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IS THIS THE END OF AN ERA?

- Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg
- Everett C. Ladd
- Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein

"It's just that I've never thought of us as little guys."

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by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg

IS IT THE END OF AN ERA?

Dear Citizen Taxpayer:

Even though you may have known it for some time, more and more Americans are just waking up to the plain and simple truth: The reason the United States Government cannot solve the urgent problems that are plaguing our country, is because the government is the problem.

—From a fund-raising letter sent By Common Cause in 1980

Something very important has happened in America in recent years: people have changed their minds.

Something else may happen in the course of the next few years: people will change their politics.

And so, we hear talk (once again) of the much-storied, much-fabled, powerful virus that periodically infects the political community: "realignment." But what political scientists think of as a realignment travels under a simpler flag to more common folk who simply say, "it's the end of an era."

It is our view that because people have changed their minds, a political era characterized by a distinct political philosophy has indeed come to an end. We further believe that the philosophy in question—American liberalism—has rendered healthy, vigorous and constructive service to the republic: that its impact will continue to be felt, and that there will be no going back to yesteryear—but, still, *it is over.* The center of the political spectrum is moving; politicians will gain or keep power only insofar as they can appeal to that moving center.

Moreover, this case holds almost regardless of who wins what in the next few years; whether or not the Republicans this fall capture the presidency, whether or not they capture the Senate in 1982, whether or not they (someday) carry the House or the governorships or the state legislatures. The changed political climate, mind you, gives Republicans a chance for all these things; but what is most important for the nation, if not for politicians, is the change in direction, not the change in party. Thus, the Democratic party can change its direction and scrub its image clean in conformity with its voters' current views and plausibly remain the dominant party; or it can *not* scrub and become the minority view in America; but it can't do both. For new conditions seek new solutions and new images. And politics in a democracy is the ultimate Darwinian activity: adapt or die.

In this article we propose to deal with both *actual* change in the climate of opinion and the *potential* for change, from Democratic to Republican.

Realignments

Wood rots. Iron rusts. Those are sometimes the wrong metaphors for political realignments. Plastic may be better. For, under stress, plastic breaks suddenly, swiftly and cleanly.

In earlier times in America, major realigning elections often sounded like the quick snap of plastic—at least in retrospect.

William Jennings Bryan's Cross of Gold speech electrified the Democratic Convention in 1896, but the issue of Free Silver was a loser on the national scene. It was not Bryan, but the Republican nominee, William McKinley, who went to the White House. That election firmly established in the public mind that the Democrats were a somewhat radical party and that the Republicans were the party of stability and "the full dinner pail." Thus, an *idea* was implanted in the American psyche—a partisan idea—with massive political reper-

cussions. For the next third of a century that partisan idea—Republican stability versus Democratic radicalism—hung on. Republicans dominated the Congress, the presidency and the State houses. When the dust settled, it was clear that the plastic had snapped during the 1896 election. And it was called, in the political science trade, a realigning election. That realigning election had two noticeable criteria: a change in partisan perception and a subsequent change in voting patterns.

In 1932, a new partisan perception began to take shape. Under the lash of the Depression, Democrats took power under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In a dozen years as President, FDR worked one rich political vein. The Democratic party, he intimated, was the party of "the people," "the forgotten man," "the little guy" and "the common man." By contrast, the Republicans were the party of "economic royalists"—or in later parlance, "fat cats" who felt at home in "corporate board rooms" and "country clubs."

Under the rubric of such (sometimes valid) imagery, Democrats have become powerful, wealthy and prominent for almost half a century. They captured the presidency five times in a row; they have had majorities in the Congress almost constantly, and won a majority of the governorships much of the time.

More important, their ideology—liberalism—became the regnant received wisdom of the time. Liberalism both reflected changed opinions in America and helped to change opinions in America. So, a third criterion for realignment became apparent. *Partisan perceptions* had changed as in the earlier realignment; *politics* had changed as in the earlier realignment; and in *this* one *opinions* changed.

Looking now toward the possibility of a new realignment, it is useful to explore whether these three criteria are satisfied in the present instance.

Criterion Number One: Opinions

So we come to 1980. As this is written in the early fall of that year, what is important about the notion of political realignment is not that anyone can say "It is here." After all, other realignments were confirmable and noticeable only long after they occurred and were in some measure dependent on both subsequent unforeseen events and remarkable political personalities (like FDR and World War II). No, what is important this year is that for the first time one can look at substantial evidence and say "this has all the earmarks; it may turn out to be an ear."

Consider first the evidence of *changing opinions*. In the field of survey research there is almost always some countervailing evidence available, but in scanning the decade of the 1970s, one is struck by the powerful themes of change that emerge. Like it or not, almost all of these changes are in general concert with recent perceived Republican doctrine—not perceived Democratic doctrine.

What is the current Republican doctrine?

In shorthand, try this: *economic stagnation and inflation are the real problems. Their major cause is big taxation which feeds big government which, in any event, is not doing well what it is supposed to do and is, moreover, making it difficult for private enterprise to do well what it is supposed to do. Furthermore, the government has been taken over by high-minded elitists who have lost touch with everyday concerns of everyday citizens. Meanwhile, America has grown militarily weak and is being pushed around all over the world.*

Those are important political thoughts and, to be fair, have not been mainstream liberal Democratic views (at least until very recently). Liberal ideology, after all, was predicated on the idea that a bigger, centralized government would help less fortunate people become more fortunate people. And if more government spending led to a little deficit spending which led to a little inflation, why a little inflation was not such a bad thing. After all, it let poor people pay off their debts more cheaply. In recent years—at least since Vietnam—the most vocal wing of the Democratic party has also said we're spending too much, not too little on national defense (the "bloated military-industrial complex") and that America is suffering from an "arrogance of power." Finally, it has been liberal Democratic credo that "social engineering" was a discipline whose time had come. Busing, quotas, environmentalism-impinging-on-life-style, were all part of the agenda.

Against that backdrop, consider a few selected poll results:

- Between 1959 and 1978 the percentage of Americans who thought that "big government" was the major cause of inflation went from 14% to 51% (!)

That's the Republicans' issue, and if reinforcement of that idea is needed let it be noted that by 1978 fully 76% of Americans thought that "Washington had become too powerful" and 84% believed that "Washington was spending too much."

A similar pro-Republican point of view has emerged on the issue of national defense. Consider what has happened as Vietnam has receded from the public consciousness:

	Increase defense spending	
	Favorable	*Unfavorable*
1971	*11%*	*49%*
1979 (pre-Iran)	*60*	*9*

Furthermore, the spirit of what was called "neo-isolationism" has receded in the land. Democrats of the "New Politics" persuasion who made political hay on the idea that America was "over-extended" and shouldn't be "the world's policeman" should consider data generated recently by Lloyd Free and William Watts. Under the Free-Watts scheme, a wide-ranging series of questions about foreign policy yields an index

to measure the percentage of "total internationalists" in the American population.

- In 1964 (pre-Vietnam when *Pax Americana* was still thought of as a good idea), *65%* of the American public were "total internationalists."
- In 1974, just before the final death throes in Vietnam the percentage of "total internationalists" had plummeted to *41%*.
- In 1980 the percentage of "total internationalists" was back to *61%*.

These are, as noted, selected data. To be sure there are other data that show that people don't want cutbacks on services, and inflation induced data that yield positive responses to the idea of wage and price controls. The idea of national health insurance is still popular. But, notwithstanding these counter-balances, there are few analysts these days who would deny what the general run of numbers tends to point up: inflation has become the nation's number one concern, the bloom is off the rose for the idea of further governmental activism, the public is substantially more hawkish than it was a few years ago. (Proposition Thirteen and the hostage issue seem to be the best attitudinal pointers in recent years.)[1]

Agree or disagree on substance, these have been Republican themes. In a just world (which, in fairness, is not always the best way to describe the political arena) these are themes that should help Republicans—perhaps enough to kick off a new political era.

The change of attitudes has not only proceeded among the public. Consider the Congress. Ideas that were unpopular five years ago are seen now as the wave of the future. The capital gains tax has been lowered. The defense budget has been raised. Oil prices have been deregulated. Airlines and trucking are deregulated. Democrats and Republicans issue *joint* reports praising "supply side" economics. And for a brief, shining moment, the budget was balanced, at least in committee. And members of both parties compete with one another to make a point of how much they want to cut domestic spending.

It's happening in expert-land, too. Economists of almost every persuasion beam proudly upon the idea of letting the market work its will and encouraging business investment. President Carter's new "revitalization" plan features business incentive tax cuts unheard of in previous Democratic programs. And when the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Charles Schultze is asked on television to explain why the proposed personal tax cuts only offset the social security tax increases, he reaches back to the Country of Friedman and says, "Well, you know, in economics there's no free lunch."

In short: opinions have changed among the public, the Congress, and the experts. We've changed our minds.

[1] With the defeat of California's subsequent Proposition 9 (halving the income tax rate) being the limiting case of the tax revolt.

A Second Criterion: Elections

Election Results: Beyond attitude, opinion and ideology, there is at least some evidence to suggest that attitudinal changes have already begun to yield election results.

Consider the senatorial races of 1978. Five Democratic incumbent senators lost their seats.[2] All were perceived to be liberal. Their liberalism was an issue in their campaigns. The only Democratic senators who lost were liberals. All of the liberals running but one (Pell) lost.

Of course, one set of elections in one year doesn't necessarily make a rigid pattern. Even in geometry, two points are needed to define a straight line. Each of the defeated liberal senators surely faced unique local situations that could have accounted for his defeat.

On the other hand, if "politics ain't beanbag" as Mr. Dooley said, it ain't geometry either. *Fear* operates in politics if not geometry. If five of six liberal senators get voted out of office—their remaining colleagues get nervous indeed. Those who seek political survival begin to wonder about trimming their political philosophy here, there and everywhere. This has already happened in Congress, as has been noted.

Moreover, something else quite potent is at work. A second point on the graph seems to be emerging. Of course, the 1980 election hasn't been held yet, and to coin a rich phrase, anything can happen. Still, it is instructive to ask the perennial political question: "Who's in trouble?"

For the second straight election, it is mostly *liberals* who are said to be "in trouble." George McGovern (D-S. Dak.) is in big trouble, reduced to endorsing a new strategic bomber. Frank Church (D-Idaho) is in trouble, reduced to smiting Russians in Cuba. John Culver (D-Iowa), Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) are in trouble, and the list can be expanded. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) has already lost. Liberals all. All being attacked on the basis of their liberalism as being "out of touch" with the people of their fair states.

And who isn't in trouble in the Democratic party? The not-so-liberals are not-so-in-trouble. Robert Morgan (D-N.C.) is not in trouble. John Glenn (D-Ohio) is not in trouble. Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) is not in trouble. Most of the non-liberals are not in much trouble.[3]

Now, the Democrats control the Senate rather substantially: 58-41 (with one Independent). It will take a *shift* of *nine* seats to break Democratic control of the

[2] Dick Clark, Iowa; Wendell Anderson, Minnesota; William Hathaway, Maine; Floyd Haskell, Colorado; Tom McIntyre, New Hampshire. In addition liberal James Abourezk, looking down the gun barrel of disastrous polls, opted not to seek reelection in South Dakota.

[3] Alas in politics, generalizations don't work in every instance. Is Warren Magnuson a liberal—or a moderate? Is he "in trouble?" If he is, is it a measure of his age, not his politics? If he is not, is it because Mt. St. Helen's blew its stack and enabled the not unpowerful President Pro Tem of the Senate and Chairman of the Appropriations Committee to bring home almost a billion dollars worth of federal aid? Further, some liberals seem to have overcome early challenges and seem somewhat safe in 1980: Cranston, Hart, Eagleton, although each has enhanced his liberal chances. And Richard Stone of Florida, a non-liberal, is in trouble.

Senate. Even with a big Reagan win, such a swing is quite unlikely—even though, as the luck of the draw would have it, far more Democrats than Republicans must face the voters this year (24-10).

But suppose the Republicans have a net gain of, say, four or five seats—which is not unlikely. After all, that still means winning less than half the contested seats. Then, in 1982, with the Republicans only needing four or five seats for control, the luck of the draw again becomes important. For then, as now, more Democratic seats are up than Republican—19 to 14. The Republicans would have to do only slightly better than an even split among the contested seats to control the Senate—for the first time in 52 years.

If one is talking about the possibility of "the end of a political era," that is a thought worth considering.

Much of this, of course, is speculation. And there will be further political speculation to come this year and throughout the early 1980s regarding the House of Representatives, the governorships, and the state legislatures. But the richest vein of speculation, of course, revolves around the presidential race of 1980: Carter vs. Reagan vs. Anderson.

The Presidency: The race for the White House further illuminates the potential for realignment. As this is written, in mid-September of 1980, the polls indicate a very close race with Governor Reagan holding a razor-thin lead and John Anderson trailing substantially with less than 15% of the vote.

Of course, we do not know who will win in November. Yet one overwhelming fact is apparent, at least for now: Ronald Reagan—thought of earlier in the year as perhaps the weakest possible Republican candidate—is at least even with the incumbent President of the majority party.

Two of the big reasons for this tend to shed some further light on the idea of political realignment.

First: Reagan is not Goldwater—because Goldwater was Goldwater.

It is a headline fact in the workaday political world that the Democratic left—at least an important part of it—has allegedly moved to the right. Thus, the attention paid to the alleged neoconservatives, a small band of itinerant intellectuals, who happily and deservedly bask in such a spotlight. What is *not* a headline fact is the obverse political motion: that a large part of the Republican conservative establishment has moved toward the center. And that, it must be noted, is a leftward move.

Accordingly, Governor Reagan seeks to convince us that he is just another reasonable, moderate conservative. Unlike Goldwater, he does not advocate making social security voluntary. He has moved back on part of the Kemp-Roth philosophy—that tax cuts will yield 100 percent revenue feedback. Nor, despite foot-in-mouth disease, does he (or the Republican platform) advocate that America withdraw its diplomatic recognition from mainland China in favor of Taiwan. Ronald

Reagan, of all people, favors the Chrysler bail-out and loans to New York City.

It is conceivable, of course, that Ronald Reagan has undergone a major ideological transformation. It is also entirely possible that (as he says) he was never as conservative as people said he was. But, more relevant is this: Reagan (and conservative Republicans generally) has seen the swamp of right-wing politics. They followed Barry Goldwater there. The bleached bones of losers still decay there. They are not going back.

Nowhere was this political movement more apparent than at the supposedly right-tilting Republican Convention in Detroit in July of 1980. The right-wing evangelicals got some satisfaction in the platform: dumping ERA, pro amendment on abortion. They are surely a powerful force in the GOP. But on big issues, positively tidal forces (which tell us a great deal about American politics) pushed the Reagan troupe toward its left (i.e. the center). Thus, the choice of a running mate was centrist—first for Gerald Ford, then for George Bush. Earlier, the right wing of the party was unsuccessful in an attempted purge of GOP Chairman Bill Brock, a moderate who has made a point that the Republicans must try to appeal to blacks. And at the convention, the center-seeking GOP turned over the podium to Benjamin Hooks, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

This shift is not apparent just on the political level. Perhaps more importantly it is also apparent on the intellectual front. Both the authors of this article are Democrats; both are associated with the American Enterprise Institute. Yet until just a relatively few years ago, AEI was an exclusively Republican domain regarded as "conservative." Under the leadership of a remarkable man, the late William J. Baroody, Sr., AEI became a think tank of the first magnitude; eclectic in its choice of scholars and fellows, with an intellectual range that now spreads far beyond traditional conservative strictures. AEI is, in many ways, a metaphor for what has happened to a part of the conservative wing of the Republican party, unbeknownst perhaps even to itself, unnoticed by the chroniclers of intellectual motion who see only the left moving right. What has happened is that many old line conservatives have become right of center moderates. As such, they can plausibly help put together electoral majorities in an America that remains centrist and moderate. Which on the presidential front, they now threaten to do. Which can lead to—indeed is a pre-condition of—political realignment. And which cannot happen if the Republican party is seen to dwell in the old right swamp.

Second: *Carter is in serious trouble for reasons that go beyond his own personal competence or lack thereof.* There was a moment, just before the Democratic Convention in August, during the confluence of the "Billygate" sensations and the struggle for an "open convention," when it appeared as if Jimmy Carter was the first American President who had more delegates than voters. There were polls in districts in Indiana and Wisconsin that showed the President fourth behind Reagan, Anderson and "undecided." In Elkhart, Indiana, fully 8 percent of the voters said Carter was their choice.

Now Carter will certainly do much better in November than the mid-August polls show: he may, in fact, win. But if we are exploring the notion of "end of an era" and political realignment, it is useful to examine whether the President's low estate is related to the premise.

What, actually, is the public's complaint with Carter?

People say he's "incompetent." (It is alleged that if the President is reelected a new French restaurant will open in Washington—called Sans Ept.)

Yet Camp David, the Panama Canal Treaty, the renewal of draft registration, a generally successful Olympic boycott, were not marks of an incompetent President. When asked why they think the President is "incompetent" Americans say he is an "indecisive" man who "changes his mind."

Perhaps that offers a clue toward a structural cause for what seems to be a personal problem. If there is such a structural cause, perhaps it tells us something about the possibility of realignment.

Why does it appear that Mr. Carter always "changes his mind?"

The President presides over a split party. There is Wing A—New Politics Liberal. There is Wing B—Old Fashioned Liberal, Trending Less So. And there is Wing C—Conservative. As a party, it does not know its own mind. It was thought, until recently, that the contemporary split in the Democratic party was caused by Vietnam and remained focused on foreign and defense policy. Not so. That is only part of the split. The other part concerns domestic affairs. Today, the domestic split may be as important as the foreign, with Wings B and C rejecting many of the Wing A nostrums.

For an old and simple political truth is becoming more apparent with every passing day: a humane welfare state cannot be funded without a vigorous private sector. If the private sector is leached, it may take some years to re-fertilize it. During that time, the public welfare sector must perforce go on somewhat shorter rations.

That is a harsh truth—but a truth nonetheless. It is not, however, a truth that is easily accepted by Wing A of the Democratic party. After all, a goodly portion of Wing A has come to earn its livelihood by providing government services, receiving government services or promoting government services that often make it more difficult for the private sector to operate. And in the cold world of politics, a constituent's rice bowl is not eroded without consequences.

