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From the Publisher

As Americans, we have never made any secret of how much we enjoy knowing about ourselves. In our daily news commentary, in our literature, and even in our music, we continually hold ourselves up to the mirror, trying to define how we think, how we live and who we are.

Nor have we been content with blurred images; we are always seeking greater clarity. Thus, in the past forty years, we have added a "scientific" twist to our introspection: the public opinion survey. And today, governments, business, labor, foundations, and private groups are supporting literally thousands of such surveys, probing into every nook and cranny of our national life.

Curiously, however, the country has yet to publish a regular journal that helps a broad, general audience understand the meaning of the vast mountains of data that are accumulating. The academic community *does* have several journals that are concerned with attitudes and behavior, but they tend to focus on theoretical or methodological issues and to be written in a language that is more familiar to other academics than to laymen.

In launching *Public Opinion*, the American Enterprise Institute hopes to fill that void. The magazine will be published on a bimonthly basis and will include not only a series of timely articles interpreting public opinion both here and abroad but will also feature a regular "opinion roundup," displaying figures that our editors believe most interesting and relevant for our readers.

We should say a word about our biases. All of us who are associated with the production of this magazine are fascinated by survey research and public opinion polls, for they often provide valuable, striking insights into the inner workings of our nation. Yet we also believe that survey data can be highly deceptive: a question that is sloppily constructed or asked within a special context can yield very different results from another one that is slightly different. Moreover, none of us believes that public opinion polls can become a talisman for public policy makers: polls can be a vital aid in a democracy but they are hardly a substitute for good, representative government.

So we approach this subject with caution. Like you, we want to know more about how opinion is formed, what it tells us about ourselves, and how it may guide us. But we intend to be neither slavish nor stuffy in trying to divine its meaning.

We would also like to think that it is especially appropriate for the American Enterprise Institute to publish this magazine. As our organization has grown and evolved over the years, we have often found ourselves at a crossroads—an intersection where the public, members of the public policy community, leaders of the business community, scholars, and representatives of the press come together to talk about the major policy issues of our time. And one of the enduring interests of each of those groups, we have found, is how the rest of the country feels about things. In launching this magazine, we are trying to address those questions on a regular basis and, in the process, we hope that we may contribute more richly to an ongoing national dialogue.

For all of us at AEI, *Public Opinion* represents one of our most venturesome and exciting projects. We hope that in reading it, you will come to share our view.

William J. Baroody, Jr.
Publisher

Jimmy Carter's Problem

Richard M. Scammon &
Ben J. Wattenberg

It is the thesis of this piece that the nature and implementation of President Carter's victory in 1976 has within it the seeds of a very great problem for him as he moves now into the second year of his term and begins, inevitably, to look ahead to his own 1980 reelection prospects.

Much of the recent talk has focused on the possibility of Carter becoming a "one-term President," on "his need for victories," the alleged ineptitude of his Georgia staff, the alienation of specific groups because of specific reasons, his attempt to "do too much," and so on. But missing from the discussion so far have been certain structural and ideological factors which may ultimately prove more troublesome to Mr. Carter than—as they say in the polling business—"all of the above."

Mr. Carter's problems are, at once, familiar and national ones, and in a more intense key, regional and peculiar ones: He won by capturing the votes of centrist switchers; he is in trouble, and may get into deeper trouble if he is perceived to be moving from the center toward the left. In his case, these not-so-unusual presidential afflictions are magnified by Carter's remarkable showing in the South in 1976.

Accordingly, it may be useful to look at that Southern regional situation first—critically important in and of itself—because it sheds light on the broader issue as well.

I

Why did Carter win in 1976?

It is, of course, customary after a close election for almost every group to claim that it was their specific group, their hard work, their support that "elected" the winner. When the winner in question is the President of the United States, such claims are made with particular vigor.

The aftermath of President Carter's victory has been no exception. Blacks have claimed the credit—although Gallup data show that Carter actually got a slightly lesser proportion of the black vote than did McGovern in 1972 or Humphrey in 1968. Jews have claimed the credit, although their voting percentages for Carter—73 percent according to an NBC election-day poll—were actually slightly less than in so-called "normal" years (it being understood that within the election observing trade, "normal" years have become rare enough to be called "abnormal"). Labor has claimed the credit with somewhat greater justification: They "came back" from a 1972 Republican vote to go solidly with Carter—but at a rate not really greater than pre-1972 years—and they provided him with massive financial and organizational help.

In a sense, they are *all* correct. Carter could not have won *without* their support. But that is the very nature of a close election. A close election is close. (You may quote that.) When it gets close enough our psephological favorite, the Maltese-Americans, can also claim credit for victory.

But saying "you couldn't have won *without* us" is not quite the same as saying "you won *because* of us." It may be said that the latter claim can properly be made by a group that not only provides a margin of difference, but votes *away from traditional patterns* to provide the margin of difference.

A simple analysis of recent presidental elections shows that there is one most obvious major group of voters who can lay claim to that formula for 1976. That grouping is "The South."

As the data show, in recent years "The South" had been trending steadily away from the Democrats in presidential elections—until 1976.

Democratic Percentage of Southern Vote in Presidential Elections, 1960-1976*

1960	50.5
1964	49.5
1968	30.9
1972	28.9
but . . .	
1976	54.1 (!)

*Eleven states of the Confederacy.

This trend has also been reflected in the electoral vote count:

Electoral Votes Won by Democratic Presidential Candidate in the South, 1960-1976*

1960	81
1964	81
1968	25
1972	0
but . . .	
1976	118 (!)

*Eleven states of the Confederacy.

There is another way of putting the 1976 Southern story: *Carter ran best in that area of the country where recent Democratic presidential candidates had been running worst.* That was the great paradox of the 1976 election.

There is a sub-tabulation available that is of particular relevance. The 1976 break with voting patterns in the South occurred almost exclusively among *white* Southerners. It was the sharpest break in that group in three decades. Here is a trend line for Southern white Protestants voting Democratic in recent presidential years, showing a dramatic decline—and a dramatic revival in 1976:

Southern White Protestants: Percentage Point Deviation from the National Democratic Presidential Vote, 1936-1976



Source: Data from the following American Institute of Public Opinion surveys: *1936*, 72, 104, 150, 177; *1940*, 208, 209, 215, 219, 248; *1944*, 328, 329, 336, 337; *1948*, 430, 431, 432, 433; *1952*, 506, 507, 508, 509; *1956*, 572, 573, 574, 576; *1960*, 635, 636, 637, 638; *1964*, 697, 699, 701, 702; *1968*, 769, 770, 771, 773; *1972*, 857, 858, 859, 860; *1976*, 959, 960, 961, 962.

Note: This chart was constructed by Professor Everett Ladd and has been used in the past in his book, *Transformations of the American Party System.* Ladd determines the "percentage point deviation" by first calculating the national vote for each presidential candidate and then comparing it with the vote of a subgroup (here, Southern whites). Both the national and subgroup voting tallies are derived from Gallup surveys taken just before and after the presidential election.

The percentage of Southern blacks voting Democratic has been much higher than Southern whites—but it remained constant in 1976.

The big change came among white Southerners. Had they not switched to Carter in large numbers in

Courtesy San Francisco Chronicle

1976 he would not have won. If those switchers do not —for any reason—vote for him in 1980, it is unlikely that he will win again.

White Southerners. Aside from the fact that about half voted for Carter, enabling him to capture the South, what else do we know about them?

We know that despite all of the talk about the "New South"—a term which has a cicada-like rhythm in American politics—white Southerners are still more conservative than most voters in America. Pollster Lou Harris reported in a release last summer: "The South is easily the most conservative part of the country."

If white Southerners were the hinge of the Carter victory, and if white Southerners are more conservative than most American voters, it behooves us to ask: Was Jimmy Carter the more conservative of the presidential candidates in 1976?

The answer is no. Notwithstanding Carter's basic traditionalism (religious, ex-naval officer, small town, moral, businessman, and so on), Ford was generally seen as more conservative by the voters. A nationwide Harris poll taken in early September 1976, asked:

"How would you describe the political philosophy of (Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter)—conservative, middle of the road, liberal or radical?"

And this was the clear response:

Political Philosophy	*Ford* %	*Carter* %
Conservative	36	17
Middle of the road	36	31
Liberal	5	26
Radical	3	4
Not sure	20	22

The most conservative part of the country voted for the more liberal candidate.

Well, then, why did so many white Southerners vote for Carter? Obviously, because he was a Southerner—and in spite of their ideological leanings. Southerners felt, with good reason, that the idea that "a Southerner couldn't be elected President" was an idea whose time had come—and gone. And so, millions of white Southerners, who in other years would likely vote for the more conservative candidate, voted for the Southern candidate.

With all that extra help, Carter managed to carry the South narrowly. Slightly more than half of the white Southerners still voted *against* him. But that was better by far than any recent Democratic candidate had done, as the tabulations above show.

So: looking to the future, we can say that if a relatively few Southern conservatives perceive Carter as a liberal in 1980 and vote conservative instead of Southern, Carter could be in serious trouble.

II

There may be a recent analogue to this tale of cross-rippling electoral tides, and it is an analogue that should be of great interest to Carter strategists.

In 1960, John F. Kennedy also won a close election when a large bloc of voters abandoned ideological and/or party-oriented behavior to vote along the axis of an external factor. The "externality" then was not that "a *Southerner* couldn't be elected President," but that "a *Catholic* couldn't be elected President." And millions of Catholics, who would normally have voted Republican, switched to vote for Jack Kennedy in a successful attempt to smash that outrageous religious axiom of our politics.

The big question, in both the Kennedy and the Carter situations, and for election pundits generally, is this: Having once voted on an externality—Catholicism or Southernism—is a voter likely to vote that way again *once his point has been proved*? Would Catholics keep voting for a Catholic for President, against their ideological bent, even after it had been demonstrated that a Catholic *could* be elected President? Will Southerners

have to prove a point about the South, again, after they proved it once in 1976?

Of course, we don't know the answer to the Southern question yet, but we have an idea about the Catholic question. John Kennedy, tragically, did not live to run for reelection in 1964. But since 1964, many Catholics have run for either President or Vice President in general elections and primaries: William Miller, Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, Edmund Muskie, Thomas Eagleton, Sargent Shriver, Jerry Brown—to name a few. *In no instance is there evidence that Catholicism became a major voting issue.*

It is as if the external issue, once settled, disappears, much as Prohibition, child labor, and free coinage of silver disappeared as issues once they were resolved.

Let us assume that the Catholic-Kennedy situation is indeed analogous to the Southern-Carter situation. With Southernism no longer a factor (as Catholicism is no longer a factor), President Carter would have to compete in 1980 along only the normal modes of voter reaction. These include: incumbency, personality, state of the nation, state of the world, record in office—*and ideology.*

Question: Under such circumstances, could Carter do well in the still-conservative white South? Surely he *could.* If the country is at peace and inflation rates are low, unemployment rates are low, and economic growth rates are high, Carter would not only carry the South, he'd sweep the nation. On the other hand, if you change the "lows" for "high" and the "high" for "lows," he might not carry Plains. But in a mixed and mottled real-world situation so common in recent years, the critical question is this: Is Carter *likely* to do as well as he needs to in the white South?

Well, he would have a good shot at it so long as he is not perceived to be wholly out of touch with mainstream Southern ideology (which remains more conservative than that of the rest of the nation).

So far—if one accepts the reportage of President Carter's administration—he has managed to maintain and even strengthen his image as a moderate. Enormous publicity is generated when black leaders denounce Carter for not spending enough. He wins more plaudits when he still says he will balance the budget. He denies federal aid for abortion. He promises the new welfare program will not hike welfare costs. He is attacked by organized labor for a variety of slights. He makes a tough-minded, vigorous defense of human rights and tough SALT proposals. And, as a result, public opinion polls show that fewer Americans regard Carter as "a liberal" than when he was elected.

On the other hand—less often reported, or less stressed for their political impact—have been a series of other acts that would, or should, or likely will, persuade more and more people that there is a "liberal" in the White House. ("Liberal," remember, is what liberal Morris Udall described in 1976 as a "worry word" when he asked the political press to please describe him as a "progressive.")

Many moderates and even more conservatives, viewing political developments through their own prisms, have noted with dismay: that Carter has signed the Panama treaties, that his welfare program ended up calling for substantially more spending, that he axed the B-1, that he condemns America's fear of communism as "inordinate" (neglecting to describe the ordinate parameter of such fear, which leads him to ask for a $10 billion increase in the defense budget), that he has taken mini-steps to recognize Cuba and Vietnam, that his energy program is widely assailed as pro-environmental and anti-production, that he backs down on SALT and human rights, that he deals the Soviets back into the Middle East, that it has become increasingly apparent this his budget will not come close to balance, that he goes public with Ralph Nader for a Consumer Protection Agency, that he allows his administration to be characterized as pro-quotas, and so on.

It could be said that these two lists are not a bad mix. Many voters' views would conform with some items in Group A and some in Group B.

But the key tactical question is this one: How vulnerable would President Carter be in his home region if he can readily be depicted as pro-Panama "giveaway," pro-quotas, pro-welfare, anti-growth, pro-Cuba, and so on. Not to put too fine a point on it, how would you like to carry that record into the South in 1980 running against a candidate who disagreed with all those positions—and perhaps had his own Southern credentials as well? (Several names come to mind.)

Well, some will say, what Carter may lose in the conservative South, he will more than make up in the liberal non-South.

But there is no liberal non-South. There is no clearer datum in modern American politics. Remember: It was Ford, not Carter, who carried the nation outside of the old confederacy, in both popular and electoral votes. And even if there were a liberal non-South, that's not how or why Carter won in 1976. Carter carried what he did outside of the South for the same reason he was able to carry the South: his opponents tried, but were not quite able to tag him as "Southern-Fried McGovern." Carter thus regained many Democratic "switchers," those voters who went to Nixon in 1972 because they found the perceived hyper-liberalism of the McGovernites unpalatable, indeed repugnant. Who were those switchers? Union men and women, Catholics, ethnics, Jews, "inner city peripherals," suburbanites and on and on. Many, many voters of all stripes; voters able in many instances to identify with a traditional muscular, bread-and-butter, pocketbook liberalism—but wholly against anything perceived as "far-out."

Looking ahead to 1980, then, it can be postulated that much of what has been advanced here about Southern votes may be wholly applicable to the non-South, albeit in lower intensity and without the special minus (from Carter's point of view) of possibly no longer having his "Southerness" as quite so potent an issue.

Public opinion polls are clear: quotas, Panama, environmentalism, Russians-in-the-Middle-East are not the issues that endear the non-Southern non-liberals to the Democratic Party or its candidate, even if he is President.

III

As this is written President Carter has served just a year of his first term. The issues of today will not necessarily be the issues of 1980. He has plenty of time to shift course gently, almost imperceptibly, if he feels politically threatened in the South or anywhere else for that matter.

Indeed, that may prove to be exactly what Carter tries to do—all quite properly within the general presidential rubric of "doing what's best for the country." (After all, one of his jobs is to represent the voters, isn't it?) But there is still this question: Will he be able to make such a shift even if he wants to?

To think about that question, one must look at the nature of the presidential appointments—to those men and women who generate presidential policies and who inevitably shape the presidential image.

Drawing by D. Fradon;
© 1977 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

At the cabinet level one gets a sense of a political outlook that is, at once, technocratic and slightly left-of-center—which is about proper for a Democratic administration.

But quite a different picture emerges when one examines the sub-cabinet and sub sub-cabinet appointments. Perhaps unwittingly, perhaps wittingly, it is not moderate technocrats who most prominently populate these slots. Ideologues live there—ideologues from every one of the activist movements of the last decade. Environmentalists, consumerists, civil rights and women's activists, veterans of the peace movement have moved en masse from their ginger groups to large federal offices controlling massive budgets and armies of bureaucrats. A recent *Fortune* article names *sixty* high-level appointments made from activist groups; beneath them are a small army of their cohorts. And Senator McGovern, after a list of the Carter State Department appointees was completed late in 1976 remarked that those were the same people *he* would have picked. Senator Jackson did not make a similar statement. Columnist John Roche recently quoted a high-level State Department official saying, "I voted for Carter to get rid of Kissinger, and I got McGovern."

(This story is told: A young woman executive, formerly with the Sierra Club, now with the Department of the Interior at a salary about five times higher than the $10,000 per year she previously made, has suggested that all former Movement-niks tithe 10 percent of their salaries to their previous organizations! Imagine the public reaction if in an earlier administration a businessman recruited to government service suggested tithing back to Exxon!)

It is not the purpose of this short article either to praise or condemn the attitudes and views of those remnants of the Movement who now hold high federal office. Nor is the purpose here to suggest that all the ex-activists-now-in-government are reacting the same way to their present high eminence. Some are of the opinion that they work for the elected executive and should represent his views, some feel that ideology reigns and that it is their job to seek an outlet for their ideology.

Still, agree with them or disagree with them, a great many of these once-young ex-activists can be said to represent a general point of view. We can say several things about that point of view. It tends to be activist about the proper role of the federal government. It is often anti-establishment: anti-business, anti-defense, anti-labor to name a few. In the age-old argument, it tends to stress equality somewhat more than liberty. It tends to be somewhat ashamed of America's role in shaping the modern world. It has a know-it-all elitist quality, probably reinforced by President Carter's insistence that all he did was hire the best people with the most merit—apparently without considering just

what substantive policies these apparatchiks would be meritorious at initiating. It is a point of view not only well to the left on the American political spectrum but well to the left in the Democratic Party. It takes positions that, as perceived, tend to be "out of sync" with mainstream American attitudes—which remain opposed to quotas, a lower defense posture, ecology-overgrowth, and so on.

The President apparently feels that his activists, to use the old Washington phrase, are "on tap not on top." The theory is that the moderates can balance the activists, and one may speculate that is the reason President Carter appointed at the top rung men of moderate reputations—the Schlesingers, Strausses, Lances, Vances, and Schultzes. Ideally, these senior moderates could channel the energies and ideas of the activists into courses sympathetic to the President's own views and synergistic to his political interests.

Well, maybe. We shall see. But many veteran bureaucracy-watchers are dubious. This dubiety stems from several sources. First, in Washington, if you ever have a choice of choosing the cabinet or the sub-cabinet, pick the latter. The men and women whose names are pre-fixed with "Sec." spend a great deal of time testifying, traveling and giving speeches. Their underlings tend to make policy. Bureaucrats sense that more ideas bubble up than trickle down. Second, winning half the battles isn't nearly enough. As the bubbling-up process ensues, some—most—ideas and rhetoric (and a candidate can get hung on a phrase as well as a program) that are not in keeping with the President's views are surely screened out. No matter. Some are not. If and as they become policy or doctrine, the President must live with them and defend them—all over the country. The hardliners may win on an I.L.O. decision. Fine. But down in the ranks someone wrote a sentence for the President's Notre Dame speech about the "inordinate fear of Communism," and that may be a subject of attack even if the attackers approve of the I.L.O. position.

As this is written, President Carter is on the griddle for a number of policies that seem clearly to derive from the New Politics bias of his government-by-sub-cabinet apparatchik.

—True to that bias, his energy program was heralded as an ecology program. "The age of abundance is over," crowed the environmentalists after its promulgation last spring. True to that bias, a score and more dams were axed. In each instance, the Congress thought otherwise.

—True to that bias, ideological environmentalists within the government have recently sought to apply American ecological standards to export goods, irrespective, apparently, of the wishes of the buying countries and with scant regard for the economic chaos that might be generated in America.

—True to that bias, the government's *amicus* brief on Bakke was open to interpretation as pro-quota or at least not anti-quota: "Minority-sensitive" is the new obfuscatory phrase. The President will be politically lucky if the Nixon-dominated Court goes against his brief, bails him out, thereby mooting the issue. If it does not oblige, the President can look forward to a campaign where he is described as Jimmy Quoter.

—True to that bias, Carter seemingly dealt the Soviets a plum in the Middle East, managing in a stroke to politically unite those sympathetic to Israel with those unsympathetic to the Soviets. It was only Anwar Sadat's bold effort that was able to rectify that error.

—True to that bias, early indications show a SALT treaty destined to cause an historic Senate confrontation.

Are these chance occurrences? Will the pattern of a leftward tilt continue? Does it represent the views of "the real Carter"? Is the GOP wise enough, and unified enough, to capitalize on it? If this pattern is perceived in the Washington political community but not around the country, will a ripple effect spread the perception? Credibly? Can Carter control his apparatchiks if he wants to? Has he already begun to try? Do his State of the Union and budget messages already presage that attempt? Will his I'll-never-tell-a-lie personality, which a majority of Americans still trust according to the polls, be enough to override these problems?

In all truth, no one knows. It is a situation without precedent. The last time the Democrats took the White House from the Republicans a very different cast of characters took over. JFK's New Frontiersmen were described as "pragmatic" and "tough." They were men very much from the center of the political spectrum.

Today it is different. The Democratic Party now has a large and militant flapping left wing, nurtured by activists who are veterans of a decade-and-a-half of civil rights, anti-war, environmental, consumerist, and feminist causes. In a party that is slightly to the left of the people on most issues, the activists are to the left of the party and the apparatchiks are often to the left of the activists. They are part of the Carter coalition, they have moved into government and no one knows what their long-range effect will be. It is fair to ask, however, "upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed?"

The circumstance being a new one, it is fair to speculate about it. How much political indigestion have the activists caused Carter so far? Considerable, the authors feel. What will happen in the future? Our speculations vary only in degree, not in kind. Mr. Scammon thinks Mr. Carter will not lose control of his government, and a majority of the apparatchiks in question will be co-opted. Mr. Wattenberg acknowledges that possibility, sees some evidence of it, hopes to see more, but remains somewhat more concerned: for him there is a recurring image of the President as the Sorcerer's Apprentice, trying desperately and honorably to gain control of what proves to be uncontrollable. ☑

A New Economic Era

George Katona & Burkhard Strumpel

By 1970 or thereabouts the Western industrial nations entered a new economic era—one that is closely hinged to changing consumer attitudes.

