Walter Russell Mead’s column in the Wall Street Journal last week praises America’s bipartisan policy in Asia, claiming that it may be as influential as NATO or the Marshall Plan. I’m a bit less optimistic than Mead on the depth of strength our policy has. It’s not a Potemkin village, but I think it falls short of the informally cohesive structure he sees.

American strategic thinking has begun to look beyond the traditional hub-and-spoke model of postwar alliances.

The warmth of U.S.-Australian ties since September 11, 2001 stands in stark contrast to the tension between Washington and some of its traditional transatlantic allies.

Paul Kennedy's view of America's power has truth to it, but it lacks any moral component and is overly dismissive of the sources of both domestic power and global stability.

Lessons from the Australian Wedgetail aircraft program are critical to future defense-industrial efforts.

The president long differentiated between the hunt for Bin Laden, which he saw as legitimate, and the wider war on terrorism which he saw as not.

This bookgoes beyond slogans and catchphrases to engage one of the most contested concepts in contemporary international politics: the sovereign rights of nation-states.

How will the Joint Strike Fighter change U.S. and Asian force structures?