Who are the constituent groups that make up

Wing A? Try for starters: pro-solar, anti-nuclear environmentalists, government workers on federal, state and local levels, the disadvantaged, minorities, grantsmen, consultants, feminists, consumerists.

(But the diminishment of the public sector is not terribly popular, even when one moves beyond the activists of Wing A. Remember, most of the country dips into the trough of entitlements: social security recipients, veterans, farmers, homeowners, and so on. We don't want the welfare state rolled back; only its growth curtailed. And even that is not due to arcane political theory—but only because voters believe that big spending is linked to high taxation and ultimately to high inflation.)

This means that Wing A—for all its protestations as being the champions against *old* special interests (oil, big business, etc.)—has come to be seen as a primary champion for *new* special interests in America.

It also means that Wing A—for all its protestations against Governor Reagan as a man of the past, steeped in nostalgia—has become the most blatant exponent of political nostalgia on the contemporary scene. Senator Edward Kennedy, the spokesman for Wing A, delivered the credo-speech for the Special Interest-Nostalgia-Entitlement wing at the Democratic Convention. It was a handsome speech: eloquent, delivered with fire and passion. It dealt with a wide range of problems omitting only one—that the problems Senator Kennedy dealt with were probably caused in some measure by just the sorts of solutions he was proposing. It was a speech from a time warp, 20 years out of sync, with just the right remedies required for a low inflation, high productivity economy. But these are not the economic conditions in America in 1980. (In this connection, it is interesting that Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, a Democrat, has recently noted that the *other* party, the Republican one, has become "the party of ideas" in America.)

Beyond all this, Wing A, although changing somewhat, remains more dovish by far than the American public. The tip-off at the Democratic Convention in New York came when the delegates, heavily tilted to Wing A views, *booed* when their nominee, President Carter, mentioned his draft registration proposal, a plan approved of by a solid majority of Americans, demonstrating afresh how different the convention delegates in New York were from typical Democratic norms.[4] The Wing-Aers have generally opposed increased military spending, although depending on whose data one uses, they can also be described as now favoring a modest turnaround in military spending. (Interestingly enough, word is out that Senator Kennedy who criticized military spending in his key February Georgetown University speech, purposely made no reference to guns-versus-butter in his New York Convention speech.)

Now briefly consider Wing B of the Democratic party. They are leery of the environmentalist's rape of energy production; they support moderate use of nuclear power. They support substantial increases in military spending. They are prepared to amend the tax code to provide further incentives for business. They are prepared to cut the rise in domestic welfare spending, albeit humanely. Wing C is the same only more so.

To sense the confusion, consider this: in the Congress, the Wing A New Politics liberals are an endangered species. If the purge begun in 1978 continues in 1980, Senator Kennedy may prove to be the leader of not much more than a one-man band.

Among the public at large, and among self-identified Democrats as well, the Wing B and Wing C views are more popular than Wing A. But the Democratic presidential contest, whether by accident or design we know not, became an intramural Wing A contest, a match in the Left of Center party between the Somewhat Left, the Somewhat Lefter, and the Somewhat-Still-Lefter (Carter, Kennedy, Brown).

To say that it is a convoluted situation understates it. (After all, Wing B champion Henry Jackson and Wing A champ Kennedy had a close political relationship going into the Democratic Convention. And Governor Brown managed to embrace both Proposition 13 *and* Tom Hayden-Jane Fonda.)

But just so; it is convoluted. It is in flux.

What of Jimmy Carter? Earlier Democratic presidents also presided over a split party: Bilbo vs. Lehman, for example. But those presidents brought their own (typically center-liberal) views and vision to the White House. Carter, however, is a self-described, solution-seeking technocrat, not an ideologue-with-a-vision. What is the poor man to make of it? He has, in fact, made a Chinese-Menu-Presidency of it: one from Group A, one from Group B, one from Group C. Soft on Russia—no, tough on Russia. Don't deregulate oil —no, do deregulate oil. More programs for poor people and blacks—no, austerity. Most important politically: big spending one year, old-time-religion the next, yielding some of the economic problems that are at the root of his "incompetent indecisive" image.

Captured originally (by accident or design we know not) by Wing A shock troops, Carter now desperately seeks to slip away from their minoritarian death grip. As he does, Wing A folks say, with some merit, that he is a "Reagan clone." And so, like Reagan with the Republicans, Carter had to make harmful political compromises on the platform to escape with a patina of "party unity." As a result, his party is now on record against nuclear power and in favor of thought

[4] A sense of just how much difference is provided by this poll done by CBS and the *New York Times* during the time frame August 2-7, 1980:

THE DELEGATES AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES

How delegates to the Democratic Convention characterized their political leanings, compared with the rank and file members of their parties (in percent)

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
Delegates	46%	42%	6%
All Democrats	21	52	21
Adult Americans	17	49	28

Verdict: A liberal convention of a centrist party in a centrist country.

control on E.R.A. Remarkably enough, but symbolic of the split-party-out-of-control, Carter's prime attackers during the platform proceedings were mostly people he himself had appointed: Paul Warnke, Ted Sorensen, Patsy Mink, Dick Clark, Pat Lucey, etc.

It's Chinese food all right; but all Wings (and the rest of the country) say that not only do you feel hungry an hour after you've eaten—but the food doesn't even taste so good anymore.

And so, the public says Carter is incompetent because he can't make up his mind. Insofar as he is and can't, his problem apparently lies in some large measure in the split personality of the Democratic party. In the worst of all possible Democratic worlds, what can happen in November is this: the Wing A Left flakes off to Anderson (Joseph Rauh and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., have already done so); some of the Wing B Centrists go to Reagan and even more of the Wing C folks do likewise. And the born again President is torn again, reduced to serving up further helpings of tasteless Chinese food to keep his wings flapping in his behalf. In any event, it is clear that schizophrenia is not the best state of mind for a party entering a national election contest that may indeed mark the end of an era—its own.

So: A split Democratic party is a weakened party, adding to the possibility of realigning activity—just as a center-trending Republican right is also a positive factor toward realignment.

Other Factors. Politics is not only theory, opinion, and viewpoint; it is also luck, circumstance, and happenstance. Sometimes all of that—and geography and demography as well.

The decennial census was taken this year.

By 1982, in time for the next congressional elections, and by 1984, in plenty of time for the next presidential election, a political reapportionment will have been executed. House seats and electoral college representation will be rejuggled.

This reapportionment bodes well to be particularly powerful and wrenching, lending further credibility to the idea of realignment. Why? Because the reapportionment based on the 1980 census coincides with a major American migration, the much noted tropism to the Sunbelt. In political terms, this migration is beneficial to the more conservative political forces in America.

Consider the reasons: Americans are moving to the South and West. These are typically the more conservative parts of the nation. *And in America the key elections are winner-take-all.*

Thus, the electoral college votes of a state are cast winner-take-all. A senatorial election provides for *one* winner; so does a House election and a gubernatorial contest. Except in the new rules for national conventions, ours is not a political culture that rewards losers with proportional shares of political power.

Consider what this means: a voter from a liberal-to-moderate state moves to a (Southern or Western) state that is regarded as moderate-to-conservative. Several possibilities. The transplantee takes on the political coloration of his new habitat. Score one for the conservatives. Or the transplantee can retain earlier (more liberal) beliefs, but in a winner-take-all situation he will find his vote subsumed in a sea of his more conservative neighbors, and *effectively wasted.* Also score one for the conservatives, at least until they are out-numbered which is at least many, many years down the road.

Consider now the key states that are expected to lose House and electoral seats starting in 1982: New York, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania. All of them industrial, with powerful trade-union influences, blue-collar, etc.[5]

And who gains? Florida, Texas, California, Arizona, Tennessee, Utah, Oregon, and Washington. Mostly all conservative in nature—but with the Pacific states, as ever, the great riddle.

To give a sense of changing political power due to geography, note this: the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 was held under an apportionment where the *"Frostbelt"* electoral college seats outnumbered the "Sunbelt" seats by *41.* The election of Carter-or-Reagan will be one where the "Sunbelt" is ahead by 4. And in the election of 1984, the Sunbelt will lead by *26.*

With such electoral arithmetic in the cards, how plausible is it that America will elect a perceived "liberal" as president in the 1980s?

Kennedy?

Mondale?

Realignment anyone?

The Third Criterion: Partisan Perception

A political realignment, should it come, and should it be a big, bouncing, healthy realignment, needs more than the "evidence" of opinion and of politics that it *may* happen, as laid out above. A political realignment of Rooseveltian magnitude also seems to need a big, bouncing change in partisan perception, a change rich enough so that 30 years from now pundits might write about the "genius" behind this realignment as they now write of the "genius" of the "FDR coalition."

Politics ain't beanbag or geometry—or philosophy or plasma physics for that matter. Big motive partisan ideas in politics are straightforward ones, simply stated. The big idea of FDR's New Deal was clear enough: "We are the party of the people," said Roosevelt. Simple idea, not entirely accurate but fecund with political potential. Fecund enough, at least, to transform a nation (for the better, we think) and, by the way, make three generations of politicians fat and powerful.

Is there such a new, big idea on the Republican side this time around?

[5] South Dakota is also expected to lose one House seat.

There is indeed. It is this: "*We* are the party of the people" (!).

Not exactly $E=MC^2$, but no matter; it is, like its predecessor, a big, bouncing, rich idea fecund with potential—and not entirely accurate.

Of course, Republicans have been trying the party-of-the-people number for many years. The last fellow to give it a serious whirl was a dapper man-about-Washington named Spiro Agnew. It didn't quite work. Aside from his other well-publicized problems, Vice President Agnew had a tendency to snarl in making his pitch.

But Ronald Reagan doesn't snarl. He has been called an "affable ideologue." And he says he represents the "party of the people" with some credibility. He was, after all, a union president. Remember, it was not Reagan, but John Connally, who was called the candidate of "the corporate board room."

Or consider Congressman Jack Kemp, one of the most interesting and able politicians on the national scene. His congressional district includes Buffalo, a large, dreary, industrial city once called "the armpit of America." It is surely not a place from whence Republicans, ostensible party of the country-club set, are supposed to hail. And Kemp is a former football player. But Republicans are supposed to own football teams, not play for them.

Now, Kemp's economics—economics which have been smiled upon by Reagan and the Republican platform—may leave much to be desired. Many astute economists, Democratic and Republican, believe the Kemp-Roth tax reduction plan as originally written is a funny-money scheme. Perhaps it is.

But that is not the point. Economics, like politics, is at least partly symbolic. As a political metaphor Kemp-Roth plus the other aspects of "supply side economics" are not only right on target but more than vaguely reminiscent of certain earlier Democratic party rhetoric: Get America moving again (but don't mindlessly slash government expenditures.) Tax cuts are offered, say Kemp-Rothniks, not to help fat-cats but because high taxes are strangling middle class people and because America needs to provide incentives to make capital work again so that all those blue-collar workers can get jobs. Hyper-regulation, too, strangles productivity say the supply siders. To square the circle, supply siders say that only if we get America moving again can the welfare state be funded without continuing inflation.

These supply side economics are, if you will, *growth economics.* As such they are far removed from one strand of Wing A Democratic economics that at times seemed to influence at least some aspects of the early Carter presidency: conservation without production incentives in the energy field, a smattering of ideological no-growth, slow-growth, and era-of-limits, a dose of anti-nuclear environmental purity and an early shot of hyper-regulation.

Indeed it was *growth economics* (along with a strong defense) that was the key theme of the Detroit

Republican convention. The GOP said that the Wing A era-of-limits ideology was a betrayal of the American dream—and that is a potent theme.

Having allowed growth economics to be stolen by the Republicans (while they were perceived to be diddling with solar power), in this election year the Democrats are now in the ironic position of saying "me too" to an economic philosophy (growth) that was once their own meal ticket. The Carter plan for "re-industrialization" represents supply side catchup ball. Democrats hope that it will not be seen as too little and too late.

A fascinating process is apparent in the current economic jousting. The *Democratic* plan has greater incentives for *business* (!); the Republican plan has more for *consumers* (!!). This role reversal is either (A) crazy or (B) a classic example of the critical electoral game called Capture the Center, with each side attempting to raid the other's constituency. We lean toward explanation (B).

And in the meanwhile Mr. Reagan will keep on making those pernicious and malign noises that say, "*We* are the party of the people, *they* are the elite royalists."

If the Republicans can make that partisan perception stick, they can remind voters of that wonderful dictum of the fooball fan: "fire the coach." If that happens, in that way, which is possible, realignment will be on its way.

* * *

All this should not be construed (not for a moment) to suggest that Ronald Reagan, the Republicans, or the new era of American politics has a clear unfettered path to happy tomorrows. There are big problems.

First: never—ever—underestimate the ability of a democratic party in a media age, particularly *the* Democratic party in *this* media age, to steal, swipe, pilfer, and appropriate the ideas of the other party. Worse still, having stolen, they will not only *believe* in the ideas, but believe they *originated* them. When you hear Democrats, in private, practicing to say the words "capital formation," you know the process is well under way.[6]

Second: If the Democrats have "lost touch" with America on one or two important sets of ideas and attitudes, let it not be forgotten that Republicans these days tread on thin ice on another constellation of issues.

The authors of this article wrote in 1970 of "the Social Issue" as a time-bomb ticking in the Democratic tent. Traditional values were being eroded by those perceived to be linked to the Democratic party. Republicans indeed attacked (with some success) on the issues of crime, permissiveness, promiscuity, drugs and so on.

Now, the Republicans face the danger of the flip

[6] Consider the powerful words of Senator Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.), a dyed-in-the-wool Wing A liberal until recently. To a dinner of the Americans for Democratic Action (of all places), he said, "The energy crisis involves one basic fact–that oil is a finite and diminishing resource. Many liberals attack this issue by attacking the oil companies. Emotionally satisfying–yes. An answer to the problem–no.

"The problem is U.S. consumption. Who led the fight against the 10 cent gasoline tax?–the liberals."



'. . . Let's Try It Again! Now This Is What Is Commonly Known As The Little Man! . . .'

side of the Social Issue. It is still true (as in 1970) that Americans approve of "traditional values." But it is also increasingly true that, Garbo-like, they want to be left alone. The tacit toleration (for others, at least) of drug use, abortion, pornography, illegitimacy, homosexuality and pre-marital-living-together, represents a tidal and liberalizing change in American attitudes and culture. Surely these changes have engendered hostility and often repugnance, but most Americans seem to be willing to live and to let live.

A Republican platform that takes no position on E.R.A. is not a big loser. But a platform that endorses a constitutional amendment prohibiting *someone else* from having an abortion may be another matter. And even that is only a beginning. Americans are "pro-morality," but millions of moderate swing voters can be put off if the Reagan campaign is seen to be overly identified with self-proclaimed moralists who can be seen to be (perhaps unfairly) seeking to impose their morality on others.

The Republican party having brought its traditional conservatives to the moderate mainstream of economics and politics—a mainstream with deep, cool water and good fishing—can risk the whole catch by heading off into the shallow, rocky swirling eddies of right-wing social issues. Emphasis on prayer-in-the-school, anti-sex education, anti-gay rights, anti-pornography, anti-E.R.A., anti-abortion amendments and anti-evolution is a one-way ticket to the Swamp of No Return. Among other things it should be noted that some of those good ole boys in church on Sunday morning had their pick-up trucks at the XXX-rated drive-in on Saturday night. New Politics troops split the Democratic party early in the seventies. Just as Wing A played a role in moving Democrats out of the mainstream, so too can the activist moralist right-wing Republicans do the same for the GOP in the early eighties. Neither the McGovern Majority nor the Moral Majority are majorities.

Third: The candidate can goof. (Either can.)

In the early summer Carter seemed to have cornered the goof market. In the early fall, it is Reagan who has specialized in doing dirty tricks to his own campaign. We offer no prediction on goofs.

* * *

And for the Democrats? How do they prevent a new partisan perception from forming?

For the past 15 years the most interesting and important fight in American politics has been the fight for the soul of a Democratic party.

That has not changed. The Wing A versus Wing B versus Wing C fight goes on.

President Carter spent the primary and convention season making necessary tactical compromises with the Wing A Left-Nostalgists.

The President now must credibly hang a right turn toward reality if he is to achieve reelection and head off the possibility of a Republican realignment. As this is written, he has announced the re-targeting of missiles and the development of secret airplanes visible only to the secretary of defense. He has gotten tougher on the Soviets. His new re-industrialization plan is four-square for new business incentives. Rest assured, more will follow.

But the question is *credibility*. Having strayed into Wing A-land can he claim to convince the voters that his real citizenship belongs to the Grand Duchy of Wing B? There are ways to try to do this. But will the Republicans allow him such dual citizenship? Stay tuned.

Does It Matter?

Possible realignment.

So what? Does it matter much if it happens?

Let us consider two alternate scenarios: with realignment, and without.

We have been in a political nether-world for a generation: the presidency rotates, the Congress is Democratic only because of an anomaly that has the most conservative part of the country (the South) helping the more liberal party. But suppose Reagan wins in 1980. And Democratic liberals lose further seats in 1980 and even lose the Senate in 1982. Suppose the governorships and the legislatures start moving toward the Republican column. Suppose the Republicans indeed become known as the party of the people; suppose the polls begin to show ever greater numbers of voters self-identifying as Republicans.

This will, to be sure, change American politics. But will it change America?

Yes, but probably not as much as one might think.

Such a Republican era would likely be characterized by increased military spending and an attempt at a reassertion of American power in some parts of the world. (There will be no big war; hawks know how to count—and we are out-gunned now.)

Such a Republican era would be pro-growth in a private-sector-incentive manner.

But here we run into the Grand Conundrum of the Center.

Will such a Republican era be anti-civil liberties? If that attempt is made—it won't be a Republican era for long. Will such a Republican era cut through the entitlements programs like a hot scythe through a vat of axel grease? If that happens, if the Republicans try to repeal rather than contain the welfare state, it won't be a Republican era for long. Will such a Republican era try to savage unions in America? Only if it wants to risk slipping back into minoritarian status. Will such a Republican era turn power back to the states? If you believe that government officials *give back* power—to anyone—go back three spaces and re-enroll in Politics 101.

So, the realignment we speak of—if it occurs—is a realignment within the moderate center of the political

spectrum, between the forty-yard lines. The "center" we spoke of ten years ago in *The Real Majority* still lives; an extreme party of left or right will not become dominant in America; the only thing extremism in either party can do is guarantee victory for the other party.