The quarter century after World War II was a period of rapid growth, unprecedented in economic history. People's expectations, aspirations, and desires for more consumer goods, better jobs, and greater income security were largely fulfilled.

In the course of the 1970s, however, the economy became a cause for concern rather than a source of satisfaction. More rapid inflation, greater unemployment, slower growth—all of these became the trademarks of the new era.

Is it justified to attribute lasting significance to these changes? Or are we dealing here with nothing more than cyclical fluctuations and the one-time impact of the oil crisis, so that we should expect the problems of 1973-1977 to disappear in a few years?

Logically, there are three possible courses for the economy to take in coming years. The first would be further growth and the spread of affluence, that is, the restoration of earlier trends rather than the continuation of a new era. A second possibility would be the decline of affluence. A third and frequently mentioned possibility would be stagnation.

But based on our studies at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, we do not think that any of the three possibilities describes what the next decade will bring. Instead, we expect a series of rapid fluctuations, periods of recovery alternating with recessions in fairly quick succession. Ups and downs in the economy brought about by optimism or even elation that is shortly replaced by pessimism or even dejection appear more probable than either stagnation, overall decline, or further growth.

Why? Because the 1970s have brought substantial changes in public attitudes, beliefs, and values from earlier postwar years—and those changes have a vital impact upon the performance of the American economy. Attitude changes in recent years have been reflected in many different ways:

—Not only has inflation become rapid in the 1970s, but confidence and trust in the ability of government, big business, and experts in general to slow down inflation have been severely weakened.

—Not only has unemployment grown greatly, but the employment situation has worsened because of changes in the work ethic, as confidence in the success of hard work has declined and as a great many people have been unable to make their jobs fit their felt needs.

—Not only have the seventies also brought adverse changes in the availability and price of energy and industrial raw materials, but concern has grown about the impact of industrialization upon the quality of life and the environment.

—Earlier we tried to avoid inflation; today we ask only whether inflation will be rapid or slow.

—Earlier we hoped for full employment; today we ask only whether unemployment will be large or small.

—Earlier we took growth and progress for granted; today we struggle to keep our standard of living.

A Confused, Disoriented Public

The net result of all of these changes is that the certainty and assurance which prevailed in the early postwar years has given way in the 1970s to public disorientation and confusion.

Earlier economic developments, after all, were easily understood. During World War II, full employment was understood to result from the production of war materials. In the 1950s and 1960s, the production of the many goods and services needed and wanted by consumers was thought to make the wheels turn and put money into people's pockets.

Things changed dramatically, however, in the 1970s. Surveys in the mid-seventies revealed that many people, even among those with extensive education and good positions in business, threw their hands up in frustration when asked about the origin of the most important developments of the day. This was true first of all of inflation. Why do prices go up? Why are they going up much more now than at earlier times? What should be done to slow price increases down? A common answer to all these questions was: "Nobody knows."

The second great problem was the instability of the economy. Domestic automobile production fell in the course of little more than a year from 10.5 million cars to less than 6 million. Very many people, not only the automobile workers in Detroit, were aware of the great

Note: This article is adapted from the authors' forthcoming book, *A New Economic Era*, to be published this spring by Elsevier Publishing Company in New York. In 1975, Elsevier published Dr. Katona's book, *Psychological Economics*. The survey data that are referred to here were compiled by the authors and their colleagues at the Survey Research Center, a part of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.

decline in car production (without knowing the figures, of course) and were unable to explain how it came about. "People are not buying cars" or "Gas prices have gone up too much," survey respondents answered in 1974-1975, but they themselves appeared to feel that their explanation was incomplete or insufficient to account for the extent of layoffs and unemployment. Then after another year had passed and gas prices had risen still further, automobile production rose again to a rate of almost 10 million—and still failed to satisfy demand! Why economic conditions and prospects appeared hopeless one year, while a year or two later they seemed to be rosy, could not be understood, and the news media offered no answers.

In the 1970s, the public also received no help from scholars in trying to understand the most important economic developments.

Economists were most successful in the 1960s, when it was widely believed that the application of their teachings had served to make the business cycle obsolete. But in 1973 the leading economists failed to predict the great recession and in 1974, they gave contradictory answers regarding its origin and prospects. Thus consumers as well as businessmen remained at sea. The understanding and assurance that in earlier years had produced stable behavior were missing. Lack of understanding of what is going on makes people feel uncertain and helpless and thus leads to volatile attitudes.

Impact of Consumer Attitudes upon the Economy

As a practical matter, what difference does this public confusion make for the U.S. economy? The answer is that it makes a great deal of difference.

Traditionally, economists have paid short shrift to changes in attitudes, expectations, beliefs, and values held by the public. Many econometricians, for instance, have developed models to express the interdependence of various sectors of the economy, but those models usually focus on items such as incomes, assets, debts, and prices, not on public attitudes. Other economists have developed and tested fiscal and monetary theories to apply to short-term economic forecasting. These various methods of analyzing the economy have frequently been successful in depicting how the economy has functioned in the past, but they have had far less success in predicting how it will perform in the future. Witness the inability to predict the recession of 1973-1975, a failure shared by those who relied on econometric models as well as by those who usually exhibited great insight. In the words of one of the latter, Arthur M. Okun, "most economic forecasters, including me, saw . . . a strong but well-balanced expansion in 1973, accompanied by an imperfect but hardly alarming record of price performance. Rarely has such a broad, bipartisan professional consensus been so wrong." [1]

[1] Arthur Okun, *What's Wrong with the U.S. Economy? Diagnosis and Prescription* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 22, 24-25.

We do not mean to dismiss such econometric forecasting. Our point is that economic forecasting, both for short-term and long-term purposes, can be greatly enhanced by also measuring and analyzing people's expectations, for those expectations play a terribly significant role in shaping their subsequent economic behavior. Several years ago, one of the authors (Katona) constructed an Index of Consumer Sentiment in order to measure the willingness of consumers to buy goods and services. The index is a summary measure derived from quarterly surveys of consumer attitudes and expectations about personal finances, business trends, and buying conditions. Over the past quarter of a century, it has been found that the index has a definite predictive value—that a willingness to buy does indeed influence discretionary expenditures by consumers, and in an economy where two out of every three dollars are spent by consumers, those expenditures can lead and influence the entire economy in recessions as well as in recovery.

Figure 1
INDEX OF CONSUMER SENTIMENT
(February 1966=100)



Note: Shaded portions indicate recessions.
Source: The Survey Research Center, University of Michigan

Figure 1 shows the movements of the Survey Research Center's Index of Consumer Sentiment from 1969 through 1977. As can be seen, the index during those years twice showed sharp declines in consumer confidence during periods of otherwise relatively stable economic activity—in 1969 and then again in late 1972 through late 1973—and on both occasions, the fall in consumer optimism was followed by a recession. (It is worth noting that after a brisk recovery in 1975 and 1976, consumer confidence began sliding again during the last two quarters of 1977, reaching its lowest level in nearly two years. The spreading pessimism, due in large measure to less favorable economic expectations as well as greatly lessened confidence in government economic policy, could have serious consequences unless reversed by the spring or summer of 1978.)

Prospects for a Volatile Economy

Looking toward the future, what must concern us is the degree to which confusion and disorientation among consumers may hamper our prospects for economic prosperity.

It is now clear from survey data that because of public disorientation, we have entered a period of great volatility in consumer sentiments—and hence, in consumer spending patterns. When the same question

about personal financial or general economic expectations is asked twice from the same sample, the second time several months after the first time, it has been generally assumed, and was confirmed in the 1950s and 1960s, that there would be a fairly high correlation between the two answers by the same people. In 1975-1977, however, there was practically no correlation: knowing the first answer of an individual gave no clue whatsoever to his or her answer in a subsequent interview. Within six months a substantial proportion shifted toward greater optimism, and another substantial proportion toward greater pessimism. Zigzag movements were also apparent in the overall Index of Consumer Sentiment, as shown in Figure 2. Between 1965 and 1971, the quarterly changes in the index rarely exceeded 2 or 3 percentage points, but in the following few years, much larger changes became the rule—averaging 6.05 percentage points in 1972-1976.

Figure 2
QUARTERLY FLUCTUATIONS OF THE INDEX OF CONSUMER SENTIMENT
(In percent)



Note: Changes in index points from quarter to quarter, 1965-1976.
Source: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan

While Figure 2 illustrates primarily the volatility of attitudes, Figure 3 presents a more direct measure of uncertainty. The Index of Uncertainty shown in Figure 3 was constructed to measure the dispersion of responses by different members of the same sample at the same time in response to three questions about their economic expectations. When optimism and confidence were pronounced, as for instance in the 1960s, most Americans agreed that prospects for the economy were good and the degree of uncertainty was small. Similarly, when most people were dejected, as in 1974 and early 1975, there was no pronounced uncertainty. But during most of the 1970s, when substantial proportions of the population were confused and disagreed about the future, there was a high degree of uncertainty, as shown by the chart. In earlier years, consumers tended to change attitudes in the same direction—either toward greater optimism or greater pessimism—but in the mid-seventies, as a majority of consumers moved in one direction, a large bloc, sometimes as big as one-fourth of the total sample, occasionally shifted in the opposite direction. Confusion among consumers apparently scaled new heights in the final quarter of 1977.

Figure 3
INDEX OF UNCERTAINTY



Source: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan

In recent years, we have already seen ample evidence of the way that fluctuations in consumer sentiment can be reflected in ups and downs of consumer expenditures and sharp fluctuations in the rate of personal saving. Consider only the great variations in 1975-1977 in the gains of the most comprehensive economic statistic, the gross national product. The rate of increase of the GNP against the previous year was 11.4 percent in the third quarter of 1975, 3.3 percent in the fourth, but 8.8 percent in the first quarter of 1976. There followed a decline in growth rates to 1.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 1976 and a subsequent rise to 7.5 percent in the first quarter of 1977. Clearly, volatile economic attitudes and volatile economic behavior have become major characteristics of the current economic recovery.

In the absence of a new strategy capable of dealing with the specific problems of today, rapidly changing consumer attitudes are likely to persist in the future and bring in their wake sizable fluctuations in the economy. In inflationary times, people become especially easy prey to a great variety of news reports. At certain times information on increased inflationary pressure will spread because of what transpires from the oil cartel or domestic energy policies or because of occasional shortages of food products or industrial raw materials. At other times anti-inflationary policies may appear to have made progress both at home and in Western Europe. Similarly, attempts to reduce unemployment may hardly be expected to progress smoothly. Finally, it should be mentioned that the huge amounts of available petrodollars and Eurodollars may tend to bring about frequent and rapid movements of funds, which may occasionally disrupt the functioning of the international banking system. Thus the volatility of consumer attitudes and behavior may easily be reinforced by an increased volatility in the financial markets.

Rapidly fluctuating economic conditions hardly represent the congenial economic environment of the earlier postwar years. Whether the current disorientation and uncertainty of consumers can be ended and stability restored must therefore be a prime concern of economic policy makers in the years ahead. ☑

Cautious Internationalism: A Changing Mood Toward U.S. Foreign Policy

Daniel Yankelovich

Over the past decade, public attitudes toward foreign affairs have swung back and forth like a pendulum, and with each oscillation, there have been important implications for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, domestic issues faded into the background. The burning domestic question of the mid-1960s, civil rights, had lost some of its fiery glow, and despite creeping inflation, the economy appeared to be strong and stable. In their place, the Vietnam War pushed foreign policy to the forefront of public concern, and as U.S. leaders sought a path out of the quagmire, more and more Americans became disillusioned with the interventionist philosophy that got us into it.

Then as the country was engulfed in quick succession by the 1973 oil embargo, inflation, recession, and the furor over Watergate, people shifted their attention back home. The inflation and recession were severe enough that many became obsessively preoccupied with economic affairs. Moreover, people thought they could worry less about external threats to the United States, for the policy of détente with the Soviet Union appeared to be working reasonably well and there were high hopes that the sphere of cooperation might be enlarged. The Vietnam experience had also made foreign military involvement so distasteful that a majority of people tried to forget about foreign policy questions while anxiously concentrating on the task of strengthening the economy. It was not, strictly speaking, a time of U.S. withdrawal from foreign affairs, but there was clearly a withdrawal of public attention.

In more recent years, however, the pendulum has started to swing back from the semi-isolationism of the early 1970s toward a new form of internationalism. The change can perhaps be dated from 1975, and it can be explained by several developments. One of the most important has been the gradual improvement in economic conditions, beginning in the spring of that year. Even though inflation and unemployment remain high, people have lost their fear that we are heading into another Great Depression. Also, as a disagreeable surprise, détente with the Soviet Union has grown more troubled—in the SALT talks, in confrontation over human rights, and in other areas as well. A deeply ingrained suspicion of the Soviets, never far from public consciousness, has begun to reappear. Finally, as the trauma of Vietnam has begun to recede, Americans have gradually become more receptive to U.S. involvement abroad.

What we find today is a reawakened sense on the part of the American people that, like it or not, the country must play an active leadership role on the international stage. People also look more positively toward our foreign policy, for President Carter's strong stand on human rights has succeeded in making Americans feel that our leadership can be constructive, not just a cross to be borne. Yet the leadership role that the public seeks today bears little resemblance to the crusading spirit of the 1950s and early 1960s: seared by Vietnam, the country has no desire to remake the world in our image nor to act as the world's leading gendarme. Indeed, there is powerful resistance to sending U.S. troops into action anywhere in the world unless our own vital interests are threatened. There is also considerable evidence today that people think the government should assert U.S. national interests more forcefully—the emotionalism surrounding the Panama Canal is a prime example—but the rising strain of nationalism stops well short of wanting to express those interests with American soldiers. *The current mood can thus be described as one of cautious internationalism—the spirit of idealism has been rekindled; some of the old jingoism has been revived; but as Americans move out of the Vietnam period into a new era of foreign policy, their mood is tempered above all by sobering caution.*

The Lessons of Vietnam

Current public attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy cannot be understood without reference to our Vietnam experience. The chief impact of the war has been to make Americans more selective and wary of military entanglements where U.S. security interests are not believed to be critically involved. The public has abstracted several conclusions and "lessons" from Viet-

nam. Namely, Americans feel that the U.S. role in Vietnam was a dark moment in American history (72 percent), and that we should not commit American troops to civil wars in other countries (64 percent). Less than a third (28 percent) of the country feels that "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations" is a very important foreign policy goal for the United States. In addition, there is considerable opposition to arms sales abroad: over half (52 percent) of the country considers it "extremely important" to reduce U.S. arms sales to other nations and over three-quarters (78 percent) say the same thing about stopping the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

These figures do not mean that the public is unalterably opposed to the United States giving or selling military aid to other countries, but when that occurs, the public wants to be certain that it will not lead to "another Vietnam." For example, in early 1976, the public perceived the civil war in Angola as fitting the Vietnam pattern all too closely and rejected the proposal to send U.S. military supplies to the pro-Western faction by a large three to one margin (59 percent to 21 percent). And, while the public feels that the communists do constitute a serious threat to Africa (75 percent) and that more African countries going communist would be a serious loss to the United States (72 percent), by a two to one margin (50 percent to 27 percent) the public opposes the United States giving military security guarantees to African countries threatened by a communist takeover. In like measure, a hefty percentage (59 percent) believes we should either maintain at present levels or increase our military aid to Israel, but by a two to one margin (49 percent to 22 percent), the public opposes the signing of a formal treaty with Israel promising to come to her aid with arms and troops if she is attacked. Even in the case of our NATO allies, the general public still favors U.S. military involvement if Western Europe is invaded but the margin of support (49 percent to 31 percent) must not give much comfort to other Western leaders.

In other words, while Americans feel apprehensive about U.S. military support of other nations, they are not turning their backs on traditional friends. They recognize and accept the necessity for military support in some instances, possibly because U.S. security seems clearly at stake, but they firmly reject it in those cases that might lead us into another Vietnam.

Détente and Defense

Public caution toward the world also springs, no doubt, from a sense of disappointment about détente and Soviet intentions. Several years ago, people assumed that détente was working well. Today, however, Americans are much more suspicious of the Soviets and, while the public is anxious to reach new arms agreements with Soviet leaders, there is also growing support for U.S. defense spending.

Though it is still far below the level of apprehension of the cold war years, concern with international communism in general, and with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in particular, has definitely intensified over the past two years. Fear of the threat of communism was 86 percent in 1964, according to the rating scheme of the Potomac Associates. It fell to a 69 percent rating a decade later in 1974 but in 1976 rose to 74 percent. In the spring of 1977, six out

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A Note from the Editors . . .

In preparing the maiden issue of *Public Opinion*, we were particularly anxious to have Daniel Yankelovich write this article because it would not only summarize attitudes in an area that we wish to explore from time to time but might also shed revealing light upon current policy making in the United States government.

Mr. Yankelovich is president of Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc., a public attitude research firm in New York City. In the fall of 1975, he and Cyrus Vance, then a New York lawyer, co-founded a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization called the Public Agenda Foundation. Their purpose, says Mr. Yankelovich, was "to involve the public more directly in the complex policy choices facing the nation."

The foundation's initial project was launched during the early days of the 1976 presidential campaign when three issues were identified for research: inflation and unemployment, moral leadership in government, and principles for defining the national interest in foreign policy. In each area, the foundation first interviewed in depth a cross-section of experts to discuss policy options available to the government. Those options were then tested in the marketplace of public opinion by asking voters how they reacted. With those findings in hand, the foundation brought together still more distinguished citizens to evaluate the results and help to prepare final reports.

The reports were published during the fall of 1976 with the hope that they might serve as a basis for public discussions during the presidential campaign. Copies of the reports, for example, were circulated to candidates Carter and Ford as well as the panelists prior to each of the campaign debates. According to Mr. Yankelovich, the results of its efforts were sufficiently encouraging that the foundation is now engaged in several additional inquiries, including a study of attitudes toward jobs and work.

Interestingly enough, not one but three of the people who participated most actively in the work of the foundation in 1976 and thus became thoroughly immersed in public attitudes toward foreign policy went on to high-ranking diplomatic posts the following year—Mr. Vance as secretary of state; Sol M. Linowitz as one of the negotiators for the Panama Canal treaties; and Kingman Brewster as ambassador to the Court of St. James. The extent to which their decisions in office have been influenced by their foundation work is a matter of speculation, but it is clear that the leadership of the Carter administration—from the President down through the ranks—came into office with more public polling data available than any previous administration.

Results of its surveys were published by the foundation in 1976 in three reports, including one entitled *U.S. Foreign Policy: Principles for Defining the National Interest*. Mr. Yankelovich drew upon those surveys and upon more recent opinion research in writing this article. Deborah Durfee Barron, a research associate at his firm, assisted him in both the analysis and in the preparation of the article.

of ten Americans (59 percent) still considered "containing communism" to be a very important U.S. foreign policy goal. Also, by a wide margin, the public saw the Soviet Union as the principal beneficiary of détente: 46 percent of the public believed that the Soviets benefit most from détente, as compared to a mere 5 percent that felt the U.S. is the chief beneficiary. And, by a two to one margin (55 percent to 26 percent), people said they would support a tough stance on human rights vis-à-vis the Soviets—even if it slows down détente and the chances of an arms agreement. In addition, nearly six Americans in ten (58 percent) see the emergence of Communist China as a major world power as a development unfavorable to U.S. interests.

Even though they are apprehensive—or, perhaps, because they are apprehensive—a vast majority of Americans want our government to press forward for new agreements with the two communist superpowers. Specifically, more than three-quarters of those interviewed (77 percent) reported in the summer of 1977 that they favored the U.S. and U.S.S.R. coming to an agreement in the SALT negotiations, and even though support had dropped 13 points over three years' time, a relatively large majority (60 percent) felt the United States "should work more closely with the Russians to keep smaller countries from going to war." Overall, when Americans were asked in the spring of 1977 whether they favored or opposed "détente—that is, the United States and Russia seeking out areas of agreement and cooperation"—a resounding 75 percent said they were in favor and 10 percent were opposed. With regard to China, support for official recognition of the communist regime on the mainland has climbed from 55-20 percent in favor in 1971 to 62-17 percent in favor in 1977. At the same time, the public does not want to abandon Taiwan: by a 62-11 percent majority, Americans want to continue diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Chinese and by a 57-12 percent margin, they want to preserve the defense treaty with that regime. In a similar vein, two major studies have shown that well over half the country (59-25 percent in a 1967 study by Potomac Associates; 53-32 percent in a 1977 survey by Gallup) favor the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Cuba.

The receptivity to closer relationships with the Soviet Union and Communist China does not mean, however, that people are willing to "let our defenses down." On the contrary, a growing wariness that the Soviets are seeking to exploit détente against our interests has led to an awakened concern with our defense posture. Specifically, public support for keeping our military and defense forces strong has increased over the past several years from a 74 percent rating in 1974 to 81 percent in 1976, reversing an earlier downward trend. Indeed, George Gallup reported in the summer of 1977 that he found support for defense spending to be at an eight-year high. (See Figure 1.) While *six* out of ten Americans (62 percent) feel that there is a lot of

Figure 1
SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE SPENDING AT 8-YEAR HIGH



Question: There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount? *Note:* the replies "too little" and "about right" are combined in the graph.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of July 8-11, 1977.

waste in U.S. defense spending, an equal number favors maintaining or increasing our defense budget—as opposed to only *four* out of ten in 1971. And a virtual consensus exists (90 percent) that it is necessary for the United States to be either stronger than (48 percent) or as strong as (42 percent) the Soviet Union.

