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POLITICS 1982

Amitai Etzioni, Peter Hart, Everett Carll Ladd, Warren Mitofsky, Martin Plissner, Richard Scammon, John Sears, Ben J. Wattenberg, and Richard Wirthlin.

plus

John Silber on Apocalypses.
Stanley Rothman and Robert Lichter on Nuclear Energy, Scientists and the Media.



This is America's off-year political heartbeat! See our unique center spread pages 30 and 31.

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CONTENTS

Which Way Are the Political Winds Blowing?

a conversation with Richard Wirthlin, Peter Hart and Everett Carll Ladd

Richard Wirthlin: Some political winds blow very gently; others hit with gale force. To understand which way the winds are blowing today we need to look at the direction the weather vane was pointing in 1980.

The 1980 election was highly significant. If it was not a watershed, it clearly gave Reagan a mandate for change. Our postelection analyses show that a desire for change provided the landslide Reagan received two years ago. The first item for change on the agenda was the public's desire for strong leadership—leadership that could cope effectively with inflation.

To answer the question of which way the political winds are blowing today, we need to look at the major elements of that 1980 campaign. Major themes of the 1980 campaign were reducing the size and cost of government, reducing waste and fraud, cutting down overregulation, and developing a more stable world through enhancing U.S. strength and launching meaningful initiatives for peace. A final and critical theme was establishing a growing economy with moderate or low rates of inflation. Americans still favor these general objectives.

The election of 1982 is going to turn on one simple precept—the extent to which Ronald Reagan is perceived to have been successful in satisfying the expectations that were created in 1980. Those expectations are not always consistent, nor do they always point unequivocally in the "conservative" direction.

Look at the nuclear freeze issue. Its emerging strength has been one of the anomalies of the last two years. That issue directly touches on one of Reagan's main goals—peace through strength. But support for the freeze issue is not support for a specific way to approach the Soviets or arms reduction. It is simply and clearly a strong desire to begin a process that will reduce armaments. Our data show clearly that people want to achieve that goal, but they want to achieve it only with verification and safeguards.

The second goal—reducing the size and cost of government—is still supported. But the pain which that involves, especially for some on welfare, is one of the serious problems this administration faces.

The overriding issue in this November election will be the economy. More specifically, the election is going to turn on unemployment. I wouldn't say that Republicans are going to win if unemployment falls to 7 percent, or lose if unemployment increases to 10 percent. Rather, people will weigh the suffering of the unemployed against the gains that have been made fighting inflation.

The election is going to turn specifically on the extent to which the president is seen as either being personally responsible for the recession or for what may be a slow and lethargic recovery.

I can speak about public attitudes more definitively on the first point than on the second. If you ask the question, "From what you've heard and read, who do you think is most responsible for the present recession, Ronald Reagan and the Republicans or Jimmy Carter and the Democrats?" almost half of all Americans tag the Democrats. About one out of five tags Reagan and the Republicans.

The second question may be more critical in determining elections this fall. Even though many believe Reagan may have inherited the recession, people *do* look to him to alleviate it. The jury hasn't decided whether the president will be given credit for the progress that is made.

At this juncture, there seems to be a strong belief held by most Americans that it will take time—a year or longer—to pull us out of the recession. That clearly redounds to Reagan's benefit.

Now, concerning more general expectations, we find Reagan has exceeded initial expectations in the area of strengthening U.S. defense capabilities; has met expectations in reducing the amount of federal regulation of business; has almost met expectations in restoring the confidence of the people in the American government; and he has exceeded expectations in getting our allies abroad to respect the United States again.

In sum, there are no magic storm lanterns that will light the road of the future. How Republicans fare in the fall of 1982 will depend to a large extent on how people view this president. Right now a majority of Americans are giving Reagan the benefit of the doubt. How long their patience will endure is not known.

Peter Hart: The 1982 election will be a "mid-course correction election." The voters' objectives will be to tell the Reagan administration and the Congress that the president misinterpreted the 1980 election and some adjustments are necessary.

Our polls suggest that major blocs of blacks, Hispanics, union voters, environmentalists, and women are in the Democratic camp. The Republicans have captured their own party faithful and the conservatives. The contest is for the middle. Independents, white collar and sales workers are just beginning to tune in and sort out the stakes.

Every election has its own set of dynamics. There are basically five dynamics in play in 1982. The first and most important is that this is going to be a "big issue" election. In 1978, voters were concerned about splinter issues. Nineteen eighty-two will be a single-issue election, if there is such a thing. The single issue of 1982 is the health of the economy.

The second dynamic is the present and future versus the past. The more the Republicans are able to run on the past—whether it is Congress's performance for the last twenty-five years or Jimmy Carter—the stronger their case will be. The more the election deals with the present and the future, the stronger the Democrats' case will be.

The third dynamic is the proper role of government. Ronald Reagan won in large measure in 1980 because people supported his idea of cutting back regulations and the role of government. Reagan's initial actions had majority support. But we sense that the public thinks the cuts are going too far. There is a growing perception of excesses, missteps, and false economies on the part of the Republicans. We see this dramatically in the area of social security and to a great extent in the environmental policies of Interior Secretary James Watt.

The Democrats have to be constructive in what they're saying. The voters aren't saying, "Let's get rid of Reagan." They are saying, "Let's make some changes." The voters are looking for a return to the center. They want to find the proper balance between a government that cuts too much and one that spends too much. Right now, they perceive each party as fulfilling one-half of the equation.

The fourth dynamic is more evident on a state than a national level. I call it a "back to basics" agenda. A set of issues—education, crime, child abuse, gun control, drunk driving, and the nuclear freeze—don't break left or right in ideological terms either, but suggest that Americans want to get back to some sort of basic agenda.

Education is a fascinating issue. Busing is not the focus. Nor is funding. Instead, it's competency and discipline in the classroom. The agenda is different. These issues have not been active concerns for some time.

The last dynamic is that the 1982 election is a continuation of a transitional period. Nineteen eighty was not a watershed election in terms of a major and lasting political realignment. There will be more back and forth movement. The Republicans are going to be forced to reevaluate the meaning of the 1980 elections, and the Democrats are going to be forced to develop a coherent policy to deal with the future. That is the meaning of the 1982 elections.

In order for the Democrats to make the most of their chances in 1982, we expect them to pursue the equity theme—ensuring that the scales are not tipped against the average person; that the wealthy and the powerful live up to their responsibilities; and that government lives up to its legitimate responsibilities. Finally, the Democrats will campaign for a foreign policy and a defense that is strong, consistent, and prudent, while making the world a less dangerous place to live.

The equity theme was used with a vengeance in the Philadelphia Democratic mini-convention. That rhetoric gives us a preview of what we're going to see in the fall.

I feel the economy will change enough to keep people from rejecting what Reagan has done. They might conclude that what this president is trying to do is sufficiently revolutionary that it does take time to make his program work.

Everett Ladd: The question of which way the political winds are blowing has an interesting bias. It assumes there is some distinct movement. I don't see that movement.

If you look at the underlying structure of party identification, there has been no clear movement toward either party in the last year and a half. Party ties have continued to weaken, but the underlying strength and relative standing of the Democrats and Republicans has not changed significantly. There hasn't been any significant ideological or philosophical movement either.

Finally, I don't detect any decisive answer to the referendum on how this administration is doing. At times there has been a decisive answer. In 1935 and 1936, the referendum on FDR was definitely positive. The last two years of the Carter presidency elicited a decisive negative answer. With this administration, Reagan is popular, but not overwhelmingly so. Many of his policies receive significant approval, but hardly overwhelming affirmation.

That the winds of political change don't seem to be blowing very strongly doesn't mean there aren't any interesting political currents. There are several.



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WIRTHLIN

To say there has been no decisive vote for or against the Reagan administration is not to make a neutral judgment. The modern presidency is a fairly weak office in an age of big government. Demands made of it are very hard to meet. The prevailing climate of public opinion in the United States with regard to political leadership is different today from what it was two decades ago. It is harder to convince and mobilize the public.

If a president comes into office and experiences the inevitable decline in popularity that Reagan has, and if after a year and a half there's a basic stabilization in his popularity at a substantial level, that's the most an administration can expect. I wouldn't hesitate to call it "success."