The Grand Conundrum of the Center is simple enough as politics goes: You can capture the center if you are a centrist; if you are not a centrist you won't capture or keep the center.[7]

In short: a Republican realignment would do those things Americans have already decided they want done. That is reinforced by the likelihood that any realignment, although viewed historically as a sudden break at a particular election, is more likely to be a process rather than an event. Reagan, for example, may well be elected by less than a majority of voters. That could be a first step, but sustainable only if Republican policies were deemed worthy by specific groups. Remember, blacks voted for Hoover in 1932—not for FDR until 1936. Republican prime targets in the eighties would be Southerners, union members, ethnics, Jews—yet they can add numbers if and only if they stay near the potent center.

But suppose there is no political realignment. Suppose the Democrats stay in the saddle. Our formal politics might not change, but would America change?

Yes.

Again, because of the Grand Conundrum of the Center.

Entering the 1980s, it is clear that Democrats will not retain hegemony unless they move to a guns-and-margarine position on defense—until we can afford butter again. They will not retain hegemony unless they reinvigorate the private sector economy.

In short, the people have spoken. A new consensus is forming. The center has moved. Both parties will respond. Change is in the air. It is a new moment. The party that listens best to the people will be known as "winners." The differences will be fewer than the similarities.

So, why is it important?

After all, it is the intent of this article to demonstrate that conditions and ideas have changed and that *both* parties are recognizing this and are responding. That is important to the nation and the world. But if that is so, what importance (other than parochial) can there be about whether or not one party or the other achieves dominance, via realignment? Liberal Democrats ask this: if Democrats have to become like Republicans to win, why bother? How about a choice not an echo, they echo. They ask: wouldn't John Anderson and Barry Commoner offer better choices?

No. It is not only in underdeveloped continents where politics is tribal and cultural. It happens right here in America.

Seen loosely, the major parties in America represent not only a somewhat different ideological emphasis, they are also the two large extended families—tribes, if you will. These tribes have a different way of looking at the world; they have somewhat different cultures.

In the contemporary tribal configuration, there are more cultural Democrats than cultural Republicans. Of course, the Republicans are (wisely) trying to sunder that family, promoting the notion that limousine liberals and Joe Six-Paks are not really co-tribal. Little do they know. They do not understand that what unites Democrats is the idea that Republicans (as Jeane Kirkpatrick has pointed out) are really people who will call a man named James—James.

And therein lies the germ of a Democratic strategy. Do not attack Reagan on his "simplistic" views on defense or the economy. Most Americans agree with those views; so do many top Carter appointees, by the way. Instead, remind Americans that if the new political era is in the hands of Republicans, it will not be carried out—tribally—in the same way it would be by Democrats. Incentives for capital formation may indeed be necessary, but they will be seen one way by a politician whose basic constituency includes small-town shoe store owners and in a very different way by a politician who gets elected because blue-collar union members are part of *his* tribe.

It is Carter's job this fall to call for the return of the natives: cultural Democrats must be reminded that people who bowl, send their kids to parochial schools and then state colleges and eat lunch at Bun 'n Burger will not have their interests well-represented by folks who play tennis on clay, whose kids go to boarding school and private colleges, and who talk business over lunch on the company tab.

So, Democrats must re-claim their tribe. Republicans must try to prevent that, and expand their own tribe, muscularizing it. They must tell the folks with kids in state colleges and without expense accounts that the Democrats will no longer best represent their interests when the time comes to do what must be done. They must say that an era is ended; not a *bad* era, but only that conditions have changed and it is, in the vast political sea, time to move the nose of the ocean liner a few degrees to starboard, and that they, the Republicans, have the ideas and the background to do that responsibly and humanely. That will not be an easy task because Democrats will not let it be an easy task.

But both parties agree—in the broadest of strokes—on what has to be done. And the two big parties are the only two big ones we have; you can't vote "independent" in America. The new parade has formed. It is already marching down Main Street.

Which party will best seize the moment, capture the image, and lead the parade?

We shall see. ☑

[7] The Supreme Court appointees *may* be an exception. But the Justices, too, hear the people. There will be no re-institution of the Warren Court—under *either* party. And Carswell-Haynsworth reminded us that not only the President, but the Congress, can play a role in Supreme Court selection.

by Everett C. Ladd

A REBUTTAL

Realignment? No Dealignment? Yes

(Editor's Note: *As Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg recognize, the views they expound in the preceding article are not universally shared. One of those who has sharp disagreements is Everett Ladd, consulting editor for Opinion Roundup and a frequent contributor to these pages as well as other forums. Dr. Ladd here offers a rebuttal to the Scammon-Wattenberg piece. For a further discussion of realignment, please see the succeeding article by Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann.)*

As Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg see it, the United States may be on the verge of a major political realignment. Or in the language they prefer, "it's the end of an era."

Their arguments are nicely phrased, but on substance, they are wrong on both the "timing"—social changes brought an end to the New Deal era a decade or two ago—and on the ingredients of the political transformation occurring in the country.

From the days of a rural nation of four million to an industrialized nation of 220 million, the path of America has, of course, been one of continuous social change. When the social and economic makeup of the nation has undergone fundamental alterations, vast political changes have naturally followed. New clusters of issues have arisen, and political power has been broadly redistributed. And at various points, when the change has been truly sharp and decisive, observers have proclaimed the emergence of a new era.

A new era does not necessarily entail a new majority party. Only once in our history, in the New Deal, did a minority party ride sweeping social transformations to a new majority status. Behind Scammon and Wattenberg's argument, I think, there is the expectation that the latest round of social and political changes really *should*, on the "bottom line," add up to a new Republican majority—unless the GOP blows it or Democratic wile heads it off. This perspective, however, is at once too casual and narrow, unsustained by history and missing much of the character of the complex partisan transformation that is under way.

A Changed Society and A Changed Politics

That American society has moved a long way from the days of FDR is obvious. Countless articles and books have described the change—among the most thoughtful, John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* (1958), and *The New Industrial State* (1967), along with Daniel Bell's *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973). A key feature of the new era, commentators agree, is the exceptional increase in personal wealth: in the quarter century after World War II (1947-73), the median income for American families about doubled (after inflation), adding more purchasing power than in all the rest of U.S. history combined. Large numbers moved from "have nots" to "haves," smothering the class tensions of the New Deal. With increased wealth also came shifts in consumption patterns, life styles, expectations and personal values.

In the face of such vast social transformations, Americans did "change their minds." That is to say, important changes occurred in American political ideology. As the social and economic conditions sustaining the divisions of the New Deal were removed, the ideological divide of that era collapsed. This development was clouded only somewhat by the American tendency to shift the meanings of the old labels—"liberalism" and "conservatism"—to fit the new conditions.

By the *early* 1970s, Americans of all classes and most social positions had come to accept two basic propositions: first, there is no alternative to a major role by government in regulating the economy, providing social services, and assuring economic progress; but second, these interventions, however desirable, can also cause problems. A new consensus thus developed as a large majority came to fully accept the New Deal conception of government, tempered by the historic American aversion to all forms of thoroughgoing collectivism (individualism remains an important strain) and by a heightened appreciation of the mischiefs of government. Once this new mix was in view—and

contrary to Scammon and Wattenberg, that occurred at least a decade ago—a new political setting had been defined.

To illustrate: the carefully designed investigations of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago (see Opinion Roundup in this issue of *Public Opinion*) found in 1972 that almost identical proportions of business managers and unskilled workers and of high and low income people favored the maintenance—or even the increase—of current government spending for the environment, health, urban needs, education, improving the positions of blacks, and the like. But these same Americans concluded in the 1970s that inflation is the fundamental economic problem and that the government bears prime responsibility. Since the lower income and occupation groups came in the 1970s to see themselves as especially burdened by inflation, they in turn came to support "anti-government" actions at least as strongly as the once "instinctively" anti-government, upper-middle class.

This resultant mix of attitudes toward the state—in favor of high levels of government services but troubled by governmental inefficiencies and often ineffective intrusions into complex problems—is neither liberal nor conservative. When the most privileged segments of the society came to see "big government" in many of its forms as helpful, and when large segments of the less privileged confronted government's problem-causing capacities, the New Deal's "liberal versus conservative" division had in fact collapsed.

Scammon and Wattenberg are correct in arguing that Americans of all classes now see inflation as "the real problem," and one which is caused in significant measure by the faulty interventions of big government. They are right, moreover, that this perception squares with established Republican doctrine and thus contributes positively to the fortunes of the Grand Old Party. But they do not at the same time give adequate weight to the fact that Americans of all classes now want a lot of government—and that this commitment squares with traditional Democratic doctrine and supports the Democrats' continued ascendancy.

The popular concern with inflation, and more generally the anti-government mood of the populace, have not ushered in a new Republican era in part because there is simultaneously the persistence and even the enlargement of a pro-government mood. Americans are ambivalent about the contemporary state—and this has contributed to an ambivalence about the parties.

The collapse of the liberal-conservative division over the past two decades has also been hastened by the intrusion of a new form of class conflict. As old conflicts were resolved or forgotten, Americans in the 1960s began to face a series of new and provocative issues: civil rights, the position of women, the status of the family, sexual conduct, drugs, attitudes toward work, and moral questions like abortion. In each of these areas, support for change has not been distributed evenly across the population, but rather has been decisively shaped by social background. The resultant divisions have been determined less by citizen's class in the traditional sense—their occupations and the



"DO YOU REALIZE THAT IF THE ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY WE'D BE OUT OF A JOB?"

amount of their income—than by their exposure to contrasting social milieus.

In its advanced industrial era, the United States has experienced a tremendous growth of its white-collar and professional-technical work force, the relative decline of agriculture and manufacturing, the rise of the knowledge and information sectors of the economy, and of particular importance, the unprecedented expansion of higher education. Thus propelled, the pace of cultural change has quickened more rapidly in the postwar period than at any time since the industrial upheaval of the late nineteenth century. Part of the reason for the present day prominence of social and cultural issues is the sheer size of the population now trained in the production and use of symbols. With an educated and relatively leisured citizenry, an elaborate communications system, and massive institutions involved in cultural innovation and interpretation, the society almost inevitably spawned conflict around new social and cultural values.

Through all of the new issues—women's rights, work, pre-marital sex, abortion, etc.—there is one common and persistent theme: those who are college-educated are the most receptive to social and cultural change, while those who ended their education in grade school—and thus were less exposed to the scientific and rationalist outlook—are the most hostile. American higher education has taught that modernity is to be welcomed, not resisted. Consequently, opinion surveys for more than a decade have regularly shown that support for new social values and practices climbs steadily with each step up the educational ladder. No other factor—occupation, income, ethnic background, or religion—matches the powerful impact of education.

What this points to is the emergence of a new "social class," differing from what we have known historically. Classes need not be defined simply by income or type of job; they can emerge just as naturally around levels of education. And in this new class division, the "top" is consistently more "liberal" than is the "bottom."

Just as some observers such as Scammon and Wattenberg are inclined to interpret the growing public criticism of government as a sign of a general "swing to the right" in economic matters, so they also find that popular resistance to the pace of social and cultural change is evidence of a conservative swing. Yet, in both areas, the interpretation is in error. As Seymour Martin Lipset and I noted in an earlier issue of *Public Opinion* (December/January 1980), the American people are ambivalent about many of the results of social change of the past two decades—but are in no sense prepared to go back to the conditions that applied before these momentous changes occurred. Quite the contrary. There can be no doubt that overall, the American people are more supportive of social and cultural "liberalism" in 1980 than they were in the 1960s, and much more so than in the 1950s before the "Great Cultural Revolution" began.

Politicians will not win in 1980 or in foreseeable elections by assuming the populace is "swinging to the right." The resentment of lower-income, less educated groups to aspects of cultural change surely presents problems for the Democratic party which has, notably in its 1980 platform, placed itself squarely on the "liberal" side of these changes. But the broad support among Americans of higher income and higher education for women's rights, individual choice in matters of abortion, and so on, also presents problems for the Republican party which has, notably in its 1980 platform, placed itself squarely on the "conservative" side of these issues. When Ronald Reagan speaks out against abortion, he may solidify his base but at the same time he threatens to drive away other voters he may need.

The *incapacity* of social and cultural issues to sustain a revival of GOP fortunes is simply not in doubt. These controversies actually do less to alter the overall partisan balance than to weaken the old class ties to the parties.

In short, the substance of political conflict in the United States is as significantly different from the 1930s as the latter was from the conflict of the 1980s. Americans, as Scammon and Wattenberg say, have indeed "changed their minds." But the pattern of conflict is neither as they describe it nor is it really new. Developments in the last few years are but elaborations on a theme which was sounded at least a decade ago.

The Erosion of Party Loyalties

A second major theme of the Scammon and Wattenberg argument is that the shift in attitudes should enable one of the parties—either a center-moving GOP or moderated Democrats—to build a new majority. Who will lead the "new parade," they ask. But in fact, the likely answer is that "no one" will lead it.

Although sweeping economic and social changes have occasionally led to major partisan realignments in the past—and some of that is occurring now—the *realignment* we have seen to date has been far *less* impressive than the *dealignment*. More people are moving away from political parties today than are crossing party lines.

A great deal has been written already about the growing incapacity of the political parties to organize the electorate. Partly this has occurred because Americans, more educated and more leisured, have become permanently less inclined to defer to party leaders and more inclined to vote independently. Partly it has occurred because the parties have become objects of suspicion and have been reduced to the status of mere labels on a ballot, rather than active intermediaries in democratic decision making. As parties have become less able to choose candidates, to bridge constitutional gaps in the federal system, to serve as meaningful instruments for political communication, and the like, their claims to the loyalty of the electorate have naturally been attenuated over the past two decades.

The growing instability and fluidity of the voters is shown in many, many ways. For example, the proportion who feel unattached to the Democrats, Republicans, or any other party, is roughly twice today what it was three decades ago. In 1952, according to the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, 22 percent of voting-age Americans described themselves as Independents; in September of this year in a Market Opinion Research survey employing the same polling measures, 40 percent called themselves Independents (versus 37 percent for the Democrats and 24 percent for the Republicans). This increase is paralleled by a dramatic increase in independent political behavior—that is, crossing party lines and ticket-splitting.

The impact of these changes is especially evident in the presidential arena, where the Democrats have long since lost their majority status while the Republicans have been unable to secure

(Continued on page 54)

by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein

1980: A Republican Revival in Congress?

Congressional campaigns are the poor relatives of our national elections. When a presidential contest heats up, the congressional races are generally ignored or neglected, with the occasional exception of a hot battle for a particular House or Senate seat involving a scandal or a celebrity.

This year, however, the pundits and politicians are paying more attention than usual to the battle for control of Capitol Hill. In fact, the keynote speech at the Republican National Convention in Detroit had the control of *Congress* as its main theme.

Why the new emphasis? There are two broad reasons. First, the conduct of the 1980 congressional campaign *is* different, in several important ways, from its recent predecessors. Secondly, 1980 is seen by many as a possible "critical" election, one which changes the shape of American politics and parties for decades to come.

Why This Year Is Different

Let's start with what makes 1980 different. The most significant factor is the obvious Republican trend. Virtually *everybody* expects the Republicans to pick up seats in both the Senate and the House—probably enough to register the most sizable GOP gains in over a decade, possibly enough to capture the Senate for the first time since 1954. Since the demise of the Republican party was forecast by many as recently as 1974, this *is* different.

The Republicans are in good shape in 1980 for a variety of short and long-term reasons. The most important reason has to be the public's assessment of President Carter's overall performance, and especially his handling of the economy. His job ratings hit record lows in 1979 and again in the summer of 1980, and the economy seems mired in high inflation and growing unemployment. Moreover, U.S. standing in the world community and its strength vis-à-vis the Soviets are being questioned more than at any time in recent history. Of course, the presidential election in November involves a choice among candidates, not simply an up-or-down vote on the Carter administration. The polls changed dramatically in Carter's favor following the Democratic Convention and the celebrated series of Reagan gaffes in late August. Most experts now acknowledge that the election will be close and that Carter could win.

But for *congressional* purposes, it was Carter's poor standing a year or more ago—not his revived standing now—that has done much to shape the outlook. The Democrats' low estate in 1979 created an unusual mood, one in which potential Republican candidates were encouraged to compete for seats held by Democrats while Democratic candidates were discouraged from contesting Republican seats. In addition, many potential donors—including corporate PACs—were willing to gamble more than usual on Republican challengers. As one Republican member of the House said, "When it came time for the Democratic party to recruit someone to run against me, they looked at several potentially strong candidates. But when those candidates sat down and looked at 1980, they realized it

might be a potentially bad year to run against an incumbent Republican given the problems Jimmy Carter had experienced . . . I have less opposition today because of it." There's something of a self-fulfilling prophecy here—Republicans will do well in November because everyone thought they would do well nine months or a year earlier. Indeed, a Reagan collapse in the fall would not wipe out the fact that many potentially vulnerable Republican incumbents are getting virtual free rides this November while their Democratic counterparts are facing serious, well-financed challengers.

Sometimes It Pays To Be Hungry

Republican prospects have also been brightened this year because they are waging a remarkable, innovative, party-based campaign that is unprecedented in modern congressional politics. Under the farsighted leadership of Bill Brock, the national Republican party has aggressively recruited strong congressional candidates (many of them earlier recruits for state legislative races), given them sophisticated training in campaign management and techniques at its own "school," and provided substantial funds (the goal is over $20 million for congressional candidates). But what makes this national party effort especially different is that the Republicans have combined it with a lavish national television advertising campaign to the tune of over $9 million. The hard-hitting commercials—variously featuring a Tip O'Neill lookalike, an unemployed factory worker, and a truck driver—all lambaste the Democratic Congress, and blame the country's ills on the Democrats' twenty-five year control of Capitol Hill. Each commercial urges, "Vote Republican—For a Change." In several test markets, the GOP market research shows impressive preliminary effects: voters respond positively to the ads and many indicate they will indeed change their votes.

Ronald Reagan has worked this fall to underscore his party's commitment to the congressional elections. On September 15, the GOP nominee appeared on the steps of the Capitol with over 150 congressional members, pledging mutual support for each other and for five legislative goals. In his speeches Reagan has also emphasized that his agenda cannot be attained without more Republicans in Congress. The *Washington Post's* David Broder singled out this strategy as highly unusual, and commendable, albeit risky.