Allies and Economic Aid

One factor that has contributed to the swing back to a more internationalist outlook is the growing acceptance by most Americans of global interdependence, particularly between the United States and its close allies. By a 51-39 percent margin, the public in 1977 rejected the idea that "we should build up our own defenses and let the rest of the world take care of itself"; only three years earlier, in responding to a similar question, a 52-44 percent majority came out the other way, accepting the idea of a "fortress America." A 71 percent majority now believes that we need our friends and allies for our military security, and 82 percent of the public considers "defending our allies' security" to be an important U.S. foreign policy goal, though, as we have seen, support drops off when it comes to actually committing U.S. troops. Similarly, a 70 percent majority believes that our national interest requires us to have friends and allies and relationships with others as trading partners. Four out of five Americans (82 percent) also agree that "problems like food, energy and inflation are so big that no country can solve them alone; international cooperation is the only way we can make progress in solving them," and 72 percent of the public agrees that "in deciding on its foreign policies, the United States should take into account the views of its allies."

The concept of an interdependent world does not apply just to our friends and allies: by 60-28 percent the public favors U.S. trade with communist countries; by 64-19 percent they are willing to see us back socialist governments that respect the rights of their citizens; by 45-29 percent they are willing to see us recognize democratic left-wing governments when they come to power; and by a 62-14 percent margin they oppose U.S. back-

ing of authoritarian governments that have overthrown democratic ones. In short, Americans recognize the world as complex, and they are prepared to deal with it as such—trading with communist nations, backing socialist governments, and the like, but all the while, maintaining our own military security and watching out for our traditional friends.

U.S. vulnerability to foreign oil producers has, of course, greatly dramatized the world's interdependence. Eight out of ten Americans (84 percent) now feel that "too much dependence on foreign oil" is an important reason for the current energy problem, and seven out of ten feel that, "if we yield to the Arabs' restrictions over oil now, we will soon find the Arabs dictating much of U.S. foreign policy, and that is wrong." But, despite this aversion, only 49 percent of the public believes that in five to ten years, we will be less dependent—as opposed to 40 percent who believe that we will not be less dependent.

The one area of U.S. involvement in the world that has suffered the greatest loss of support in recent years has been foreign aid. Only four out of ten Americans (39 percent) consider "helping to improve the standard of living in less-developed countries" to be a very important U.S. foreign policy goal. While a majority believes that economic aid helps the economies of other countries (77 percent), helps the people in these countries to live better (70 percent), helps their national security (65 percent), improves our relationship with them (50 percent), and strengthens our political friendships abroad (50 percent), the public simultaneously is afraid that economic aid makes other countries too dependent on the United States (74 percent), gets us too involved in other people's affairs (73 percent), generally aggravates our relations with other countries (52 percent), and hurts our economy at home (63 percent).

On balance, the public favors the *principle* of foreign aid by a sizable 52-18 percent margin, but, at the same time, 61 percent would like to see us spend less on foreign aid, and 55 percent say that a cut of fully one-third in such spending would be "hardly a loss." In fact, Lou Harris finds less public support for foreign aid than any other form of federal spending. One of the chief arguments against foreign aid is the widespread belief that the people for whom aid is intended never receive it. If the public were convinced that our economic aid actually ended up helping the people of those countries, it would favor economic aid to others by a clear-cut 79-13 percent margin.

Public Confidence in the Conduct of Foreign Policy

In 1976, increasing numbers of Americans expressed a desire for a more active role in shaping our foreign policy, reflecting some disaffection and disappointment both with the current international situation and with the government's performance in foreign policy. Confidence in the ability of the federal government to handle international problems had declined sharply from a 67 percent rating in 1974 to a 53 percent rating in 1976, and ratings on the prospect for world peace dropped from 67 percent in 1974 to 58 percent in 1976. A six-out-of-ten majority (62 percent) believed that the United States was losing world power and was disturbed by it.

The public's desire for a greater voice in the conduct of foreign affairs, particularly through its representatives in Congress, registered in a number of national surveys and was also striking in some of the statewide surveys. Nationwide, only 19 percent of the public believed that public opinion was playing a very important role in our foreign policy, and 59 percent wanted it to play a more important role. Fully 48 percent of the public wanted Congress to increase the importance of its role in foreign policy. The California poll showed that Californians wanted Congress (54 percent) to have the strongest voice in foreign policy rather than the President (28 percent). Iowans showed an identical pattern: 60 percent believed that Congress should have the stronger voice in foreign policy, as compared to 29 percent for the President.

It is worthwhile to note that the public mood seems to have taken several twists and turns since the 1976 presidential election. Whereas 68 percent of the public expressed confidence in President Ford's handling of foreign affairs a year ago, that percentage rose to 78 percent for President Carter in May of 1977. As of November 1977, however, Carter's handling of foreign policy had dropped nine points to 69 percent.

U.S. Role in the World

To sum up, let us look at how the public answers the following question: How active a role should the United States play in the world and what commitments should it be prepared to make in the exercise of leadership? The public's answer to this crucial question today is neither the same as it was in the late 1950s and early 1960s when a strong tide of interventionism prevailed, nor as it was in the past few years when people were so preoccupied with the economy and internal domestic problems that they did not want to give attention to foreign policy issues. To illustrate: drawing upon a series of questions concerning the general posture the United States should assume in world affairs, the Potomac Associates determined that as of 1964, internationalists outnumbered isolationists in the United States by more than eight to one: 65-8 percent. By 1974, that ratio had dramatically shrunk, so that only 42 percent might be considered internationalists, 23 percent isolationists. And then, the pendulum seemed to begin swinging the other way. In 1975, Potomac Associates said the ratio stood at 45-20 percent; in 1976, 44-23 percent (they did not measure beyond that time). In the spring of 1977, a *Foreign Policy Study* by Yankelovich, Skelly and White found that two-thirds of the country (62 percent) thought it best for the future of the United States to take an active part in world affairs. Later that

year, the Harris survey found that an even greater number felt the United States has a positive *responsibility* to take an active world role. Thus, there is now considerable public support for a more assertive role for the United States.

As we have seen, however, the new internationalism in the United States must be seen within a particular context. Americans want their government to live up to its military commitments, but not to the point of leading us into armed conflict unless our national interest is clearly involved. At the same time, there is also a feeling among the public that, as the world's leading democracy, the United States has to stand for something more idealistic than just protection of narrow national interests in its foreign policy. Consequently, President Carter's stand on human rights has received growing public support: 50 percent of the public thinks that "standing up for human rights in undemocratic countries" is a very important foreign policy goal, and by a 50-29 percent margin the public opposes aid for countries like South Korea, which, even though essential to our defense, are understood to suppress human rights. The country does not want to take up once again the role of the "world's policeman," as in the 1960s, nor is it attracted to the cold pragmatism of more recent years, but Americans today seem fully prepared to support a foreign policy that takes an active, idealistic but prudent role on the world stage.

On Reading the Polls

How should you interpret these survey statistics on public attitudes toward foreign policy? Several qualifications should be kept in mind. First, it can be misleading to accept at face value the public's answer to any one item or question. These are complex and intangible issues, and no single question can accurately reflect the public's true feelings. Inevitably, the public's responses are fraught with ambivalence, conflict, mixed emotions, and even contradictions. Consequently, the analyst should deal with these figures only in the aggregate as they form meaningful patterns.

A second qualification is even more important. Many different surveys show that in terms of the whole range of the public's concerns, foreign policy issues usually rate low. In 1977, only about 5 percent of the public cited foreign policy as a dominant concern, as compared to 70 percent who cited the economy as a dominant concern. In addition, only about one-third of the public expresses a strong interest in foreign affairs (39 percent in March 1977). Inevitably, this means that people have not thought deeply about their positions on many of these complex matters.

At the same time, most people are reluctant to give a "don't know" answer to questions and, consequently, end up giving responses that are likely to be "unstable" in the technical sense. Events or discussion today could easily influence people to react quite differently tomorrow. This instability does not occur on those domestic issues where the public has firm and settled views. Consequently, public attitudes on many foreign policy issues are likely to be susceptible to wide swings.

Conventional survey techniques are most accurate when reflecting the public's state of mind on well-thought-through issues. They are not as sensitive in judging how the public *might* react after it has had the opportunity to learn the facts, to listen to competing views, to think through the questions, and to see how well any particular policy accords with their deeper values, attitudes, and beliefs.

The Public Agenda Foundation (PAF), which played an important role in drawing together some of the survey research highlighted in this article, recognizes the limitations of survey techniques in the foreign policy field and has attempted to overcome them in several ways. In 1976 the PAF experimented with a process of collective interpretation. It invited a distinguished group of political scientists and survey researchers to analyze, from the perspective of their own survey data, both the present and likely future direction of public attitudes toward a series of foreign policy propositions derived from our interviews with foreign policy professionals. The panel collectively evaluated these propositions from the standpoint of whether public interest in them was currently high or low and whether they could win public support easily or only with considerable difficulty. (For the panel's evaluation see the Public Agenda's report, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Principles for Defining the National Interest.*) The experiment worked well and will be continued.

In its upcoming research projects, the Public Agenda plans to take still further steps beyond the collective interpretation approach and to stimulate cross sections of the public to think through complex foreign policy issues so that their responses to survey questions on these issues will be more stable and more reliable. **—Daniel Yankelovich**

Sources for this article were:

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The 1978 Congressional Elections: A Renaissance for Republicans?

Austin Ranney

With a new set of elections just over the horizon, we can expect a good deal of handwringing in coming months about the ever-shrinking status of the Republican Party and the approaching demise of our two-party system.

In past *presidential* elections, that pessimism has been badly misplaced. After all, the GOP has won four of the eight presidential sweepstakes since World War II, and their candidates have drawn a total of 270 million votes to 256 million for the Democrats. That's not bad for a "hopeless minority," and Republican presidential candidates will surely be highly competitive in 1980 and beyond.

When we look at congressional elections, however, the doomsayers may have a point. In the sixteen congressional elections since the war, Republican candidates for the House have won a total of 373 million votes to the Democrats' 421 million, and more importantly, the Republicans have won control of either chamber only twice (1946 and 1952).

In some ways, the 1976 results were the most disheartening yet for the GOP. Most Republican leaders thought the party had hit rock bottom in the "Watergate" election of 1974 when they lost a net of forty-eight House seats and five Senate seats. But there were good reasons to expect a strong comeback in 1976: most of the Democratic House gains came in districts they had not won for decades, if ever. Hence, Republican strategists were confident the party would win back most of these seats in 1976 and make a net gain of anywhere from fifteen to thirty seats. Just to make sure, the Republican congressional and national committees put more than $3.5 million into key House races. The results were a rude shock. The Republicans defeated only two of the Democrats' first-termers and lost a net of two House seats.

The Republicans, therefore, approach the 1978 congressional elections from one of their lowest postwar ebbs. The 146 House seats they now hold are the fewest since the 1964 Johnson landslide cut them back to 140. Their current total of thirty-eight Senate seats is one better than in 1974 but four to six lower than in the Nixon years. It would seem the GOP has nowhere to go but up; yet, if they could not make headway in 1976, what hope is there for 1978?

There is at least one, maybe more: in this year's elections, the Republicans can capitalize on one of the most persistent patterns in American politics—the tendency of the President's party to lose seats in both Houses of Congress in midterm (or "off-year") elections. *This tendency has operated in House elections in every midterm election since the Civil War, with the single exception of the 1934 elections.* It has been a shade less consistent in Senate elections, but even so, the presidential party has lost Senate seats in the great majority of midterm elections. The facts for the period from 1930 to 1974 are set forth in Table 1.

In the Senate, as shown by the table, the pattern of losses for the presidential party has been more irregular than in the House. Only one-third of the sen-

Table 1
LOSSES BY PRESIDENT'S PARTY
IN MIDTERM ELECTIONS, 1930-1974

Election Year	Party Holding Presidency	Pres. Party Gain/Loss in House Seats	Percent Change from Two Years Earlier	Pres. Party Gain/Loss in Senate Seats	Percent Change from Two Years Earlier
1930	R	−53	−20%	− 8	−14%
1934	D	(+ 9)	(+ 3)	(+ 9)	(+15)
1938	D	−70	−21	− 7	− 9
1942	D	−50	−19	− 8	−12
1946	D	−54	−22	−11	−20
1950	D	−29	−11	− 5	− 9
1954	R	−18	− 8	− 1	− 2
1958	R	−47	−23	−13	−28
1962	D	− 5	− 2	(+ 2)	(+ 3)
1966	D	−48	−16	− 4	− 6
1970	R	−12	− 6	(+ 1)	(+ 2)
1974	R	−48	−25	− 5	−12
AVERAGE		−35	−14	− 4	− 8

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976), Table 736, p. 461.

ators are up for reelection every two years, of course, which means that losses for the President's party may depend heavily on the number of the President's co-partisans who must face the voters. In 1978, that quirk will work against the Republicans. Although they hold only thirty-eight of the Senate's 100 seats, more than half of all the seats up for reelection this year—17 of 33—are now held by Republicans. Thus, even their minority status will not reduce their risks: they will have to expose nearly half of their incumbents to the possibility of defeat, while the Democrats must risk only a quarter of theirs.

Prospects for the Republicans may be brighter in the House. Since the Eisenhower years, it should be noted from Table 1, the number of House losses for the presidential party has been considerably smaller during the first term of an incumbent President than during the second term—a point cutting in favor of the Democrats this year—but nonetheless, looking all the way back to 1930, the average loss for the party in the White House has been a sizable thirty-five seats. Republicans believe that the anti-coattail trend may already be working in their direction: during 1977, there were four special elections to fill House seats vacated by Democrats in widely different parts of the country (Minnesota, Washington State, Georgia, and Louisiana), and the GOP won three of them. So the Republicans may be pardoned for hoping that in 1978, they will once again profit from the historical "law" that gives the party out of the White House a solid boost in midterm elections, especially in House seats.

But *is* it a law, and *will* it operate in 1978? Both questions are well worth considering, and not only for congressional politicians.



Editorial cartoon by John Fischetti.
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Why Does the President's Party Lose Midterm Elections?

Any search for the answer to this question might well begin by recognizing that not nearly as many people vote in congressional elections as in presidential elections. In the presidential years from 1932 to 1976, the average turnout in presidential elections was 57.6 percent of the voting-age population. In elections for the House in presidential years, turnout averaged 53.7 percent. But in off-years, turnout for House elections was only 37.6 percent. If this pattern holds—and there is no reason to suppose it will not—then we can expect a turnout in 1978 of no more than 35 to 40 percent of the voting-age population.

This small congressional electorate, moreover, differs significantly from the much larger presidential electorate. It is older, better educated, of higher socioeconomic status, more partisan and more concerned with issues. (Several of these factors favor Republican candidates, of course.)

Some political scientists believe those differences mean that presidential electorates are more likely to be swayed from their basic party preferences by such fleeting influences as a glamorous candidate or a red hot issue, while congressional electorates are more likely to stick with their parties' tickets whatever the state of the issues or personalities.[1]

But most political scientists, like most politicians, don't believe this. After all, the Democrats have had far more party identifiers than the Republicans ever since the early 1930s; yet, with the sole exception of 1934, the Democrats, like the Republicans, have lost ground in midterm elections when they held the White House and gained ground when they did not. In fact, despite their majority status, the Democrats' midterm losses in the House as the presidential party have been *greater* than the Republicans', averaging thirty-eight seats lost per election to the Republicans' thirty-one.

How can this be? Most observers believe that two basic forces are at work. One has been the tendency of past midterm elections to become essentially referenda

1 Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Fall 1960), 397-418; and Barbara Hinckley, "Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's 'Expected' Loss of Seats," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September 1967), 694-700.

on the incumbent President's popularity, whatever his party. If he retains most of the popularity which elected or reelected him two years earlier, his party will lose few if any seats in either house. If his popularity has dropped markedly, his party may suffer devastating setbacks. That is why congressional candidates eagerly seek close association with popular Presidents, as in 1934, 1954, and 1962, and put all the distance they can between themselves and an unpopular administration as in 1946, 1966, and 1974.

The second force is what political scientist Samuel Kernell calls "negative voting." This is the tendency of most voters to be more activated by candidates and policies they are against than by those they support. It means that even if most voters approve the President's general performance in office, those who disapprove are more likely to vote in midterm elections than those who approve. And the low turnout in midterm elections suggests that congressional off-year electorates have higher proportions of highly motivated "negative voters" than presidential electorates.[2]

Political scientist Edward Tufte has tried to reduce these tendencies to a mathematical formula. His study of midterm elections concludes that for every 10 percent loss in the President's approval rating between the presidential election and the ensuing midterm election (as measured by the Gallup poll), the presidential party will lose 1.3 percent of its share of the votes for the House in the midterm. And that, in turn, means that the party will lose about 2.6 percent of its share of the seats. (He also calculates that for every loss of $100 in the real disposable income per capita, there will be a reduction of 3.5 percentage points in the popular vote and a 6 point loss in the share of seats.)[3]

If Tufte's scheme worked perfectly, there might be no reason to hold elections, but it doesn't. It is highly instructive, however. The way it might be applied to 1978 is suggested by Table 2, which shows the changing approval ratings of the postwar first-term Presidents prior to their first midterm elections (I exclude Ford because he had not been elected in his own right prior to the 1974 election) and their parties' election losses.

Table 2 shows a distinct relationship (though no perfect correlation) between a first-term President's loss of popularity and his party's losses in the House in his first midterm election. Johnson lost the most popularity and the most seats, Truman the second most popularity and seats, Eisenhower third, Nixon fourth, and Kennedy the least. *It also shows that Jimmy Carter lost more popularity in his first nine months in office than any of his five predecessors.* From Carter's viewpoint, it is also ominous that the net approval of every President shown in Table 2 declined between October of his first year in office and October of his second year—and

Table 2

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND MIDTERM LOSSES IN THE HOUSE, 1950-1970

First-Term President	Net Approval Index[a] Jan.-Feb. 1st Year	Oct. of 1st Year	Loss	Oct. of 2nd Year	Loss	Pres. Party Mid-term Loss in House Seats	Percent Loss
Truman (1949)	52	20	32	11	41	29	11
Eisenhower (1953)	74	45	29	44	30	18	8
Kennedy (1961)	66	65	1	40	26	5	2
Johnson (1965)	56	45	11	10	46	48	16
Nixon (1969)	54	33	21	27	27	12	6
Carter (1977)	58	24	34	?	?	?	?

[a] The Gallup poll asks: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent President) is handling his job as President?" The index is computed by subtracting the percent disapproving from the percent approving. Thus, in January-February of this year, 66 percent approved of Carter's handling of the presidency, 8 percent disapproved—and his net approval index stood at 58.

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll).

the average decline was over 15 points! At the present writing, we cannot say how Carter will fare in the polls in 1978. *If,* however, he manages to stay even and *if* presidential popularity were all that mattered, we might predict that Democratic House losses in 1978 would be in the range of 25-35 seats. An improvement in his standing would improve Democratic prospects by 10 seats, while a Carter erosion on a scale similar to his predecessors could increase prospective Democratic losses to 45-60 seats. It must be emphasized that these predictions are based strictly on the "presidential popularity" theory that many political scientists have traditionally applied to congressional elections in the past.

Winds for Democratic Sails

In reality, however, several factors in addition to presidential popularity come into play in congressional elections. In fact, Republican candidates today—especially those challenging incumbent Democrats—are caught in a riptide of public attitudes, many of which tend to help Democrats return to Congress.

A quick reading of recent polls illustrates some of the problems for Republicans challenging Democratic incumbents. In the summer of 1977, George Gallup found that public affiliation with the Republican Party had sunk to the lowest point in forty years: only 20 percent of all respondents identified themselves as Republicans, 31 percent as independents, and 49 percent as Democrats. In October of 1977, Gallup found that if voters were casting their ballots then for congressional candidates, 23 percent would vote for Republicans, 51 percent for Democrats and 20 percent were undecided.

2 Samuel Kernell, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party," *American Political Science Review,* 71 (March 1977), 44-66.

3 Edward R. Tufte, "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review,* 69 (September 1975), 812-826.

In that same month, Gallup found that on the two key issues that matter most to voters, Democrats were judged better able to solve them than Republicans: on inflation by a 36 to 19 percent margin; and on unemployment by a 43 to 10 percent advantage. Thus, even though President Carter has fallen in the polls, there is little evidence so far showing that his decline has rubbed off on his fellow Democrats in Congress. Indeed, a survey conducted this January by *New York Times*/CBS News found that despite the erosion of public confidence in Carter's abilities, 67 percent said that their opinion of Carter would not have any effect upon their congressional votes this fall.

There is at least one other factor that is bound to influence the 1978 elections, and we should ponder it well, for it is one of the most striking developments in postwar politics. As *Congressional Quarterly* sums it up:

> The tendency since World War II has been for incumbents to seek reelection as long as they were physically able to serve, and for nearly all of them to win. In virtually every election in recent years, more than 90 percent of all incumbents sought reelection, and more than 95 percent of those who ran won.[4]

Political scientists call this "*the incumbency factor*," and in 1978—just as in the recent past—it should work as a powerful force for the Democrats.

The incumbency factor does not always extend to senators: in 1976, for example, only 64 percent of the incumbent senators running for reelection were successful. But it seems to have a magical effect for House members. As noted earlier, Republicans lost forty-three seats in 1974 as they struggled with the twin handicaps of Watergate and an economic slump. In 1976, they had solid hopes of recouping at least fifteen to thirty of those seats. Yet, when the votes were counted, the GOP wound up with a net *loss* of two seats and many of the Democrats who entered Congress two years earlier managed to strengthen their holds on their districts.

