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It is quite telling that if President Obama had to construct a strategy for defeat, it would not differ from what he and his aides describe as America’s way forward.
A new report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) argues that one of the greatest mistakes the United States can make is to imagine that Iranian activities in a given arena--the nuclear program, for example--are isolated from Iranian undertakings in another. The report examines those other areas
On March 30, Afghan president Hamid Karzai strongly condemned actions of the "Kill Team," a rogue military unit accused of deliberately murdering Afghan civilians. Reaction to the photos in Afghanistan has largely been muted, but this may change as Karzai's condemnation draws more attention.
The United States and its allies and partners must not only understand Iran’s regional strategy and influence but also develop a coherent strategy of their own with which to confront them. Considering the relative economic, political, and diplomatic power of the two sides, it is unacceptable for the United States and its allies to allow Iran even such progress as it has made in these realms.
We must go to war with the partners we have, not necessarily the ones we would like to have.
The Republican primary has returned the war to a prominent place in the national debate, and has given an opportunity to candidates to voice their differences with the president on more than just domestic policy. The Republicans have a chance to offer a choice—win this war, don't just end it.
Despite the Karzai government's failures, a majority of Afghans continue to support democracy and the current system over the insurgent groups. But these achievements are fragile and reversible. A premature withdrawal from Afghanistan is a recipe for failure with disastrous consequences for the United States and world security.
Estados Unidos necesita mantener la fuerza residual de entre 20.000 y 30.000 hombres después de 2014 para salvar los logros de los últimos diez años y evitar que los talibanes y Al Qaeda restablezcan bases terroristas en Afganistán.