The lack of clear partisan or ideological movement is especially interesting given the conditions of the American economy. In the face of painfully high interest rates and substantial unemployment, there isn't any strong movement against Reagan, against the Republicans, or against conservative policies. I attribute this to countervailing forces pushing against the natural bias of these adverse economic developments.

There are three of these countervailing forces. The most interesting—and perhaps most unappreciated one—is the strength of the anti-inflation constituency in the United States. We've asked endless numbers of poll questions on public attitudes toward inflation. There are some steps that polls, no matter how well designed and executed, can't take. Polls cannot measure what the public will tolerate on behalf of a goal such as bringing inflation under control. The answer of the past eighteen months is that the public will tolerate a great deal of short-term pain in the interest of obtaining the objective.

The second countervailing factor is the strength of the view that some real changes are necessary in the conduct of public business in the United States. Americans don't want to reverse the New Deal, but they want some changes made. The parallel between the United States and Britain is interesting. The same general consensus exists in Britain, and it has played a significant role in propping up the Thatcher administration whose economic problems are far more severe than our own.

The final factor is the underlying strength of the American economy. If, as we've been told so often, our economy entered a static stage around 1970, culminating in today's high unemployment and high interest rates, one would think we have the conditions for a substantial *ressentiment* that could move large numbers of people to vote in protest. But it's simply not the case. It's worth asking why.

The public has been realistic. It has tempered its dissatisfaction with a recognition of continuing economic progress. Recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports suggest that in 1980 U.S. gross per capita income was $1,850 higher than that of our nearest competitor, West Germany. The margin had actually increased in dollar terms over the period. The index OECD used was a realistic one designed to get at the real comparative standard of living by using 1,300 market basket items and making cross-national comparisons. That success is not often recognized. The economic issue in 1982 would be very different from what it seems to be if we didn't have this underlying sense of economic progress.

There's a dynamic equilibrium operating. There are negative factors—problems in the economy and elsewhere. But there are also significant countervailing pressures. Thus, the electorate is in a wait-and-see mood. It's going to



The Democrats have to be constructive in what they're saying. The voters aren't saying, "Let's get rid of Reagan." They are saying, "Let's make some changes." The voters are looking for a return to the center.

HART

stay in this wait-and-see mood through November. November 2, 1982 won't be decisive. The answer will come in 1984.

Wirthlin: Our data support Everett's observation about the size of the anti-inflation constituency. In a recent D/M/I survey, we posed a question about two budgets. One budget would cut human services expenditures by $5 billion, leaving a deficit of yet $100 billion. The other budget would restore these cuts—and some other programs as well—but doing so would cost an additional $16 billion and would likely generate more inflation.

I phrased the question specifically to bias it in favor of the kinds of service expenditures that people almost automatically approve, such as retirement benefits, education, training and employment programs. Still, 47 percent opted for the more austere budget and 44 percent for the more socially oriented one. The conditioning phrase was that the one budget was inflationary. That surprised me.

Hart: I don't think you can go to the American people on inflation alone. Those who care most about inflation tend to be more optimistic about the economy. They also tend to be more Republican.

The bottom line is whether the economy is healthy, and most people are saying it's not. Democrats have to do more than carp.

Right Track, Wrong Track

Hart: Dick, it's been alleged you have a favorite stock you like to watch, a question about the country being on the right or wrong track. How's your favorite stock doing?

Wirthlin: I believe in a very balanced portfolio. [Laughter] In our June survey, 62 percent of Americans believed the country had seriously gotten off on the wrong track. That particular stock isn't doing as well as it did in August of last year. We have found that a large proportion of the concern about "wrong track" comes specifically from the problem of unemployment.

That doesn't bode well for the incumbent president. But, the linkage between that unemployment concern and this president is not, as I said earlier, direct. That leads me to be neither terribly optimistic nor pessimistic about Republican chances this fall.

Ladd: I don't look at any particular stock. There are all kinds of measures of pessimism and cynicism. You get some back-and-forth movement on these, but on the whole there's been a downward slide for twenty years.

Another large battery of questions bearing on the structure of the economy, the nature of the society, its worth, and its comparative position exists. On these questions the numbers are unbelievably positive.

One of the things we've learned from public opinion research is that people don't always answer poll questions the way the questions are literally framed. Rather, they use poll questions to convey messages of one kind or another. If the message the public intends is a basic affirmation of the society, one finds one set of responses. On the other hand, if the message is meant to express some concern about an aspect of the economy or the performance of political leaders, a whole different set of answers is forthcoming.

Obviously, there is economic concern at the present time. You don't need polls to show that. The interesting question isn't whether people are happy about the current direction of unemployment or interest rates. They would be idiots if they were satisfied. The important question is what larger conclusions they draw about the administration's responsibilities for these things. People are arguing that the administration's economic programs cause them some problems but still they expect longer-term benefits from them.

The data show that people recognize that the world is complicated. You can have protests and dissatisfaction about unemployment or whatever *and* the sense that the program correctives the administration has pursued are necessary. The simultaneous occurrence of these is the simple fact of American attitudes at the present time.

Hart: I agree. In addition to our qualitative research, we conduct focus groups. We find over and over again that people are willing to endure short-term pain to reach long-term goals.

People recognize that the world is complicated. I agree with that. At the same time they're also trying to say, "Make some adjustments, don't stay right here." That's part of the message of 1982. But people are willing to bear the short-term pain.

If a president comes into office and experiences the inevitable decline in popularity that Reagan has, and if after a year and a half there's a basic stabilization in his popularity at a substantial level, that's the most an administration can expect. I wouldn't hesitate to call it "success."

LADD



Elections '82: A National Test?

Question: *How many congressional seats actually move on the basis of national issues and Reagan's popularity?*

Hart: I would say 150 of them.

Wirthlin: In the 1960s, elections turned more on an incumbent's responsiveness or experience in office. But the Republicans proved in 1980 that you can move the electorate with a national message. In 1982 I believe many seats will turn on national issues as they relate to the president.

Hart: "Responsiveness" won't win many seats in 1982.

Wirthlin: Your question is a difficult one. Let me answer a more simple one. "To what extent does a change in Reagan's job rating affect congressional elections?" The answer to that question is, "A lot!" The level of presidential job rating is not so important, but the change that occurs between the fall of 1981 and 1982 is important. We have done some empirical work in the last ten years on making estimates of changes in congressional seats based upon a number of variables. Two variables compiled by Edward Tufte—namely, change in presidential job rating and changes in real per capita disposable income—have been good predictive variables. Now, to separate how the mega-issues affect the job rating which in turn affects congressional races is very difficult.

It is evident that if President Reagan does get a bounce of two or three or four percentage points in his job rating, in that critical year's time, that will have strong impact. I wouldn't say 150. But there will be many congressional races that will be helped, if they stand on the margin.

Ladd: You get variations from one election to another. In the case of an election with a clear national direction in ideological, partisan, or the "referendum" terms, many more congressional races will be affected. My general view is that we're not seeing a lot of movement in this election and consequently the number is on the lower side.

Short-Term Pain, Long-Term Goals: The Case of Social Security

Question: *The panel agrees that the public is willing to accept short-term pain for long-term goals. Is this true with respect to social security?*

Hart: In terms of social security, Ronald Reagan raised a fear about cuts and reinforced a concern the voters had in the 1980 campaign. It is a self-inflicted wound.

The issue is one of future risk. The voters recognize that there have to be some changes in the social security system. It is a question of who is going to administer those changes. The Democrats have an advantage here in the fall election.

I believe the American people think that there will be changes. The short-term pain that people were willing to put up with—at least in a survey we did for the Presidential Commission on Social Security—was higher taxes.

Wirthlin: Attitudes about reforming social security depend on the age cohort you're examining. Those sixty-five and older give very different responses from those who are fifty-five to sixty-four, or those who are under forty.

Those who are under forty accept some rather revolutionary options. Those about ready to retire favor the status quo.

Ladd: I've reviewed several hundred questions on social security and public attitudes toward it, and I don't think we have the slightest idea what short-term pain the public will bear. The questions are inadequate. The questions generally begin "Do you favor cuts in social security?" or something like that. As far as I know, no one has proposed cuts in social security. That is not the issue. The question is the *rate of increase* in social security benefits. This isn't just playing with words. It is a critical conceptual matter. The survey research community hasn't posed it well. We simply don't know.