Several explanations have been offered for the increasing invulnerability of House incumbents: their enormous advantage in free mailings, free trips home and other forms of publicity; the fact that many of them now concentrate primarily on servicing their districts (a priority that the public at large may not appreciate but goes down well with the home folks); and the low public attention to House elections, which makes name familiarity so much more important than in higher-visibility Senate elections.

It may well be, then, that for the foreseeable future the party out of the White House will have a reasonable chance of increasing its share of Senate seats, but the only House seats it can seriously hope for are those in which incumbents have retired or have been defeated in primaries. To illustrate: over the years 1973-1977, when Republicans challenged nonincumbent Democrats for seats previously held by Democrats, one out of every ten Republicans won; but in running against sitting Democrats only one Republican candidate out of every forty managed to win!

Republicans may draw some encouragement this year from increasing retirement rates: retirement benefits for congressmen are getting better all the time, and retirement may appear more attractive to incumbents than in the past. Preliminary reports indicate that a record number of Democratic incumbents in the House may not seek reelection this year. (As of early January, 15 Democrats had announced retirement plans, another 12 were considered possible, and more announcements were expected.) Yet, it seems clear that in 1978 and beyond, the ability of the out-party to capitalize on the President's declining popularity in midterm elections will be limited—though not eliminated—by the increasing difficulty of defeating incumbent representatives.

It should be added that 1978 will be the first midterm election in twelve years when the same party has held both the White House and the Congress. In such circumstances, if the economy were to nosedive or some other event were to shatter public confidence, it might well be that voters would forget all about incumbency and rise up to "throw the rascals out"—"negative voting" in excelsis! In 1966, for example, LBJ dropped sharply in the polls and the Democrats lost forty-seven seats in the House as well as three in the Senate. For the moment, however, no such earthshaking event looms on the '78 horizon.

In summary, members of Congress today are not as closely tied to the coattails of a President as in days past. Thus, even if President Carter were to follow past tradition and slip still further in the polls during his second year in office, it is likely that Democrats in Congress would suffer no more than a moderate electoral set-back and our modified one-party system in congressional politics would continue much as it has since 1930. Stirring together the many contrary forces, here are Austin Ranney's "guesstimates" for 1978:

Table 3

ESTIMATED DEMOCRATIC 1978 HOUSE LOSSES WITH CHANGES IN PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY

If Carter's Net Approval Index[a] in October 1978 is:	The Democrats' Losses in House Seats Should Be:
49-40	0-5
39-30	5-15
29-20	15-25
19-10	25-35
9-1	over 35

Note: Shaded area denotes Carter's net approval index as of October 1977.

Source: A clouded crystal ball.

[a] The Gallup poll asks: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent President) is handling his job as President?" The index is computed by subtracting the percent disapproving from the percent approving. Thus, in January-February of this year, 66 percent approved of Carter's handling of the presidency, 8 percent disapproved—and his net approval index stood at 58.

4 *1974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1974), p. 840. See also David Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity*, 6 (Spring 1974), 295-317; and Warren Lee Kostroski, "Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December 1973), 1213-1234.

OPINION ROUNDUP

One of the first axioms drummed into the heads of law students is that there is only one way to learn the law: by reading the cases. And so it is in the public opinion field: the best—and perhaps the only way—to gain a firm grasp of public attitudes is to spend some time reading the polls.

Our purpose in this "Opinion Roundup" is to provide the general reader with a means of doing just that. In every issue, we will present a review of public opinion data that we believe to be objective, comprehensive *and interesting*. Sometimes, we will present a few words of commentary, but mostly we shall leave it up to you to draw your own conclusions.

The material in this section has been produced with the invaluable assistance of the Roper Center, the oldest and largest archive of sample survey data in the world and an affiliate of the University of Connecticut, Yale University and Williams College. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., who serves as a consultant in the preparation of this roundup, is the acting executive director of the center.

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC polls). The samples usually consist of approximately 1500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. These samples are, of course, only approximations of social reality, and so there is always a margin for error: *in the typical sample of 1500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that this error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned.* The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample. The reader may also note that in some cases, a "no opinion" column is shown here and in others, it is not. This reflects a tradition in the publication of polls: typically, when the "no opinion" or "uncertain" responses are relatively small—say, 10 percent—the organizations report only the answers of those who have a definite opinion on the theory that they represent a relatively accurate measure of public attitudes. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they *are* reported because they reveal the degree of uncertainty that people feel about the issue.

The Editors

I. DIRECTIONS

MOOD OF THE COUNTRY

Question: How do you feel that things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, pretty badly, or very badly? (Note: in the graph, "very well" and "fairly well" are collapsed into "well.")

	Very well and fairly well
Mar 1974	29%
Sept 1974	30
Jan 1975	23
May 1975	40
Jan 1976	46
April 1976	52
June 1976	50
Oct 1976	56
May 1977	65
July 1977	70
Nov 1977	64

Source: Surveys by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, begun in 1974.

Chart illustrations by H. Karlsson

PROSPECTS FOR THE U.S. & U.S.S.R.: WHAT AMERICANS FORESEE



Question: Which of these do you think is likely to be true of (next year) a year when (America; Russia) will increase her power in the world, or a year when (American; Russian) power will decline?

Start of	Power will increase America	Russia
1960	72%	53%
1965	64	38
1966	74	X
1967	66	49
1968	63	56
1969	62	58
1974	29	55
1976	42	63
1977	58	63
1978	42	53

Source: Surveys by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of November 18-21, 1977. Question not asked, 1970-1973.

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OR DIFFICULTY AHEAD?



Question: Which of these do you think is likely to be true of (next year): a year of economic prosperity or a year of economic difficulty?

Start of	Difficulty	Prosperity	Same/ Don't know
1965	22%	65%	13%
1966	33	56	11
1967	45	43	12
1968	47	42	11
1969	48	38	14
1971	73	19	8
1973	47	40	13
1974	85	7	8
1976	70	23	7
1977	54	34	12
1978	52	24	24

Source: Surveys by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of November 18-21, 1977.

AS ECONOMIC PESSIMISM DECLINES, HOUSING OUTLOOK RISES



Questions:

[1] Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or a bad time to buy a house?
[2] Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the next 12 months we'll have good times financially or bad times, or what?

	[1] Good time to buy a house	[2] Bad times ahead
Aug-Sept 1973	22%	48%
Oct-Nov 1973	21	48
Feb 1974	28	69
May 1974	27	52
Aug-Sept 1974	20	57
Oct 1974	15	68
Feb 1975	20	70
May 1975	34	44
Aug-Sept 1975	35	40
Oct-Nov 1975	33	41
Feb 1976	41	30
May 1976	39	26
Aug-Sept 1976	47	23
Nov-Dec 1976	44	29
Feb 1977	48	31
May 1977	62	31
Aug-Sept 1977	56	32
Nov-Dec 1977	55	39

Source: Surveys by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumer Attitudes, latest that of November-December, 1977.

GROWING SKEPTICISM ABOUT PUBLIC LEADERS . . .



	Leaders don't know what they're doing
1964	28%
1968	38
1970	45
1972	42
1974	47
1976	52

Source: Surveys by Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Studies, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976.

Question: Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?

. . . AND RISING DOUBTS ABOUT GOVERNMENT WASTE



	The govt. wastes a lot of tax money
1964	48%
1968	61
1970	70
1972	67
1974	76
1976	76

Source: Surveys by Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Studies 1964, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976.

Question: Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

TRENDS IN PARTY AFFILIATION



Question: In politics; as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?

Year	Democrat	Republican	Independent
1937	48%	34%	17%
1940	43	37	20
1944	43	38	19
1948	47	32	20
1952	50	29	21
1956	44	36	20
1960	48	31	21
1964	53	24	23
1968	41	29	29
1972	43	26	31
March-May 1973	43	26	31
May-August 1973	43	24	33
March-June 1974	44	23	33
July-October 1974	47	23	30
March-May 1975	44	22	34
Sept-November 1975	45	22	33
March-May 1976	46	22	32
August-October 1976	48	23	29
May-July 1977	49	20	31

Sources: AIPO (Gallup) Surveys of March 1937, November 1937, September 1940, September 1944, September-November 1948, October-November 1952, September-November 1956, September-November 1960, August-November 1964, September-November 1968, May-August 1972, March-May 1973, May-August 1973, March-June 1974, July-October 1974, March-May 1975, September-November 1975, March-May 1976, August-October 1976, May-July 1977.

VIEWS ON E.R.A.



	Favor	Oppose	Not Sure
1974[1]	74%	21%	5%
1975[2]	58	24	18
1976[2]	57	24	19
November 1977[3]	53	37	10
By sex, 1977			
Men	56	36	8
Women	50	38	12

[1] **Question:** (Respondents were handed a ballot covering the issue and were asked): Suppose that on election day, November 5, you could vote on key issues as well as candidates. Please tell me how you would vote on each of these fourteen propositions: I would favor a Constitutional Amendment which would give women equal rights and responsibilities.

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), October 1974.

[2] **Question:** (After respondents were asked if they had heard or read about the Equal Rights Amendment, they were then asked): Do you favor or oppose this amendment?

Source: Surveys by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), March 1975 and September 1975-March 1976.

[3] **Question:** The women's conference adopted resolutions on a number of subjects. One resolution called for the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution—the E.R.A. Do you favor or oppose passage of the Equal Rights Amendment?

Source: Survey by NBC News, November 29-30, 1977.

THE COURTS: ARE THEY HARSH ENOUGH?



Question: In general, do you think the courts in this [geographic] area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?

Source: National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972, 1975, 1977.

GROWING SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY



Question: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

Source: National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972, 1975, 1977.

Note: Californians have followed the national trend. In 1956, the Field Institute found that only 49% of the state favored the death penalty; by June 1977, in spite of Governor Jerry Brown's firm stance against the death penalty, this figure had climbed to 71%.

DRINKING AND MARIJUANA: HOW SERIOUS?



[1] **Question:** Do you think heavy drinking of alcoholic beverages is a very serious problem in this country today, a moderately serious problem, not too serious, or not really a problem at all?

[2] **Question:** How about the use of marijuana—would you say this is a very serious problem in this country today, a moderately serious problem, not too serious, or not really a problem at all?

	Very Serious	
	[1] Drinking	[2] Marijuana
1969	54%	75%
1973	68	68
1975	72	60
1977	76	56

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, 1969, 1973, 1975 and 1977.

DECRIMINALIZING MARIJUANA

Question: In Oregon and some other states, while it is still illegal to possess marijuana, the penalty for anyone having a small amount of marijuana is a small fine and no jail term. Would you favor or oppose adopting the Oregon marijuana law nationally?

	1974	1975	1977
Favor	36%	43%	46%
Oppose	49	45	44
Not Sure	15	12	10

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of May 31-June 5, 1977.

II. SNAPSHOTS

COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM TODAY

Problem	Percent
High cost of living—inflation	35
Unemployment	24
Energy problems	18
International problems, foreign policy	7
Crime and lawlessness	5
Moral decline/lack of religious commitment	4
Excessive government spending (for social programs)	3
Dissatisfaction with government	2
Drug abuse	2
Race relations	2
Poverty	2
All others	14
Can't say	3
Total	121%*

*Total adds to more than 100 percent because of multiple responses.

Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?

Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), October 21-24, 1977.

Government and the Economy

HOW WELL IS THE GOVERNMENT COMBATTING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS?

Question: As to the economic policy of the government—I mean steps taken to fight inflation or unemployment—would you say the government is doing a good job, only fair, or a poor job?

	A good job	A poor job
August-September 1973	10%	44%
October-November 1973	12	41
February 1974	6	51
May 1974	8	45
August-September 1974	7	43
October 1974	8	45
February 1975	5	46
May 1975	6	38
August-September 1975	8	37
October-November 1975	7	40
February 1976	10	32
May 1976	10	35
August-September 1976	16	26
November-December 1976	17	27
February 1977	26	19
May 1977	22	17
August-September 1977	20	16
November-December 1977	12	25

Source: Surveys by Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumer Attitudes.

WHERE BUSINESS FORESEES PROBLEMS



Question: For each item on this list, do you expect during the next few years it will cause your company very serious problems, serious problems, not very serious problems, or hardly any problems? (Read list)

Source: Mail survey by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Gallup Economic Service, October-November, 1977. 59% of the 2,000 executives who received questionnaires responded.

LOW EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN BUSINESS COMMUNITY

Question: During the next year or two, do you think the government will do a good job, only fair, or a poor job in its economic policies to fight inflation and unemployment?

Note: The survey defined "small business executives" as those with 500 employees or less; "large business executives" are those whose companies have more than 500 employees.

	Government's economic policies expected to be poor
Small Business Executives	56%
Large Business Executives	61
Consumers with Incomes above $20,000	21

Source: Mail survey by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Gallup Economic Service, October-November 1977. Fifty-nine percent of the 2,000 executives who received questionnaires responded.

TAXES AT THE BREAKING POINT



Question: As far as you (and your family) are concerned, do you feel you have reached the breaking point on the amount of taxes you pay or not?

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of March 15-21, 1977.

NEW SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES

Question: Social Security taxes have just been increased so that the Social Security fund will not run out. Do you favor or oppose this tax increase?

Favor	60%
Oppose	40

Question: Who would you say is more responsible for the Social Security tax increase? Would you say the President is more responsible or would you say Congress is more responsible?

President	14%
Congress	68
Both	5
Not sure	13

Source: Survey by NBC News, January 10-11, 1978.

IS THE TAX SYSTEM FAIR?



Question: How do you feel about the present federal income tax system—do you feel it is quite fair to most people, reasonably fair, somewhat unfair, or quite unfair to most people?

Note: "Fair" = "quite fair" plus "reasonably fair."

	Fair	Somewhat Unfair	Unfair
Total Sample	38	31	31

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York *Times*, October 23-26, 1977.

The Energy Imbroglio

TWO VIEWS OF THE ENERGY CRISIS: GALLUP AND CADDELL

GALLUP

Question: How serious would you say the energy situation is in the U.S., very serious, fairly serious, or not at all serious?



	Very serious
April 1-4**	43%
April*	56
April 29-May 2**	45
June 3-6**	42
August 5-8**	40
Sept 30**	42
Oct 14-20*	42
Nov 18-21**	42

Note: President Carter presented his energy program to the nation in two prime time speeches on April 18 and 20, 1977.

Source: **Newsweek*/American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), based on approximately 500 respondents' telephone interviews on dates shown above.

**American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) based on approximately 1500 respondents' personal interviews on dates shown above.

CADDELL

Question: What do you think are the two most important problems facing the United States today? (Answers volunteered)



	4th Qtr. 1975	4th Qtr. 1976	4th Qtr. 1977
Inflation	28%	41%	35%
Unemployment	28	42	38
Economy in general	25	24	17
Energy	5	12	35

Source: Cambridge Reports, Reports #5, 9 and 13. All studies nationwide; the 1977 survey was of 1500 respondents. Published with permission.

A PHONY SHORTAGE?

Question: Do you think the shortage of energy we hear about is real or are we just being told there are shortages so oil and gas companies can charge higher prices? (Results for total: it is real, 43%; just being told, 47%; no opinion, 10%.)



Source: Survey by CBS News/New York *Times*, January 8-12, 1978.

ASSESSMENT OF CARTER ENERGY PLAN IN LATE 1977

Question: Now let me read you some statements that have been made about the debate and controversy over the energy bill as it has gone through Congress. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree.

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
While President Carter's energy program is not a final answer, it is a real beginning at giving this country an energy policy.	83%	13%	4%
The Carter White House did not do an effective job of selling the President's original energy program.	65	20	15
What was wrong with President Carter's original energy program was that it would have meant a big increase in taxes on energy to try to get people and industry to use less energy.	61	20	19
The trouble with the Carter energy program is that it puts all the emphasis on conservation and very little on how to get new sources of energy.	56	32	12

Source: Louis Harris and Associates, December 2-4, 1977.

Carter and T

THE CARTER POLLS

Jimmy Carter began his presidency with a high measure of popular approval. As can be seen from the accompanying graph, however, Carter's public endorsement was not unusually high in the context of the experience of presidents since Harry Truman.

Since his inauguration over a year ago, Carter has experienced a rather pronounced decline in his standing within the populace generally. There has been no sudden, precipitous falling-off of support, such as had happened to Ford following the Nixon pardon, but the weakening of Carter's standing has proceeded steadily.

As with opinion data on most complex issues, a note of caution should be struck with regard to these data showing the decline in the President's popularity. For one thing, public institutions and their leaders have generally come in for a higher measure of criticism in the 1970s than they confronted in earlier decades. This general deterioration may well be part of the "problem" of the Carter presidency. The public still believes that the President is doing much better "handling his job" than Congress is doing with its job.

And as his popularity has slipped, Carter is shown by some recent surveys to be likely to win reelection fairly easily—in the hypothetical condition that one were to be held at the present time.—*Everett Ladd*

APPROVAL

	Truman (4/45)	Eisenhower (1/53)	Kennedy (1/61)	Johnson (11/63)	Nixon (1/69)	Ford (8/74)	Carter (1/77)
Month Took Office	—	—	—	—	59	71	—
After 1st month	—	68	—	79	61	50	71
After 2nd month	—	59	73	80	63	55	72
After 3rd month	87	74	83	75	61	48	63
After 4th month	—	74	76	73	65	42	64
After 5th month	—	—	74	77	63	39	63
After 6th month	—	71	71	75	65	39	67
After 7th month	75	—	73	74	62	37	66
After 8th month	—	75	75	—	58	39	59
After 9th month	—	65	76	—	56	51	54
After 10th month	63	—	77	—	68	52	56
After 11th month	—	60	78	—	59	—	57
After 12th month	50	68	77	69	61	46	
After 13th month	—	71	78	69	56	47	
After 14th month	—	68	79	71	53	44	
After 15th month	43	—	77	—	56	41	
After 16th month	—	64	73	69	59	39	
After 17th month	—	61	71	67	55	46	
After 18th month	32	—	69	64	55	48	
After 19th month	—	71	66	70	56	50	
After 20th month	—	65	67	69	—	48	
After 21st month	35	64	62	65	58	47	
After 22nd month	48	57	—	65	57	45	
After 23rd month	60	63	74	63	52	—	
After 24th month	—	69	76	64	56	—	

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: JIMM

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of Presid



Note: In months where more than one approval poll was conducted, the last result

e Presidency

ARTER AND HIS PREDECESSORS

is handling his job as President?



the month are presented. **Source:** Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup).

CARTER JOB RATINGS

Question: Now let me ask you about some specific things President Carter has done. How would you rate President Carter on (read list)—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?

Note: Positive = excellent and pretty good.

	Positive Ratings									
	Mar 1977	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan 1978
Restoring confidence in government				64		49	44	47	53	48
Inspiring confidence in the White House	75	62	62	65	59	50	46	51	55	50
His working for a peace settlement in the Middle East			48		51	34	44	44	63	57
His handling of foreign policy matters				48		34	38	38	42	43
His handling of relations with Congress	65		51		46	41	38	37	38	33
His handling of the economy		47	44	41	39	35	32	33	34	28
His overall energy program			45		40	33	37		40	36

Note: Approval figures appearing in **red** indicate months in which percentage of disapproval was greater than approval.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of December 27, 1977-January 10, 1978.

CARTER WINS HIGHER MARKS THAN CONGRESS



Questions: Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Carter is handling his job as President? Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?

	Carter	Congress
March 1977	66%	36%
May 1977	64	40
June 1977	63	34
July 1977	62	31
October 1977	55	31

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), March, May, June 1977; CBS News/New York *Times*, July, latest October 23-26, 1977.

CARTER VS. FORD: HOW WOULD PEOPLE VOTE TODAY?

Yankelovich

Question: If the election were held today, for whom would you vote?

	Actual election results, Nov. 1976	November, 1977
Carter	50%	44%
Ford	48	41
Not sure	—	15

Source: Survey by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 1977.

Late Poll: An NBC News survey conducted January 10-11, 1978 found that, if a new election were held now, Carter would defeat Ford by 51-39%.

Roper

Question: Suppose that next week there were a new national election for President of the United States, and the candidates were President Jimmy Carter on the Democratic ticket and former President Gerald Ford on the Republican ticket. Do you think you'd vote for Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford?

	Actual election results, Nov. 1976	December, 1977
Carter	50%	47%
Ford	48	32
Wouldn't vote or would vote for someone else	—	13
Don't know	—	8

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, December 1977.

The Middle East: Before Sadat's trip to Jerusalem...

WHERE SYMPATHIES LIE

Question: In the Middle East are your sympathies (read list)

Note: Asked only of those people who said they have heard or read about the situation in the Middle East: June 1967 = 59%, June 1977 = 86%, October 1977 = 79%. **June 1967 poll taken shortly after the war.**

	June 1967	June 1977	October 1977
More with Israel	55%	44%	46%
More with Arab nations	4	8	11
Neither	41	28	21
No opinion		20	22

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), June 1967, June 1977, October 14-17, 1977.

WHAT SHOULD ISRAEL DO WITH THE CAPTURED LAND?

Question: As a result of the 1967 war, Israel now controls land that was formerly controlled by Arab nations. What do you think Israel should do?

Note: Asked only of those people who said they have heard or read about the situation in the Middle East: June 1967 = 59%, June 1977 = 86%, October 1977 = 79%.

	June 1967	June 1977	October 1977
Give back part of land	44%	35%	36%
Give back all land	15	16	13
Keep all of land	24	24	26
No opinion	17	25	25

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), June 1967, June 1977, October 14-17, 1977.

...In the Wake of the Sadat Trip

WHO WANTS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?



Question: Do you feel that (read list) really wants a just peace in the Middle East, only reluctantly wants a just peace, or really does not want peace?