A third factor buoying the Republicans is a recent boost in the GOP's standing in the polls, caused by both the national Republican strategy and the Carter record. Public confidence in the Republican party's ability to handle major problems increased dramatically during 1980 and by mid-summer exceeded or equalled confidence in the Democrats on most issues. There has also been a steady increase in the proportion of voters who are aware that the Democrats have controlled the Congress for the past twenty-five years. Some evidence suggests as well a modest shift toward the Republicans in terms of party identification. And several polls (Harris, for example) have found a sizable swing in congressional voting intentions toward the Republicans, although no such movement has been detected by Gallup.

These factors alone could account for the nervousness of Democratic incumbents. But 1980 is threatening for other reasons as well. The Democrats up for reelection this year in the Senate—twenty-two compared to only seven Republicans (two Democratic and three Republican seats are also open)—last faced the electorate in 1974, when the national climate of opinion could not have been more favorable. But six years later, wary from the loss of five liberal colleagues in 1978, and as yet untested in the era of Proposition 13 and Kemp-Roth, many of these Democratic senators feel themselves more vulnerable than ever before. The endangered list, which has always included such electorally marginal senators as McGovern, Culver, Church, and Bayh, has now lengthened to contain the likes of Eagleton, Nelson, and Magnuson, who were considered safe earlier this year. (As this is written—in late September—the polls are looking better for several of these incumbents, but none is yet fully out of the woods.)

A Bad Year for Top Incumbents?

The view is less cataclysmic among House Democrats, who more than their Senate counterparts traditionally face under-financed, inadequate challengers and enjoy increasingly wide margins of victory. Nonetheless, the list of incumbents in trouble includes some real stunners: Majority Leader Jim Wright, Whip John Brademas, Caucus and Agriculture Committee Chairman Tom Foley, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Al Ullman, Interior Committee head Mo Udall, Public Works Chairman "Biz" Johnson, and veteran liberal Jim Corman. And as a group, House Democrats have been especially squeamish this year, as witnessed by their rush to balance the budget and then to cut taxes, the quest for an "open convention" as a way to oust President Carter from the top of the ticket, and the new found interest in district polls among those who seldom face a substantial challenger.

If all these omens persist through November, we may see big GOP gains in the House—say, twenty-five to thirty seats—and a major net gain of four to six seats or even more in the Senate, putting the Republicans within striking distance of taking control of both houses of Congress for the first time in twenty-six years.

This *would* be different! It would make 1980 the first big Republican congressional victory since 1966, when the GOP picked up forty-seven seats in the House and four in the Senate. But 1966 represented less a victory than a GOP comeback from the Goldwater disaster of 1964; a big 1980 would stand on its own as a clear-cut, unsullied Republican win. And, 1966 was

not the only recent "good" election for the Republicans; Nixon, remember, won the presidency overwhelmingly in 1972. But unlike the LBJ landslide in 1964 that brought a wave of Democratic congressmen into office, the 1972 Nixon landslide was not accompanied by a comparable Republican pickup in Congress. Democratic incumbents in Congress ran and won independently of the presidential race. More like 1964 and 1972, the GOP hopes for a congressional victory in 1980 are tied in part to the success of the Reagan candidacy, while the Democratic nervousness is linked to Jimmy Carter's weakness.

But can we expect 1980 to resemble 1964 and not 1972? After all, the main lesson of the past decade in congressional elections is that resourceful incumbents can insulate themselves from presidential politics and national events by getting voters to focus on them as individual candidates with attractive personal qualities. While incumbents have always had a remarkably high degree of electoral success, their reelection margins in the late 1960s and early 1970s increased to the point where relatively few remained vulnerable to strong national tides. Voters increasingly defected from their traditional party loyalties and split their tickets, thereby giving incumbents an added measure of support and decreasing the probability of a popular presidential candidate sweeping his party's challengers into office on his coattails.

Of course, this picture of the insulation of incumbents from national politics can be overdrawn, especially when we consider the "Watergate" election of 1974. Recall that in that year, thirty-six Republican incumbents were defeated in the general election, a third of whom had won more than 60 percent of the vote in the previous election, and the Democrats picked up forty-nine seats above their 1972 total. In 1974, adverse public reaction to the Republican record—Watergate, the pardon of Nixon, and the recession—left a clear imprint on the congressional elections. What we have not yet seen in 1980 is whether the newest generation of Democratic incumbents, many of whom first rode into office over the backs of Republican incumbents in 1974 and who have usually enjoyed both a stronger partisan base than their Republican challengers and a special adeptness in exploiting the media-oriented resources of incumbency, will prove to be equally vulnerable when they face adverse national conditions.

Republican strategists have apparently concluded that these post-1974 Democrats are hardier than their 1974 GOP counterparts. And there are good reasons for that view. In 1976 and 1978, the Republicans selected the seventy-five Democrats from the "class of '74" as prime targets for defeat; they poured large amounts of money and gave a lot of campaign help to Republican challengers in the Watergate districts. The results in both years were dismal, to say the least—only two out of the seventy-five defeated in 1976, another seven in 1978. In 1980, the Republicans have given up on most of the remaining group, and are targeting their resources instead on other Democratic seats, including some very senior incumbents who may not have learned the lessons of the "new politics" quite as well. There are still enough potential seats to make notable gains, but GOP optimism has to be tempered by the admirable durability and versatility of new-style Democratic incumbents.

Realignment vs. Dealignment

If 1980 is in fact different, there is a bigger question at stake: is the 1980 difference the beginning of a major shift in American politics that will shape this decade and beyond? A growing number of observers have based their predictions of sizable Republican gains across the board in 1980 on a belief that in fact we are on the verge of a major political realignment, the likes of which we have not seen since the beginning of the New Deal.

The argument is a familiar one. Every thirty or forty years in American electoral history, the pattern of partisan attachments across the country has undergone a major upheaval, lifting the minority party into majority status and fundamentally altering group voting patterns. To proponents of the current realignment, the breakup of the Democratic New Deal coalition has been delayed, but it is inevitable. The signs are everywhere. Democratic support among Jews, blacks, labor union members, blue-collar workers, and urban dwellers is no longer consistently high and these groups themselves have declined as a proportion of the American electorate. The central ideas of the Democratic coalition—its public philosophy—appear stale and not directly relevant to the problems of the 1980s: energy shortages, persistent inflation, declining productivity, national security threats. Party loyalties have also attenuated, and a massive generation of young adults has come of age politically without developing any attachment to one of the major parties. Finally, according to this argument, the Republicans in 1980 have stretched their campaign beyond their traditional, narrow Wall Street base to appeal directly to the core of the Democratic stronghold—blue-collar and union workers. The emphasis on suppy side economics, the Kemp-Roth tax cut proposal, and the GOP emphasis on "jobs, jobs, jobs," are designed both to broaden the base of the party and to cast President Carter as a modern day Herbert Hoover.

Assessing the likelihood of a coming Republican alignment is no easy task. It's impossible to know for sure whether a critical election is upon us until well after its occurrence, when the stability of new patterns of partisan identification and voting can be assayed. *But from our study of the past, we know that several things are usually required for a true realignment to take place:*

(1) *the public must perceive that the two major parties and their presidential candidates differ in some new and fundamental ways;*
(2) *the youngest eligible voters, those who have not yet formed lasting ties to one of the major parties, must become engaged by the campaign rhetoric and move disproportionately into the column of the new majority party;*
(3) *the new majority party must sustain the relevance and appeal of their new public philosophy and the loyalty of their youngest supporters by doing as well at governing as they do in winning office.*

Our own view is that these three conditions are very unlikely to be met by the GOP in 1980. To begin, the initial conduct of the presidential campaign has done little to help the voters see dramatic substantive differences between the parties in their approach to the problems of the 1980s. Most of the publicity has emphasized the personal strengths and weaknesses of the candidates. Moreover, President Carter has moved to neutralize the political appeal of Governor Reagan's economic planks by proposing his own version—one that he calls more "responsible"—of a tax-cut and supply side economics, emphasizing reindustrialization, with a dollop of public works jobs added in. Moreover, the Reagan appeal to the working man is constrained by the right-to-work, anti-organized labor zeal of his hardcore supporters.

Nor are Democratic candidates uniformly cooperating with the Republicans. Such savvy Democrats as Gary Hart, Tim Wirth, Dale Bumpers, and Fritz Hollings are trying to coopt the Republican issues, emphasizing the need for a revitalized economy and a strengthened defense.

Secondly, there is no sign yet that the Republican campaign is making headway in mobilizing the young. The low turnout, independent-oriented character of this generation probably will not change dramatically in 1980. It's hard to believe that a presidential candidate who defends the Vietnam War as a noble cause will succeed in winning over an extraordinary majority of young adults, many of whom entered adolescence at the height of the protest movement.

Finally, there is the problem of sustaining throughout the decade whatever momentum is achieved this November. If Governor Reagan wins the election and Republicans do as well as expected in Congress, he is

still almost certain to face one and probably two houses of Congress controlled by the Democrats. Even if Reagan has policy prescriptions that will work, he also faces an uphill battle in seeing them enacted. And by almost all accounts, the problems of the 1980s will easily outlive any plausible solutions. Moreover, an early political test of his administration comes in only twenty-four months—much too early for any Thatcher-like restructuring of the economy. The problem for the Republicans is how to consolidate and expand their political base, absent any consistently good news out of Washington during a Republican administration. If they can't, the likely outcome in 1982 would be Republican losses in the House and Senate—not the additional gains the GOP would need to capture a majority of Congress.

This doesn't add up to a political realignment. Rather, we expect 1980 will see a continued dealignment, in which individual and group attachments to party continue to weaken and voting decisions are made in a largely ad-hoc, media-based, candidate-centered, non-ideological fashion. Does this mean that the Republicans are doomed to permanent minority status, that their chances of taking control of the Congress in the eighties are virtually nil? Not at all. What it does mean is that the Republicans cannot pin all of their hopes upon a single national election and a sudden restructuring of partisan loyalties. A long-term strategy that seeks to build a competitive edge at all levels—nationally, by demonstrating a capacity to think constructively and imaginatively about the problems of the 1980s, and locally, by recruiting able candidates, raising money sufficient to wage serious challenges, and redrawing district boundaries to make themselves potentially more competitive—presents their best—and probably their only—chance of succeeding.

GOP Faces A Long Obstacle Race in the 1980s

Building for the future, the Republicans must overcome many, many other obstacles if they hope to wrest power from the Democrats in Congress. Since the New Deal, far more voters have identified themselves as Democrats than as either Republicans or Independents. Even in an era of weakening partisanship, it's better to have more voters who identify with your party than not. And Republican hopes for a dramatic reversal in this pattern of party loyalties are unlikely to be realized in 1980 or 1982.

But history and probability could reverse another Democratic edge. During the last quarter century, the Democrats have enjoyed three decisive national congressional election victories (1958, 1964, 1974) to only one for the Republicans (1966). Without the almost unprecedented swing of thirteen seats to the Democrats in 1958, the Senate might well have been taken over by the Republicans already. In the House, Republican progress toward majority status was dealt a severe blow by the strong public reaction against Watergate and the recession in 1974. It's partly a matter of timing: the Republicans were unfortunate enough to have held the presidency during two mid-term elections when times were bad. One can imagine how two good years—perhaps a sharply negative reaction to a second Carter administration in 1982 and then a strong effort in the presidential race in 1984—could put the Republicans in control of one or both houses of Congress without a major political realignment in the country. Ironically, GOP hopes for control of Congress could well be enhanced by a *Carter* victory in 1980!

Overcoming the Incumbency Advantage

Another factor accounting for the phenomenal success of the Democratic party in Congress is the advantage of incumbency. The party with the most incumbents obviously stands to gain most from an incumbency advantage. But, even more so, it is the Democrats who have managed to exploit the resources available to incumbents. As a result of the 1974 landslide and their success in capitalizing upon a large number of retirements, Democrats have elected substantially more of the new-style representatives to office during the last decade than have Republicans. The new-style legislators caught on immediately and wholeheartedly to the new and sophisticated resources at their disposal—from staff to media control to computerized mailing lists.

If Republicans are to overcome this incumbency advantage, they must first understand how it works. Incumbents, particularly in the House, have increased their margins above what might be considered their natural partisan base by (1) developing favorable public images in their districts by self-generating virtually all of the "news" that constituents receive about them and, (2) discouraging serious opposition by currying favor with those who might otherwise lend financial and organizational support to a challenger. Individual voters, bombarded by laudatory communications from and about their representative and straining to learn anything at all about the challenger, overwhelmingly cast their ballots for the incumbent; many even crossing party lines in order to do so.

The lesson for the Republicans, one they have tried to heed in 1980, is clear: Recruit able candidates, equip them with the financial resources to make themselves known, and send different messages to the public about the incumbent. Of course, this is easier said than done. The involvement of parties in candidate selection has in modern times been episodic and local in character. There are pitfalls awaiting any national party organization that assumes an activist role in candidate recruitment, but it appears the Republicans are willing to gamble in 1980.

Republican strategists may draw encouragement from the fact that their 1980 approach to House candidates has already seen some GOP breakthroughs in the

(Continued on page 56)

The Last Lap

Question: If President Jimmy Carter were the Democratic candidate running against Ronald Reagan, the Republican candidate, and John Anderson, the Independent candidate, which would you like to see win? (Those who named another person or who were undecided were asked: As of today, do you lean more to Carter, the Democrat, to Reagan, the Republican, or to Anderson, the Independent?)



1980	Carter	Reagan	Anderson
March 28-31	42%	36%	22%
April 11-14	45	36	19
April 26-27	41	38	21
May 2-5	41	36	23
May 16-19	43	34	23
May 30-June 2	42	35	23
June 13-16	38	36	26
June 27-30	35	41	24
July 11-14	37	40	23
August 1-3	34	50	16
August 15-17	42	43	15
September 13-14	38	40	15

Source: Surveys by the Gallup organization, latest that of September 13-14, 1980.



Question: Suppose for president next November it is between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans, Jimmy Carter for the Democrats, and Representative John Anderson of Illinois as an Independent. If you had to choose right now, would you vote for Reagan, Carter, or Anderson?/Let me read you a list of candidates running for president in November (Ronald Reagan, Republican; Jimmy Carter, Democrat; John Anderson, Independent; Edward Clark, Libertarian party; Barry Commoner, Citizens party; Ellen McCormack, Right to Life party; Andrew Pulley, Socialist Workers party). If you had to decide right now, who would you vote for? (Asked from August 14-18 on)

1980	Reagan	Carter	Anderson	None (vol)
Late March	39%	39%	22%	
April 25	44	34	20	2
April 26-30	40	34	24	2
June 5-9	40	35	25	
July 18-21	55	27	19	
August 1-3	54	26	20	
August 5-6	51	29	20	
August 14-18	44	38	18	
September 3-7	43	39	18	

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of September 3-7, 1980.

Chart illustrations by H. Karlsson

NORC: PORTRAIT OF

I. The Government's Role

SPENDING PRIORITIES: THE CALL FOR ARMS

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (read item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (item)?. . .



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-78, 1980.

AMERICA- Part Two





Note: *Combined responses for 1973-78, 1980.

PERSONAL PREFERENCE VS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

Question: Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to continue the services it now provides, even if it means no reduction in spending. A. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? B. Where would you place what the federal government is doing at the present time?

1980

Spending vs. services



1980

"Government should provide fewer services and reduce spending" (pts. 1-3)



Note: Personal preference responses for "continue services/no spending reduction"=49%, 41%, 40%, 41%, 39%, 41%, 62% for groups shown above. Perception of what government is doing now responses for "continue services/no spending reduction"= 48%, 57%, 57%, 69%, 62%, 58%,41%, respectively.

Question: Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. A. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it? B. Where would you place what the federal government is doing at the present time?

1980

Spending for defense



1980

"Government should increase defense spending" (pts. 5-7)



Note: Personal preference responses for "government should decrease defense spending"=11%, 11%, 14%, 15%, 30%, 12%, 23% for groups shown above. Perception of what government is doing now responses for "government should decrease defense spending"=34%, 41%, 40%, 36%, 33%, 38%, 33%, respectively.

Question: Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7: Think of a score of *1* as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of *7* meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between *1* and *7* comes closest to the way you feel? (Circle one) (Hand card)

Reducing income differences:



Government ought to reduce income differences (pts. 1-3)★



Note: *Combined responses for 1978 and 1980.

"Government should not be concerned with reducing income differences" responses=22%, 33%, 44%, 50%, 46%, 37%, 16% for groups shown above.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS LACK THE COMMON TOUCH

Question: Now I'm going to read you several more statements. Some people agree with these statements, others disagree. As I read each one, tell we whether you *more or less agree* with it or *more or less disagree* with it. Now I'd like your opinion on a number of different things. . . . Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.



Most public officials not interested in average man's problems★



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

II. Civil Liberties

Tolerance Doesn't Extend to Teaching

Question: There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion. . . . If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? Or, consider a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not? Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not? Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not? And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak, or not? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? Suppose he wrote a book advocating doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. Somebody in your community suggests that the book be removed from the public library. Would you favor removing it, or not?











Note: Responses shown are rewordings of original response in some cases for comparison purposes.

Should Allow to teach...



Note: *Combined responses for 1976-77 and 1980.

Note: *Combined responses for 1972-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

Note: *Combined responses for 1973-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

III. Racial Attitudes

TENSIONS RELAX

Question: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with (Negro/black) white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself feel? (Hand card)(Negroes/blacks) shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted.

Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/blacks) and whites?

Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or separate schools?



Note: Black responses in 1980=Same schools 97%; Shouldn't be laws prohibiting intermarriage 82%; Disagree blacks shouldn't push 54%.

Blacks and whites should go to same schools ★



Note: *Combined responses for 1972, 1976-77, and 1980.

Should not be laws prohibiting interracial marriage ★



Note: *Combined responses for 1972-77 and 1980.

NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION: FAMILIARITY BREEDS APPROVAL

Question: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with (Negro/black) white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself feel? (Hand card) . . . White people have a right to keep (Negroes/blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and (Negroes/blacks) should respect that right.



Note: Black responses in 1980=Disagree slightly/strongly that "whites have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods" 86%.



Note: *Combined responses for 1972, 1976-77, and 1980.

NOTE ON OPINION ROUNDUP

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

The reader may note that in some cases a "no opinion" column is shown while in others it is not. This reflects a common practice in the publication of polls: when the "no opinion" or "undecided" responses are relatively small, on the order of 10 percent or less, one reports only the answers of those who have a definite opinion. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they *are* reported because they reveal a substantial degree of unawareness or uncertainty within the populace on the issues in question.