Turnout

Question: *Will voter turnout be higher or lower than in the last congressional election?*

Hart: In 1978 it was about 38 percent. It will be higher in 1982 for two reasons. First, there will be heavier turnout among minority groups who perceive a greater stake in sending the Reagan administration a message. Second, referenda in various states are going to bring people out in greater numbers.

Wirthlin: Turnout is going to be higher. Forty to 42 percent is as good a guess as any other. We're moving toward stabilization in voter turnout.

Ladd: I agree. The whole question of turnout in the United States has been misinterpreted.

The turnout in 1976, for example, was about the same as in 1936. And yet Roosevelt was supposed to be revitalizing the country, bringing up spirits, and mobilizing a population.

We've had a very long experience of low turnout. The satisfaction thesis—that people don't go to the polls be-

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FIGURE 1

Question: From what you've heard and read, which of the following two positions best describes the way Ronald Reagan feels about nuclear weapons? Position A: Ronald Reagan believes that we must build as many nuclear weapons as quickly as we can so that we won't be pushed around by the Russians any more. Position B: Ronald Reagan believes that once the Soviets and the United States have about the same strength in nuclear weapons, then nuclear weapons must be reduced dramatically to assure lasting peace and security.

Among those who have heard or read recently anything Reagan has said about nuclear weapons



Note: In the April survey, 42% had heard or read recently anything Reagan has said about nuclear weapons, 58% had not; in May, 45% had, 55% had not; in June, 44% had, 56% had not.

Source: Surveys by Decision/Making/Information, latest that of June 16-22, 1982.

cause they are basically satisfied—tells us a lot more than the "grave discontent" explanation.

Foreign Policy and the 1982 Election

Question: *Is there now a perception that the United States has become the pusher rather than the pushee in foreign policy?*

Ladd: In the thirty-five years since World War II, American public opinion on foreign policy has changed very little. Americans want an *assertive* but not a *bellicose* foreign policy. Both are "pushing," but one is pushing too far. Poll data have shown that Reagan as president—and, indeed, as a candidate—was seen as walking right down the middle—dangerously close to bellicosity but gaining from a sense of assertiveness.

Wirthlin: One of the things a president lives with is the legacy of his prior campaign. Clearly, one of the legacies we inherited was Carter's charge that Reagan would likely get this country into an unnecessary war. That perception was prevalent as we went into the last days of the campaign even though it did not affect many votes.

The president has had now sixty or seventy good days in the foreign policy area. We had the Eureka speech and the trip to Europe. Those events helped strengthen somewhat the public perception that he handles foreign affairs well. We have redressed in part the balance between assertiveness and bellicosity.

The Nuclear Freeze and Ronald Reagan

Wirthlin: The freeze issue could have rolled the Reagan administration because it could have ignited those latent concerns raised during the campaign.

As recently as April of this year we interviewed a national sample and asked, "Have you heard or read anything recently that Ronald Reagan has said about nuclear weapons?" The results are shown in figure 1 (left). This is probably as dramatic a single shift concerning the perception of this president that I have measured in three years. The increase in position B has been remarkable (see figure 1).

Whither the Social Issues?

Question: *What happened to the social issues such as abortion and school prayer? Reagan campaigned on those issues. Have they just disappeared?*

Wirthlin: Clearly, the economic issue represents a major priority for us. But as far as school prayer and some of the other social issues are concerned, the president has demonstrated that he will keep his commitments. Granted, the social issues won't dominate the fall election across the board, but the social issues that tap the Moral Majority support could be decisive in bringing many Republicans into the Congress who might otherwise not get there.

Ladd: There's been a general liberalization on social issues in the United States over the past fifteen years. There are exceptions such as school prayer where large majorities favor an amendment. If social issues were to become more important to the electorate, it wouldn't be very helpful for the Reagan administration.

Debunking and Defending Models

Question: *There are a number of models used to explain election behavior. You mentioned Edward Tufte's earlier. How useful are these models?*

Ladd: In my profession an enormous amount of attention is given to developing models to explain voting decisions. It's been a singularly unproductive exercise. A number of considerations are involved in a vote decision. There are ideological views. There are policy commitments on specific issues; there are impressions of candidates. Then there is the tenor of the times. There is party I.D., and various group attachments to parties. The mix is very complex.

All of these efforts try to find formulas that attach quantitative and numeric weight to one dimension or another. It's rarification. It doesn't work. It's a fundamentally flawed picture of the nature of the voting decision.

Wirthlin: It may be rarification as far as academic hypotheses are concerned, but the exercise of developing complex variables, combining party I.D., ethnicity, age, partisanship, or whatever, has been extremely fruitful in developing strategy for campaigns.

Granted, there are no magic formulas, but each campaign and each election can be more clearly understood and the scarce resources of the campaign more effectively allocated through modeling that sheds light on the interactions between constituencies, issues, demographics, and partisanship, to come up with a clearer view of what is driving the vote decisions.

Politics is like the wind. Sometimes you don't know from where it comes or where it goes; you simply feel it at the moment; you measure it, and try to assess it. In developing strategy for campaigns, you have to understand the direction of the wind, and its force. Quantifying some of the key relationships you believe are *a priori* important can be very helpful in making those decisions rational.

Teledemocracy's Peril

Question: *In five or ten years, with new technologies, any member of Congress will be able to assess the mood of his district instantly. Or, he will be able to hire a pollster to find answers to a selection of national concerns. What does this mean for the political process as we know it?*

Ladd: On the basic attitudes toward government and the economy, the public wants government to do a lot and thinks there's no recourse but for the government to have these responsibilities. At the same time the public believes big governmental structures create all kinds of problems. That's all there is with regard to public attitudes. I don't see the technology or the nature of the inquiry changing the situation very much.

Wirthlin: The technology you describe is very close. We'll soon be able to do exactly what you have described.

Measuring public attitudes accurately simply adds another dimension that both politicians and public servants have to take into account when they make a major decision on an issue.

With the advance of technology comes also a better understanding of the tool—its strengths and weaknesses. The more you know about the measurement of attitudes, the more careful you become about hastily concluding that the public is crying for a particular action.

Regardless of how sophisticated polling becomes, regardless of how quickly we're able to collate the results and present them, the measure of how good our government is, I strongly believe, will ultimately rest simply on how good the judgment of those people we elect turns out to be.

by Richard Scammon

The Thoughts of Chairman Scammon

The flat rate tax, the nuclear freeze, and the balanced budget amendment are the opiates of the summer of 1982. None constitutes immediately realizable policy.

Let's examine the nuclear freeze first. Most favor it, but few are willing to implement it unless the Soviets go along and unless the ban is fully verifiable. Moreover, not many are ready to consider greatly increased weapons expenditures or a return to the draft to meet Soviet preeminence in conventional weapons. Second, the flat tax. There is simply no agreement about what a flat tax is. To some it means a graduated income tax, but one with fewer stages; to others it means the government will collect a flat percentage from all taxpayers and corporations across the board. Some politicians say that there should be no exemptions, and then go on to name social security, medical expenses, charitable contributions, the interest on home mortgages, and so on, as exemptions. No one can agree. Finally, the balanced budget amendment is riddled with escape hatches. The 60 percent escape clause is the most obvious. As any congressman knows, there are an infinite number of ways to subvert the balanced budget requirement without escape hatches—items can be taken off the core budget and put in special budgets; revenues can be misestimated, and expenditures can, too. In the real political world, deficits occur because they are the least intolerable of the available alternatives. It is more acceptable to have a deficit than it is to cut the defense budget in half. It's more acceptable to have a deficit than to cut heavily into social programs.

These three propositions are not going to be true issues in the 1982 election, because if everyone can endorse them, there is little to debate about. There is a wonderful line in Gilbert and Sullivan's operetta "The Gondoliers." After everyone has been made equal, these lyrics follow: "When everyone is somebodee, then no one's anybody." The same principle applies here.

The three opium pipes are the way the public expresses a general feeling about things. They'd like to see the budget balanced; they would like to see nuclear weapons eliminated; and they would like a simplified income tax system. But when you move from these general feelings to specific acts, you have to put away the opium pipe. The pipe is a demoralizer of action. It keeps you from doing the things that you really must do.

