Saturday’s NYT had a piece bylined by James Risen about the Ghosts of Iraq Haunting CIA in Tackling Iran. It’s a Captain Obvious story in conception.

Judge Silberman and others discussedthe findings of the commission on U.S. intelligence failuresand what needs to be doneto reform the gathering and analysis of secret information.

On March 31, 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction presented its recommendations to President George W. Bush. The Commission, co-chaired by retired judge Laurence H. Silberman and former senator Charles Robb, concluded that the American intelligence community must undergo fundamental...

The North Korean government did not opt to join the world’s nuclear weapons club suddenly, on a bizarre and inexplicable whim. To the contrary: last week’s announcement represents the predictable culmination of decades of methodical progress on a multifaceted program of weapons of mass destruction.

Last week's announcement represents the predictable culmination of decades of progress on a multifaceted program of weapons of mass destruction.

If Iran can build a nuclear weapon, then do we really care whether it has? Once the requisite fissile materials and the design for a warhead and the preliminary testing (not necessarily requiring a detonation) have taken place, aren’t the two the same, plus or minus a couple of weeks?

After three years of interagency wrangling, there is still no agreement on U.S. policy toward Iran.

In a flurry of diplomatic activity yesterday, Poland promised the White House to clarify remarks of its president, Alexander Kwasniewski, after he said he believed Iraq never had weapons of mass destruction, according to American and Polish officials.