IV. How Party Affects Opinion

INDEPENDENTS AND DEMOCRATS: LIBERAL PESSIMISTS









V. How Fear Affects Attitudes

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

White response



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

VI. How Family Compo

SATISFACTION WITH FAMILY LIFE

Satisfaction with family life ★ (Respondents age 25-50)



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-78 and 1980. **"A little/none" response=less than one percent.

HAPPINESS OF MARRIAGE

Among those married with children



Among those married with no children



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-78 and 1980.

OUTLOOK ON LIFE

By family composition:

Lot of the average man getting worse★
(Respondents age 25-50)
Percent agree



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

Hardly fair to bring child into world★
(Respondents age 25-50)
Percent agree



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

Most people try to be fair★
(Respondents age 25-50)
Percent agree



Note: *Combined responses for 1972-73, 1975-76, and 1980.

sition Affects Attitudes



Note: *Combined responses for: Abortion=1972-78, 1980; Aged=1973, 1975-76, 1980; Marijuana=1973, 1975-76, 1978, 1980; Extramarital sex=1973-74,1976-77, 1980.

We're spending too little on: **(Respondents age 25-50)**



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-78 and 1980.

Should allow to teach...
(Respondents age 25-50)



Note: *Combined responses for 1973-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

Note: *Combined responses for 1972-74, 1976-77, and 1980.

Note: *Combined responses for 1976-77 and 1980.

VII. How Family Income and Financial Satisfaction Affect Attitudes

In the bar graph below and on page 35, attitudes on several questions—whether people are "out for themselves" (or try to be helpful), whether the lot of the average citizen is getting worse, and whether the government should be spending more for education, health, and controlling crime—are compared across various economic groups. The groups are defined by not one but two components of personal financial standing: the objective (respondents' *actual income*); and the subjective (whether they are satisfied or not satisfied with that income).

While the results of this analysis should not be taken as definitive, they suggest that some assumptions commonly made in this area are wrong. For one thing, this analysis of National Opinion Research Center surveys indicates that it is *people who are the most dissatisfied with their own economic positions,* whatever their actual incomes, *who are the most inclined to support increased government spending.* Economic dissatisfaction spurs reliance on the state, not a "selfish" turning away from it.

Another interesting finding is that the inclination to believe one's fellows are mean-spirited and things are going badly in society are more affected by one's *subjective* view of economic position than by actual position. Thus, those with higher incomes who are dissatisfied with their financial positions are much more likely to believe that the lot of the average person is getting worse than are those with similar incomes who are on the whole satisfied with what they have economically; indeed, those dissatisfied with their high incomes have about the same view on many questions as those dissatisfied with low incomes.

Everett Ladd
Consulting Editor, Opinion Roundup

1980 FAMILY INCOME



1980 FAMILY INCOME



Polish Public Opinion Post Gdansk

Question: What will be the effect of the recent events over the next three years in the following matters? Respondents were asked to rate the prospects for improving or worsening conditions in each of sixteen categories on a five point scale. Optimistic responses were considered those where "much" or "some" improvement was expected. (Selected categories shown)

Editor's Note: Publication of survey results in Communist countries is highly unusual. To our knowledge, no published surveys have treated social problems as directly as this one.

Expect much/some improvement in next three years:



Note: For this survey, sociologists conducted over 500 interviews in Poland. Because of time limitations, many of the interviews from workers in smaller plants and institutions were not included. Agricultural workers, residents of small towns, retirees and nonworking family members were not included. While the sample is not representative of the nation, researchers consider it representative of workers in heavy industry.

Source: Survey by Warsaw weekly *Polityka*, September 3 and 4, 1980. The survey was conducted immediately after the signing of the Gdansk agreements which ended the strikes and before Stanislaw Kania replaced Edward Gierek as party chief.


by Warren J. Mitofsky and Martin Plissner

The Making of the Delegates, 1968-1980

"I am her Highness' dog at Kew.
Pray tell me, Sir, whose dog are you?"
Inscription for the collar of a favorite poodle of Queen Anne, by Alexander Pope.

At this summer's Democratic Convention in New York City, CBS News polled virtually every delegate on matters ranging from their race and sex to where they stood on price controls and the MX missile. The poll gave reporters and analysts a rich supply of numbers on which to ruminate: 49 percent of the delegates, they reported, were women; 15 percent were blacks; 97 percent were formally committed to a presidential candidate, and so on.

Each of these numbers represented a sharp contrast to the Democratic conventions of earlier years. As such they were the consequence of a hard struggle, mostly by "reform" elements in the party, to reshape the rules for selecting delegates. High among their goals was to make the national conventions more demographically representative of the party's voters—and with respect to women and blacks, this convention was a great success.

Equally important to the reformers has been a desire to wrest control from local party leaders by making the delegates more politically representative of the primaries and state conventions which sent them. That effort, too, seemed triumphant in 1980. It should also be noted that, while Republicans have attracted less attention by it, their own conventions too have changed over the same period in similar ways.

Yet how real a victory for "reform" have these changes been? Even some of the original reformers are now asking, as many of them went to Madison Square Garden anxious to break open the convention for Senator Kennedy but found themselves caught up in the coils of their own rules changes. And regardless of what side of the 1980 Democratic power struggle a sometime reformer might have been on, he or she could easily find it ironic how efforts to transform the process can work at cross purposes with each other and with those engaged in them.

For the past dozen years, a period which coincides with the changing of the process in both parties, CBS News has been polling delegates to the conventions. The data from this polling, never reported in one place before, provide a useful perspective on what has happened since 1968 to this country's unique instrument for nominating its chief official.

For most of the 150 year history of presidential conventions, national parties paid little attention to who or what the delegates were or how they got there. When left to their own devices, which was most of the time, state parties generally sent delegates populated by their principal party and public officials, their most generous contributors and lesser servants whose turn for reward had come. Presidential candidates who had cultivated support in the state might influence the choice of delegates (especially in the handful of states with binding primaries), but the normal practice of such candidates was to solicit, not to challenge, the existing party leadership. That was the system that prevailed, with one or two exceptions, through the conventions of 1968. At the 1968 conventions, as at most before them, the great majority of delegates had no formal commitment to support any candidate for president. And most (80 percent at both 1968 conventions) were white, middle-aged men.

Under the system as it stood in 1968, it was possible for Hubert Humphrey to win the Democratic nomination without winning (or even entering) a primary. And it was possible (though it didn't happen) for Richard Nixon, who had won nine out of twelve primaries, to lose the nomination to Nelson Rockefeller or Ronald Reagan—each of whom had won exactly one. It was also possible at both conventions for more than

five out of six delegates to be men, 97 percent over thirty and for states with large black populations to send only one or two black delegates or even none at all.

The Delegates of 1968

At the last of the conventions of the old order, you were almost sure to be a delegate if you were a sitting governor, more likely than not to be one if you were a U.S. senator, a little less likely if you were a member of the House of Representatives. At both conventions, at least one out of four delegates was a lawyer. Much more partisan was another occupation: union official. Over a hundred of them were Democratic delegates; none was a Republican delegate. This was how some of the principal occupations at the two conventions compared:

Occupation	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
Law	*28%*	*22%*
Government	*13*	*13*
Business	*27*	*40*
Teachers	*8*	*2*
Union officials	*4*	*0*

The high incidence of teachers at the Democratic Convention was something unlikely to have been found at previous conventions and was attributable to a high degree to the role played by the educational community in Senator McCarthy's campaign. Teachers have continued to be a major element at Democratic Conventions—reflected in Senator McGovern's large academic following in 1972 and the exceptional activism in Democratic nominating politics since then of the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers.

Two-thirds of the delegates to both 1968 conventions were attending their first one. At both conventions the great majority were college graduates. Nearly half had attended graduate schools. Most striking, however, were the figures on age, sex and race:

	Democrats	*Republicans*
Women	*13%*	*16%*
Blacks	*5*	*2*
Under 30	*3*	*4*

The First Reform

After the 1968 conventions, the CBS News polling data came into the hands of the Democratic party's Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, the body initially chaired by George McGovern. Originally, its chief mandate was to make future conventions more reflective of the presidential choices of the party's rank and file. But evidences of discrimination also came within its jurisdiction, and the discovery that women, blacks and young people had been so scantily represented in Chicago eventually led to the most notorious of all the commission's innovations. These were the 1972 "guidelines" calling for representation of minorities, women and the young (identified as people thirty and under) "in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population." Most people called them "quotas."

At about the same time the Republicans, making less noise, were traveling the same road. At the 1968 convention, while the struggle for the nomination was occupying most people, a non-discrimination clause was added to the party's rules. Following it, the GOP inserted this provision: "Republican State Committees shall take positive action to achieve the broadest participation in party affairs." The sponsors were concerned about their party's loss of its once sizable share of the nation's black vote. Lily-white Southern delegations in 1964 and 1968 (the Northern delegations were not much different) had not helped.

Southern state chairmen took the rule seriously, actively recruiting black delegates in 1972. So did Northern party officials. The national chairman, Robert Dole, aware of what was happening in the other party, also started a personal campaign to get more women elected to the 1972 convention. Because there was no contest for the nomination, it was relatively easy to pick delegates for race, age or sex.

The Delegates of 1972

When the parties gathered in 1972, the changes were both obvious and large: blacks and women at the Democratic Convention were three times the number in 1968, and at the Republican Convention, were twice the number. At the same time, in both parties, fewer governors and congressmen showed up. At the Democratic Convention polling revealed some striking changes not directly related to quotas. Lawyers—the traditional ruling occupation of U.S. politics—plunged from 28 percent in 1968 to a mere 12 percent at George McGovern's convention. Business people dropped from 27 percent to 8 percent. Though leaders of organized labor had been among the earliest and most vigorous critics of the quotas, union officials (at 5 percent) were even more generously represented in 1972 than at the previous convention. This time CBS News also polled for union membership. Sixteen percent of the delegates, it turned out, were members—roughly the same as in the voting-age population. We also polled for ancestry and found the United Kingdom first, Ireland a close second, Germany third, Italy fourth. Thirty-nine percent called themselves Protestant, 26 percent Catholic, 9 percent Jewish. Holders of high public office were fewer than at most conventions.

The Counter-Reform

Without the benefit of guidelines or quotas, the Republicans in 1972 had quietly accomplished many of the same changes in the makeup of their convention which the Democrats in some turmoil had achieved in theirs. While one of the most conservative of all Republican

conventions was renominating Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew, Republican moderates were once again quietly expanding the rule for "achieving the broadest possible participation" in the party's future conventions. Specifically identified for "positive action" were "women, young people, minority and heritage groups." With respect to women, the Republicans got a step ahead of the Democratic reformers: "Each state," said a new party rule, "shall endeavor to have equal representation of men and women" at the next national convention.

Over at the Democratic party, the movement was the other way. After McGovern's defeat, when a more traditional party leadership recaptured the national committee, the quotas which had been so conspicuous in the 1972 delegate selection process became a symbol of what had gone wrong that year.

The quotas, to be sure, had had little to do with either McGovern's nomination or the absence of so many leading Democrats from the convention. What had really altered the party politics of 1972 was the other part of the McGovern Commission's work: the greatly increased power over delegate selection given to primary and caucus participants. Blind primaries in Ohio, Illinois and Pennsylvania—which traditionally elected uncommitted delegates controlled by party leaders—were outlawed. So too was the plain dictation of delegates by existing state committees. Compliance with the new rules brought a sharp increase in binding primaries, and even in the caucus states, the new rules made it tougher to become a delegate without making a commitment.

One result of these reforms was to impede prospective delegates who refused to make an early commitment or did so and picked a loser. Another result was to minimize the political impact of having more women, blacks and younger people at the convention. Because, like everybody else, prospective delegates would usually have to sign away their presidential vote in order to get elected, their personal identity could have little impact on the chief business of the convention. Nevertheless, for several years the Democrats were preoccupied with the exorcising of convention quotas. The obsession reached a climax in the writing of a charter and of delegate rules for 1976 which condemned quotas and simultaneously decreed elaborate machinery for "affirmative action" to prod women, minorities and young people to the next convention.

The Delegates of 1976

In terms of proportional representation, 1976 represented something of a setback for Democratic reformers. Women at the 1976 party convention slipped from 40 to 33 percent of the delegates; blacks from 15 to 11 percent. The latter figure was consistent with the black presence in the population, though not with the standard black Democrats preferred—their presence in the party's electorate. The thirty and under group fell from 22 to 15 percent, but there was no organized constituency here, and hardly anybody noticed it.

Over on the Republican side, women (31 percent) did just about as well as they did at the Democratic Convention. Only 3 percent of the Republican delegates were blacks, though by the standard embraced by black Democrats (presence in the party's electorate), the Republican figures were not that far out of line.

For the first time, CBS in 1976 asked the delegates to both conventions to characterize themselves as conservative, liberal or moderate. In both parties a little under half proclaimed themselves moderates. But that

ended the resemblance. The rest of the Republicans divided 48 percent conservative, 3 percent liberal. The rest of the Democrats split 40 percent liberal, 8 percent conservative.

For the first time, in 1976, we were also able to compare the delegates to both conventions for both religion and ancestry. And, whatever else might be changing in American politics, it was clear that the Republicans remained the party of the WASP. In spite of all the encouragement to achieve fuller participation of "heritage groups," the Republicans produced a convention that was less than one-fifth Catholic; two-thirds of the delegates gave their ancestry as the British Isles, Germany or Scandinavia. Though 14 percent of the Republican delegates listed Ireland as their country of ancestry, two out of three of the Irish Republicans were Protestants. Of the Democratic delegates who claimed Irish ancestry (the largest ancestral block at the Democratic Convention), the great majority were Catholic.

Other divergences between the parties were also evident. The Republicans averaged five years older (the same spread would reappear in 1980). They were also significantly richer. In both parties about two-thirds were college graduates. About half had attended graduate schools.

Politically, something else had happened to the delegates of both parties since 1968. The Republicans had done little to encourage the growth of binding primaries, but they participated in many of them. As a result, nearly half the Republican delegates were legally bound and three out of four were publicly identified as supporters of a candidate.

The Democrats, meanwhile, had gone even further to minimize the decision-making power of their delegates. Having made it very difficult for uncommitted delegates to be chosen, whether in a primary or in a caucus state, the party (under rules adopted in 1974) then gave to presidential candidates an absolute veto over just which individuals could be committed to them from each state.

Candidate approval provided for a new kind of brokering of delegates. In return for support from the United Auto Workers and the National Education Association—which shifted from state to state and even from one congressional district to the next—those two organizations were enabled to pick several hundred delegates. As a result, nearly a third of all the union members at the 1976 convention were members of UAW or NEA.

Toward 1980

When the Democrats met to plan their rules for 1980, they had something they had not had since the process of tinkering with the system first began in earnest: an incumbent President. Jimmy Carter and the people around him were not liberals or conservatives, reformers or regulars. They were not fanatically for or against quotas. They were not devoted to making the system any more or less Democratic than it had been. All they wanted from the 1980 convention was that it renominate Carter.

Because the rules of 1976 had served Carter well, he had little inclination to change them. The candidate approval rule of 1976, however, had upset a lot of Democrats around the country, and the President's people were under some pressure to loosen that particular provision. They did loosen it, just a little. But the delegates were then required to sign written pledges to a particular candidate, and after that the celebrated Rule 11H was adopted, allowing them to be replaced by the candidate if they seemed about to break their pledge. (Rule 11H was at the center of the open convention fight.)

Meanwhile, Carter was having trouble with the party's activist women. Some were not impressed with the quality of his lobbying for ERA. Others were even less impressed with the well-publicized back-slapping at the White House after the dismissal of Bella Abzug. Nor did Carter's opposition to federal funding of abortion help. Thus, when the opportunity to do *something* for the party's women came in the drafting call of the convention, Carter went along with what organized women had been seeking since 1968: "equal division" of convention delegations between men and women.

The Delegates of 1980

As indicated earlier, twelve years of convention reform in the Democratic party produced a convention almost evenly divided between men and women and one in which all but 3 percent of the delegates had no choice in how they would vote for president. Similarly, the proportion of blacks in 1980—15 percent—restored the level of the 1972 McGovern convention, but nearly all the blacks, like nearly all the women, had no choice in how they would vote for president.

The irony of this arrangement was best displayed when the convention's women, Carter and Kennedy supporters alike, lobbied for and voted heavily in favor of minority planks on ERA and abortion and forced their addition to the platform. Carter-pledged defecting black and labor delegates similarly provided the marginal votes required to get a minority plank on jobs added to the platform.

The very next day, responding to yet another new rule, President Carter declared his opposition to both women's planks and his reservations on the jobs plank. At the roll-call on the presidential nomination, which immediately followed that declaration, over eleven hundred black and women delegates were automatically recorded as voting for the President without regard to how they may then individually have felt about him or those painfully achieved provisions in the platform.

At the Republican Convention, in spite of all those rules calling for "positive action" to increase "minority" participation, the black minority still accounted for

just 3 percent of the delegates—only a point above 1968. The figures clearly said something about the campaign of Ronald Reagan. Of the delegates originally chosen as Reagan supporters, 2 percent were black. Of the remaining delegates, 6 percent were black. Unlike the blacks in New York, those in Detroit were too small a group to form a bloc on anything—even if they could make common cause with labor delegates and a minority presidential faction (Kennedy's) as the black Democrats did. The Republican women, however, were a sizable body in Detroit. From the 16 percent of 1968, they have reached an apparent plateau of about 30 percent through the three subsequent conventions. In the case of women, the Reagan delegates had about the same share as the rest.

With respect to "women's issues," the activists among the Republican women had much less success on platform issues in Detroit than their counterparts in New York. For the first time in forty years (during most of which women were far less numerous at Republican conventions than this year), the party platform failed to endorse the Equal Rights amendment. And, for the first time ever, it endorsed a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion. Though neither issue came to a roll-call (the platform in its entirety was adopted by voice vote), there does happen to be a count of the Republican delegates by sex on both these issues. It was done in the course of the CBS News survey:

ERA	*Men*	*Women*
Favor	*26%*	*32%*
Oppose	*63*	*61*
Amendment prohibiting abortion		
Favor	*36*	*29*
Oppose	*49*	*56*

Even if these "women's issues" had gone to a vote on the floor, the survey indicates that the number of women in Detroit would have had no appreciable effect on the result. The women at the convention were almost as solidly opposed to ERA as the men. And, surprisingly perhaps, the men joined the women in opposing the abortion amendment. In neither case, of course, did it matter, since the politics of the convention prevented the delegates from voting either on the women's plank they favored or the one they opposed.