If I were a candidate, I would endorse the ideals behind all three of these proposals. I would then urge the appointment of a commission to study the details and report back. Candidates may have reasons for not supporting specific aspects of one or the other of them, but they can agree with the general goals. Most people (and most politicians) understand this.

The actual debate in most parts of America in 1982 is based on a nostalgic appeal to party label, on the personality of the candidates, and on local perceptions of issues. Few people will be moved to shift their vote from whatever they did in 1978 or 1980 because of the balanced budget amendment, the nuclear freeze, or the flat tax. A liberal can endorse them all. So can a conservative. In a "Star Trek" political world, you can embrace any amorphous, flexible kind of thing. Anything that is broad and subject to wide interpretation ceases to be a decisive issue in American politics. Measures such as the ERA, the handgun ban in San Francisco, or abortion bills are specific, and they require specific responses by politicians.

National vs. Local Issues

In 1982, most people will vote for Congress the way they did in 1980. Democrats will vote Democratic; Republicans will vote Republican. Independents will split. In 1976 and 1980, the great majority of people voted Carter-Carter or Ford-Reagan. This tendency will be even greater since neither party is going to commit equal resources to all 435 congressional districts. They are going to concentrate on those close districts where there might be a small swing. They will concentrate on those districts that might be affected by local issues such as unemployment in Detroit. The 1982 elections will involve national issues only to the extent that they affect localities.

Making Reagan the Issue

The Republican party should make this election a referendum on Reagan. The July Gallup poll shows that if the presidential election were being held today, 45 percent of the registered voters surveyed would vote for Reagan. Forty-eight percent preferred Kennedy. By that measure, Reagan is doing better than the Republican party did in its congressional races in 1978 in the

House. If you estimate that the party might otherwise expect to poll around the low forties in the congressional races, then making Reagan the sole issue could help in many cases, especially in southern districts. But he won't help everyone. Ten out of eleven southern states cast their votes for Reagan in 1980 and also elected a majority of Democratic congressmen. Another example would be the Jewish congressional district in Brooklyn which voted for Reagan and at the same time sent its Democratic congressman back to Washington with 75 or 80 percent of the vote. If Reagan had been the issue in 1980, that House seat would have gone Republican. If the GOP could make Reagan the sole issue, they might even gain seats. But they can't because people don't vote that way.

Democratic Prospects

Nineteen eighty-two will produce Democratic gains. This is an iron law in politics. The Democratic gains will have a good deal to do with the recession, but even more with history. Ever since the Civil War, the party out of power has won seats in the off-year elections. The only exception was 1934. Only one exception in over a century is as close to unanimity as you get in American politics. If the Democratic gain is only fifteen or twenty seats there should be little ideological shift in Congress. If the Democrats gain fifty or sixty seats, the House would be more liberal because many of the gains would come in the more liberal North. But I doubt very much that many elected liberal Democrats would be prepared to reinstitute all of the Great Society programs.

Looking Out for Number One

The reorganization of the House and the lack of discipline in the Congress have contributed to party decline. We don't, nor did we ever, have a disciplined party system in the sense that you do in a parliamentary democracy. The fate of the executive doesn't depend on it. There is a certain nostalgic loyalty to party, but there is sufficient latitude to interpret things like the nuclear freeze, the balanced budget, and the flat tax to an individual congressman's own specifications. But a member belongs first to his own "Reelect Me" party. Discipline is imposed by the voters in the district. A candidate can run all over the lot on many issues, but not on issues of major importance to his district. If you have substantial numbers of Greek Americans in your district, it's not the wisest course to argue for rearming Turkey. If you represent a port area such as Galveston or San Francisco, you're not going to take on the maritime industry or denounce the maritime unions. These are political facts of life. Under these conditions, the big party in Congress is the "Reelect Me" party. The smaller parties are labeled Republican and Democratic. Others are labeled liberal or conservative dogma, or this or that special caucus.

PACs: The New Political Parties

The RNC and the DNC will make general appeals. They have a problem because they really can't make national appeals without establishing national programs. The "out" party never has a national program because there is no way to establish it. The "in" party does have a record (good, bad, or indifferent) and that may be one of the reasons "in" parties lose seats in the off-year elections. The best the parties can do is to make general claims. They will "point with pride" and "view with alarm." There are many sides to every political issue except one, and that's public office. You're either in it seeking to stay in or you are out seeking to get in. That is what the parties will concentrate on.

The parties can be almost anything you want them to be. The bigger the party, the less dogmatic and doctrinaire. In Ray Bradbury's *Martian Chronicles*, when people arrived on Mars they found that the Martians looked like whatever they wanted them to look like at the moment. This is the key to party appeal here.

In a sense, the PACs have become the new political parties in America because the political parties are not parties any more. You can give money to a political party if it has a general philosophy you agree with. But for a specific purpose, you give money to an individual candidate or a PAC. The general purpose of the parties is national and broad. In the very real sense, they are noncontentious. Their messages concern the things that "unite" us as Republicans and Democrats rather than those things which tear us apart. New political ideas don't come through the parties. The antiwar movement, prohibition, and women's suffrage are examples. The ideas of flat tax, balanced budget, and nuclear freeze didn't come out of the parties. The parties may latch onto an idea, but the real ideas come from outside. Parties are not innovators.

Initiatives in American Politics

The politicians have not yet found the great value of the initiative. It relieves the individual politician of responsibility for making a decision. I would be fascinated if the ERA proponents decide to go this route and take the new ERA to popularly elected state conventions rather than state legislatures. I don't know if they would do better or worse, but it would save politicians a lot of wear and tear. But, there has been no real upsurge in the initiative process except in the West. It has been particularly popular there, stemming from the great progressive reforms early this century.

In watching politicians and legislatures around the world, we find that the American Congress is the most representative. It may not be the most responsible, it may not be the best, but it is the most representative. This is because the parties do not intrude themselves to deflect the weight of public opinion. Some feel this is a bad thing. Being a "primitive democrat," I think it's great.



by John Sears

What the Should Tell Ronald

Politics is an art, not a science. It's like painting a picture, writing a book or composing a piece of music; for it to be done well, it has to have the proper degree of originality, blended with a symmetry which appeals to the critics.

The trouble is that politics can't be simply admired for its beauty; it must meet the additional test of whether it is functional. You see, it doesn't matter how artful the politician is, there aren't enough political artists to appreciate his work. All that matters is whether the unsophisticated find utility in his handiwork. Can you imagine Rembrandt having his work reviewed by peasants? Shakespeare writing for illiterates? Beethoven having to satisfy Blondie?

The Republicans will not do well this fall. The combination of high unemployment, fear of spending cuts by those most affected by them, depression conditions in the American farm belt, suspicion about Reagan among blacks, other minority voters, and women, and an increasing worry that the president may not be experienced enough to handle complicated foreign policy questions should keep the Republicans on the defensive this fall and give the Democrats an additional thirty seats in the House, plus some new governorships in the larger states.

With unemployment currently at 10 percent, the Democrats deserve the political dunce cap already for being drawn into discussions of tax cuts versus balancing the budget, when they could be discussing the plight of the working man. I can only guess that this stupidity will not last much longer. By December of this year, unemployment will be firmly established as the predominant matter on the minds of what the sophisticates say is a newly forming majority voting group—a group which is more tolerant, less fiscally conservative, more understanding of the needs of others, more peaceful in their attitudes toward the Soviets and, you guessed it, more liberal.

A little over four years ago, most of the sophisticates believed that Proposition 13 would be beaten in California because citizens would be unwilling to vote for it once apprised of how deeply state services would have to be cut. From January of 1978 until June, horror stories appeared in the press and on television depicting the wages of a Proposition 13 victory: fires unfought; criminals freed to work their will on society; children left unfed and uneducated; and the needy, handicapped, and insane uncared for.

When the sophisticates were proven wrong, and Proposition 13 was adopted, it became fashionable to describe the majority of voters in California as heartless, selfish individuals who had turned their thoughts inward and could no longer be aroused about the greater needs of society. Tax initiatives were spawned all over the country. Tax policy and the total tax burden on America's citizens were suddenly prominent in the political debate, fostering discussion of supply-side economics, budget cutting, and waste reduction—all so that the presumably greedy voter could be appeased.

