Islamic Militants from Russia Flock to Syria?

A Russian think tank estimates that several hundred Russian-speaking Salafists have joined the anti-Assad rebellion in Syria. It’s difficult to say whether this figure is accurate. Moreover, in addition to Russia, the number includes militants from the repressively secular but predominantly Muslim countries of Central Asia, which isn’t a shocker given their considerable presence in Afghanistan.

At the same time, it’s safe to assume that the vast majority of the Russian-speaking militants in Syria originate from Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region, where since 1994 the Kremlin has fought what began as a secessionist movement in Chechnya but rapidly morphed into a widespread Islamic insurgency.

We most often discuss Russia’s support for Assad in moral terms. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Moscow’s UN Security Council vetoes “despicable,” and Amb. Susan Rice obliquely told Russia and China that they “will have any future blood spill on their hands.” That’s all true. But such ethical arguments won’t resonate with the Putin regime.

No surprise there. What’s surprising, however, is the inability of the Kremlin to properly understand the consequences of its Syria policy for Russia’s own interests. Whether there are 100 or 500 militants from Russia in Syria is irrelevant. They do have a presence and—much like the opposition to Assad as a whole—the longer they fight, the more radicalized, experienced, and integrated with global jihadists they will become. And chances are they won’t stick around Syria when the Assad regime collapses. Instead, they’ll return home to the North Caucasus, probably with several dozen new friends, where they’ll intensify their struggle to liberate this region from Russia much like they helped liberate Syria from Assad.

To call the Kremlin’s Syria policy shortsighted would be quite an understatement.