More than three decades after the Revolution of 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the IRGC remain entangled in a rivalry which the Army — should the hitherto trend continue — is bound to lose.

In the name of Muslim unity, many Muslim-American leaders and organizations have been less than coherent when it comes to violent extremism.

Byreporting only theviolence and political intrigue and ignoring underlying religious tension, the Western media often gets the Middle East wrong.

It is too soon to know what General Stanley McChrystal might ask for, but any sound strategy to achieve the president's stated goals in Afghanistan will require more forces.

Peter R. Mansoor weaves together an expertly written narrative that describes in detail his service in Baghdad during a period of transition.

The Army's combination of uncertainty about the nature of future warfare, excessive enthusiasm about technology and an inability to communicate a clear purpose may inhibit the production of new ground combat vehicles, just as it doomed the Future Combat Systems program fifteen months ago.

For almost a third of a century, the Islamic Republic of Iran has confounded American presidents. It has taken hostages, conducted terrorism, undermined the Middle East peace process, and worked unrelentingly to become a nuclear power and develop missiles with global reach.

The U.S. Navy will have to face new challenges from China and North Korea with fewer resources.