The political sophisticates made further calculations. If the voters had become greedy and selfish, they must have become more conservative in other ways (sophisticates have always equated greed and selfishness with being conservative; of course, the compassionate ones with the blank checks are, they say, liberal and, therefore, good). At any rate, a political profile of the new conservative voting majority was constructed. They were fiscal tightwads, they were intolerant, savagely anti-Soviet, moral fundamentalists, and generally self-centered in every way. When the Republicans captured control of the Senate, anyone who disagreed that the country had made a calculated and intentional turn to the right was dismissed as a fool.

I wish I could figure out why political scientists

1982 Elections Reagan about 1984

and journalists spend so much time trying to decide whether the voters are liberal or conservative, especially when the only test is whether they agree with the sophisticates. The truth is that the vast majority of the voters are principled pragmatists. They don't believe in miracles, nor do they believe that any philosophy will render justice in every instance. If you examine their principles, they would tend to be conservative; if you concentrated on their pragmatism, they would look more liberal.

Today, both liberalism and conservatism seem exhausted politically. The liberals don't have any causes left to promote. They sound almost Republican in their denunciation of budget deficits and high interest rates. The conservatives seemed to be enjoying themselves while they were cutting taxes but, part way through, their consciences got the better of them. They turned around and raised taxes again, just at the moment when interest rates were falling. It must seem odd to many Democrats who voted for the recent tax increase to be raising taxes in the middle of a severe recession. But, think how odd it will seem next year when, after Congress proves unwilling to tamper seriously with the entitlement programs and the administration holds steadfast against any large defense cuts, these same Democrats find themselves prepared to vote again for another tax increase to close an even bigger Republican deficit. Don't laugh. Next year isn't an election year, so the Congress will be capable of performances even stranger than this year's.

Six months from now, it will be difficult for even liberals and conservatives to tell which they are and why. The majority of voters will, therefore, feel less kinship toward either. We will finally have reached that perfect political state where no one knows what anyone is and anyone can call himself anything he wants. I suppose I shall enjoy my biggest laugh when the conservative Republican administration of Ronald Reagan proposes a sweeping package of economic stimuli to relieve the unemployment problem, and the Democratic House votes it down as too expensive.

If my expectations are fulfilled, one could easily presume a kind of paralysis enveloping the Reagan administration in which the Congress becomes unmanageable in early 1983, as it tries to distance itself from a president perceived as unpopular and from policies rejected by the voters. A president in the final two years of his term finds his powers severely diminished if his poll figures are poor. As every day goes by, the steady increase of political news brought on by the approach of the next presidential race reduces the ability of any president to view things substantively. As a result, the last two years of recent administrations have been the most difficult—Johnson was hounded from office, Nixon was forced to resign, Ford became immobile, and Carter became irrelevant.

Taking the High Road

One would hope that Ronald Reagan will prove himself more resourceful than his predecessors. If he does, it will be because he ignores the perceptions swirling around him as he embarks on the third year of his term. He will be told that if he changes his policies he will lose his political base, alienate the conservative wing of his party, lose credibility, and further diminish his popularity. He will also be told that if he doesn't change his policies, an angry country will make the Republicans pay at the ballot box in 1984, the liberals will regain a majority constituency and Teddy Kennedy will become president. Faced with similar Hobson's choices, our recent presidents had one thing in common—they all chose to do nothing and hoped that fickle fate would rescue them from the responsibility for destroying

themselves. In order to avoid a similar fate, Reagan must be willing to discuss some realities which no politician has so far shared with the people:

1. *The economy.* There is no quick fix for the country's economic ills. Whether the most pressing problem appears to be inflation, high taxes, interest rates, unbalanced budgets, or unemployment, the nation's economy requires a major overhaul which must result in closer cooperation between government, business, and organized labor. There are only two ways in which this major overhaul can take place: first, a strong president can call together the involved parties and, after consultation, use their support to get Congress to authorize the necessary reforms; or second, we can let everything deteriorate until everyone agrees that something *must* be done. America has always chosen the latter. But, taking this "survival of the fittest" course now would be cataclysmic.

No politician has been willing to tell the truth about the great American economic machine. It isn't laying any more golden eggs. Not until either leadership or severely hard times cause us to get serious about modernizing plant facilities, finding and protecting our resources, establishing productivity as a standard for wage increases, and enlarging and developing our foreign markets, will it start to do so again. Government must be the catalyst which makes business and labor cooperate in meeting this agenda, but it must resist the temptation to prefer one over the other and must promote those things which are universally regarded as in the best interest of the country. We are getting beaten. We need to do more than complain about competitors' tactics and threaten restrictive trade legislation or we will get beaten a lot worse.

2. *The Soviets:* Since the end of World War II, literally trillions of dollars and billions of man hours have been devoted to combatting the Soviets. Yet with every passing year they seem to be more worrisome. There are only two lessons which can be learned from this: (a) they are better than we are and therefore we ought to sit down and make the best deal we can with them; or (b) they really don't deserve so much of our time and resources and are probably getting away with psyching us to death. I happen to think the latter better represents the truth.

The Soviet Union suffers the indignity of purchasing the bare essentials of its diet from its biggest adversary. It cannot properly clothe or supply itself with consumer goods. It is made up of a labyrinth of conflicting cultures, races, religions, and languages. Such a country would seem more likely to fall apart if we would let it than to be able to occupy the full foreign



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policy attention of the United States for the last forty years. Ah, you say, but what about the rockets, the megatons of nuclear warheads, the political might of the Soviet military, the threat of communist doctrine to the free countries of the world? It is bothersome that a country with so many problems possesses such sophisticated weapons. I would feel more comfortable if I knew the Soviets understood that America had the power to destroy them, even if a war continued through seven or eight exponential exchanges. But is it logical to be so terrified of a country which is acknowledged to be ruled by the world's biggest bureaucracy?

We have bigger problems than the Soviets. Our allies are no longer willing to bow to our leadership, and they compete with us for the same world markets; a small group of oil-rich countries stands ready to strangle our economy with increased energy prices whenever any hint of renewed prosperity occurs; we are unable to control events in the third world and seem willing to ignore any disruptions there even if they interrupt the continued flow of resources; many of our banks hold seemingly worthless loans on the treasuries of foreign countries; we are barely on speaking terms with most of the governments of Latin America, an area which must in the future provide the markets for our goods and, through the weight of immigration to this country, is destined to play a larger role in the domestic policies of the United States; we are losing our strongest ally in the Far East as we tell the Japanese they must trade less in our market and at the same time share a bigger burden of the defense costs in Asia; and our closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, seem to detest us and chuckle whenever we are embarrassed.

The world has shrunk and we must subject a broader range of our actions to multilateral scrutiny if we are to enjoy the cooperation of our allies and potential friends. We can either stick our heads in the sand and pretend the world is as it was in the 1950s or we can commence the painful and long diplomatic process of dealing with the realities of our weakened international situation.

If Ronald Reagan is smart, he will take the initiative next year and rise above the agenda which will be forced on him by the Democrats. He will use his abilities as a great communicator to tell the country what it already knows but can't get anyone to admit: the United States has to make some basic, structural changes in the way it manages its economy and conducts its foreign policy. These changes have to be undertaken slowly so that an already bad situation will not be made worse. They will require bipartisan support and draw from ideas both to the left and right of political center, but the changes themselves will conform to only one rule: do they have a reasonable chance to succeed?

I suppose that if Ronald Reagan does as I suggest, he will be accused of becoming more moderate, simply because he is willing to address the country's problems in a more thoughtful way. Liberals won't like this new Reagan because any tampering with economic structure or foreign policy goals will disrupt their handiwork of the last fifty years. The American voters will be pleased, however, since they have sensed for the last twenty years that something basic was wrong.

The broad American middle has no standard-bearer. It wants reduced government spending, lower taxes, more capital for the private sector, increased productivity, low unemployment, low interest rates, and low inflation. It also wants an adequate defense force, a strong and constructive American presence in the rest of the world, a close political alliance with Western Europe and Japan, better relations with Latin America, and friendship with the two countries closest to our borders. In short, it wants prosperity and peace and it wants to be able to feel that neither is threatened in the immediate future.

Long ago the voters became accustomed to politicians overstating the case and, more recently, they have shown sophistication in distilling the truth from what they hear from the media. Contrary to informed opinion, they are not impatient—only insensitive to those who tell them lies. They think the situation is bad but not irreparable.

