereafter government policies required the broad-based introduction of “flexible underwriting standards.”

Discolsures contained in SEC complaints further validate the necessity to look behind Fannie and Freddie's characterization of subprime loans.  

Government housing policies and the toxic mortgages they spawned were the sine qua non of the financial crisis.

The question the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission should have answered--and did not--was why there were so many bad mortgages outstanding in 2008?

In AEI's latest Financial Services Outlook, AEI scholar Peter Wallison discusses the government's housing finance reform efforts.

Greenspan will have to be called to account for regulatory failings and his interest rate policy.

At a Hill event this morning in which Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Vice Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee will participate, AEI housing finance experts Peter Wallison, Alex Pollock and Edward Pinto will introduce a new housing finance policy white paper.