The attendance of blacks and women at the 1980 conventions reflected to some extent rules and exhortations for "affirmative action" in one party and "positive action" in the other. But other characteristics which emerged from the CBS News survey received no such artificial stimulation and may therefore tell us more about the traits that arise more naturally from the presidential nominating process in the respective parties. Not only were the Democrats more likely to be women and black, they were significantly younger, less rich, more Catholic and Jewish, seven times as likely to have union cards, much more likely to call themselves liberals, and much less likely to be conservative. They were rather more likely to get their main paycheck from some branch of government, but the difference was not as great here as is widely supposed.

The most striking single difference between the two conventions was in the relative prominence of liberals, moderates and conservatives. Liberals in Detroit and conservatives in New York were equally hard to find:

	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Overall U.S.*
Liberals	*46%*	*2%*	*19%*
Moderates	*42*	*36*	*43*
Conservatives	*6*	*58*	*30*

Twenty-seven percent of the Democratic delegates were union members—an all-time high even for the party traditionally allied to organized labor. At the Republican Convention, whose nominee declared union members to be a principal target of his campaign, only 4 percent of the delegates who nominated him belong—as he does—to a union. Many other differences also showed up. Some 11 percent of the Democrats this year were under thirty, compared to 5 percent of the Republicans. At forty-four, the median Democrat was five years younger than the corresponding Republican. At $37,000 a year, he (or she) was also $10,000 a year poorer than the median Republican. One cannot account for this discrepancy in income by the education of the two convention populations, for they were just about the same:

	Democrats	*Republicans*
No college	*13%*	*10%*
Some college	*23*	*25*
College graduate	*20*	*26*
LLB	*15*	*18*
Master's	*18*	*8*
Ph.D.	*3*	*2*
MD/DDS	*1*	*2*
Other postgraduate	*8*	*9*

Not surprisingly, not too many of these highly educated delegates are in the blue-collar occupations so eagerly solicited for votes in the current campaign:

	Democrats	*Republicans*
Teachers	*15%*	*4%*
Own business	*14*	*18*
Lawyers	*13*	*15*
Government	*11*	*8*
Union officials	*5*	*0*
Doctors, dentists, engineers	*2*	*5*
Media	*3*	*2*
Other white collar	*17*	*26*
Blue collar	*4*	*2*
Agriculture	*2*	*5*

Just how 27 percent of the Democrats could claim

union membership while only 4 percent are in blue-collar occupations needs some examination. It is found in the exceptional prominence of four white-collar unions, in particular the National Education Association (8 percent of all this convention's delegates, and a bloc about the size of the California delegation), which earned its representation by exceptional service to the winning (Carter) campaign. Moreover, among those delegates belonging to blue-collar unions, an exceptionally large number held a particular white-collar job: union official.

In a campaign year that is focusing a great deal on the Catholic and "ethnic" voter, the Democratic delegates once again were closer to the targeted voting blocs than their Republican counterparts. According to the CBS surveys, the Democratic delegates in New York were more likely to be Catholic, and less likely to claim ancestry in the United Kingdom or Western Europe than were their Republican counterparts: Not all elements of the convention populations are available for comparison over the years. For instance, we did not inquire about ancestry, income, religion, union membership, and a number of other things in 1968. Some comparisons, however, can be made apart from those already noted as to sex and race. Contrary to a common belief, prominent public and party officials are not quite a vanishing race at the conventions of either party. The Republicans actually had more members from both houses of Congress present in Detroit than at their 1968 convention. At the Democratic Convention, there has indeed been a sharp decline in senators and members of the House. But governors continue to be well represented at the gatherings of both parties. Overall, one delegate out of four held some public office at both conventions this year. Three out of five Republicans and half the Democrats currently held some party office.

Lawyers, while vastly overrepresented by comparison with the national work force (½ of 1 percent), are no longer the 20-30 percent they used to be at both conventions. At the 1980 Democratic Convention, union officials, for whom no national figures are available, had to be (at 5 percent) about as far out of line with their presence in the population as any group can get. Teachers, who *are* a major element in the national work force, were nevertheless (at 15 percent) very, very generously represented at the Democratic Convention.

A good deal of interest arose during this year's Democratic Convention over the number of delegates employed by government. The CBS News survey did not address that question directly, but it does make possible a fairly good estimate. For the purpose of the estimate, delegates were initially assumed to be publicly employed in some degree if they did or were any of the following: members of a teachers union or a government employees union, gave their occupation as teacher or government employee, *or* answered yes when asked if they held public office. No one was counted twice. Then, 20 percent of those counted as teachers (the percentage in the work force employed by private institutions) were subtracted. The resulting figure was 40 percent. Of that number, however, 8 percent were delegates who qualified only because they were members of state legislatures or of city councils —which are not generally full-time jobs.

At most, then, about a third of the Democratic Convention delegates worked full-time on some government payroll. This is, of course, very high, and hardly representative of the population. It does, however, reflect mostly that exceptional supply of teachers activated by the Carter campaign (and to a lesser degree the Kennedy campaign, which had its own teachers union, the American Federation of Teachers). Interestingly, using the same standard of measurement, 21 percent of the Republican delegates could be counted as full-time employees of government.

Beyond 1980

By 1980 the rules for "broadening participation" and "affirmative action" of the convention population had grown enormously in the canons of both parties. Those of the Democratic party comprise more than half the text of the entire rules for delegate selection. At the same time few people this year in either party were inclined any longer to care much about the matter.

In the Democratic party women had won "equal division," as much as they could ask, and the chief problem anybody found with it was finding a rational way of implementing it in states where delegates are chosen by machine ballots. Given the strenuous competition for black votes in presidential primaries, this year and in the foreseeable future, the political marketplace is likely to maintain a large black presence at future Democratic conventions without any pressure from the rules. What has taken most of the fire out of the quota issue is the discovery by everyone, long after it should have been obvious, that changes in the sex, race, age, and other personal characteristics of the delegates have had little demonstrable effect on the politics of the conventions.

During the struggle over the quotas (among the Republicans the code word was "broadening the party"), there was a general assumption that women, blacks and younger people tended to be liberal and anti-establishment. But, politically, it never worked out that way. Jimmy Carter, one of the more conservative Democratic contenders in both 1976 and 1980, had the most blacks and one of the highest percentages of women and young people at both conventions. In the Republican party, women and young people as conservative as anyone could want were available to serve as delegates for the more conservative candidates.

Most important of all, as the role of binding primaries and, in the Democratic party, candidate control over the choice of individual delegates grew, the actual identity of the person who goes to the convention to

	National Convention Delegates								Public	
	1968		1972		1976		1980		1980	
	DEM.	REP.	DEM.	REP.	DEM.	REP.	DEM.	REP.	DEM.	REP.
Women	13%	16%	40%	29%	33%	31%	49%	29%	56%	53%
Blacks	5	2	15	4	11	3	15	3	19	4
Under thirty	3	4	22	8	15	7	11	5	27	27
Median age (years)	(49)	(49)	(42)		(43)	(48)	(44)	(49)	(43)	(45)
Lawyers	28	22	12		16	15	13	15		
Teachers	8	2	11		12	4	15	4		
Union official	4	0	5		6	0	5	0		
Union member			16		21	3	27	4	29*	18*
Attended First Convention	67	66	83	78	80	78	87	84		
College Graduate	19		21		21	27	20	26	11	18
Postgraduate	44	34	36		43	38	45	39		
Protestant			42		47	73	47	72	63	74
Catholic			26		34	18	37	22	29	21
Jewish			9		9	3	8	3	4	1
Ireland			13		19	14	15	9		
Britain			17		15	28	15	31		
Germany			9		9	14	6	12		
Italy			4		6	5	5	6		
Liberal					40	3	46	2	21	13
Moderate					47	45	42	36	44	40
Conservative					8	48	6	58	26	41
Governors (number)	(23)	(24)	(17)	(16)	(16)	(9)	(23)	(13)		
Senators (number)	(39)	(21)	(15)	(22)	(11)	(22)	(8)	(26)		
U.S. Representatives (number)	(78)	(58)	(31)	(33)	(41)	(52)	(37)	(64)		

* Households with a union member.
Source: CBS News Delegate Surveys, 1968 through 1980. Characteristics of the public are average values from seven CBS News/*New York Times* polls, 1980.

cast a vote has become progressively less important.

The bitterness of this year's Democratic Convention fight over the rule inescapably binding nearly all the delegates may lead to some loosening of that particular rule. But the trend in Democratic party practice toward making the delegate essentially a messenger from the primary and caucus participants is probably irreversible. The shackling of future delegates may not be as crude as it was this year, but genuinely uncommitted delegates are not likely to be seen in great numbers at any Democratic Convention soon.

To the extent uncommitted delegates continue their path to extinction in the Democratic party, the reduced participation by the party's leading public officials is likely to continue. Their declining participation since 1968, as indicated earlier, had little to do with the increased role of blacks and women. It had just about everything to do with the necessity of making an early commitment to a presidential candidate. This year's high attendance by Democratic governors reflected the skillful seduction of a presidential candidate who happened to be the incumbent President and was able to get the necessary commitments. Most members of Congress, on the other hand, preferred the opportunity for early neutrality available for the most part only to those who chose not to be delegates. Four years from now, when no incumbent is running, even more of the party's chief public officials may seize that opportunity.

As shown earlier, however, lesser public officials in great abundance were present in New York—as were party officials at all levels.

Though it's harder for Republicans to go uncommitted now than it was in 1968, it is still a good deal easier than for Democrats. That undoubtedly explains the greater presence of governors, and the much greater presence of senators and members of the House, in Detroit than there was in New York. At the Republican Convention barely half of these officials had been committed at the time of their selection. All but two of the Democrats were so committed.

For the Republicans too, however, times are changing—and in the same direction they have changed for the Democrats. Blind primaries, which have produced most of the uncommitted delegates to recent Republican conventions, brought the party leaders who sponsored them this year nothing but ill will. Puzzled Republican voters who wanted to vote for Reagan, Bush, or Anderson delegates and couldn't figure out how became aware for the first time that their Democratic neighbors could go in the polling booth and vote for delegates clearly labeled as Carter's or Kennedy's. In big states like Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania, Republican voters next time are likely to insist on the same right Democrats have to decide how the delegates they vote for will vote at the convention.

To the extent that happens, it will matter just as little at Republican conventions as it did at the last Democratic Convention just who or what the delegates may be. On the main job they are sent there to do, it will only matter which candidate's collar they wear. ☑

by Richard Jensen

Armies, Admen and Crusaders: Strategies to Win Elections

For generations, historians and journalists have written in exquisite detail about campaign tactics—from torchlight parades, monster rallies, and whistle stops of old to thirty-second spot commercials and computer-generated "personalized" letters of today. But what of the broader picture? How have campaign strategies evolved in American politics and why do some tactics work and others fail?

Looking back through presidential campaigns since 1800, when John Adams squared off against Thomas Jefferson, one can roughly divide campaigns into five different brands: the Army Rally; the Missionary campaign; the Advertiser; the Crusade; and the Counter-Crusade. None of the strategies is now obsolete, but their relative effectiveness has changed dramatically over time, as candidates and campaign managers have tried to calculate the best way to capitalize on changing moods, shifting loyalties, and new media environments.

In the table accompanying this article, I have tried to classify all of the 44 major presidential campaigns from 1800 to 1980 (omitting only the non-party elections of 1820 and 1824) in terms of the predominant strategy employed by each party. While any one campaign may involve a mixture of two or even three types, and the blend of styles may vary somewhat in different areas, a concentration on ideal types helps to bring order and clarity to an otherwise bewildering array of events and activities.

Glancing at the table, one can quickly see that nineteenth century elections (1800 through 1912) were predominantly of two army-style types, the *missionary* and the *rally* campaign. Since World War I, the army styles have largely given way to *advertising* campaigns. But throughout this period, and especially during times of high social tension since 1800, campaign history has been punctuated by two other unusual strategies: the *crusade* and its antidote, the *counter-crusade*.

The two army styles, missionary and rally, were invented early in U.S. politics to solve the problem of mobilizing a large, dispersed, agrarian, poorly educated potential electorate on a national scale. The solution was to instill a deep sense of loyalty to a national party identity. Campaign tactics reflected the explicit metaphor that the two parties constituted organized armies that fought it out on the election day battlefield for the spoils of office. The candidate heading the ticket was the "commanding general" at party "headquarters," party officers and committees occupied staff positions, and lesser candidates were the line officers. The chain of command extended through precinct "captains" to the "rank and file" of loyal troops who manned the army.

Nineteenth century politicians, most of whom had served in the army or in state militias, had no other organizational model than the military with which to conceptualize the process of dealing with hundreds of thousands of individuals, for mass parties existed nowhere else in the world. They thought and acted as if their parties could be handled like real armies, ones that cast ballots not bullets on the day of battle. Conversely the voters, mostly very parochial folk, could appreciate the importance of loyalty and hierarchy in a quasi-military formation.

A successful "rally" campaign activated and reinforced party loyalty and pulled supporters to the polls in full number. The partisan attachments of the electorate were considered fixed, so that the goal was not to convert the enemy but to overwhelm him with numbers. Morale-building devices constituted the bulk of the tactical maneuvers in the campaign. The favored

device to freshen the army's enthusiasm was the monster meeting at which thousands or tens of thousands of partisans and their families gathered for parades, martial music, an ox-roast, ample refreshment (recall the "hard cider" campaign of 1840), and long-winded speeches that exhorted the rank and file to do their utmost to vanquish the enemy. The duties of the troops were to vote, to display the colors by wearing buttons or carrying banners, to talk up the ticket, and to guarantee that their partisan neighbors and kin also marched to the polls.

Organization of monster rallies was an art form perfected early in the nineteenth century. The most promising future leaders were the young advance men who could plan and coordinate a good rally, deliver a stirring speech, and immediately start organizing the next event. Crowdsmanship in estimating attendance at parades and rallies was a popular sport. Big crowds were measured by the acre (10,000 persons per acre), with partisans grossly exaggerating turnout and opponents ridiculing the half-hearted response of a dismally small meeting. Everyone realized that the size and enthusiasm of audiences reflected not so much the probable vote as the effectiveness of campaign work. Hence one of the important goals of every rally was to convince the faithful that they were headed to victory. No poormouthing was permitted. With parties so nearly equal in strength, victory was determined primarily by differences in turnout rates.

In any election the key issues revolve around party traditions, new promises and platforms, candidate personalities, and protest against apparent evils. The rally-type campaign focused voters' attention primarily on party tradition—one army was right and good, the other wrong and dangerous. The personalities of the candidates received less attention than the remembered heroics of leaders past. Thus, the Federalists honored Washington much as Democrats two centuries later gloried in the memory of Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy. Independent protest played no role, for virtually every voter considered himself a loyal partisan strongly attached to one or the other army. "Mugwumps," or other species of independent thinkers, were brutally ridiculed and denounced. To the extent that substantive issues received attention, they were transformed into slogans and battle cries that encapsulated the official position.

Serious analysis of the issues was not absent, however. A man who thoroughly understood the issues and his party line was a better soldier, and so the parties provided their rank and file with far more detailed information on the issues than is available to the average voter today. The hour-and-a-half main speech that the crowds came to hear was "brimful of facts and reasons," as frontier Senator Thomas Hart Benton noted, with detailed statistics, citations from official documents, allusions to the Bible, and exhaustive analysis of major legislation in full historical detail. Oratory was the great American art form, so that a powerful argument, coupled necessarily with a powerful voice, commanded a high premium. The electorate was poorly educated in terms of formal schooling, but close attention at a few score rallies provided a thorough, albeit one-sided, understanding of the complexities of tariffs, banking laws, and the Constitution. Copies of major speeches were routinely printed in pamphlet form and circulated nationwide in tens or hundreds of thousands of copies.

The chief medium of communication inside a political "army" was the official party newspaper. In-

Table 1
CLASSIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, 1800-1980

Missionary:
- Republican in 1800
- Whig in 1832
- Whig and Democratic in 1844
- Democratic in 1876
- Republican and Democratic in 1892
- Republican in 1896 (in part)
- Socialist in 1908 and 1912
- Anderson in 1980

Army Rally:
- All campaigns from 1800 through 1912 except otherwise listed (including American [Know-Nothing] in 1856)
- Democratic campaigns in big cities, 1860 through 1948
- Democratic campaigns in the South, 1900 through 1944, except 1928
- Democratic campaigns in Black urban areas, 1968 through 1980

Advertising:
- All campaigns from 1916 through 1980, unless otherwise noted

Crusade:
- Federalist in 1812
- Jackson supporters (Democratic) in 1828
- Anti-Masonic in 1832
- Free Soil in 1848
- Republican in 1856
- Liberal Republican in 1872
- Populist in 1892
- Democratic in 1896, 1936, 1948 and 1972
- Progressive in 1912, 1924 and 1948
- Republican in 1940, 1952, 1964 and 1980(?)
- American Independent (Wallace) in 1968

Counter-Crusade:
- Federalist in 1800
- Adams' supporters (National Republican) in 1828
- Democratic in 1856 (against Republicans)
- Southern Democratic in 1860 (against Republicans)
- Republican in 1872, 1896 (in part), 1912 (against Roosevelt) 1924 (against LaFollette) and 1972
- Democratic in 1912 (against Roosevelt), 1940, 1952, 1964, 1968 (against Wallace) and 1980 (against Reagan)
- Dixiecrats in 1948 (against Truman)

Note: Smaller minor parties have not been included.

deed, the modern cheap newspaper was created in the 1830s primarily to keep party leaders in touch with one another and with the rank and file. By 1850 the nation boasted 1,630 party newspapers, with a circulation of nearly one per voter, together with a mere 83 "neutral" or independent papers. The papers, both daily and weekly, devoted their columns to political news and commentary, providing far more details than now reach modern readers.

In 1896, for example, the three leading San Francisco papers printed twice as much political information as the same papers did in 1952, even though the number of pages per issue had increased fourfold. The party line was inherent in every line of news copy, not to mention the long, authoritative editorials. As one might expect, the stupidity of the enemy and the triumphs of the party were always chronicled, often leading to serious distortion of genuine news. Not for two weeks did readers of the *New York Tribune,* the foremost Republican paper in the nation, learn that James G. Blaine had lost the election of 1884!