Now I don't really expect that Ronald Reagan will commit himself to any long-term overhauls of the economic structure or foreign policy goals of the country. As he is faced with a poor showing this fall, the cry will rise loudly from his political base that any deviation, any change of step, any adjustment of emphasis, will put its loyalty at risk. No recent president has been able to summon the courage to defy his political base or even lead it to higher ground. But real leadership involves drawing on the loyalty of your followers, and presidential leadership requires putting the good of the whole country above any interest group.

It is more likely that 1983 will see the country locked in trench warfare. The Democrats will be beating their breasts about the administration's lack of concern for the unemployed and the administration will be lamely predicting that the problem will soon go away. Antinuclear resolutions will be passed in Congress while the administration stands fast behind its call for increased defense spending. Single issue constituencies from both right and left will weigh in with threats of reprisal against all who oppose them.

The political middle will remain silent and unrepresented in these discussions. If no one addresses it during the presidential primaries, it will withhold its support and vote for whichever candidate it finds least objectionable in the fall of 1984. But someday soon somebody is going to start talking to the reasonable Americans, the ones who don't have any axe to grind, the ones who don't care if an idea is supposed to be liberal or conservative if it makes sense. Whoever takes this tremendous political risk is going to be amazed at how popular he becomes. I just wish it could be Ronald Reagan; it would make it a lot easier on all of us. ☑



by Martin Plissner and Warren Mitofsky

Voting Twice on Election Day

On Tuesday, November 2, CBS, NBC, and ABC, with newspapers or a wire service as partners, will employ an important and controversial tool. Voter polls,* introduced by CBS News in 1967, will tell us a great deal on election night. They will tell us the degree to which this election will or will not be—as many people expect—a "referendum" on President Reagan's policies. They will enable us to correlate the vote for Republican candidates with approval of Reagan or with the vote on nuclear freeze referenda in their states, or both. They will tell us how the people who voted for Reagan in 1980—and those who didn't—feel about him today and the degree to which their feeling about him is reflected in their vote for Congress. In their fifteen-year existence, voter polls have become a highly competitive, increasingly expensive and valuable device in public opinion research.

The first voter polls appeared in the early years of network election projections. They were designed to augment other procedures for estimating an election outcome which were based primarily on scientific samples of the actual vote in each state. Over the years, the purpose of election day polling changed. From the beginning, voter polls inquired about demographics as well as how people voted. In 1972, CBS News added questions about the mood and motivations of the voters. This enabled our election night analysts to discuss the dynamics of the day's results in a way that had not been possible before.

In the 1970s, CBS News and NBC, which began using voter polls in 1974, confined themselves for the most part to a single national election day survey aimed at interpreting outcomes, rather than predicting them. On election day 1980, however, voter polls were used to help determine the outcome of the presidential election. By midday, all three networks showed Ronald Reagan getting a large proportion of the popular vote. Between 5:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M. the three networks gave their viewers reason to suspect that Reagan might win, though all reports were accompanied by the appropriate disclaimers. One network, NBC, went a step further. By conducting a national survey and similar surveys in specific states, it was able to project an electoral college majority for Reagan by 8:15 P.M.

The consequences of that announcement, coupled with Carter's concession a short time later, have been mulled over by congressional committees, academic conclaves, and writers in *Public Opinion* magazine. The early announcement, not the voter polls which provided corroboration for it, is at the center of the controversy. Whatever the consequences may have been, one network's voter polls made a marginal contribution at most. Early predictions are not unprecedented. In 1964, President Johnson's reelection was announced shortly after 9:00 P.M. In 1972, an electoral vote majority for President Nixon was announced by 8:30 P.M. In both cases, the networks made their predictions without the help of voter polls. With or without voter polls, a presidential landslide cannot be concealed very long.

* CBS News originally referred to these surveys as "election day polls." They are also called "exit polls" or "street polls."

The Ins and Outs of Exit Polls

A voter poll has all the scientific elements of any other poll. It includes a probability sample of voting precincts selected to represent the country (for a national survey), or a particular state.

Two professional interviewers are assigned to each of the selected precincts. One arrives at the polling place before it opens. Each wears a sash identifying his network affiliation, and carries a "ballot" box sporting the same logo. The interviewers get as close as they can to the polling place. Access varies from state to state, and even within states. Florida, the most restrictive case, keeps interviewers 300 feet from its polling places. Most states are more accommodating. In some places, interviewers are able to set up tables inside the polling place.

Interviewers are instructed to obtain a random sample by counting voters as they leave the polling places and giving a questionnaire to every *n*th person. In comparison to most polls, the voter poll questionnaire is short (see box). The interviewer identifies himself, tells the voter the poll is secret, and asks him to fill out the questionnaire. "Votes" are placed in the "ballot box." If a voter refuses to be interviewed, the interviewer records his race, sex, and apparent age. There is no substitution for voters who are not interviewed. The interviewer continues counting and distributing questionnaires until approximately one hour before the polls close.

At specified intervals during the day, each interviewer stops polling, calls an election processing center and reports his results—the answers to each question from every poll respondent. The coded data are stored in a computer.

What Can Go Wrong?

Voter polls and the more traditional sources of election predictions (precinct sampling) are subject to a mathematically definable sampling error. On top of that, voter polling presents a number of additional challenges. Things can—and have, at least in our experience—gone wrong. For example, there is no guarantee that voters who respond to the poll are like those who refuse to answer. Also, an interviewer who is required by local law to stand a long distance from the exit of the polling place may have a difficult time obtaining a random selection of emerging voters. If interviewers are not professional, or if local election officials impede the interviewers, voter cooperation can suffer. Such impediments rarely render a voter poll useless for analytical purposes, but they can make projections a risky business.

Since our first election day polls, we have experimented with ways to reduce some of the potential sources of error. One of the earliest changes was the secret ballot. Originally, our interviewers asked the voters direct questions. The self-administered, secret questionnaire significantly improved participation rates.

Our studies have shown that older voters are much less willing to participate in these polls than other voters. To correct for the refusal rate among older voters, we increase slightly the statistical weight of those who participate. Race or sex don't appear to be factors in refusal.

Even with all the years of research on the methods for conducting these polls, there is still more to learn. A voter poll experiment conducted during the New Jersey governor's race in 1981 led to an incorrect announce-



SECRET BALLOT

CBS ELECTION DAY POLL

SECRET BALLOT

(A) 1 2 (B) 1 2 3 (C) 1 2 3

D IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WHO DID YOU JUST VOTE FOR?
1. ☐ JIMMY CARTER
2. ☐ RONALD REAGAN
3. ☐ JOHN ANDERSON
4. ☐ ED CLARK
5. ☐ BARRY COMMONER
6. ☐ DIDN'T VOTE FOR PRESIDENT
7. ☐ OTHER _____ (please specify)

E WHICH QUALITIES BEST DESCRIBE YOUR CHOICE? (Check "X" up to 2 boxes)
1. ☐ He's my party's candidate.
2. ☐ He is a real conservative.
3. ☐ He is a strong leader.
4. ☐ He has good judgment.
5. ☐ He impressed me during the debate
6. ☐ His experience in government.
7. ☐ He has honesty and integrity.
8. ☐ He is not too extreme.
9. ☐ I like his Vice-President.
0. ☐ It is time for a change.

F WHICH ISSUES WERE MOST IMPORTANT IN DECIDING HOW YOU VOTED TODAY? (Check up to 2 boxes)
1. ☐ BALANCING THE FEDERAL BUDGET
2. ☐ CRISIS IN IRAN
3. ☐ JOBS AND UNEMPLOYMENT
4. ☐ REDUCING FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
5. ☐ E.R.A./ABORTION
6. ☐ INFLATION AND ECONOMY
7. ☐ NEEDS OF BIG CITIES
8. ☐ U.S. PRESTIGE AROUND THE WORLD

G WHEN DID YOU DECIDE WHO TO VOTE FOR?
1. ☐ Knew all along
2. ☐ During the Primaries
3. ☐ Around the Conventions
4. ☐ Since Labor Day
5. ☐ During the last week

H WHICH ONE STATEMENT COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR FEELING ABOUT YOUR PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE:
1. ☐ I strongly favor him.
2. ☐ I support him but with reservations.
3. ☐ I am voting mainly against the other candidates.

