The capacity of the US military is both dangerously small and imperfectly shaped for the coming decades.

The Army's combination of uncertainty about the nature of future warfare, excessive enthusiasm about technology and an inability to communicate a clear purpose may inhibit the production of new ground combat vehicles, just as it doomed the Future Combat Systems program fifteen months ago.

Wednesday and Thursday mark Egypt’s first post-Mubarak presidential elections. Sadly, what should be a purple-fingered moment brings some hope and much disappointment. Don’t get me wrong – Mubarak was a loathsome stooge, a petty and incompetent rentier tyrant who deserved what he got and more.

The Romney 4 percent Pentagon budget is no “spike”; it’s more like a return to normal, even very constrained military spending given the global mission of America’s armed forces.

AEI resident scholar Mackenzie Eaglen was testifying Wednesday to the U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, in which she explained that the 2013 long-term shipbuilding plan "does not accurately portray the forces or funding necessary to execute the administration’s strategy."

Under current law, the U.S. Department of Defense automatically faces significant spending cuts over the next 10 years—cuts that america's civilian and military leaders have cadidly described as "devastating" and "very high risk."

With his decision to cancel the Future Combat Systems family of ground combat vehicles, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has done the U.S. Army a grave disservice.

There are good reasons why some military systems get used and others collect dust.