The armies succeeded in whipping enthusiasm to a high pitch. In fact, mass participation in campaign activities reached heights in the mid- and late nineteenth century that have never been equalled since. Surveys since 1940 show that less than a fourth of the modern electorate attends rallies, contributes money, wears buttons, solicits votes, or does much more than vote. The phenomenal attendance at rallies and circulation of speeches demonstrates a much higher level of participation a century ago. As for voting itself, the rate of turnout was 77 percent from 1840 through 1896, contrasted with a 60 percent rate from 1948 through 1976. Politics was the spectator sport of the era, with the fans devoted to their teams and eager to follow the game as closely as possible.

The continued vigor of the political armies depended upon an adequate supply of rewards for party workers. High paying, high prestige jobs were the chief attraction. By 1860, the federal government alone controlled some 60,000 jobs—a generous number for the partisans of that day. In the 1880s, a local postmaster was paid $2,500—more than the divisional superintendent of a major railroad—yet could dispose of his duties in ten or twenty hours a week. The demands of office-seekers were heavy, and a new administration spent most of its first six or ten months in office dispensing the spoils. The realization that there were four or five "qualified" applicants for every job led by the 1830s to the system of rotation, whereby no one could expect to feed at the public trough more than four years. Party newspapers received lucrative public printing contracts from federal, state, and local governments, as well as contracts to print posters, handbills, speeches, and paper ballots.

Early Inspiration from the Evangelicals

The other major form of campaigning in the nineteenth century—the *missionary* campaign—served a different purpose from the rally-style: it was designed not to stimulate troops already on board but to create a new army or to rebuild an old one after partisan loyalties had been under severe strain. Of course, political armies did not spring up spontaneously from the loose factional alignments, issueless environment and low participation rates that characterized American politics in the 1790s and 1820s. The organizations had to be created afresh by ambitious national figures in alli-

ance with local politicians, and the troops had to be recruited through personal contact. The inspiration for party formation in the nineteenth century came from the missionary activities of evangelical denominations (especially Methodists and Baptists) which were busily converting nonreligious sinners to the true faith. Evangelists proselytized to save souls and to build a church; politicians proselytized to win votes and recruit an army.

The original recruitment of the troops of the major parties usually did not take place during election campaigns. Too much rhetoric was flying around then to permit sober man-to-man discussions and earnest persuasion. "The noise and excitement of a campaign," observed Grover Cleveland, "are not conducive to the accomplishment of missionary work or the dissemination of political truth." Minor parties, however, have often used the heightened political awareness created by a presidential campaign to educate the voters to their platform and recruit new supporters. As a Socialist leader explained during the 1908 contest:

> Altogether there are probably not less than 4,000 speakers at work every night of the year lecturing, campaigning and selling literature. Nearly every one of the 40,000 members of the party considers himself a missionary and undertakes some active work. Each one agrees to call upon neighbors, to urge subscriptions for the papers of the party, or to sell and distribute Socialist literature.

The 1980 Anderson campaign is the only recent major missionary drive, with a corps of newly enlisted petition canvassers actively soliciting votes on the street corners. In the 1970s, however, a number of single-issue movements used the missionary style to build grassroots support. The Right-to-Life party used this strategy in 1976. Other movements, particularly fundamentalist Protestant political action groups, having recruited through local churches and national television programs, are playing an important part in the 1980 campaign.

Earnest exhortation through door-to-door canvassing, and the generous distribution of party literature, have long been an essential ingredient for missionary-style campaigns. In 1799, when the Jeffersonians were building their army, the leading Boston Federalist, Fisher Ames, complained the enemy was sending "emissaries to every class of men, and even to every individual man that can be gained. Every threshing floor, every husking, every party at work on a frame-house or raising a building, the very funerals are infected with bawlers or whisperers against the [Federalist] government." As a result, he lamented, "The Jacobins have at last made their own discipline perfect; they are trained, officered, regimented and formed to subordination, in a manner that our own militia have never yet equalled."

From time to time, the sudden emergence of highly salient new issues, or the sharp weakening of traditional loyalties in particular groups, forced parties to switch from the rally to the missionary strategy. The year 1844 was a prime example. A wave of anti-Catholic agitation that year sparked bloody urban riots; a new nativist party elected the mayor of New York. The slavery issue blazed to the fore on the question of annexing Texas as a slave state. The abolitionist movement quickened, and the two largest denominations, the Methodists and Baptists, each split apart along North-South lines. National politics had been thrown into confusion by President Tyler's break with the Whigs, his abortive attempt to form a third party, and his last minute switch to the Democrats (along with his patronage). The rally-style of 1840 was no longer adequate, so both parties—Democrats and Whigs—adopted a missionary strategy to win over confused voters. As soon as the situation stabilized, the parties reverted to the rally-type campaign.

Social tensions and economic crises again upset traditional alignments in the 1890s, forcing a decade-long abandonment of the rally. In the off-year elections of 1890 the Democrats scored a landslide on the basis of missionary work that attracted Germans, farmers and consumers by branding the GOP as the party of prohibition, nativism, and high taxes. Farmer movements in the South and West threatened to move voters into the new Populist party.

In 1892 Cleveland called for a "campaign of education," that would "appeal to the reason and judgment of the American people, to the end that the Democratic party should be reinforced as well as that the activity and zeal of those already in the ranks should be stimulated." The Republicans realized that their support of high tariffs, prohibition, compulsory education, and civil rights laws had alienated so many supporters that they could no longer rely upon a rally of loyal troops to win the election. They organized 20,000 local clubs, with two million active workers to proselytize and distribute literature. Club members, one observer noted, were related to the party as "the preacher to the church; the recruiting officer to the army." Instead of monster rallies and parades, the major parties spent four million dollars (equivalent to ten times that today) for millions of documents to be sent to every voter in key states, including hundreds of thousands of individually typed letters of appeal. In Wisconsin alone the Democrats distributed two million pamphlets and leaflets among the state's 400,000 voters. Comprehensive door-to-door surveys of voting intentions of *every* voter were used by both parties in critical areas to identify potential swing voters.

The depression of 1893-1896 drastically weakened the loyalties of Democrats, giving the Republicans and Populists an unprecedented opportunity to enlist fresh strength. Internal organizational weaknesses prevented the Populists from exploiting the situation, but not the GOP. Under Mark Hanna's brilliant leadership, the Republicans in 1896 distributed 200,000,000 docu-

ments, in a dozen languages, to the nation's 15,000,000 voters! That summer and fall, some 750,000 party activists journeyed to Canton, Ohio, where the carefully crafted speeches of William McKinley inspired them to become missionaries in his cause. The result was a stunning realignment of American politics in the election of 1896.

For any army to win—whether in a rally or missionary campaign—strict discipline was necessary in the ranks. Coordination of a presidential campaign required close cooperation among all units at all levels, and subordination of state, district, and local candidacies to the national contest. Lesser candidates tied their efforts closely to the top of the ticket, working to secure a straight party vote. Local issues, even local variations on the national theme, were seldom discussed. Ticket-splitting was strongly discouraged. Before the adoption of the Australian ballot around 1890, it was difficult and uncommon for a voter to divide his vote between the parties, because men usually used a ballot printed by the parties which did not even list the opposition. The strong party organizations controlled nominations for office and aspiring politicians were encouraged to throw their energies into the party campaign in return for an excellent chance of obtaining a suitable office for a short period.

The Decline and Fall of Political Armies

Why did the armies weaken in the early twentieth century? There were many reasons. For one thing, political careers became less attractive as most of the patronage plums gave way to civil service. Congress also became harder to reach as incumbents disregarded the rotation rule and stayed in office for long terms, acquiring the seniority that spelled power in the twentieth century. Progressive legislation deliberately set out to weaken or even, as in California, destroy the party organizations. The major newspapers discovered they could make more money from advertising than politics, but to compete for the ads they needed high circulations, and to expand their readership they had to appeal to both Democrats and Republicans. They soon demonstrated that sports, sex, and scandal sold better than tariffs, treaties, and taxes. Voter interest fell precipitously as the poorly educated were inhibited from voting by literacy tests, poll taxes, and registration requirements.

The active electorate thus became more middle class, better educated, and less inclined to automatically accept the dictates of party leaders. In 1912 Theodore Roosevelt led the middle classes in a dramatic break from the GOP, smashing a heritage of party loyalty that, like Humpty Dumpty, could not easily be glued back together. Woman suffrage doubled the potential electorate, but without prior political experience most women did not vote. By 1924 turnout sank to an all-time low of 49 percent. Consecutive elections showed not only large switches between the parties, but also heavy movement into and out of the electorate.

The New Deal slowed the decay of party loyalty by bringing large numbers of new voters, especially ethnic workers, into the electorate permanently, and tying them closely to the FDR party. The missionary work of expanded unions, new relief organizations, and newly revived big city machines demonstrated, as late as the mid-1930s, that armies could still be built in America. Although the big city ethnic worker army, along with the white South, became the core of the new Democratic coalition, the core was never large enough by itself to decide national elections. To win, FDR and his successors also had to appeal to the majority of voters who were not mobilized into armies. The Republicans, deprived of their own big city machines after 1932, could not use old-fashioned army techniques at all.

The Voter as Customer

The solution to the problem of winning elections without using army strategies was discovered and perfected in the 1910s and 1920s: advertise. The development of political advertising paralleled—and often preceded—the growth of the new mass-market Madison Avenue industry. Politicians thought of voters as customers and themselves as products that had to be attractively packaged and presented to an audience. A sort of "brand loyalty" could be built up over time, but only if the politician distanced himself from rivals both within and without his party. The moods and needs of his specific constituency, not the overall needs of the party, determined how each candidate allocated his resources of money, time, volunteer help, and choice of issues. Presidential candidates packaged their personalities through multi-million dollar advertising campaigns, reinforced by personal appearances around the country.

Inevitably, in the age of advertising campaigns, control of many significant features of the race—especially the budget—passes from the party to commercial agencies or, beginning with Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter's Campaigns Inc. in California in 1934, to specialized campaign management firms. Party organizations have little to do unless, like the Republican National Committee in the late 1970s, they transform themselves into giant campaign consulting operations. A network of volunteer campaigners/salespeople, recruited on a friends-and-neighbors basis, becomes more important to the candidate than the state or local party apparatus. Indeed, by 1980 the two national conventions no longer were gatherings of party leaders, but had instead become conventions of delegates/salespeople who owed their primary loyalty to the candidate, not the party.

The advertising strategy first emerged in 1916. Both parties tried to win over the Roosevelt Progressives of 1912, but neither had the manpower for door-to-door missionary work. The solution was heavy use of newspaper advertisements and billboards that emphasized the progressiveness of each party. During World War I, the government also used the fledgling

advertising agencies to sell war bonds, recruit soldiers, encourage food conservation, and, above all, convince the people of the righteousness of the American Cause.

In 1918 the Republican National Committee hired the foremost advertising genius, Albert Lasker, to devise a nationwide sales campaign on behalf of Republican candidates. The coming of woman suffrage, and the disaffection of ethnics with Wilson's policies, encouraged the GOP to greatly expand its advertising approach to the 1920 contest. Local candidates paid for short "commercials" in movie theaters. Radio broadcasts became the favored technique of the 1920s, with over a million dollars spent for political air time in the depression year of 1932.

Withering Away of Old Politics

As advertising took hold, the "army" tactics of the nineteenth century withered away in the 1920s, except in areas dominated by party machines. Monster rallies gave way to radio broadcasts that could reach larger, though more passive audiences, at a lower cost per thousand, and to handshaking tours and motorcades that offered the public a glimpse of the candidate-celebrity without the necessity of listening to him. Lengthy, heavily argued pamphlets gave way to colorful leaflets and even comic books that extolled the charm and the family of the candidate at the expense of a serious analysis of platforms and promises. Anonymous aides began writing speeches, for the chief function was no longer to deliver a serious message but to have the candidate use them as a vehicle to display his handsome visage, his "sincerity," and, thus, his competence to hold office.

Cut adrift from party loyalty, more and more voters began to consider themselves independents in the 1920s, especially young people without exposure to the army drills or recollection of the performance records of the parties. These independents decided elections, and candidates increasingly concentrated on them. Ticket splitting soared from less than 5 percent in the nineteenth century to 30, 40, 50 percent today, as the voters combined their own shopping basket of candidates. At the same time citizens began to lose interest in politics; sports, travel, and electronic entertainment filled the leisure time once occupied by politics.

Turnout fell steadily after 1900, as did participation in all forms of political activity. Even though the educational level of the citizenry rose and their experience increased (with the median age of voters climbing from 36 years in the nineteenth century to 46 years today), the information level of the electorate declined. Without a clear party line to follow, and without partisan newspapers to indicate it, the voters grew increasingly baffled by the issues. The tariff, slavery, money, and foreign policy issues of the nineteenth century were comprehended by the voters because their party explained the implications to them and provided a coherent, intelligent party position they could easily follow. In the advertising era, every candidate blurs the deep issues or ignores them, and emphasizes the superficial and transient. The voter, forced to choose among attractively packaged personalities, loses sight of the complex issues of the day. It is easier to stay home.

The Crusade: A Series of Lost Armageddons

While there has been a major evolution in basic campaign strategies since the early 1800s, the times continue to call forth from time to time an old favorite in American politics: the *crusade*. Over the years, the crusade has always proved to be the most dramatic and most memorable campaign strategy—and also the least successful. Jackson in 1828, Frémont in 1856, Bryan in 1896, Roosevelt in 1936, Willkie in 1940, Eisenhower in 1952, Goldwater in 1964, McGovern in 1972, and Reagan in 1980—all have been striking attempts to upset the status quo but most have failed. Similarly, third parties have often sprung up to crusade with impatient demands—notably the Free Soilers in 1848, the Know-Nothings in 1854 (an off-year election), the Populists in 1892, three different Progressive parties in 1912, 1924, and 1948, George Wallace's American Independent party in 1968—and none has succeeded.

The dominant characteristic of the crusade is a pervasive moral fervor that animates both the standard-bearer and his supporters to extirpate evil from government in the name of the people. Evil power-holders must be routed; apocalyptic doom is prophesied if the forces of darkness prevail; war, social calamities, economic exploitation, or deep injustice all lie just around the corner. "We stand at Armageddon," cried Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, "and we battle for The Lord!"

Americans are a moralistic people, with a strong sensitivity to guilt that can be focused on particular targets, ranging from crooked incumbents to Jacobins, monarchists, Masons, Catholics, abolitionists, slaveowners, blacks, bankers, railroads, Communists, fascists, reactionaries, Wall Street, socialistic planners, elitist intellectuals, labor-baiters, race-mixers, war hawks, big oil, nuclear power, despoilers of the environment, bureaucrats, and assorted demons who stir local anxieties. The constantly reiterated theme is that the nation is on the brink of disaster because of a takeover by these sinister forces, and the common people must rise up and smite their cunning and wicked foes on election day.

The theme that the evil enemy is already in power naturally limits the possibilities for crusading on the part of incumbents seeking reelection. Occasionally they do mount a crusade, especially when they are trying to create a new coalition or reactivate an old one. The enemy then consists of mysterious behind-the-scene characters, preferably in far-away cities. Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 crusaded against "economic royalists" in a successful effort to mobilize previously apathetic laborers, farmers, and unemployed workers. In 1948 Harry Truman revived the 1936 coalition by

(Continued on page 52)

These people say our problems can be solved.

Everytime you pick up the newspaper it seems there is another crisis. And it seems like someone is saying it can't be solved. But there are solutions. Some of them have been proposed by the experts and scholars listed here.

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

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painting Thomas Dewey as the puppet of malevolent Wall Street forces.

Crusaders employ the whole range of campaign tactics. Mass meetings, parades, special newsletters, distinctive insignia (buttons and bumper stickers): all are used to identify and encourage allies. Protestant revival techniques, which combine guilt themes, moralistic fervor and time-tested conversion tactics, are especially favored. They echo the prophetic tones of the Old Testament. Thus, William Jennings Bryan elicited accusations of blasphemy by his unblushing use of Messianic symbols, notably in his "Cross of Gold-Crown of Thorns" speech. Harry Truman in 1948 prayed for "an Isaiah or a Martin Luther to lead us out of this moral despond into which we have fallen. I wish we could bring forth the political leaders . . . who would preach the gospel of the welfare of the country first, and special interest never." Followers of TR in 1912 and Goldwater in 1964 marched to the strains of "Onward Christian Soldiers" and "The Battle Hymn of the Republic." The political awakening of born-again Christians in the 1970s fueled the moralistic crusaders combatting abortion, women's liberation, and atheistic Communism. One of the unexpected features of John Anderson's campaign is that once he abandoned his old constituency and carefully distanced himself from reborn Christians, he also showed a striking reluctance to employ the crusading strategy. Anderson's summer supporters yearned for a crusade against the old politics, and, not getting one, drifted away in the fall.

Sad in Defeat, Adamant in Victory

The crusade cuts across old party lines. True believers are welcomed regardless of past affiliation, and advertising techniques are employed to reach everyone who might respond. Door-to-door proselytizing, often joined to petition-signing, works well. Eugene McCarthy, when he was crusading against President Lyndon Johnson in 1968, used armies of college students ("clean for Gene") directed to suburban neighborhoods by elaborately programmed computers. If the crusade catches fire, the response can be overwhelming. An 1856 newspaperman reported:

> I am everywhere astonished at the depth and ardor of the popular sentiment [for Frémont]. Where we least expect it large and enthusiastic crowds throng the meeting and stay for hours with the thermometer at 100°. It is a great canvass; for genuine inspiration, 1840 could not hold a candle.

Sometimes crusaders offer a comprehensive panacea for all the ills of the day, as Bryan did with his Free Silver platform. This approach makes counterattack and ridicule too easy, however, and has not been used since Upton Sinclair's "End Poverty in California" crusade of 1934. A more successful appeal wraps up the crusade in a vague slogan like: "Throw the Rascals Out," "Every Man a King," "In Your Heart You Know He's Right," "Freedom Now," "No Nukes," "Korea, Communism and Corruption," or the stirring, "Free Speech, Free Press, Free Soil, Free Men, Frémont and Victory!"