Note: President Sadat visited Israel on November 18 and 19, 1977.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, October 8-16, November 21, December 2-4, 1977, and December 27, 1977-January 10, 1978.

JOB RATINGS OF THE NEGOTIATORS



Question: What kind of job do you think (read list) is doing in handling peace negotiations in the Middle East? Do you think he is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or a poor job?

Source: Survey by NBC News, January 10-11, 1978.

SHOULD THE U.S. PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS?

Question: Do you think the United States should participate in the Middle East peace negotiations, or do you think the United States should not participate in the peace negotiations?

U.S. should participate	47%
U.S. should not participate	53

Source: Survey by NBC News, November 29-30, 1977.

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST



Question: If Israel were attacked by another Mid-Eastern nation, what should the United States do? Give all-out military assistance to Israel including sending troops; give all the supplies and equipment to Israel they need, but send no troops; give Israel limited military supplies; give no help to either Israel or the Arabs; give military assistance to the Arabs, and no assistance to Israel; or not sure.

Source: Survey by NBC News, November 29-30, 1977.

NEW ISRAELI OPINIONS ON WAR AND PEACE



[1] **Question:** Do you think there will be another war with the Arab countries in the coming years?

[2] **Question:** Do you think Egypt is or is not interested in reaching a peace agreement with us on conditions that can be acceptable to us? Definitely interested; perhaps interested; I don't think she is interested; definitely not interested; (note: "definitely interested" and "perhaps interested" have been collapsed into "interested").

			[1] There will be no more war with Arab countries	[2] Egypt is interested in peace
1973	Oct. 30-31	After the ceasefire	11	41
	Dec. 17-18	Kissinger shuttles	12	52
1974	Jan. 22-24	After separation of forces agreement	13	56
	Nov. 20-22	After appearance of Arafat at U.N.	4	42
1975	Aug. 27-31	Eve of second separation of forces	12	48
	Dec. 1-3		7	48
1976	June 30-July 4	Eve of and after Entebbe operation	16	52
1977	June 8-12	After Knesset elections	10	53
	Nov. 16-17	Eve of Sadat's visit	24	82
	Nov. 21	Sadat's departure	54	89
	Nov. 22	Day after Sadat's departure	50	91
	Nov. 23	Two days after Sadat's departure	32	90
	Nov. 30-Dec. 2		46	—
	Dec. 11-18		43	84
	Dec. 22-27		33	90
1978	Jan. 11-15		—	78

Source: Surveys by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, latest that of January 11-15, 1978.

The Great Canal Debate

Since 1975, according to survey data, a plurality of Americans have generally opposed ratification of Panama Canal treaties. The polls do suggest some growth in public support, but the data must be read with caution because questions have varied significantly.

The surveys also indicate that the more informed Americans are about the treaties, the more likely they are to favor them. But if better informed Americans are generally more supportive, the intensity factor is on the side of the opposition: many more foes than supporters say they feel so strongly about the issue that they would vote against a senator who joins the other side.

While there is surely some pure emotionalism in the treaty debate, that does not seem to be the critical factor in public sentiment. A high proportion of treaty opponents, for example, say they would approve ratification if they were confident that the U.S. could always send in troops to keep the canal open.

—Everett Ladd

SENTIMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE TREATIES



Questions were worded as follows:

[1] Do you favor the United States continuing its ownership and control of the Panama Canal, or do you favor turning ownership and control of the Panama Canal over to the Republic of Panama? (Approve = favor Panamanian ownership; disapprove = U.S. ownership.)

Source: Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, April 1976, May 1977.

[2] The proposed new treaty between the U.S. and Panama calls for the U.S. to turn over ownership of the canal to Panama at the end of this century. However, the U.S. will maintain control over the land and installations necessary to operate and defend the canal. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposed new treaty? (Asked of those aware of treaties.)

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup),

[3] As you know, President Carter asked the U.S. Senate to vote approval of a new treaty between the U.S. and Panama that will hand control of the Panama Canal back to Panama by the year 2000. Would you favor or oppose the U.S. Senate approving this treaty with Panama?

Source: Louis Harris and Associates, September 1977.

[4] The Senate now has to debate the treaties that President Carter signed granting control of the Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama in the year 2000. Do you approve or disapprove of those treaties?

Source: CBS News/New York *Times*, October 1977, January 8-12, 1978.

[5] The new treaty between the United States and Panama calls for the United States to turn over the canal to Panama at the end of this century. However, this treaty still has to be approved by the Senate. Do you favor or oppose approval of this treaty in its present form by the United States Senate? (Asked of those who said they had heard or knew about the treaty, which amounted to 77% of all respondents.)

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, January 10-11, 1978.

Late Poll: Late in January, Mervin D. Field released a California Poll showing that Californians disapproved of the treaties by only 46-41 percent. Three months earlier, Field had found opposition higher: 49-35 percent.

A PHILOSOPHICAL SPLIT

Question: The Senate now has to debate the treaties that President Carter signed granting control of the Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama in the year 2000. Do you approve or disapprove of those treaties?

	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Total Sample	29%	51%	20%
By Political Philosophy			
Liberal	38	42	20
Middle-of-the-road	31	54	15
Conservative	24	59	17

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York *Times*, January 8-12, 1978.

INTENSITY OF FEELING

Question: Do you feel strongly enough about the way your senators vote on the Panama Canal treaty to change your vote because of it when they run again? (Asked only of those who approved or disapproved to the question . . . Do you approve or disapprove of those treaties?)



Source: Survey by CBS News/New York *Times*, October 23-26, 1977.

MAJORITY INDICATES SUPPORT IF U.S. RETAINS RIGHT TO INTERVENE

Question: Would you favor or oppose approval of the Panama Canal Treaty if an amendment were added specifically giving the United States the right to intervene if the canal is threatened by attack? (Asked of those who knew about the treaty.)

Favor	65%
Oppose	25
Not sure	10

Note: This question was asked by NBC-AP in a survey on January 10-11, 1978. As can be seen in the chart displayed above this one, the same poll showed that public support for the treaties in the absence of an amendment was 28% for, 62% against. *Thus, NBC concluded that inclusion of the amendment would turn the public completely around on the issue.* A spokesman for the network also noted that the treaty in its amended form won support from Republicans by about a 2-1 margin and from those who opposed it in the first question by a 61-33% margin.

A CBS/New York *Times* survey conducted on October 23-26, 1977, showed strikingly similar results.

DOES AWARENESS PRODUCE SUPPORT?

Question: The treaties would give Panama full control over the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone by the year 2000, but the United States would retain the right to defend the canal against a third nation . . . Do you favor or oppose these treaties between the U.S. and Panama?

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
Those Not Aware of Treaties (26%)	23%	39%	38%
Those Aware of Treaties (74%)	40	48	12
The "Better Informed"	51	46	3

Note: Gallup defines the "better informed" as those who can correctly answer three questions dealing with key facts about the pact: the year the canal is to be turned over to the Republic of Panama, whether or not the U.S. has the right to defend the canal against third-world attacks, and whether or not the biggest U.S. aircraft carriers and supertankers are able to use the canal.

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), September 30-October 3, 1977.

OPINION ON THE TREATIES' ARTICLES

Question: Now let me ask you about some specific parts of the agreement with Panama on the Panama Canal. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose that provision.

	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
After the year 2000, Panama guarantees that the Panama Canal will be kept "neutral," open to every country, including the U.S., to use for its ships.	63%	17%	20%
Americans who live and work in the Canal Zone will continue to enjoy American rights, and if they break the Panama law, they will serve sentences in American prisons.	61	18	21
The U.S. would leave military troops stationed in the Panama Canal Zone until the year 2000.	61	21	18
The U.S. will be allowed to defend the Panama Canal even after the year 2000 to be sure that all nations can send their ships through it.	55	24	21
Each year until the year 2000, the U.S. will pay the government of Panama $50 million for the right to control the Panama Canal.	17	64	19
The U.S. would maintain control of the Panama Canal until the year 2000.	60	24	16

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, September 18-26, 1977.

"...AND WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 22% SAID 'NO', 17% SAID 'YES', AND 61% SAID 'WHAT EVER SIDE IT WAS JOHN WAYNE SAID HE WAS ON'!"

Morals, Mandatory Retirement, + More

SEXUAL LIBERATION?



Question: There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

	Not wrong at all	Always wrong/ Almost always wrong	Wrong only sometimes
1972	27%	48%	24%
1975	33	44	24
1977	37	40	23

Source: National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972, 1975, 1977.

ABORTIONS FOR THE POOR: SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT HELP?

Question: Now I'd like you to tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements: The government should help a poor woman with her medical bills if she wants an abortion.

Should	Should not
46%	54%

Source: CBS News/New York *Times*, January 8-12, 1978

SHOULD THE AGE OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT BE RAISED?

Question: Both houses of Congress recently passed a bill that would raise the age at which companies could make workers retire from 65 to 70. Do you approve or disapprove of raising the mandatory retirement age from 65 to 70?

	Approve	Disapprove
Total Sample	55%	45%
By Age:		
18-29	62	38
30-44	55	45
45-64	46	54
over 65	57	43

Source: CBS News/New York *Times*, October 23-26, 1977

SHOULD PEOPLE BE RETIRED TO MAKE ROOM FOR THE YOUNG?

Question: One of the arguments for not raising the mandatory retirement age is that letting people work beyond 65 will prevent younger people from being hired or promoted. Do you think this is a good enough reason for not raising the mandatory retirement age?

	No
Total Sample	57%
By Age:	
18-29	64(!)
30-44	59
45-64	53
over 65	48

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York *Times*, October 23-26, 1977

WHAT WOULD YOU MISS IF YOU RETIRED?



Question: Here are some things that people have told us they would miss about their jobs if they stopped working. For each, tell me if you think it's something you would miss, or not (something you did miss when you stopped working, or not)? (Base: Adult public who are now working or who have at some time worked.)

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, August 13-20, 1977

EXERCISE: A HEALTHIER NATION?

Question: Aside from any work you do, here at home or at a job, do you do anything regularly—that is, on a daily basis—that helps you keep physically fit?

	Percent of those who exercise regularly
Total Sample, 1961	24%
Total Sample 1977	47
By Education:	
College	59
High School	47
Grade School	30

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), September 9-12, 1977, with 1961 Gallup survey used for the time comparison.

JOGGING: WHO RUNS AND HOW FAR?

Question: Do you happen to jog, or not? (If respondent said yes: On the average, how far do you usually jog in terms of miles or fractions of miles?)

	Percent who jog
Nationwide	11%
By sex:	
Men	16
Women	7
By education:	
College	17
High school	11
Grade school	3
By region:	
East	13
Midwest	9
South	9
West	17
By occupation:	
Professional & Business	13
Clerical & Sales	16
Manual workers	12
By marital status	
Married	10
Single	26
How Far Jogged? (Based on all joggers)	
Less than one mile	23%
One mile & fractions	37
Two miles & fractions	23
Three miles & more	14
Can't say	3

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), September 9-12, 1977

VIOLENCE AT SCHOOL

This January, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare released a national survey, "Violent Schools-Safe Schools," indicating that teenagers are far more likely to be attacked or robbed in school than on the streets. According to the report, the student in a typical secondary public school, in any one month, has:

- One chance in 9 of becoming a theft victim.
- One chance in 80 of being attacked; and,
- One chance in 200 of being robbed.

Teachers face similar problems, and students in urban schools must live with even higher risks.

In October of 1977, the Gallup Youth Survey interviewed 1,000 teenagers about violence in schools and came up with the following results:

Question: When you are at school, do you ever fear for your physical safety, or not?

	Yes
Nationwide	18%
By sex and age	
Boys, 13-15	19
Boys, 16-18	11
Girls, 13-15	24
Girls, 16-18	18
By race	
White	16
Nonwhite	26

Question: During the last 12 months, have any of the following happened to you at school? (read list)

	Yes
Been physically assaulted	4%
Had money stolen	12
Other property stolen	24
Other property damaged or destroyed	11

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), October 11-14, 1977.

OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

Question: I am going to read off a number of different occupations. For each, would you tell me whether you feel it is an occupation of great prestige, considerable prestige, some prestige, or hardly any prestige at all.

	Very great prestige	Considerable prestige	Some prestige	Hardly any prestige at all
Scientists	67%	26%	6%	1%
Doctors	62	30	7	1
Ministers	41	32	21	5
Lawyers	37	38	20	5
Engineers	34	43	21	2
Teachers	30	37	28	6
Athletes	27	33	33	8
Artists	21	37	32	9
Businessmen	18	43	35	4
Entertainers	18	33	39	10
Journalists	17	44	34	5
Bankers	17	40	35	8
Skilled workers	15	36	36	13
Politicians	17	26	35	22
Salesmen	6	19	43	31

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, October 8-16, 1977.

Collector's Items

BY DAVID GERGEN

Year-end Roundup—As 1977 neared its end, a small army of opinion collectors were out scouring the countryside, trying to canvass public sentiments on everything from the outlook for the economy to prospects for salvation.

When the results were toted up, it appeared that God was still in His heaven—in an Iowa poll, people gave Him the highest vote of confidence of any major social institution, edging out the State Highway Patrol—but elsewhere, it was hard to say that all was right with the world.

Toward the end of every year, several large polling organizations test the mood of the country to compare it with years gone by. In 1974-1975, as the country climbed out of the recession and left Watergate behind, most of the social indicators began marching steadily upward, reflecting a growing sense of optimism. In late 1977, however, the mood apparently began to waver: some of the indicators continued upward, some began sliding down, and others—well, they were just plain confusing. Consider:

Up: As of late 1977, Lou Harris reported that for the first time in four years, public confidence was rising in leading American institutions. While the levels were still below the high-water mark of 1966, they showed growing support for all but one of sixteen institutions.

Up: George Gallup found that hopes for peace also seemed to be brighter than in the past. Some 43 percent were expecting 1978 to be a peaceful year—not a majority, but still 14 points higher than three years earlier.

Up: In addition, Gallup found that the fear of crime seemed to be easing. In 1975, 50 percent said that there was more crime in their area than a year earlier. In late 1977, that figure had receded to 43 percent.

Down: On the other hand, Yankelovich, Skelly and White found that between spring and winter of 1977, the mood of the country had soured perceptibly (see Opinion Roundup, page 21).

Down: Gallup also discovered that as 1977 closed, the country was decidedly less optimistic about the economy than a year earlier: only 24 percent thought prosperity lay ahead, a drop of 10 percent, while 49 percent forecast rising unemployment in 1978, compared to 37 percent a year earlier.

Down: Confidence in U.S. power was also diminishing. When Jimmy Carter took office, 58 percent polled by Gallup thought that U.S. strength would increase in the coming year. Now, only 48 percent see a waxing of American power.

Mixed: And then there were the consumer confidence surveys— one major poll (Conference Board, New York) found confidence at year-end at the highest point in five years, a second poll (Survey Research Center, Michigan) pegged it at the lowest point since early 1976, and still a third (Albert Sindlinger) said the other two could both be right because they polled at different times and in different ways.

What could be made of the public mood? Kevin Phillips, an attentive student of opinion surveys, believes that "1978 may be signalling a second round of malaise based on the economy, resurgent political scandals and public disillusionment with Carter." The President's pollster, Patrick Caddell, thinks instead that attitudes are drifting—a "public pause," he says. Could they both be right, too? ☑

The Carter Market—Economically, it has never made much sense to treat the stock market as a barometer of the President's standing in the business community, but politically, it seems to go with the turf. Thus, as the year ended and political analysts were comparing Carter's polls with those of his predecessors, editors of *Public Opinion* were also looking at the way that the Dow Jones industrial average had performed under each chief executive. Here's what they saw:

	Change in Dow Jones During 1st Year in Office	*Percentage Change in Dow*
Truman	+48 points	+31%
Eisenhower	+1	+.4
Kennedy	+66	+10
Johnson	+179	+25
Nixon	−153	−16
Ford	+40	+5
Carter	−182	−19

☑

The Most Admired—Another year-end polling tradition is to determine the men and women that Americans most admire. Typically, the President and the First Lady place high on the list, and they did again this year, sweeping both first place honors. But there were some interesting twists this time: on the men's side, who should suddenly reappear? Richard Nixon—*and tied with the Pope.* Among women, the editors of *Good Housekeeping* almost fell over themselves with apologies when they found their poll showing the most admired woman in the world to be—Anita Bryant. "When I saw this happening," groaned the editor, "I went back in the office and I had the crew examine all the 10,000 votes." But only a few weeks later, Gallup confirmed her high standing, finding her third only to Rosalynn Carter and Golda Meir on his most admired list. ☑

Heavenly Days—Last April, the Iowa poll ascertained that an overwhelming majority of Iowans believe in Heaven and Hell. In December, they asked the question that inevitably came next: just where do you think you're going?

Fully 65 percent of Iowans thought they would wind up in Heaven ("It'll be a fight all the way," allowed one farmer), 30 percent were not sure, and a bare 5 percent foresaw a life in Hell. Only one Republican in every 35 thought he was on the road to Hell, but one Democrat in every 9 thought he had already gone astray. (Perhaps Republicans find strength in small numbers. But do Democrats have more fun?)

The one point on which many were agreed was that their neighbors were in worse shape than they were: 31 percent said they knew someone else who wouldn't make it through the Pearly Gates. ☑

Tubular Vision—There were many, many polls that we had to leave out of this issue, most of them conducted with great precision and care, but we thought we ought to save room for at least one informal, little, back-of-the-envelope survey that a reporter recently conducted among the executives of the commercial television networks. What is your favorite show when you go home at night, he asked. The hands-down favorite: "I, Claudius," shown only on PBS. But then, why don't you show that kind of material on the commercial nets? Because, they said, it was over the head of most Americans. And they wonder why the Nielsens are falling. ☑

THE BAKKE CASE:

HOW WOULD IT BE DECIDED AT THE BAR OF PUBLIC OPINION?

Seymour Martin Lipset &
William Schneider

Let's suppose two runners are competing in a hundred-yard dash. The first quickly reaches the fifty-yard mark, but the other is still struggling at the ten-yard line because his legs are shackled together. The judges, seeing the unfairness, stop the race and remove the shackles.

But what should they do now? Should they just let the race proceed? Should they move the second runner even with the first and then let the race go forward? Should they perhaps move the second runner ten yards ahead of the first and let them compete? Or should they start the race all over again and ensure that each of the runners is guaranteed a share of the prize money?

That analogy, first suggested by Earl Raab in an article in *Commentary* in the mid-sixties, has been applied for many years now to relations between black and white Americans. But the questions it raises have never been answered satisfactorily and today, in the most fundamental and far-reaching civil rights controversy of this decade, they have been brought before the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Allen Bakke.

Mr. Bakke is a white engineer who applied unsuccessfully to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis in 1973 and 1974. He subsequently sued the University in the California courts, alleging that he had been denied admission because the school sets aside sixteen of the one hundred places in each first-year class for minority students. Such "special admission programs," Bakke argued, constitute reverse discrimination and, therefore, violate the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The California courts agreed with him.

If the U.S. Supreme Court now upholds Bakke's contention, the implications are nearly overwhelming, for over the past decade, affirmative action and special admissions programs based on racial or sexual quotas have been a mainstay of the civil rights and women's movements. But the controversy surrounding the Bakke case also strikes at the far more fundamental question: "What do Americans really believe about racial equality and what steps are they willing to take in its pursuit?" Some months ago, we began to probe that issue, undertaking a detailed review of available public opinion polls of racial attitudes conducted since 1935. In this article, we present a summary of what we found.

Deep Split in Public Attitudes

Our findings are at once surprising and somewhat perplexing: On the question of equality, the American mind is deeply split. Most Americans favor equal rights and equal opportunity, but they overwhelmingly reject the use of conventional affirmative action and preferential treatment to achieve them. The fact that such affirmative action programs have been a fixture in our society since the Johnson administration apparently makes no difference to the public.

Our examination of nearly a hundred opinion polls reveals that over the past forty years there has been a vast improvement in American attitudes toward blacks,

women, and other minorities. More Americans than ever before are aware that these groups have suffered discrimination, and minority claims to full equality are accepted much more widely than in earlier eras. Most people say that further progress towards complete equality should be made.

On two of the most central issues, the concept of general integration and the integration of schools, there is now abundant popular support. Yet it must be noted that in both of these areas, most white Americans still shrink back from absolutist positions. For instance, in a 1976 Harris survey, when asked "Generally speaking, do you favor full racial integration, integration in some areas of life, or separation of the races?", 12 percent of white respondents favored "separation of the races" and 28 percent supported "full racial integration." But the most popular response was the intermediate one, "integration in some areas of life," which was chosen by 48 percent of whites. Presented with similar questions over the past twelve years, whites have consistently rejected both "desegregation" and "strict segregation" in favor of "something in between," by margins similar to those reported for 1976.

These are grand phrases, "discrimination," "equality," "integration," and the like. What do they mean in more specific terms?

In the area of education, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), of the University of Chicago, has been inquiring since 1942 whether Americans think "white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools." The percentage favoring school integration has increased steadily from 30 in 1942, to 48 in 1956, to 74 in 1970, and to fully 85 in 1977. But NORC has also asked white parents whether they would object to sending their children "to a school where more than half of the children are blacks." The percent *objecting* rose from 39 in 1972 to 45 in 1977.

Attitudes toward residential integration and mixed marriages are more ambiguous. The University of Michigan Survey Research Center has found that the percentage of Americans agreeing that "Negroes have a right to live wherever they can afford to" increased steadily from 57 in 1964 to 85 in 1976. But in 1977, according to a poll taken by NORC, only 13 percent of Americans favored efforts by local governments to encourage black people to buy homes in the suburbs; 10 percent thought that the government should discourage blacks from doing so, and the vast majority of whites, 74 percent, said "leave it to private efforts." And when people were asked about precisely such private efforts to encourage blacks to move to the suburbs, only 38 percent were in favor, while 55 percent were opposed.

