A new report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) argues that one of the greatest mistakes the United States can make is to imagine that Iranian activities in a given arena--the nuclear program, for example--are isolated from Iranian undertakings in another. The report examines those other areas

The United States and its allies and partners must not only understand Iran’s regional strategy and influence but also develop a coherent strategy of their own with which to confront them. Considering the relative economic, political, and diplomatic power of the two sides, it is unacceptable for the United States and its allies to allow Iran even such progress as it has made in these realms.

Saturday’s NYT had a piece bylined by James Risen about the Ghosts of Iraq Haunting CIA in Tackling Iran. It’s a Captain Obvious story in conception.

This month, Obama administration officials revealed plans to dramatically reduce embassy staff in Baghdad, the largest U.S. diplomatic mission abroad. Along with the announcement in December of the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq — the message President Obama is sending is clear: The sooner we put Iraq...

The Iraq Effect is a thought-provoking but flawed study commissioned by the U.S. Air Force on the regional implications of the 2003 Iraq war. Trends discussed may be real, but their presence before Operation Iraqi Freedom suggests that they should not be attributed only to the war.

Here's what success in Iraq looks like: democratic elections, sectarian comity, independence in foreign policy, al Qaeda stymied, cooperating with the United States, and self sufficiency. Iraq didn't look completely like that in early 2011, but it was headed in the right direction.

The question of the moment is not “Who lost Iraq?” but rather “Is Iraq definitely lost?”

We’ve left Iraq in a bottle with three scorpions–with no help from us except kind words.