Crusades usually begin when a faction inside a major party suddenly seizes power (Bryan in 1896, Goldwater in 1964, McGovern in 1972). The faction may lose its bid for power and form a third party (Liberal Republicans in 1872, Progressives in 1912 and 1948, Wallace in 1968). While the target of the crusade sometimes comes to terms with the crusaders (as Humphrey did with McCarthy people in the closing weeks of 1968, or Ford did with Reagan in 1976), the successful crusaders are usually adamant in victory. Eisenhower's reconciliation with Taft in 1952, and Reagan's with Ford and Bush in 1980 mark the few times that crusaders have effectively united the entire party behind the cause with guarantees of major roles for the losing faction and a switch of targets from intraparty to interparty rivals. More often, the crusaders insist that "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice; moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue," and demand a complete cleansing of the party temple (Crusader Jesse Helms was bitterly disappointed that this did not happen in 1980). The resulting intraparty fight leads to bitter vituperation (as in the treatment of Nelson Rockefeller in 1964). James Garfield noted that the 1872 Liberal Republican crusade "has more mean and personal elements in it than any I have known. The disruption of party organization leaves the mere politician to fall back on personal scandal."

Distrusting the established party apparatus, the crusaders organize special volunteer groups to build support. Thus Bryan had his silver clubs, while Willkie, Eisenhower, Goldwater, and Reagan relied heavily upon "Citizens" groups. The fervor of the crusade engenders a very high turnout among supporters (e.g., in the deep South for Goldwater, in college towns for McGovern), and a marked decline of support in the "enemy's country," (e.g., Bryan's and Goldwater's dismal showings in the Northeast, or Reagan's weakness in affluent suburbs during the primaries).

The Counter-Crusade: Demolishing the Crusaders

The disruption and bitterness wrought by the crusaders within their party gives the opposition the opportunity to employ the fifth campaign strategy, the *counter-crusade*, to maul the crusaders. The idea is to charge that the crusader is a dangerous and reckless fool—too radical, anarchistic, mad, or even senile—and represents not the honorable traditions of his party but some sinister forces. The first counter-crusade came in 1800 when Federalists advised their editors to "sound the tocsin about Jefferson." Promptly, editorials warned readers to "Look at every leading Jacobin as at a ravening wolf, preparing to enter your peaceful fold, and glut

his deadly appetite on the vitals of your country."

In 1828 counter-crusaders depicted Andrew Jackson as an uncouth backwoods bigamist and murderer. In 1856 James Buchanan instructed Democrats that "the Black Republicans must be, as they can be with justice, boldly assailed as disunionists, and this charge must be reiterated again and again." Ignore the other issues, he advised, and "flay the abolitionists, free soilers, and infidels against the union." Buchanan's editors thereupon began warning of "anarchy, civil war, servile war, despotism" should the Republican crusaders win. Lincoln learned well the lesson of 1856, and he did *not* crusade in 1860; by escaping a counter-crusade in the North he was able to woo conservative and cautious men. There were no (visible) Republicans in the South, however, and the Southern Democrats used a counter-crusade that worked too well—when Lincoln did win, most Southerners thought their way of life was doomed if they stayed in the union.

Bryan in 1896 appeared in the counter-crusading press as a fanatic firebrand, the advance agent of anarchy and economic disaster, and as the sponsor of an utterly immoral program to redistribute wealth. Republicans in 1924 pointed to the menace of LaFollette's "socialism" and cautioned voters to "Keep Cool with Coolidge." New Dealers insinuated that Willkie was the front man for fascists. In 1952 liberal Democrats (who once wanted to nominate Eisenhower themselves) successfully evoked negative images of the general as a dangerous militarist in one-fourth of the electorate. In 1964 opponents associated Goldwater with nuclear doomsday and the sabotage of social security. By early September of that year, fully 45 percent of the public saw the Arizonan as a "radical," while only 40 percent considered him a conservative. Jimmy Carter has tried to stop Reagan in 1980 by echoing the same themes that worked then: Reagan's radical and irresponsible course . . . could put the whole world in peril.

In 1968 Wallace's selection of superhawk General Curtis Lemay as his running mate provided the opening the Democrats needed to warn of doomsday, while unions told their restless members that Wallace's election would undercut their economic security. In the closing two weeks of the campaign, the majority of Wallace-leaning northern Democrats returned to the fold, giving Humphrey almost enough votes to win. Nixon avoided a counter-crusade so as not to sully his image as president-to-be. Nixon was not so reluctant in 1972, when a classic counter-crusade demolished McGovern (aided by revelations that running mate Eagleton had psychiatric problems).

The crusade is an ephemeral but recurring style. If the men of wrath win (1800, 1828, 1936, 1948, 1952), they inevitably moderate their stance next time around. If they lose but retain control of a major party, their next campaign avoids the blistering counter-crusade by abandoning the crusading style (Lincoln in 1860, Bryan in 1900, Nixon in 1968).

Nothing is quite as sorry as the fate of defeated crusaders. Sometimes they claim a "moral" victory and try to rewrite history accordingly. (Bryan's memoir of the 1896 crusade was entitled *The First Battle;* TR in 1912 claimed to have purged the GOP of its hated bosses.) Usually they drift aimlessly in the political wilderness, like Willkie, or recede into obscurity like McGovern. Two died of exhaustion and disappointment (Horace Greeley in 1872, Robert LaFollette in 1925). Wallace made a strong comeback in 1972, and his near-assassination suddenly made him almost respectable. He and Reagan were the only crusaders able to sustain enough fury to mount a second crusade, though Reagan's "crusade" in 1980 was much tamer than in 1976.

Will We See More Crusades in the Future?

Crusades became more frequent in the twentieth century as a result of the shift from army to advertiser styles. The armies, whatever their faults, did provide the electorate with a keen understanding of public affairs and an opportunity to participate in the affairs of state. They made democracy work. Politics in the age of mass media has become far more distant from the average citizen. The news media provide only superficial coverage of complex events, and the sure guidelines of party positions are no longer available. Party workers no longer come door-to-door to discuss the candidates and explain the issues; instead we get pseudo-personalized letters in the mail, or phone calls from telephone banks staffed by operators with a one-hour briefing on politics.

Dissatisfaction with government has soared in the last decade, caused by its failure to solve the problems of wild inflation, high taxes, low productivity, energy shortages, environmental threats and a baffling revolution in standards of equality, freedom and opportunity. Since Watergate, the major media have looked on government as an adversary, with investigative reporting used to sniff out and exploit any hint of scandal or impropriety. Disgruntled voters have found that only the crusaders seem to tell it like it is. Oversimplification of complex issues and moralistic polarization into stark good and evil is the inevitable result. Thus, the crusades of presidential and local candidates, and of single issue groups, do provide a means for public participation in the affairs of state.

The full democratization of the presidential selection process has almost eliminated the equilibrating gyroscope of the organized party. High office can now only be won by professional campaigners, for whom expertise in government is an image rather than a usable skill. But the politicians are only adjusting their strategies to what the people want and will respond to. The inner logic of the structure of society and the psychology of the people determine the strategies and shape the candidates, and no amount of fiddling with the rules can make our system work otherwise. ☑

Ladd

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a majority of their own. Each presidential election is a law unto itself. "Since the early 1950s, 'deviating' presidential elections have been the rule rather than the exception," Walter Dean Burnham pointed out more than a decade ago in *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics.*

The various forces that are weakening party identification strike with special fury around the presidency, that most visible and individualistic of offices. In an age of television, contenders can appeal to voters directly in their living rooms, placing emphasis on the candidates' personalities rather than their partisan commitments. Then, too, the post-1968 "reforms" have encouraged candidates to seek office outside the regular organizational and interest group structures of the parties. The apparatus of the Republican party is more actively involved in this year's Reagan campaign than that of either party in any campaign of the past two decades, but serious steps have not yet been taken to reverse the trend toward running with large personal organizations that operate outside the political parties.

Instability among the voters is further extended by their own uncertainty and ambivalence about the proper course of public policy. Since people are of mixed minds about what government should be doing, they naturally are tied only lightly to the contending parties and to their murky blueprints for the future. This high measure of popular ambivalence necessarily works *against* realignment and *for* dealignment.

Then, too, it hardly seems likely there will be a "new parade" when the American electorate is so jaded and "turned off." The electorate views the record of the past decade as replete with high-blown rhetoric and sub-par performance. It really does not believe the country will be much better served whomever wins the 1980 presidential election.

In a survey this past July, for example, Gallup found a striking drop in the number who gave each party a "highly favorable" rating, compared to 1967:

	1967	*1980*
Democrats	*42%*	*28%*
Republicans	*34*	*17*

Similarly, when the CBS News/*New York Times* poll posed this question in September of 1980: "Do you think there are any important differences in what the Democratic and Republican parties stand for?", only 43 percent said yes—including just 52 percent of the registered Democrats and 49 percent of the registered Republicans!

Another dramatic illustration comes from a survey conducted in late January and early February of this year by the University of Connecticut's Institute for Social Inquiry, which asked state residents: "Which party, the Republicans or the Democrats, does the better job [handling a specified problem] *or don't you think there is much difference?*" The emphasis is added because the inclusion of that second clause in the question produces results very different from those obtained when voters are asked simply whether



they think the *Republicans or Democrats* can do better. On every issue addressed, 60 percent or more said that there was not much difference between the parties, and another 5-16 percent said they didn't know. All told, here were the total number who said "not much difference/don't know" on each issue:

Controlling inflation	*78%*
Energy	*80*
Foreign affairs	*70*
"For people like you"	*78*
Running Connecticut	*74*

One of the factors accounting for such numbers is the growing belief that some of the most pressing problems are out of control. This June, the CBS News/*New York Times* team asked: "Do you think an effective president would be able to control inflation, or is that something beyond *any* president's control?" Just 46 percent thought an "effective president" could control inflation—a position taken, incidentally by only 51 percent of Republicans.

To summarize, Scammon and Wattenberg err in their preoccupation with *realignment;* it is much more accurate to say that the United States is experiencing a *dealignment.* "Electoral dissolution" began with the weakening of long-standing partisan alliances within the general public, notably the collapse of the New Deal coalitions, and with the erosion of party ties. It was further advanced by the weakening of party organizations. And it has been nurtured in our own day by the widespread belief that no party and no candidate has the answers or the capabilities to get government firmly in hand. *Thus, all the anchors are being raised at the same moment in American politics, and the electoral ship is drifting as never before.*

Campaign '80: It Looks Like a Primary

The unstable nature of today's politics, evident throughout the presidential primaries, is showing up once again in the "homestretch." Most polls in the early fall indicated a very tight race, but only a few weeks earlier, Reagan's lead appeared massive. And just 60 to 70 days prior to the 1980 presidential vote, extraordinary numbers of Americans were still floating free. Thus, the NBC News poll of August 15-16, taken after the Democratic Convention, found only 50 percent had made up their minds. And a CBS News/*New York Times* poll of mid-September reported that just 50 percent were satisfied with the Carter/Reagan/Anderson choice, while 45 percent were still foundering and wanted "other choices."

The 1980 presidential contest is a general contest, of course, but it has all the markings of a primary. Volatility in primaries is customary because there are no party ties to hold voters in place. But so weak have attachments to the parties and their candidates become that this general election has taken on primary-like properties. The size of the electorate that is undecided and is susceptible to being moved by even modest events is incontestably the highest it has ever been in American history at this stage of the presidential campaign (late September).

Contrary to the Scammon-Wattenberg view, the evidence thus suggests that neither party is likely to acquire majority status of the kind the Democrats enjoyed in the New Deal era and the Republicans held from McKinley to Hoover. Clearly, there is no presidential majority of an enduring sort now on the horizon. And below the presidential level, the Democratic majority that exists is only nominal in many ways.

In the New Deal years, the Democrats could reliably count upon the support of some groups, as could the Republicans on others. Over the past fifteen years, it is true, clear pluralities—if not majorities—of almost every social group have voted Democratic in the sweep of subpresidential elections, including those for congressional seats. But this should not be read as a sign of the continued vitality of the house that FDR built. Rather, it is an almost vestigial growth that has survived only in the context of a general deterioration of political parties and of voter confidence in the parties.

During the New Deal era, some groups saw government as a vehicle for improving their status while others believed their interests would best be served by the absence of an expanded governmental role. By the late 1960s, however, there was no longer any significant argument over the scope of government. Virtually all groups saw government as a necessary instrument for providing desired services. Education, science, industry, health, welfare, urban redevelopment, environmental protection, the problems of disadvantaged ethnic groups—all have with equal force become the claimants for federal interventions and largess. Put crudely, everyone is now "on the take" in the interest-group, liberal state.[1]

The Democrats are still seen as the "loyal guardians" of the "service state." As such, they continue to win a kind of vestigial majority support from most social groups in all party-centered voting—in all contests, that is, where the personal stands and styles of candidates are not decisive. But the base is hardly a comfortable one, and it does not attest to general public approbation.

Looking Ahead

What are the prospects for all these conditions—eroding party loyalties, extreme electoral fluidity in the highly visible and personality-centered offices, and a fragile stability with the Democrats lightly if extensively ascendant elsewhere—being changed in the course of Campaign '80? They are exactly *zero.* These conditions result from basic structural features of contemporary American politics; nothing that will happen in this or any other campaign will alter them significantly.

If change is to occur, it will come in response to the actual performance of political leaders in the years ahead. What if a candidate won the presidency and then proceeded to achieve these things:

- to advance a series of programs that are, objectively, more effective responses to our national needs than those of the past;
- to secure a set of modest but coherent changes in the way political institutions operate so that they become more responsive and responsible; and,
- to convince a clear majority of his fellow citizens that what he has done is sound.

Were this to happen, it is likely that the realignment that Scammon and Wattenberg think they see aglimmering and that countless observers over the past three decades have thought they detected, would actually take place. But until it happens, the present drift and the vague discontent that distinguish American politics today, will continue. ☑

[1] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979, Second Edition). For further discussion of the partisan implications of interest group liberalism, see Ladd and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., "The Voting System, the Policy System, and the Current Malaise of Representative Government in the United States," a paper presented to the 1979 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2, 1979.

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Senate. Senators, of course, are generally more hard-pressed for reelection than their House counterparts: they are much less able than representatives to control their own press (and thus more vulnerable to potentially harmful publicity), and they have more difficulty preventing a considerable mobilization of resources by potential challengers. In many states a certain status is accorded any major party Senate nominee, which brings with it much free access to the media and more access to big campaign contributors. While House races will never match Senate ones, they are becoming more alike: House challengers are more able these days to break through the veil of anonymity in congressional districts and visably compete with the incumbent. The GOP is pinning its hopes this year on those kinds of changes.

If overplayed, however, the current GOP advertising tactic of sharp partisan attacks on the Democratic Congress could well backfire. Attractive and aggressive Republican candidates running as individuals should do well. Attempting to tie them all to the Republican party during uncertain economic times and partisan dealignment is much more risky. Few successful Democratic incumbents run nowadays with a party label tied around their necks. A heavy-handed GOP strategy that forces the party tag on all its candidates will cause more losses in bad years for the Republicans without necessarily making more gains in good GOP years.

Still other hurdles also await the Republicans. One is malapportionment, long seen as a major villain by all GOP strategists. Republican National Committee Chairman Bill Brock is fond of pointing out that Democratic gerrymandering of congressional district boundaries has cost his party 10 percent of the seats in Congress. In 1978, for example, the Democrats won 53.4 percent of the national vote, but they received fully 63.7 percent of the seats in the House. In fact, the Democrats have won a higher percentage of seats than of votes in every election since 1952, the last time the Republicans won a majority in the House. But partisan gerrymandering is less to blame than our single-member, "first past the post" electoral system which always—here and abroad—rewards the majority party and punishes the minority party in allocating seats in the legislature. Without altering a single district line, the malapportionment that now bothers the Republicans would probably vanish if they could only manage to win a decisive majority of the national popular vote for the House.

Nonetheless, it does matter at the margin how the new boundaries are drawn after the decennial census. If the ambitious Republican effort succeeds in electing legislators in key states in 1980, it will pay dividends—if only by preventing what the Democrats might have otherwise done to salvage districts whose demographic character is moving Republican.

A Party Divided against Itself Cannot Stand

While Republicans are thus embarked upon an impressive, broad-ranging and imaginative strategy to win Congress, their hopes for 1980 are being hampered by internal bickering and personal ambitions. Several vulnerable Democratic senators may have been helped by divisive Republican primaries that drained party resources, split party unity and slowed momentum for the general election. In New Hampshire, for example, Democrat John Durkin was aided by an eleven-candidate Republican primary in which liberals, moderates, conservatives, and ultraconservatives spent their energies—and their good names—accusing each other of dirty tricks, threats or other heinous acts. The same thing happened in Vermont, Florida, and elsewhere. The GOP failure to unite behind a single candidate in Colorado and Washington may also cost them those Senate seats, while the courtroom conviction of their most popular Senate candidate in Illinois two days before that primary could mean the loss of an open seat there.

Moreover, Republicans are showing a penchant for turning their *own* safe seats into Democratic opportunities. Jacob Javits' embarrassing primary defeat in New York—after all but one of his Senate colleagues had begged him not to retire—makes Democrat Elizabeth Holtzman the favorite in November. The primary defeat of popular Republican Representative John Buchanan of Alabama by Moral Majority forces also turns that safe GOP House seat into a tossup. A divisive Republican primary for North Dakota's lone House seat has had the same effect there. Until the Republican party can solve or mute its deep internal splits (among conservatives, as well as between moderates and rightists), a GOP majority will remain more a dream than a reality.

Conclusion

It would be folly to predict anything other than Republican gains in both houses of Congress in 1980. But it would be even greater folly to exaggerate the likely gains into an expectation of Republican majorities in the 97th Congress, or to project 1980 advances onto comparable swings in 1982, 1984 and beyond. Indeed, for a variety of reasons—Republican primary divisions, Democratic incumbency advantages, and so on—the GOP may have to settle for much less than they want or expect this November.

Republican hopes for the future may rest at yet another level of elections—the all-but-unnoticed state legislative races. The Republicans gained 300 of these seats in 1978, and they hope for as many or more in 1980. This is the party farm system, the breeding ground for strong and seasoned congressional candidates in 1982 and beyond. If the GOP can keep coming up with the candidates and supply them with money and campaign expertise, there could be a Republican Capitol Hill in the '80s—realignment or no. ☑

Realigning Elections



1896
"The Full Dinner Pail"

1932
"The New Deal"