In 1977, NORC asked people whether "there should be laws against marriages between Negroes and whites." Only 28 percent favored such laws. But 73 percent of all respondents reported that they would feel "uneasy" if a close relative were planning to marry someone of another race, and 87 percent agreed with the statement: "You can expect special problems with marriages between blacks and whites."

Where Resistance Stiffens

While most people have abandoned many of the racial prejudices once identified with white America, it is also clear that they are in no mood today to accept some of the boldest ideas of the civil rights movement. Throughout the 1960s, of course, most whites rejected the aggressive tactics of that movement. Polls taken by Harris and by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC) between 1964 and 1968 showed that over two-thirds of white Americans felt that "civil rights leaders" (SRC) or "Negroes in this country" (Harris) were trying to move "too fast." Thereafter, the percentage of whites feeling this way declined until it reached 43 percent in 1976 (SRC), a shift which coincided with the period of quiescence in the civil rights movement after the turbulence of the mid-sixties. (The percentage of blacks who said that civil rights leaders are pushing "too slowly" tended to increase after 1968.) In 1977, however, following the election of a Democratic president visibly backed by black leaders and voters, the Harris survey found 55 percent of the whites saying "too fast," a significantly higher figure than that reported in the 1976 SRC poll. This finding suggests that shifts in white reactions may be a function of their sense of the strength of black pressure.

Opposition by whites to the major current proposals for remedial action, affirmative action and busing, is even more decisive. A Gallup poll in October of 1977 found, for instance, that Americans reject "preferential treatment" by a margin of over eight to one. The Gallup question was as follows:

Question: Some people say that to make up for past discrimination, women and members of minority groups should be given preferential treatment in getting jobs and places in college. Others say that ability, as determined by test scores, should be the main consideration. Which point of view comes closest to how you feel about this matter?

	Favor preferential treatment	*Favor selection on ability*	*No opinion*
Nationwide	11%	81%	8%
By sex			
Men	10	82	8
Women	12	80	8
By race			
Whites	9	84	7
Nonwhites	30	55	15

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), October 21-24, 1977.

Of course, many would regard Gallup's question as biased because it specifies that "preferential treatment"



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is the alternative to "ability." No such distinction was made in a question asked of a national sample by Cambridge Survey Research (Pat Caddell) in 1976: "Some large corporations are required to practice what is called affirmative action. This sometimes requires employers to give special preference to minorities or women when hiring. Do you approve or disapprove of affirmative action?" A majority of respondents—51 percent—still disapproved, while 35 percent approved. Among women, 47 percent disapproved of affirmative action and 35 percent approved. Even self-described liberals were divided—43 percent approved of affirmative action and 45 percent disapproved. Only among blacks did approval outweigh disapproval, 58 to 24 percent.

A July 1977 Roper poll of 2,000 Americans included a question which dealt specifically with the issue raised by the Bakke case: "There is a developing controversy over special admission procedures and quotas for blacks and other minority students in colleges and graduate programs." Roper asked respondents to choose between two positions on the issue: "Some say quota programs are necessary to increase the numbers of minorities in these schools and make up for past discrimination. Others say this practice discriminates against whites who cannot be considered for the places in the quota." The results showed 25 percent in favor of quotas and 54 percent opposed. An unusually large number, 15 percent of the sample, volunteered the response that they had "mixed feelings" on the issue. The percentage with "mixed feelings" was notably higher—23 percent—among blacks, who otherwise endorsed the use of quotas by 47 to 15 percent, sharply at variance with whites who rejected it by 59 to 22 percent.

The opposition to quotas or special preference for members of minority groups and women does not mean, however, that most white Americans are unconcerned about discrimination in employment. Confirming the findings of many earlier studies, a *New York Times*/CBS News survey taken in July 1977 found that 94 percent felt that not hiring qualified people because they are black is "wrong," while 73 percent favored laws which "see to it that blacks have equal job rights." When the same sample was asked, however, whether "extra consideration should be given to make up for past discrimination" against blacks, only 22 percent were in favor.

Thus, there can be no doubt that a large majority of white Americans have come to accept the proposition that discrimination in hiring is wrong and that government should guarantee operation of the competitive merit or achievement principle by outlawing such discrimination. But every major national study shows that a sizable majority of Americans are also opposed to remedying the effects of past discrimination by giving any special consideration in hiring or school admissions.

The same pattern of opposition to affirmative action may be found in other areas. In a review of questions that have been asked on the issue of busing, we found that, without additional conditions and modifications, the percentage of Americans favoring the busing of school children for racial integration has ranged between 10 and 20 percent. Such lack of support is not a new phenomenon. It is difficult to think of any proposal for *government* action in the civil rights area (for example, a Marshall plan for the cities) that has won popular approval since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the

Voting Rights Act of 1965. There is no indication that opinion was favorable to the proposals of the civil rights movement at any time since 1965. White Americans were divided about its goals and largely critical of its methods.

How Opinion Swayed Policy

The most important advances achieved by blacks, of course, occurred before race became a divisive issue outside of the South. This was particularly true of the Supreme Court's desegregation decision of 1954 and the passage by Congress in 1964 and 1965 of the two civil rights acts. The story of the enactment of these measures and of the proclamation of executive orders by President Johnson tells a great deal about the way American politics operates and the role of public opinion.

The early 1960s were marked by a major decision by the Democratic administration then in office. The administration, in effect, chose to write off the bulk of its support in the white South in order to consolidate its backing among blacks and liberal white supporters of civil rights. In the North, this decision cost it little and gained it much. There was little vocal or organized opposition to black demands for access to public accommodations, hotels, restaurants, and lunch counters, to forcing southern school districts to integrate, or to federal enforcement of black voting rights in southern states. Such issues were divisive south of the Mason-Dixon line, but not north of it, although northern whites were not strongly behind them and were, in fact, reluctant to see educational desegregation enforced by federal marshals. Blacks and liberals were demanding such policies and, in effect, were getting them. The South, as a result, went in large part to Senator Goldwater in 1964.

Subsequently, however, the arena of controversy moved north. As the courts sought to bring integration to northern cities and as federal administrative agencies tried to enforce affirmative action policies in hiring and university admissions, various forms of organized backlash occurred: support for George Wallace (as much as 25 percent in national opinion polls and 13.5 percent in the 1968 election), the election of hard-line mayoral candidates in cities like Philadelphia, Minneapolis and Los Angeles, organized opposition to busing orders handed down by federal courts, and widespread pressure by groups who felt that the introduction of the quota concept would hurt their members.

In this context, politicians reacted by backing down in their support for busing, affirmative action, and new civil rights legislation. Even so, busing still occurred in major American cities and affirmative action orders were still forthcoming from administrative agencies. In large part, these policies were pursued by officials not concerned about being reelected—federal judges and high-level civil servants.

The civil rights and feminist movements now face opposition that is sizable and organized. Yet that opposition is not as effective as public opinion polls suggest it could be. The reason, we would argue, is that opponents who are well educated and of high status are shame-faced about trying to stop what appears to be a struggle for further equality, and much of the rest of the public basically feels the same way. While most Americans oppose government intervention in their lives, they view race as a categorical disability deserving of special aid, much like physical handicaps and impoverishment in old age. Blacks should be helped because they have been down so long.

Compensatory Action versus Preferential Treatment

But there is considerable controversy, of course, about the forms such help should take. Our review of the opinion data suggests that Americans make a critical distinction in their minds between *compensatory action* and *preferential treatment*. Compensatory action involves measures to help disadvantaged groups catch up to the standards of competition set by the larger society. Preferential treatment involves suspending those standards and admitting or hiring members of disadvantaged groups who do not meet the same standards as white males, standards which some contend are set by white males. Relatively few object to compensation for past deprivations in the form of special training programs, head start efforts, financial aid, community development funds, and the like. Such programs meet with tentative approval from the population because they are consistent with the notion that race, and to a lesser extent, sex, have in the past been "imperfections" in the market of free competition—that is, unjustifiable grounds for denying equality of opportunity to certain categories of individuals.

To return to the image of the shackled runner, Americans are willing to do more than remove the shackles. They will go along with special training programs for previously shackled runners, enabling them to catch up with those who have forged ahead because of unfair advantages. Americans are even prepared to split the prize money so that those who started the race with handicaps will not end up with nothing. But most Americans draw the line at *predetermining the results* of the competition: they are disturbed by policies which require that the winners of all the races be constituted according to certain fixed racial and sexual proportions (50 percent female, 11 percent black, and so forth).

Policies favoring quotas and numerical goals for integration produce a creedal response, since they violate traditional conceptions of the meaning of equality of opportunity. Americans will accept the argument that race and sex are disadvantages deserving of compensation, just as the majority of Americans approved of the New Deal as a justifiable intervention in the free market. They will go along with special compensation up to the point where it is felt that resources have been

roughly equalized and the initial terms of competition are once again fair. But the data show that every attempt to introduce any form of absolute preference where the results of the race are "set aside" meets with stiff and determined resistance from the vast majority of Americans.

Several sources can be cited to demonstrate this distinction. Whites in a 1972 survey administered by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center *favored* "government job training programs for Negroes" by 77 to 16 percent but *opposed* "giving Negroes a chance ahead of whites in promotions where they have equal ability" by 82 to 12 percent. More recently, a 1977 poll of New York City residents carried out by Louis Bolce and Susan Gray of Fordham University found that whites gave overwhelming support to laws preventing discrimination in hiring and promoting blacks and they also approved existing programs for compensatory action, but they were almost evenly split on the question of spending *more* for compensatory action (44 percent in favor, 46 percent opposed) and they decisively rejected preferential treatment programs by margins of about eight to one. Thus, the line of resistance is not between nondiscrimination and compensatory action but between compensatory action and preferential treatment.

A *New York Times*/CBS News survey carried out in October of 1977 demonstrated the same point on a national basis. Both whites and blacks in this nationwide sample were sympathetic to the general principle behind affirmative action programs:

> *"The government should see to it that people who have been discriminated against in the past get a better break in the future."*

Whites		Blacks	
Agree	68%	Agree	85%
Disagree	25%	Disagree	9%

The interview then turned to a series of questions dealing with the implementation of affirmative action policies. The first question inquired about the use of quotas in a relatively weak form, namely, a requirement that businesses hire "a certain number of minority workers" with no specification that they be given absolute preference over whites. In this case, white and black opinion diverged sharply:

> *"First of all, would you approve or disapprove of requiring business to hire a certain number of minority workers?"*

Whites		Blacks	
Approve	35%	Approve	64%
Disapprove	60%	Disapprove	26%

However, both whites and blacks approved "special consideration" for "the best minority applicants" where no quotas or numerical requirements were specified:

> *"What about a college or graduate school giving special consideration to the best minority applicants, to help more of them get admitted than otherwise. Would you approve or disapprove of that?"*

Whites		Blacks	
Approve	59%	Approve	83%
Disapprove	36%	Disapprove	16%

The same was true for the next question, which dealt with compensatory action programs in business:

> *"How about requiring large companies to set up special training programs for members of minority groups?"*

Whites		Blacks	
Approve	63%	Approve	88%
Disapprove	32%	Disapprove	9%

But the fourth question returned to the notion of quotas in a context bearing directly on the Bakke case, and the results showed a majority of whites once again disapproving and blacks split almost evenly:

> *"What if a school reserved a certain number of places for qualified minority applicants. Would you approve or disapprove of that even if it meant that some qualified white applicants wouldn't be admitted?"*

Whites		Blacks	
Approve	32%	Approve	46%
Disapprove	60%	Disapprove	42%

Those who approved of "reserving a certain number of places for qualified minority applicants" were then asked, "What if this means that someone you know might have less of a chance of getting admitted? Would you still approve of reserving places for qualified minority applicants?" Eighteen percent of white respondents and 26 percent of blacks who had approved quotas in the initial question then changed their minds to either "disapprove" or "don't know." Thus, when the specification was added that the use of quotas might hurt "someone you know," white disapproval increased slightly (from 60 to 63 percent) and black opinion became negative (from 46 to 42 percent approving, to 48 to 34 percent disapproving).

In Table 1 below, the questions in the *Times*/CBS News survey are reordered from the one meeting the widest approval to the one meeting the widest disapproval. It should be emphasized that the questions were intermixed in the actual questionnaire, with the two "quota" questions asked first and last and the "special consideration" questions asked in between, just as they were presented in the discussion above. There was no apparent response set; responses shifted according to changes in the meaning and implications of each question.

Table 1

RESULTS OF *TIMES*/CBS SURVEY ON DISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

	Net Approval Index	
	Whites	Blacks
1. Government should give better break to those discriminated against.	+43%	+76%
2. Large companies should be required to set up special training programs for minority group members.	+31%	+79%
3. Colleges should give special consideration to the best minority applicants.	+23%	+67%
4. Business should be required to hire a *certain number* of minority workers.	−25%	+38%
5. Universities should reserve a *certain number* of places for qualified minority applicants, in preference to qualified white applicants.	−28%	+ 4%
5a. Places should still be reserved at universities even if this reduces the chances for someone you know.	−37%	−14%

Note: Net approval index is obtained by subtracting the percentage who "disapprove" from the percentage who "approve."

Source: *New York Times*/CBS News, October 1977.

The *Times*/CBS News survey and the Bolce-Gray survey in New York City, cited above, thus show the same "breaking point." Whites in both surveys were favorable toward the kinds of programs we have labeled "compensatory action," that is, special aid and intervention aimed specifically at improving the resources and opportunities available to disadvantaged minority groups. Words like "special training programs" and "special consideration" did not frighten off a majority of whites polled across the nation in the *Times*/CBS News survey, just as the New York City whites did not feel that existing programs to aid low-income blacks were a waste of money. On the other hand, white opinion in the New York City survey took a decidedly negative form in response to those questions that mentioned absolute preference for "blacks over whites": or alluded to "special advantages to blacks over whites," or "a federal law which favors less qualified blacks over whites." In the *Times*/CBS News poll, a similar effect could be seen in those questions that mentioned jobs or admission for "a certain number" of minority applicants or that referred to the practice of "requiring a business to hire a certain number of minority workers" or holding "a certain number of places for qualified minority applicants."

These findings refute claims that when whites reject quotas they are rejecting all forms of special treatment or compensatory action for minorities. Clearly, a majority of whites are willing to endorse "special consideration" of race as a factor in hiring and admissions and to approve of programs which channel resources to specific racial minorities. But they draw the line at absolute preference.

A Broken Consensus

Many of the inconsistencies we have found in our survey of American racial attitudes point up a deeper contradiction between two values that are at the core of the American creed—individualism and egalitarianism. Americans believe strongly in both values, and, as one of the present authors has shown in an earlier study,[1] the history of American social change reflects a shifting back and forth between these core values as a period of obsessive concern with equality and social reform is typically followed by a period emphasizing individual achievement and upward mobility.

One consequence of this dualism in the American value system is that political debate often takes the form of *one consensual value opposing the other.* Liberals and conservatives typically do not take "alternative" positions on issues of equality and freedom. Instead, each side appeals to one or the other core value, as liberals stress the primacy of egalitarianism and the social injustice that flows from unfettered individualism, while conservatives enshrine individual freedom and the social need for mobility and achievement as values "endangered" by the collectivism inherent in liberal nostrums. Both sides treat as their natural constituency the entire American public. In this sense, liberals and conservatives are less *opponents* than they are *competitors,* like two department stores on the same block trying to draw the same customers by offering different versions of what everyone wants.

The contradiction between these core values has nowhere been more apparent than in racial attitudes. Gunnar Myrdal concluded that most Americans put their beliefs about race and their often inconsistent beliefs about equality and achievement into separate mental compartments: "few Liberals . . . have not a well-furnished compartment of race prejudice," while those most "violently prejudiced against the Negro" have "also a whole compartment in . . . [their] valuation sphere housing the entire American Creed of liberty, equality, justice, and fair opportunity for everybody."[2] Some of the most appalling social injustices in American history have been committed under the pretense of fulfilling the American creed—the institution of chattel slavery as a means of denying Negroes the rights of human beings and the use of the "separate but equal" deception to justify the Jim Crow system are two examples that come easily to mind.

Much of the progress in the early years of the civil rights movement was made by breaking down the "compartmentalization" of the American mind and forcing the public to see that the country's attitudes and institutions fell outrageously short of our egalitarian ideals. It is the egalitarian element in the American creed that created the consensus behind the civil rights revolution of the past thirty years. But the more recent focus of the civil rights movement, with its stress on substantive equality and "forced" integration, has

[1] S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1967).

[2] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. XLiv.

forced the country up against the individualistic, achievement-oriented element in the American creed—and as a result, the consensus has been broken. The turning point can be dated from the "Watts riot" in Los Angeles in 1965, when black Americans demonstrated that they intended to press their claim for equality far beyond what white Americans were willing to accept.

On every issue we have analyzed, the public opinion data show a "positive," pro-civil rights consensus when only egalitarian questions are at stake but a "negative," anti-civil rights consensus when an issue also pushes up against basic notions of individualism. Thus, on the central issues involving racial discrimination and Jim Crow practices, the American consensus is powerfully *against discrimination;* trends on these issues have been consistently "liberal," and even the white South has joined the national consensus. The consensus breaks down, however, when *compulsory integration* is involved. White Americans have been much slower to accept full racial integration in education, in housing, and in social interaction. To a large extent, white Americans see such interaction as a matter of individual choice—that people should be free *not* to interact with members of another race. Many whites deeply resent efforts to force racial integration on them, not because they oppose racial equality, but because they feel it violates their individual freedom. Liberals are, of course, quick to point out the inegalitarian consequences of de facto segregation, but the data continue to show that most whites favor individual freedom over social egalitarianism in racial matters.

Similarly, most whites have endorsed the egalitarian *goals* of the civil rights movement while rejecting, repeatedly and consistently, the "collectivist" *tactics* of that movement. White Americans recognize the tremendous progress that has been achieved in race relations over the past thirty years, and they have come to endorse most of the goals of civil rights that were once fiercely controversial. But most whites, and many blacks, continue to feel that it is better for disadvantaged groups to work through individual improvement and mobility than to press collective demands for all members of the group. Most Americans do approve of concrete federal programs to help the disadvantaged and to combat racial discrimination. Given a choice, however, between government intervention to solve social problems and "leaving people on their own" to work out their problems for themselves, the public always chooses the latter option. This preference is particularly interesting in view of the fact that most of the achievements of the civil rights movement would not have been possible without the active intervention of the federal government, just as the widely approved reforms of the New Deal were brought about largely through an expansion of federal power.

Affirmative action policies have, of course, forced a sharp confrontation between egalitarian and individualistic values. We have noted that white Americans look favorably upon "compensatory action," since compensation for past discrimination is consistent with the egalitarian creed and essentially makes the conditions of competition "fairer" without violating the notion of a competitive system. But most Americans, including many blacks, oppose the notion of "preferential treatment," since such treatment precisely violates the notion of open and fair individual competition.

In some measure, the distinction between "compensatory action" and "preferential treatment" parallels a distinction that many observers have drawn between "equality of opportunity" and "equality of results." Compensatory action is probably seen as a way to enhance equality of opportunity. Because blacks have been discriminated against in the past, it is fair to give them special consideration so that they will get a better break in the future. Preferential treatment, on the other hand, probably sounds to most whites like an effort to force equality of results by predetermining the outcome of the competitive process. Of course, the distinction between "opportunities" and "results" is a slippery one, and most situations are inherently ambiguous. For instance, admission to professional schools is probably seen by most whites as a reward for prior work and achievement—a *result* of the competitive process. But many liberals, blacks, and members of other minority groups would argue that admission merely provides "equality of opportunity" for disadvantaged groups to become professionals. Needless to say, admission to college or professional schools is *both* an opportunity for future success and a result of past achievement. Jobs also involve this inherent ambiguity, in that a job is both an opportunity and a reward.

It is a problem for legal opinion to determine how much weight is to be given to each of these points of view. But as far as public opinion is concerned, most whites and many blacks believe that race should be "considered" but not "preferred" in these ambiguous situations. Our guess is that if significant further progress toward equality of results is to occur, it will take the form of what T. H. Marshall called the expansion of the idea of citizenship to include social rights—that every citizen can claim the right to a share in the prevailing material and cultural standards of the society; in other words, no one, even the runner who finishes far back in the pack, will be condemned to a life of suffering and deprivation.

Sources for this article were:

The Harris Survey, 1963; 1976.
National Opinion Research Center, 1942; 1956; 1970; 1977.
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Traditional Values Regnant

Everett C. Ladd, Jr.

The past decade and a half—from roughly the time of John F. Kennedy's assassination to the present—has been a period of such sweeping change and turbulence in the United States that many have asked whether the nation is undergoing a profound alteration in its social values.

Has there been a "greening of America"? Is there a "New Morality"? Will the values that took root in the counterculture of the late 1960s now blossom across the land? Or conversely, have the old values persisted, and indeed, may they now be reasserting themselves?

The topic is complicated, but the issue itself is extremely important, for beneath it lies a fundamental query: what will this society look like ten, twenty, or even thirty years from now? Where are we headed as a nation?

It is the argument of this piece that *continuity*, not *change*, is the most striking feature of American values today. As a society, we are being propelled by old beliefs, not by the new ones, and it is the survival of those old beliefs that is the distinguishing feature of our time.

Lifestyle: Too Narrow a Focus

Much of our social commentary today emphasizes the idea of rapid change because it concentrates on only one set of values—those associated with lifestyles, such as attitudes toward sexual relations, the family, work, and leisure. If that were all there were to social values, one would have to conclude that the past fifteen years have been a time of extraordinary ferment.