I IF TODAY'S ELECTION WERE ONLY BETWEEN JIMMY CARTER AND RONALD REAGAN WHO WOULD YOU HAVE VOTED FOR?
1. ☐ CARTER 2. ☐ REAGAN 3. ☐ WOULDN'T VOTE

J DO YOU USUALLY THINK OF YOURSELF AS A:
1. ☐ REPUBLICAN
2. ☐ DEMOCRAT
3. ☐ INDEPENDENT

K ON MOST POLITICAL MATTERS DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF:
1. ☐ LIBERAL
2. ☐ MODERATE
3. ☐ CONSERVATIVE

L DID YOU VOTE FOR THE REPUBLICAN OR THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES?
1. ☐ REPUBLICAN
2. ☐ DEMOCRATIC
3. ☐ SOME OTHER PARTY
4. ☐ DIDN'T VOTE FOR HOUSE

PLEASE TURN BALLOT OVER

PLEASE ANSWER EACH QUESTION

M PLEASE MARK AN "X" TO SHOW IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

	AGREE	DISAGREE
1. We should be more forceful in our dealings with the Soviet Union even if it increases the risk of war.	1. ☐	2. ☐
2. Cutting taxes is more important than balancing the Federal budget.	1. ☐	2. ☐
3. Unemployment is a more important problem today than inflation.	1. ☐	2. ☐
4. I support the Equal Rights Amendment – E.R.A. – the constitutional amendment concerning women.	1. ☐	2. ☐

N COMPARED TO A YEAR AGO, IS YOUR FAMILY'S FINANCIAL SITUATION:
1. ☐ BETTER TODAY
2. ☐ WORSE TODAY
3. ☐ ABOUT THE SAME

O IN 1976 FOR WHOM DID YOU VOTE?
1. ☐ JIMMY CARTER
2. ☐ GERALD FORD
3. ☐ SOMEONE ELSE
4. ☐ DID NOT VOTE

P OCCUPATION OF THE HEAD OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD:
1. ☐ PROFESSIONAL OR MANAGER
2. ☐ CLERICAL/SALES OTHER WHITE COLLAR
3. ☐ BLUE COLLAR WORKER
4. ☐ AGRICULTURE
5. ☐ LOOKING FOR FULL-TIME WORK
6. ☐ OTHER

Q WHAT WAS THE LAST GRADE IN SCHOOL YOU ATTENDED?
1. ☐ DID NOT GRADUATE HIGH SCHOOL
2. ☐ COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL
3. ☐ SOME COLLEGE BUT NOT FOUR YEARS
4. ☐ FOUR YEARS OF COLLEGE OR MORE

R ARE YOU ANY OF THE FOLLOWING? (Check as many as apply)
1. ☐ BORN AGAIN CHRISTIAN
2. ☐ HISPANIC AMERICAN
3. ☐ TEACHER
4. ☐ ACTIVE IN POLITICS
5. ☐ FAVORED KENNEDY FOR DEM. NOMINATION IN 1980

S TO WHICH AGE GROUP DO YOU BELONG?
1. ☐ 18-21
2. ☐ 22-29
3. ☐ 30-44
4. ☐ 45-59
5. ☐ 60 OR OVER

T WHAT IS YOUR RELIGION?
1. ☐ PROTESTANT
2. ☐ CATHOLIC
3. ☐ JEWISH
4. ☐ OTHER
5. ☐ NONE

U ARE YOU OR ANYONE LIVING IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD A UNION MEMBER?
1. ☐ YES
2. ☐ NO

V 1979 TOTAL FAMILY INCOME WAS:
1. ☐ UNDER $10,000
2. ☐ $10,000 – $14,999
3. ☐ $15,000 – $24,999
4. ☐ $25,000 – $50,000
5. ☐ OVER $50,000

W DID YOU HEAR ANY NATIONAL ELECTION RETURNS ON EITHER TELEVISION OR RADIO TODAY
1. ☐ NO
2. ☐ YES... WHAT TIME DID YOU HEAR THE RETURNS?
TIME _____

ment. The experiment was testing new questionnaire and interviewing procedures that were being considered for future elections. None of the new methods was a significant departure from past practice, or so we thought. The combination of procedures being tested produced an apparent victory for James Florio when in fact Thomas Kean won by a margin of one-tenth of one percent. The correct conclusion would have been that the race was "too close to call." However, a faulty analysis of the results on election night led to the error.

A Unique Analytical Tool

Recent controversies over voter polls have obscured their chief use. We have several means for making quick determinations of election outcomes, but only voter polls can explore the voters' motives with any precision. Only these surveys can relate voting behavior to many of the voters' more interesting characteristics. Reagan's friends on the political right, for example, who urge him to be faithful to the constituency that elected him, might look at the percentage of Reagan voters in our voter poll who picked "he is a real conservative" as a reason for their vote. It was a mere 11 percent. The same percentage voted for him because he was a Republican. (Thirty percent voted for Carter because he was a Democrat.)

Should the president feel obligated not to waver on his three-year tax cut? By two-to-one, those who voted for Reagan in 1980 believed that balancing the budget was more important than cutting taxes.

In this fall's and other off-year elections, when the president is not on the ballot, we can measure his popularity and relate it to votes for Congress. We can also relate it to major issues. In 1978, for example, the Republican party's three national campaign committees had united on the Kemp-Roth tax cut as a common theme. Our voter polls revealed two remarkable things about this issue. Most voters were not in favor of a deep tax cut; and, among those who did favor it, most voted for Democrats.

Before there were voter polls, political analysts had two principal sources of information about who voted, how they voted, and why. One was the preelection polls conducted by many news organizations, survey research firms, and academic institutions. The other was the study of selected precincts known (or thought) to be populated more or less uniformly by people with a particular ethnic or economic trait.

Such surveys, no matter how carefully done, are uncertain guides to the actual voters. Even more important, their sample sizes (seldom over 2,000) are too small to permit any but the most superficial analysis of demographic groups.

Anyone, for example, who wants to study Jewish voters, middle-income blacks, or Catholic women under thirty will find only about fifty of them in a typical Gallup, Harris, or CBS/*New York Times* sample. If you want to look further at the 9 percent of Republicans who voted for Carter, an ordinary survey will provide a sample of only thirty-five. A voter poll will provide ten times that number. And all are known voters.

Before voter polls became available, political analysts relied heavily on the study of precincts believed to have a special character. There were, or were thought to be, precincts inhabited almost exclusively by Irish, Italian, black, Jewish, white, or blue collar Americans. There were serious deficiencies in this kind of analysis. For one thing, ethnically pure neighborhoods were a vanishing part of American living patterns, even before Jimmy Carter's brief fling at reviving them. And, to the extent that some neighborhoods did have very high concentrations of Italians, Jews, or blacks, for example, the individuals who lived in them were by no means representative of all members of the groups.

On the basis of a handful of "Jewish precincts" in 1972, political analysts concluded that there was a dramatic decline in Democratic voting by Jews that was attributable to George McGovern. Our voter polls showed McGovern winning two-to-one among Jews.

Precinct analysis has also led to some erroneous notions about black voting habits—notions which can be corrected by studying voter polls. Only about a third of black voters live in predominantly black neighborhoods, and they don't necessarily vote the same way as blacks who live in integrated neighborhoods. Black precincts don't give an accurate picture of the diversity of the black vote. Voter polls do. An example from the 1972 election illustrates the point:

	Nixon	*McGovern*
High density black neighborhoods	*6%*	*93%*
Other blacks in cities	*18*	*81*
Suburban blacks	*34*	*66*
Rural/small town blacks	*31*	*67*

Note: "Other" not shown.
Source: CBS News voter poll, 1972.

The overall black vote for Nixon in that voter poll was 18 percent—well above the percentages cited by analysts relying on the vote in mostly black precincts. In 1976, the CBS voter poll showed that 16 percent of the black vote went to President Ford. That was a good deal higher than the figures generally used in discussions of that year's black vote—figures based on precinct analysis. Though Reagan's share of the black vote represented a decline from the Nixon/Ford levels (to 11 percent), that number is still higher than the low single digits that turned up in black precincts. And, because of the sample sizes available in voter polls, we can say something significant about the suburban black vote in 1980. Twenty-six percent of it went to Reagan.

