Not only has the Clandestine Servicenot performed well against the Islamic extremist target, itperformed poorlyagainst all "hard targets" throughout the entire Cold War.

Merely monitoring Iran's foray into Latin America is the very least the United States must now do to frustrate Teheran's plans to threaten U.S. security and interests close to home.

In clandestine intelligence collection and covert action, bigger is rarely better.

Truth be toldthe CIAdoesn't care much at all about cover.

The fight against terrorism is no closer to success today than it was a decade ago when, in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks, President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terrorism.

The career of Iraj Masjedi, including his service at Base Ramezan and his promotion to senior adviser to Qassem Suleimani, highlights a cycle of generational change within the IRGC QF, and offers an indication of where to find Iran's future Quds Force leaders.

America's clandestine-service officers would defend us against the threats coming from the Middle East if Congress, the White House, and the press took cover more seriously.

It is too early to tell whether the revolutions sweeping across the Arab world will prove the long awaited "third wave of democratization." It is clear, however, that no regional regime is immune to their impact, not even the self-proclaimed vanguard of permanent world revolutions, the Islamist regime in Tehran.