The change in lifestyles has not been entirely in one direction, but the trend is clear. Daniel Yankelovich makes that point effectively in many of his writings, especially in *The New Morality*, where he draws upon survey data to argue that new values are now ascendant in many parts of society, stretching far beyond the young, college-educated Americans where they originated. There has been a breakdown of the "No, no—you can't do that!" ethic, and more emphasis has been placed on individual choice and on the expression of individual tastes and desires. Belief in self-denial has lost ground all across the spectrum, from work to family to sexual relations.

In the past year, to be sure, one might detect a counterthrust. In November of 1977, for instance, *Time* magazine told us that there is still a lot of life left in the old sexual mores. Yet in the very article announcing the restoration of the old morality, the magazine also cited a number of Yankelovich survey questions showing movement toward a "do what you want to do" ethic. Thus, 70 percent of Americans polled by Yankelovich believe "there should be no laws, either Federal or state, regulating sexual practice."

The Public Value Commitments of a Liberal Society

Lifestyles are an important barometer and they do show important changes in recent years, but basic *social values* reach well beyond our daily living patterns. Historically, after all, the most powerful types of value commitments in the United States have been those associated with classical liberalism, the constituent American sociopolitical ideology. Are we as a society in the process of discarding or substantially revising those basic liberal values? If so, something momentous is occurring. But if not, there is reason to be cautious about proclamations of a bold New Morality—because liberalism is the very core of the Old Morality.

Let's review for a moment that cluster of values that we ordinarily associate with classical liberalism. Perhaps foremost among them is a belief in *individualism*. Alexis de Tocqueville argued in his famous work, *Democracy in America*, that this country actually invented the concept. Other societies, he said, have known "egoisme"—self-centeredness or selfishness—but America was the first to assert that the individual should be put on a pedestal and that the task of a society was to make people happy. Never, he said, had there been a country so committed to individual wants as opposed to collective needs. Closely allied with the emphasis upon the individual has been a commitment to two other values: *freedom* and *achievement*. In order to assert his individualism, a person must have a large measure of choice or freedom to choose among alternative forms of behavior. By the same token, people should be judged and rewarded on the basis of individual performance, not what family they may come from, their social class, or their ethnic background. This emphasis upon achievement has carried with it, as an ancillary condition, the stress on work.

Throughout our history, beliefs in individualism and achievement have linked up to give a distinctive American cast to another basic value: *equality*. In order to compete fairly for status and rewards, each individual must have equal opportunity. Yet, because some individuals work hard, do better, and attain more, there will necessarily be an inequality in the actual distribution of those rewards.

Still another basic value in the United States, one we brought with us from Europe, has been a commitment to *private property* and *private rights*. To some degree, that belief has rested upon the practical notion that a society will produce more goods and services if people are allowed to acquire property and dispose of it as they see fit. The market works. But classical liberalism also makes a more diffuse value commitment to private property on the grounds that individualism requires it. "Property," as Andrew Hacker has observed, "is . . . a hedge. It demarcates a certain area—large or small, depending on the size of the property holding—in which its owner may do as he pleases."[1] To deny property is to deny individualism, for property is a prime way in which individuals define themselves, protect themselves, and locate their own niche.

These several values—individualism, achievement, equality of opportunity, property rights—are closely interrelated and can be seen as facets of yet another social commitment: to *progress*. Liberalism sprang up at a time when science and technology as well as the whole arrangement of the economic order—trade, commerce, the beginnings of the factory system—were poised on the edge of the Industrial Revolution. It is not surprising, then, that liberalism developed as a profoundly materialistic ideology, defining progress in terms of more and more goods and services, more and more opportunities for individuals, higher and higher standards of living, and so on.

All of these values, of course, establish only the boundaries for the course of development. They set the channels. But they do not require static situations; they leave open the specific way that end products are defined. The United States in 1788 was an agricultural society, having risen only modestly above a subsistence economy. Today the United States is an urban society of unprecedented wealth. Could the sense of individual entitlement and the way it is expressed be unaffected today by such a transformation? Is it possible that individuals today would not expect more than their ancestors did a couple of centuries ago? Of course not. Thus, the critical question is not whether Americans are changing the way that we express our values—we are always doing that—but whether the basic values have themselves survived, and it is to that question we turn now.

Individualism Run Rampant

If survey research and personal observation tell us anything, surely they make it clear that there has been no diminution whatever of the American commitment to individualism in our own day. In fact, we appear more intensely individualistic as a society than we did in the nineteenth century. Increasing affluence has made us more conscious of individual entitlement and less tolerant of any barriers that lie between us and our personal goals.

In many ways, it's the emergence of the New Morality, in the sense that Yankelovich and others describe it—more freedom of choice, fewer rules and constraints involving sex, family, and work—that furnishes some of the most powerful proof of the persistence of traditional values. At the core of the Old Morality, as we have seen, is the belief in serving the individual, and that is exactly what much of our society has been doing over the past decade—and with gusto.

In December of 1976, Yankelovich surveyed a cross-section of parents with children 12 years of age and younger. His findings show a level of assertion of individual needs over those of the collective (here, the

[1] Andrew Hacker, *Political Theory* (New York, Macmillan, 1961), p. 263.

DOONESBURY **by Garry Trudeau**



family) that is probably without precedent in American experience. Thus, two-thirds (67 percent) *disagree* with the statement that "for their children's sake, parents should not separate even when they are not happy together."[2] And precisely the same proportion of parents maintain that their children have no obligation to them —specifically, that the kids don't owe them anything regardless of what their parents have done for them. The Yankelovich researchers sum up by noting that "the current crop of parents has clearly been influenced by the value structure of the college youth of the sixties and seventies. . . . [They] stress self-fulfillment as more important than role obligation to others."[3] Thus, the old belief that individual wants exert a special claim seems to be enlarging, apparently as an offshoot of affluence. Americans simply will not put up with as much self-denial as would their counterparts in eras more bound by scarcity.

The way that more and more claimants are stepping up to assert their rights and their self-importance is another modern expression of old values. Throughout American history, members of one group after another have come forward insisting that "I'm important; I have rights; society owes me. . . ." That's the thrust of individualism. But if a white male may thus assert himself, so can a black male, and so can a female. Of course the value sounds different when another group comes to emphasize it. Different tensions are created. White males might be perfectly happy with certain individualistic assertions but are less content when white females, particularly in their own family, make the claims. Different oxes get gored. To note, however, that new groups are jostling society with their claims for personal recognition is not to say that individualism is disappearing; to the contrary, it is being reinforced.

The feminist movement in the United States over the past decade or so, for example, has been profoundly individualistic, the absolute antithesis of collectivist. In its emphasis on the entitlement of individuals, it is pure, home-grown, American liberalism. A recent survey sponsored by the Washington *Post* and directed by faculty at Harvard's Center for International Affairs demonstrates this point nicely. A number of leadership groups in the United States were asked by the *Post*-Harvard study how they felt about various social issues. National leaders of the women's movement comprised one of the groups interviewed. In their general ideological stance, the feminists were well over on the left. Seventy-eight percent said they were liberals of some sort, 14 percent moderates, and just 4 percent conservatives.[4] But their proclivity for left-of-center policies was repeatedly redirected by their intense individualism. Presented with the proposition that "there should be a law limiting the amount of money any individual is allowed to earn in a year," the liberal leadership of the women's movement divided this way:

Strongly agree	6 percent
Agree with reservations	17 percent
Disagree with reservations	*14 percent*
Strongly disagree	*64 percent*

Three-fourths of the group insisted that there should be no governmentally imposed limits on what compensation people receive. Individuals should be permitted to earn on the basis of what they do. Thus, as in so many other aspects of individualism, today's style may seem jarring, but the underlying value remains remarkably untouched.

Equality of Opportunity: Little Slippage

It is often suggested that the United States is moving away from emphasizing equality of opportunity in the direction of equality of result. Some work at the intellectual level contributes to this sense of change. Serious thinkers such as John Rawls have set forth an elaborate rationale for shifting the national commitment from opportunity to result.[5] But the socialist ideal has long had its American proponents. They seem today, as in the past, to comprise only a small slice of the intellectual community. In the spring of 1977, for example, Martin Lipset and I presented this choice to a cross-section of professors in the United States: "Here are two ways to deal with inequality. Which do you prefer?"

"Equality of opportunity: giving each person an equal chance for a good education and to develop his or her ability."	"Equality of results: giving each person a relatively equal share of income and status regardless of education and ability."

Eighty-five percent of the professors opted for the "opportunity" standard, just 7 percent for "results," while 8 percent were in the middle.[6] Nowhere in this segment of the American intellectual community did the equality of results standard find anything other than decidedly minority support.

Yet there is in the United States today a general willingness to raise the income floor. Equality of opportunity (and inequality of results) are still the norm, but there are widespread sentiments now for granting a better base of support to those at the bottom. No one should be allowed to fall too far. We will continue to expect more by way of what the least highly attaining individuals are guaranteed. This is natural enough,

[2] *Raising Children in a Changing Society*, The General Mills American Family Report, 1976-77. The data themselves, along with all supporting materials, have been deposited in the archive of the Social Science Data Center, University of Connecticut, through the courtesy of General Mills and Yankelovich, Skelly and White.

[3] *Raising Children in a Changing Society*, pp. 66-67.

[4] Leadership Survey, a joint project of the Washington *Post* and the Harvard University Center for International Affairs. Data were collected in the spring of 1976. Three hundred and sixty-four leaders of the women's movement were surveyed.

[5] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

[6] Everett Ladd and S. M. Lipset, "The 1977 Survey of the American Professoriate," data available through the Social Science Data Center at the University of Connecticut.

given the increased wealth of the society.

There is also a greater appreciation today of how demanding equality of opportunity really is as a social standard. Past inequalities, it is now recognized, leave persisting disadvantages. If a social group has been subjected for two hundred years to all manner of discrimination, simply eliminating that discrimination doesn't confer equal opportunity: as every President since Lyndon Johnson has said, compensatory action is also needed. The center of much of our debate today is just how far that compensation should extend.

Even as that dialogue continues, however, the public shows no signs of backing away from the old American commitment to the equality value understood in terms of equality of opportunity. Before looking at some of the recent survey support for this assertion, we should remind ourselves of just how strong backing for "equal opportunities, unequal results" has been in the United States in the past.

George Gallup asked a cross section of Americans this question in 1941: "How much do you think [a] family, with a total income of $100,000 a year—that is, $2,000 a week—should pay in personal income taxes next year?" A hundred thousand dollars in 1941 sounded like $300,000, perhaps $400,000, today. It was a lot of money. Yet if the public had set the tax rate, it would have been just $10,000—the average figure given—well below what such families actually paid and far below the published rate which prescribed approximately $46,000 total payment. The general population wanted a lesser curtailment of social inequalities than did the makers of the tax code—and this after a decade of public rhetoric describing businessmen as "robber barons," attacking the "plutocrats" and "economic royalists," and stressing the injustices of the economic system! The public wanted to take only *10 percent* of the income of the richest families. This is pretty powerful stuff.

In the late 1950s Robert Lane conducted a series of long, discursive interviews with fifteen working-class men in New Haven, Connecticut. He documents, as vividly as the survey instrument in any form ever has, the intense support for the equality of opportunity value. These *average* people—average in their economic position, attainments, and social standing—believed that individuals should be given a more or less equal chance but should then be allowed to go their own way and that it was highly desirable for profound inequalities of result to occur. Consider these representative samplings from the Lane interviews:

> Your income—if you're smart, and your ability calls for a certain income, that's what you should earn. If your ability is so low, why, hell, then you should earn the low income.
>
> Personally, I think taxes are too hard. I mean a man makes, let's say $150,000. Well, my god, he has to give up half of that to the government—which I don't think is right.
>
> I'd say that [equal income]—that is something that's pretty—I think it would be a dull thing, because life would be accepted—or it would—rather we'd go stale. There would be no initiative to be a little different or go ahead.[7]

Now in the 1970s a great variety of survey data attest to the continuing public adherence to the equality of opportunity standard. Elsewhere in this magazine, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider report on a comprehensive study of American racial attitudes from 1935 to the present. They note that the public is sensitive to the difference between "compensatory action" and "preferential treatment." Relatively few people reject compensation for past discrimination through special training programs, Head Start, community development funds, and the like. These efforts are seen consistent with the belief that race has been used in the past to deny equality of opportunity. But most Americans reject programs and proposals such as quotas, which are seen as predetermining the results of the competition. Thus, their study shows some modification of the traditional belief in equality of opportunity, but no repudiation of it. (See Lipset and Schneider, page 38.)

What Lipset and Schneider document for the general public shows up powerfully when one looks at various leadership groups in the United States. The Washington *Post*-Harvard study referred to above posed these two questions: Does a fair economic system require that people earn about the same amount, or that people with more ability can earn "a much higher salary"? And, which is the preferable way to deal with inequality—extending equality of opportunity, "giving each person an equal chance for a good education and to develop his/her ability"; or pursuing equalities of result, "giving each person a relatively equal income regardless of his/her education and abilities"? The study found business leaders overwhelmingly in favor of equal opportunity and differential incomes—that is no surprise. But the entire spectrum of leadership groups shared this value, and those presumably on the left were almost as committed to it as the conservatives.

Table 1

RESPONSES OF LEADERS TO QUESTIONS OF EQUALITY

Leadership Group	"Does a fair economic system require: that people would earn about the same amount	or	that people with more ability would earn a much higher salary?"
Businessmen	1%		96%
Feminists	15		67
Students at prestige colleges	14		72
Blacks	16		64
Party leaders	5		88
Intellectuals	7		87
Media	3		92

[7] See Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 69, 76.

	"Here are two ways to deal with inequality; which do you prefer: equality of opportunity	or	equality of results?"
Businessmen	85%		2%
Feminists	82		7
Students at prestige colleges	84		6
Blacks	81		7
Party leaders	90		4
Intellectuals	88		3
Media	94		1

Note: The data are from the Leadership Survey, a joint project of the Washington *Post* and the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, conducted in the spring of 1976. Percentages do not add up to 100 because some respondents chose an "in-between" position.

Is Exxon Private Enterprise?

As these data suggest, there continues to be a solid commitment not only to equality of opportunity but also to the rights of private property. It is one thing to attack certain business firms and practices and quite another to devalue private property. In the public's eye, private enterprise and Exxon are not one and the same. It is perfectly possible to say, "Damn those oil companies; they're doing this and that wrong!" and still be committed to property rights and to a private enterprise system.

Criticism of some business practices has increased in the last decade. That's a well-known fact. But commitment to private property and "free enterprise" has not decreased in the last decade. That's also a fact. About 95 percent of Americans maintain that "we must be *ready to make sacrifices* if necessary to preserve the free enterprise system." Only one American in twenty rejects this position.[8] Would the proportion defending "free enterprise" have been higher in 1900? I doubt it. Property is not a besieged value.

Progress

Americans also continue to value material progress and to believe that the society they inhabit will permit them to achieve progress. For example, Yankelovich notes that three out of four parents (74 percent) "want their children to be better off than the parents were in terms of money and success."[9]

One of the most striking demonstrations of the persisting belief that our system—whatever its failings—will sustain progress for the individual comes from the "Self-Anchoring Striving Scale," developed by Hadley Cantril and employed in recent years by Potomac Associates. Respondents are shown a ladder with steps numbered from 0—what they think would be the worst possible life situation for them—to 10—the best life as they see it. They are then asked to locate their position. Where were you five years ago? Where are you today? Where do you expect to be five years hence? As Figure 1 attests, Americans almost invariably see themselves moving upward in the future.

[8] Yankelovich, Skelly and White, survey in January 1976. The same question has been asked a number of times in other surveys, with comparable results.
[9] *Raising Children in a Changing Society*, p. 71.

Figure 1
PERSONAL LADDER RATINGS, 1959-1976



	Past	Present	Future
1959	5.9	6.6	7.8
1964	6.0	6.9	7.9
1971	5.8	6.6	7.5
1972	5.5	6.4	7.6
1974	5.5	6.6	7.4
1976	5.7	6.7	7.7

Note: The graph represents responses to the following questions: "Here is a ladder (scaled from 0 to 10) representing the 'ladder of life.' Let's suppose the top of the ladder represents the *best* of life for you; and the bottom, the *worst* possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the *present* time? On which step would you say you stood *five years ago*? Just as your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say about *five years from now*?"

Sources: Institute for International Social Research 1959, 1964; Potomac Associates 1971, 1972, 1974, 1976.

The scale was first employed in 1959 and most recently in 1976. It thus covered a tumultuous period, but confidence in personal progress never wavered. Most Americans saw the present better than the past and expected the future to be better still. Even in 1974, after Vietnam, with a weakening economy and inflation, with the President being booted out of the White House, Americans saw rosy personal futures. The commitment to progress, and the belief it will continue, are deep. They are not easily shaken.

Conclusion

The other related constituent values of liberalism, including freedom and achievement, show the same condition I have been describing: they are all alive and well. There is no indication that popular commitment to them is in decline.

The persistence of these fundamental liberal values does not mean the area of social values is bereft of change. Sexual norms are obviously different than they were two decades ago. The expectations Americans bring to the work situation have evolved. The family is an institution in flux because of shifts related to social values. But so many of the changes we see are those stipulated and channeled by the underlying liberal values. The United States was set on a course by these values two centuries ago, and it is sticking to that course today.

The value system of classical liberalism has its attractive features—but as countless critics over the years have pointed out, it is far from an unmixed blessing. To say that the rampant individualism of our day is but a manifestation of the old liberal ethos is not to bless it. Some small satisfaction may be gained, though, from the recognition that if we are, as a society, going to Hell, it is by way of following the Old Morality to its natural limits. ☑

E.J. Dionne, Jr.

THE NEW POLITICS OF JOBS

It has become increasingly clear in recent months that minority group leaders and their liberal and labor allies have seized upon a new strategy of social reform for the late 1970s. Whether that strategy will succeed or not is still an open question, but simply by shifting their emphasis, liberals could bring an important and, I would argue, beneficial change in the American political landscape.

Their new strategy can be summarized in a single word: jobs. And their intention can be captured in a single phrase: to turn back the threatening tide of social conservatism.

The Legacy of the Sixties

The shift comes none too soon, for the sixties bequeathed a decidedly mixed inheritance to reformers on the left. There were, on one hand, the civil rights bills, a growing awareness of the problems of poverty, and the mobilization of large numbers of poor people to wage political battles on their behalf. There were, as well, the poverty programs which never worked as badly as their critics averred. But the liberals also paid a heavy price: their rhetoric and many of their programs—especially busing and affirmative action—stirred a whirlwind of social resentment. Even today, many a politician will run for cover when someone calls him a "liberal."

Although George Wallace was the first major figure to capitalize on the resentment, it was Richard Nixon who was able to ride the whirlwind to a stunning victory in 1972. As liberals sifted through the wreckage of that year, they advanced a variety of theories for their loss. Some pointed to the personal failings of George McGovern and his staff, others to the inability of the antiwar movement to gain a firm base in the working class, still others to the "elitism" of the white middle class. But the "dirty little secret" of the election, as Jack Rosenthal wrote later in the *New York Times*, may have been *race*.

According to one view, the race issue as it emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s was only a temporary public reaction, fanned by Wallace-Nixon rhetoric. Against that view were those such as the Kerner Commission who argued that a pervasive racism had enveloped America. This racism, argued some liberals, would stymie all future efforts at reform.

Without attempting to resolve that difference of opinion (I lean toward the former, with caveats), it is

fair to say that racially linked sentiments were indeed powerful forces in 1972. The reasons behind this were many, but one of the most important in my view was the way conservative politicians succeeded in linking racial resentments with moral (and pseudo-moral) concerns stimulated by a seeming breakdown of traditional values—and then hanging the whole mess around the neck of the liberals.

The rhetorical gambit that Mr. Nixon employed so successfully was to glorify the "work ethic" and to suggest that his opponents were not in favor of work but welfare. Repeatedly, he spoke about the value of hard work, of the way that most Americans earned their keep by the sweat of their brow, and how the value of work was being "demeaned" in the modern day. In one speech, he went so far as to say that he would rather have his mother cleaning bedpans than collecting welfare. Mr. Nixon would argue that he was a true friend of black Americans—he did, after all, sponsor some of the earliest compensatory action programs—but in his harping upon welfare, certainly the liberals and many others felt he was tugging at the same racial emotions as George Wallace.

Liberals and minority leaders were hard pressed to combat this rhetoric, however phony and opportunistic it seemed. They tried to invoke compassion. They attacked racism. They pointed to past discrimination and unemployment. But at bottom, the work ethic itself was virtually immune from effective political attack, since to attack it would be to assault the way in which a vast majority of Americans of all colors lived their lives. Thus, the "work ethic" gave the conservatives a mighty club to use against liberals at the polls.

For the left, Watergate helped to discredit the Nixon administration and deflate the threateningly large Republican vote. The result was seen in the massive gains by the Democrats in the 1974 midterm elections. But the avalanche of Democratic votes represented a rejection of Mr. Nixon, not an endorsement of liberal programs. As political scientist William Schneider pointed out later, "Liberals did well in 1974 because they were Democrats. Democrats did not do well because they were liberals." [1] The continuing strength of conservatives like Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia, Ralph Perk in Cleveland, Charles Stenvig in Minneapolis, and, of course, George Wallace pointed to the persistence of conservative social feeling in those years. Conservative strategists like William Rusher, in rejecting the Republican Party, were hoping that by letting the dead bury the dead and starting afresh with a new conservative party, Democratic conservative votes could be added to the Republican ideological and class base to produce "a new majority."

1 William Schneider, "The Two Majorities," *New York Times*, September 12, 1975.

Raising a New Banner

Thus, as we reached the mid-1970s, conservatives were still happily identified with the "work ethic" and liberals were still tagged with the "welfare ethic." Enter the politics of jobs.

