AEI’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies will host Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter for a timely discussion of U.S. defense budgets, of the changing strategic landscape in the U.S. and the force that this landscape demands.

When a divided Supreme Court issued its highly controversial Citizens United decision allowing corporations free rein to use their dollars to intervene in elections, there was one seemingly shining light, an area where broad consensus existed and that was endorsed by eight of the nine justices: the value of disclosure.

How do civil society organizations operate in the authoritarian environment of Vladimir Putin’s “sovereign democracy?”  To what extent are they able to further their causes despite pervasive corruption and the rule of courts that take their cues from the Kremlin?

This paper explores the opportunities presented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to Japan to revitalize its trade policy, bolster economic growth, and increase participation in regional multilateral fora for the 21st century. Despite its strengths, Japan has continued to face problems caused by its economic, political,...

With the recent publication of its final rule, the federal government's Financial Stability Oversight Council is now in position to designate certain nonbank firms as "systemically important financial institutions" (SIFIs). There is probably no aspect of the Dodd-Frank Act that will have more damaging effects on competition in the U.S. financial system.

Baghdad is all atwitter over the P-5+1 talks with Iran beginning today. A sandstorm kept many European and Western diplomats from landing, but the Iranians were out in full force, with Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili leading the way.

November 9 is the anniversary of both joyous and regrettable events in German history.

Iran could offer to halt production of 20% enriched uranium in upcoming negotiations. This “concession” would have limited impact on Iran’s ability to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear warhead, however. Iran would still retain the ability to resume 20% enrichment and to produce weapons-grade uranium at a time of its choosing.