Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents identifies two waves of organized crime in Iraq: One took advantage of the collapse of the state and of the breakdown of social control; the other was defined by political ambition and the need to find resources for militias.

Since Saddam Hussein’s fall, few problems have destabilized Iraq more than militias. Allied with political parties, these forces have become incubators of sectarian violence. With President George W. Bush’s deployment of additional troops to pacify and secure Baghdad, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promises to take action. As reprisal attacks continue...

American assistance programs aimed at helping Yemen build and maintain counterterrorism forces will not suffice in the face of a real and growing al Qaeda-affiliated insurgency.

Taiz is as important a city as Sana’a to understanding the Yemeni Spring, yet its significance has been largely overlooked by the international community. The path to meaningful political settlement in Sana'a runs through Taiz.

Khamenei’s strategy is to suppress Iraq with militias.  He seeks to impose through the barrel of a gun what isn’t in Iraqis’ hearts and minds. Khamenei wants a compliant little brother, not a democracy next door.

Denial of access by al Shabaab militants, and in some cases by other armed militias, is the single greatest obstacle to the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The American withdrawal, which comes after the administration's failure to secure a new agreement that would have allowed troops to remain in Iraq, won't be good for ordinary Iraqis nor for the region. But it will unquestionably benefit Iran.

Faced with the likelihood of spreading violence and Iranian influence in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, will the next president make the hard choices to confront those threats to American national security, or will he or she seek to remain aloof?