Paul H. Kupiec is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he studies systemic risk and the management and regulations of banks and financial markets. He also follows the work of financial regulators such as the Federal Reserve and examines the impact of financial regulations on the US economy.
Before joining AEI, Kupiec was an associate director of the Division of Insurance and Research within the Center for Financial Research at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), where he oversaw research on bank risk measurement and the development of regulatory policies such as Basel III. Kupiec was also director of the Center for Financial Research at the FDIC and chairman of the Research Task Force of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. He has previously worked at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Freddie Mac, J.P. Morgan, and for the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Kupiec has edited many professional journals, including the Journal of Financial Services Research, Journal of Risk, and Journal of Investment Management.
He has a bachelor of science degree in economics from George Washington University and a doctorate in economics — with a specialization in finance, theory, and econometrics — from the University of Pennsylvania.
Chairman, Research Task Force, Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2010–13
Director, Center for Financial Research, FDIC
Associate Director, Division of Insurance and Research, Center for Financial Research, FDIC, 2004–13
Deputy Chief, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Department of Monetary and Financial Systems, IMF, 2000–04
Outside of executive salaries at the largest institutions, perhaps the highest-paying and most-secure jobs in banking can be found at the federal bank regulatory agencies, where average employee compensation is more than 2.7 times that of private-sector bank employees.
It is true that the very top bank executives make more in a year than most of us make in a lifetime, but compensation of this magnitude is rare. Most banks in this country are small businesses and pay employees modest salaries. Yet one group in banking stands out as highly paid—federal bank regulators.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) new rules for mortgage lending practices will not deter predatory lending and will significantly increase many small banks costs of mortgage lending.
The financial reforms enacted in the DFA have given government regulators many new powers, including the ability to use the banking system to implement politically driven lending policies. These new rules, many well-intentioned, have created a number of negative unintended consequences.
Government-directed lending policies create an unfavorable financial environment that pushes resources out of the financial sector, reducing business and consumer access to credit and limiting economic growth.
At this event, Charles Calomiris will present this provocative book “Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit,” co-authored with Stephen Haber. A discussion by banking experts will follow.
Current newspaper accounts alone make it difficult to understand why the SEC should waste resources on investigating the sales practices of mortgage-backed securities by large financial institutions. It looks suspiciously like an SEC attempt to redeem its public reputation as a lax regulator by capitalizing on a target that currently garners little public sympathy.
An emerging literature proposes using conditional value at risk and marginal expected shortfall to measure financial institution systemic risk. We identify two weaknesses in this literature: (1) it lacks formal statistical hypothesis tests; and, (2) it confounds systemic and systematic risk. We address these weaknesses by introducing a null hypothesis that stock returns are normally distributed.