Jobs are hardly a new issue. Democrats have won countless elections by invoking the specter of Herbert Hoover, and in 1946 the Congress made "full employment" an official policy of the government. In practice, the civil rights movement has also had jobs at the center of its concerns for many years. A. Philip Randolph's planned march on Washington in 1941 was organized against the idea of job discrimination.

Yet, by changing their emphasis from welfare reform to job creation in the mid-1970s, the liberals made it seem as if they were raising a new banner. The centerpiece of their new strategy was the Full Employment Act, first introduced by Senator Hubert Humphrey and Congressman Augustus Hawkins in January 1975. It was a propitious time to strike, for the country was in the midst of its worst recession in a generation and the left could forcefully argue that blacks and other minorities were disproportionately poor not because they didn't like to work, but because they couldn't find work. Long lines at job offices helped to bear out the point.

Politically, the shift from a welfare strategy to a jobs strategy also had a great advantage for the left: it turned the argument about the work ethic on its head. If all Americans had a *duty* to work, then surely all had a *right* to hold a job. The same moral concerns that fed the conservative revival in the early 1970s could, it seemed, just as easily fuel a revival of liberalism and a renewed concern for the poor toward the end of the decade.

Debate has raged among social planners over the relative value of jobs, services and income "strategies" to help the poor. Whatever the merit of those policy arguments, there can be no doubt that from a *political* standpoint—as an issue around which to organize a

rhetoric and a strategy for reform—jobs and full employment are far more popular than the rest.

Consider the following findings of a *New York Times*/CBS News poll, taken in September of 1976, just before the fall campaign got under way:

—Only 23 percent of those polled called themselves "very liberal" or "liberal," reflecting in part the continuing disenchantment with the McGovernites of old.

—Only 36 percent thought that people on welfare "really need this help," while 49 percent agreed with the statement that "most people who are on welfare could get along without it if they tried."

—Whites in the survey were almost evenly divided on the question of whether "the government has paid too much attention to the problems of blacks and other minorities."

—*But*, in the same survey, 69 percent of Americans agreed that "the federal government should see to it that every person who wants to work has a job."

Perhaps even more surprisingly, in a *Times*/CBS survey taken in April 1977, Americans who were asked to choose between a "tax cut" and "government programs to stimulate the economy" chose government programs by a 2 to 1 margin. Both whites and blacks showed a preference for government programs.

The attitudes reflected by these surveys have been reaffirmed in many different ways by the Harris and Gallup organizations. In August of 1977, for instance, Lou Harris found that only 24 percent of the public thought it would be a "very serious loss" if the federal government cut welfare spending by a third; in sharp contrast, 64 percent thought it would be a "very serious loss" to make the same cuts in jobs for the unemployed. In May of 1977, when George Gallup asked people how the welfare system ought to be changed, the highest priority on the list was to improve the investigative and screening process in order to reduce cheating. Gallup also noted that then, as in past decades, he found a majority of people favored the reestablishment of government work programs such as the CCC and WPA.

The lesson is clear: most Americans have misgivings about the welfare programs of the 1960s and even deeper doubts about the rhetoric associated with them, but they still want to be generous to the "deserving" poor and more importantly, they will support legitimate jobs programs sponsored by the government. Thus, in choosing to make their fight on the jobs issue, liberals appear to have hit upon a promising strategy.

The Conservative Counterattack

One might conclude that conservatives would do well to avoid the full-employment issue and instead try to turn the national debate back to divisive racial and social issues. These, it seems, are issues around which a conservative majority might be built. There are a number of conservatives who are making such arguments and who believe they can scuttle full employment and other welfare measures in the bargain.

However, the debate that has already arisen around the Humphrey-Hawkins bill indicates that conservatives have another course open to them, a course pursued with near success by Gerald Ford in 1976. It is *the politics of inflation.*

Few social programs are costless, and the costs are usually both direct (the spending of public funds) and indirect (the loss of special privileges or the rise of inflation). The original Humphrey-Hawkins proposal clearly carried the first price tag and probably the second in the form of inflation. Since people who favor full employment also want lower taxes and less inflation, it is by no means clear that their support for full-employment measures would stand up if they could be convinced that those same programs would make taxes and prices skyrocket. This line of attack is the basis of the traditional conservative economic critique of Humphrey-Hawkins and other social welfare measures. It is also an important basis of support for politicians with conservative views.

It is a political truism that if a vote for Republicans is a vote for unemployment, it is also a vote against inflation. Though stagflation has disrupted much economic thinking, it has made less of a dent in the political verities. Rarely was this seen more clearly than in 1976.

Throughout the 1976 campaign, and at various times since then, the *Times* and CBS have asked Americans in various ways which problem they considered "more important" for the country, unemployment or inflation. In the final pre-election poll in 1976, registered voters across the country cited inflation as being more important by a 51 to 39 percent margin. (This, incidentally, stood in contrast to a poll of registered and unregistered voters, taken the previous April, when unemployment "won" by a 5 to 3 margin.) In the pre-election poll, voters who chose inflation supported Gerald Ford over Jimmy Carter by a 50 to 37 percent margin. Those who said unemployment was more important backed Mr. Carter, 50 to 28 percent.

It is fair to say that Mr. Carter's "turn to the right" in the final weeks of the campaign—especially his emphasis on the promise of a balanced budget—was designed in part to appease inflation-conscious voters. At the same time, the *Times*/CBS and other surveys showed that one of the key factors behind Mr. Ford's comeback was his success in getting across his message that Democrats equal liberal programs which in turn equal inflation.

In short, a conservative candidate very nearly succeeded even though he largely avoided the politics of race and instead emphasized the oldest of modern American conservative virtues, "fiscal responsibility" and the seemingly unemotional but quite effective issue of inflation.

The importance of this achievement should not be

overlooked, because it points to a threat to the New Deal coalition that could, over the long term, be even greater than the politics of race. Well-to-do voters and those on fixed incomes will nearly always worry more about inflation than unemployment. This is generally true regardless of their views on the acid, amnesty, abortion, and race issues that seemed so crucial just five years ago. And growing affluence, even an affluence which leaves behind large numbers of poor people, breeds a larger class of inflation-phobes—that is, economic conservatives. The potential appeal of this conservatism extends well beyond corporate board rooms and Rotary Club dinners.

President Carter is obviously aware of this. Before he took office, his pollster, Patrick Caddell, warned of a growing group of young professionals who were at once "social liberals" and "economic conservatives." This group, he said, could hold the balance of power in the future and had not been terribly sympathetic to Mr. Carter during the campaign. The President seems to have gotten this message, and the threat of inflation has been a central factor in most of the Carter administration's economic decisions—particularly in its caution on new social programs and in its refusal to push for the Humphrey-Hawkins bill until after it had been severely watered down.

Yet Mr. Carter has a problem on the inflation issue that conservatives don't have to worry about. Though he needed moderate and conservative swing voters to win the election, Mr. Carter leaned heavily on the left wing of the Democratic base: blacks, poor and working-class whites, liberals and (especially in New York and Pennsylvania) city dwellers. Failing to meet his basic social welfare (that is, Democratic) commitments could spell serious trouble for the President among those groups in 1980, both in the Democratic primaries and later. The revolt of black leaders last year was a warning that the President could not take his base for granted. Moreover, blacks and liberals can point to genuine public sympathy for many of their social welfare goals, especially jobs.

Conservatives, on the other hand, make few promises to the poor, garner few of their votes, and can thus pursue the politics of inflation and restraint with little fear. Only an economic collapse (which, in any event, would now work to Mr. Carter's disadvantage) would threaten the anti-inflation, Republican conservative base.

The Demographics of Inflation: The Politics of Class

For better or worse—I will argue for better—the politics of jobs and the politics of inflation translate into the same thing: the politics of class.

There is no absolute relationship between concern over inflation or unemployment on the one hand and class position on the other. Poor people worry about inflation, rich people about unemployment. Views on the relative importance of the two are also sensitive to economic trends. In April of 1976, when the economic indicators seemed to show that unemployment was a more serious problem than inflation, so did the public, by about 5 to 3. In September after the economy had picked up steam, the public divided almost evenly. By April of 1977, when government reports indicated a rise in the inflation rate and a small drop in unemployment, opinion had shifted to a 50 to 34 percent margin for inflation as the more important problem.[2]

But within the temporal shifts, class differences endured. Poor people as a group will always worry more about unemployment than the rich. Depressed areas will always harbor more worry about unemployment. So, barring some rapid social change, will blacks. (See Table 1.)

Table 1

INFLATION VS. UNEMPLOYMENT: BASIS FOR "POLITICS OF CLASS"?

Q: Which do you think is the more important problem facing the country today—unemployment or inflation?

	Unemployment	Inflation
ALL	34%	50%
Region		
Northeast	44	39
North Central	30	56
South	32	53
West	33	53
Party		
Republican	28	60
Democratic	37	46
Independent	35	51
Class		
Professional/managerial	27	62
White collar	32	55
Blue collar	39	44
Farm	34	46
Union Membership		
Union family	38	45
Nonunion	33	52
1976 Vote		
Carter	38	47
Ford	26	62
Did not vote	39	44
Ideology		
Liberal	41	46
Moderate	33	54
Conservative	32	54
Income		
Less than $8,000	39	40
$8,000 to $12,000	35	50
$12,000 to $20,000	33	54
$20,000 and over	28	62
Race		
White	31	54
Black	56	27

Source: *New York Times*/CBS News Survey of 1,707 Americans conducted in April 1977

2 Most of the data used in this article appeared in summary form in the *New York Times* on May 15, 1977.

Similarly, poor and working-class people will always be more sympathetic to direct government social programs than to tax cuts and market incentives. As shown by Table 2, among higher income brackets, white-collar workers and conservatives, there is a definite shift toward tax cuts and free markets.

Table 2

JOB PROGRAMS VS. TAX CUTS

Q: Would you rather see the economy stimulated by a tax cut—or by government programs to create more jobs?

	Tax Cut	Job Creation
ALL	30%	60%
Region		
Northeast	25	66
North Central	31	58
South	28	59
West	37	54
Party		
Republican	38	51
Democratic	24	67
Independent	32	57
Class		
Professional/managerial	38	51
White collar	38	54
Blue collar	25	65
Farm	22	62
Union Membership		
Union family	30	61
Nonunion	30	59
1976 Vote		
Carter	25	66
Ford	39	48
Did not vote	26	64
Ideology		
Liberal	27	67
Moderate	32	59
Conservative	33	55
Income		
Less than $8,000	20	72
$8,000 to $12,000	29	62
$12,000 to $20,000	34	57
Over $20,000	39	50
Race		
White	32	57
Black	12	82

Source: *New York Times*/CBS News Survey of 1,707 Americans conducted in April 1977

Table 3

A COMPARISON OF VIEWS ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION AND VIEWS ON SELECTED RACIAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES (WHITES ONLY)

Q: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

The government has paid too much attention to the problems of blacks and other minorities.

Sometimes busing may be necessary if it is the only way to integrate the schools.

Do you think that most people who receive money from welfare could get along without it if they tried, or do you think they really need this help.

	Percent of Those Who Think That:	
	Inflation more important	Unemployment more important
Too much attention to minorities		
Agree	55%	37%
Disagree	49	43
Busing necessary		
Agree	46	46
Disagree	54	37
Welfare recipients don't need help		
Agree	53	38
Disagree	49	44

Reading tip: "Of those who think that too much attention has been paid to minorities, 55 percent also think that inflation is more important than unemployment, while 37 percent think that unemployment is more important than inflation."

Source: Based on a *New York Times*/CBS News Survey in late August and early September 1976. Table is based on white respondents only. Total sample: 1,703. White sample: 1,500.

That this should be the case is hardly shocking. What is more important is that views on inflation and unemployment, while class biased, are not firmly tied to attitudes on racial and "social" questions. As shown by Table 3, among those whites who believed that busing may be necessary to integrate schools, 46 percent thought that unemployment was more important than inflation but an equal percentage felt the other way. Among those whites who thought the government was *not* paying too much attention to the problems of blacks, 49 percent thought inflation was more important than unemployment while 43 percent ranked unemployment higher. In that same poll, those who took more conservative positions on social issues consistently showed even more concern about inflation, but the margins were far from overwhelming. In other words, though there is a limited connection between racial and economic conservatism, it is fair to conclude that among whites, views on inflation and unemployment tend to cut across the racial divisions of the 1960s.

Despite the particular importance of Humphrey-Hawkins and other pieces of job legislation to blacks, the fight over these economic issues promises to be something other than a racial battle along the lines laid down during the 1960s. *And it is a debate that both sides have a good chance of winning in the forum of public opinion.*

Backers of large-scale public job programs can win in the public arena if they can persuade Americans either that the inflation and taxation costs of their programs will not be too high or that those costs are worth paying. There appears to be considerable sup-

port for that position among voters. Opponents of such plans, on the other hand, can count on fears of inflation and taxation to buttress their position, and they can even win votes among those whose views on racial questions are quite liberal. And conservatives have an additional weapon, one of the oldest and most reliable in their arsenal: politically, they can capitalize on the practical difficulties inherent in *any* large-scale effort at social reform. All social programs have initial problems and failures, some more than others. In the case of jobs programs, such failures usually have to do with "fake" jobs—ones in which the job holders do little work or perform seemingly unproductive tasks. Attacks aimed at such "make work" could garner significant popular support, if the charges can be proven. Moreover, the 1970s are not the 1930s. A more affluent electorate can be counted upon to cast a more critical eye on jobs programs than their forebears did on the WPA, which was launched at a time when truly pervasive unemployment was at issue.

Laying Down the Burden of Race

There are many things that a renewed emphasis upon economic issues will *not* do. It will not end the conflicts around emotional issues like busing and the Bakke case. It will not, obviously, solve the inflation/unemployment dilemma. It will not, assuredly, lead to a consensus on most issues of importance.

But a revival of politics based more on class than race will have a number of positive implications and results.

For Democrats and the left, the politics of jobs is an essential coalition-building tool. Such a politics could make it possible to reunite the New Left and the Old Left, ease past resentments, open the way to dialogue on difficult questions, and offer many concrete opportunities for cooperation. Reunited in a single coalition, they might also reestablish the political consensus of days gone by. The alternative, a reliance on a vague coalition of minority groups, some poor whites, a reduced segment of the working class, and middle-class social liberals, seems almost certain to lead to a liberal-left decline. Jimmy Carter's victory, while in part the result of his unusual strength in the South and in rural areas, was heavily dependent on the reconstruction of a New Deal-style class coalition. He may well need the same coalition in 1980.

For conservatives, matters are less clear-cut. The potential appeal of social conservatism, especially on racial issues, persists despite the attenuation of racial conflict. Race continues to afford conservatives and Republicans the opportunity of "splitting the working class" and carrying away a large chunk of the votes. Moreover, the economic strategy carries with it long-term risks, since views on the economy are subject to its performance at a particular juncture. Conservatives are also aware that even though Republicans are regarded as the anti-inflation party, a Gallup poll in October of 1977 found that by a 36-19 percent margin, the public thinks Democrats are better than Republicans in combatting the high cost of living. And they know, too, that there is still latent public support for wage and price controls, so that one day the liberals could steal the inflation issue from them.

Yet, moving toward economic issues also offers Republicans and conservatives substantial opportunities. First, the growing black middle class is not immune to an economic appeal from the moderate right. An emphasis on racial politics precludes an opening to the black community, but an emphasis upon inflation and business-led economic growth does not. The same may be true of blue-collar and "ethnic" voters: they identify more with middle-class interests, and they also tend to be more conservative. Senior citizens also fear inflation, of course, and they are an essential ingredient for a successful coalition on the right.

Another factor is that a coalition based upon race is inherently less stable or enduring than one based upon economic interests. The European conservative parties, which have firm economic and certainly class bases, tend to enjoy much more stable and deeply rooted support than do Republicans now.

Finally, there is the question of how far democratic conservatives would wish to carry racial politics. There is a line between "legitimate" social conservatism and overt racism, but some of the fringe conservatives have in the past seemed quite willing to cross that divide. Conservatives must be prepared to ask where social and racial conservatism lead and whether they want to go there. There may well be less appeal in such a political stance than in the 1960s. The defeat of Louise Day Hicks and the problems encountered by the Rizzo machine over the past year suggest that voters are tiring of confrontation and are prepared to punish politicians who foster it.

The national benefits of economic as opposed to racial politics, however, override the particular interests of liberals or conservatives. While politics based on class or economic differences is no guarantee of stability, politics based upon race almost certainly guarantees instability of the most unproductive and potentially dangerous sort. Political systems characterized by economic-based politics usually permit a great deal of maneuvering, compromise, and frank discussions of political and economic self-interest. In the phrase of Seymour Martin Lipset, they permit the working out of the "democratic class struggle." Ethnic and racial antagonism tends to breed mistrust, violence, false moralism, less than honest discussion, and a contempt for democratic processes. In addition, such politics often results in the unconscionable mistreatment of the minority groups involved.

The politics of jobs in particular, and the revival of economic and class-based politics generally, offers America an enormous opportunity. It could help us, at last, to lay down the burden of race. ☑

Reviews of Recent Books and Articles

Social Indicators, 1976, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), $7.00.

The U.S. Census Bureau and the associated, affiliated and semi-affiliated statistical agencies of the government are, quite simply, one of our great unsung national, neutral and natural resources. Every day, week, year and decade—with the regularity of the tides and about as much ideology—there pours forth an ocean of numbers by which a modern society attempts to gain a sense of its own direction.

Tides cause few headlines; it is the once-in-a-while event—hurricane, tidal wave, meteor shower—that cops big ink. So, too, with the statistical output of the federal establishment.

The current case in point is the publication of the massive and fascinating compendium entitled *Social Indicators, 1976,* second in a so-far irregular series that harvests the fruits of our great data tree. The volume was greeted with the front-page play that, needless to say, was not the treatment rendered when the assorted data were originally published in recent years.

That is too bad, because there is a message in this volume that if recognized by more people earlier might have led to a more realistic public dialogue. Consider that the data collection runs roughly through 1975 with some data included for 1976—that is, reflecting two major recessions, including "the worst one since the Great Depression." And what is the message of this data feast? In headlines it might look this way:

AMERICANS
FAIRLY WELL-SATISFIED
WITH THEIR LOT:
CRISIS-MONGERS ROUTED

with a sub-head that might read:

Bottom Does Not Fall Out:
It Is Probably Rising

That message comes through eleven chapters ranging from family life to housing, work, income, health, leisure, social mobility—with the possible exception only of "public safety."

It is a message that is buttressed by a new feature, one that in an earlier presidency might have been trumpeted—accurately—as "the first time an American government has attempted to systematically collect and publicize the fruits of public opinion research!"

A volume of social indicators, after all, should assess not only hard indices but what people themselves think of their own condition. And so senior author Denis Johnston has committed the U.S. government to public opinion data. Each of the eleven chapters has a section on "public perceptions" and, put together, they add up to a mini-encyclopedia of American public opinion—excepting issue-oriented material (nothing, for instance, about the Panama Canal or E.R.A.).

Mr. Johnston has, of course, taken his government into the great swamp. Public opinion data are inherently less precise and more controversial than, say, economic or demographic numbers. But Johnston, with the quicksand at his ankles, quotes Angus Campbell in defense: "better a poor measure of the right thing than a good measure of the wrong thing."

Fair enough. Mr. Johnston has harnessed the great federal data machine and has taken a first solid crack at survey research. The volume has fascinating material in it. At seven dollars from the superintendent of documents, it's a steal.

—BEN WATTENBERG ☑

The American Monomyth, Robert Jewett and John Shelton Lawrence (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1977), $8.95.

How vulnerable is public opinion to subliminal messages beamed daily from our television sets, comic books, magazines, books and newspapers? Very vulnerable, argue the authors, who see a recurring pattern in popular culture: a community is first shown under threat from an outside evil, it then proves unable to save itself, and finally it is rescued by a "superhero": Superman, Charles Bronson, Bionics, Trekkies and so forth. Viewers are bombarded so often with this message that they come to believe it, and feeling powerless, people rely less and less upon their own initiative and more and more upon centralized government. Moreover, the menace is "spreading . . . to the rest of the planet through the powerful new technomythic media." While it's a provocative gloom-and-doom portrayal, the authors' solution—"public examination of popular materials" (pg. 223)—is not only vague but doubtful.

—ANDREA HAINES ☑

The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Ronald Inglehart (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), $9.95.

"They" are highly educated, idealistic, politically sophisticated, cosmopolitan, enjoy broad horizons, are nonauthoritarian, are open to new experiences—in a word, "civilized." Where can you meet these wonderful creatures? Ronald Inglehart, drawing upon extensive attitude surveys of Western Europe and the U.S. in the early seventies, argues that they are all around you, for they are the "post materialists" and they are the vanguard of a silent but permanent revolution in Western society. Freed by "peace and prosperity" from the demanding struggle for sheer survival, they now tend to higher tasks, like "self actualization." And their emergence will transform Western politics, shifting the emphasis from economic issues to questions of life-style.

Before we trade in our three-piece suits for jeans and T-shirts, however, Inglehart's conclusions should be questioned more closely. His own figures, for instance, show that the "post materialists" remain a minuscule minority in all nations surveyed, and in most cases, *they are even a minority of the postwar generation.* Judging from more recent surveys of college students who are stampeding into business administration and accounting courses, peace and prosperity may be yielding a slower greening of the West than Mr. Inglehart supposes—indeed, the advent of a revolution in political values may be wholly illusory. In view of certain peculiarities among the post-materialists—their intense moralizing and unwillingness to compromise—perhaps such a revolution is undesirable as well.

—BILL SCHAMBRA ☑

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



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