Voter polls are a unique resource for the study of elections—both by television broadcasters when the news is fresh, and by scholars for years to come. ☞

by Robert Shogan

The Gap: Why Presidents and Parties Fail

When Richard Nixon first heard that agents of his 1972 reelection campaign had broken into Democratic party headquarters at the Watergate, he claimed to be genuinely surprised. "The whole thing made so little sense," Nixon wrote later. "Why, of all places, the DNC? Anyone who knew anything about politics would know that a national committee headquarters was a useless place to go for inside information on a presidential campaign."[1]

For all his failings, Nixon had a keen eye for the arrangement of power. He assumed, correctly as it turned out, that the Democratic National Committee was as ill-informed about the inner workings of George McGovern's candidacy as he knew the Republican National Committee to be about his own campaign.

This ignorance was no fluke. It reflected the dominant reality of the modern political age—the diminishing role of political parties in both politics and government, and the consequent widening of what amounts to a gap between politics and government.

The gap was not created by recent presidents or by modern reforms. Rather, it is imbedded in our laws and sustained by our customs. Its origins lie in the Constitution's impediments to the healthy development of political parties. To put it in simplest terms, politics defines what people want; government decides what they get. This is where political parties come in—or should come in. They are the best means available to us for connecting politics and government, for making politics relevant by providing voters with meaningful choices between policies and candidates, and for holding government accountable to the electorate.

This article is excerpted from the forthcoming book, *None of the Above*.

But the parties were born to fail. To succeed, they must be able to win support from the electorate and deliver results in government. The Constitution, however, makes no provision for the functioning of parties. Indeed, the Constitution's separation of powers makes the task of parties difficult, if not impossible, by ordaining a permanent antagonism between the executive and the legislature which transcends party allegiance. By curbing the authority of parties in government, the Constitution undermines their influence on politics and, in effect, institutionalizes the gap between politics and government.[2]

The gap has been with us from the beginning of the Republic. In recent years it has expanded dangerously, for three principal reasons: the electorate, on one side of the gap, has been going through a period of turmoil and divisiveness; the government, on the other side, has had to deal with growing demands and rising expectations; and the parties, which ought to serve as the connecting link, have been steadily debilitated.

The impact of these developments is mirrored in the syndrome which has gripped the White House for two decades. Not since Dwight Eisenhower has a chief executive served out two full terms in office. The subsequent story of the presidency is dominated by upheaval and distress, producing chaotic swings in political fortunes.

The chronic failings of the presidency have less to do with personal characteristics, upon which so much attention is lavished, and more to do with the political and governing system to which presidential candidates and presidents must respond. This system has been transformed and distorted by a combination of interlocking events and circumstances, in which nearly every factor seems to be both cause and effect of every other factor. Sweeping social and economic changes have

altered customs and mores and eroded longtime partisan allegiances. Innovations in technology—most notably television, but also the computer—harnessed to refinements in such political techniques as polling and fund raising, have undermined the parties' traditional influence.

Out of this flux and ferment has emerged a new breed of candidates for the White House, and for other offices as well, who manage to get elected without much help from their parties. Not surprisingly, once in power they tend to maintain their distance and their independence.

Pitfalls and Preventives

The decline of parties is evident at every level and branch of government. Candidates for the House and Senate, most of whom once depended heavily on party support, have learned to set up their own organizations, to use television and direct mail techniques, and to cultivate special interest groups for their backing. The net result, Thomas E. Mann points out, is that "the substance of the campaign as presented to the voters revolves around the candidate, not the party."[3]

The dominance of personality over party is most conspicuous, and most significant, in presidential politics. The trend was markedly accelerated by John Kennedy. After gaining the 1960 Democratic nomination on his own, despite the misgivings of the established party leadership, Kennedy carried over his personalized style into the general election campaign. Robert Kennedy, as his brother's proconsul, took over the Democratic National Committee and converted it into a Kennedy fiefdom. Mistrustful of state and local organizations, he dispatched his own handpicked operators to coordinate the Kennedy campaign effort around the country.

The future attorney general treated party concerns with disdain. "I don't give a damn if the state and county organizations survive after November," Kennedy told an assemblage of New York reform Democrats, among them the revered Herbert Lehman, who had been feuding with the regular party organization. "I don't give a damn if *you* survive. I want to elect John F. Kennedy."[4]

Subsequent presidential candidates in both parties have shown even less regard for their party organizations. The most notorious case in point is, of course, Nixon, whose CREEP organization ran his 1972 reelection campaign and, in the process, touched off the Watergate scandal, the worst blow suffered by the GOP since the depression.

Watergate led to a wave of reforms. Unfortunately, though, the reforms increased the separation of political parties from presidential campaigning by establishing federal subsidies paid directly to the candidate, leaving the parties only an ancillary role in campaign financing. The new rules also encourage the tendency of presidential nominees to operate their own political shops. As vice president, Gerald Ford had publicly denounced Nixon's CREEP as "an arrogant elite guard," and urged that the Republican National Committee run future GOP presidential campaigns. But when he ran against Carter in 1976, Ford chose to rely on his own President Ford Committee, not the RNC.

The subordination of the party's role in presidential campaigning has inevitably been reflected by lessened party influence in the White House. In bygone years some national party chairmen—James J. Farley and Robert Hannegan, for example—carried weight in presidential councils. But with the personalization of the presidency, the party chairmanship has been reduced to a flunkyship, dedicated to serving the president's interest, regardless of the interests of the rest of the party.

Ronald Reagan's White House had made plain its disregard for the views of Richard Richards, whom Reagan chose to head the Republican National Committee. Though an ardent conservative, Richards had criticized the operations of conservative political action committees which operate independently of political parties because, he complained, "they create mischief" and are responsible neither to candidates nor to parties. But Reagan's political director at the White House, Edward J. Rollins, brushed aside Richards's criticism and praised the efforts of the groups as "the wave of the future."[5]

Given the present condition of the parties, Rollins may be right. It is true that the Republicans have developed an efficient fund-raising apparatus for helping their candidates, and the Democrats are scrambling to catch up. But party funding for candidates is small change compared with the bounty from independent political action committees—conservative and liberal, business and labor.[6] More fundamentally, everyone knows where the PACs stand, and what they want; each exists to serve its own economic or ideological interest.

But who can say what the goals and purposes of the parties are? Their quadrennial platforms provide only hazy hints. And neither party possesses the intellectual and political discipline to convert this generalized rhetoric into realistic and distinctive policy alternatives.

After the 1980 election, Democrats jeered that Reagan had won the presidency by promising gains without pains. But when Reaganomics produced huge budget deficits and the country plunged into the worst postwar recession, the Democrats could not agree on an alternative policy.

Indeed a fair number of Democrats, particularly Southern "boll weevils," in the House were already on record as voting for Reagan's tax and budget cuts. Their behavior infuriated some Democratic leaders. But the House Democratic Caucus let them off with a scolding, and a vague warning that future defections could bring retribution.

What can the parties do to make themselves more potent and more relevant? Under existing strictures of the Constitution, nothing much. All previous attempts

to create mechanisms for establishing firm policy positions and assuring their support by a party's elected representatives have failed. They have been undermined by the implacable institutional rivalries between the executive and the legislature and the overriding and often conflicting separate agendas of individual lawmakers.

Unable to deal effectively with their isolation from issues and the inherent causes of their institutional anemia, party leaders have turned their attention to procedural reforms, a familiar subject in recent years, particularly for the Democrats. Soon after the 1980 election, both national committees established commissions to review their rules for selecting national convention delegates. The Republican panel, whose recommendations cannot take effect until the 1988 campaign, is still deliberating. But the Democratic commission, headed by North Carolina Governor James Hunt, has already completed its work. Its principal creation is a special class of "uncommitted" delegates—party and elected officials who will be free to cast votes at the convention for whichever presidential candidate they prefer, regardless of the outcome of primaries and caucuses in their home states.[7]

About 14 percent of the 1984 convention's delegates will fall into this category, including three-fifths of Democratic House and Senate members. Representative Gillis Long of Louisiana, chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, predicted the change will strengthen the ties between the national party and members of Congress who, Long complained, had been excluded from recent conventions as a result of reforms adopted since the stormy 1968 convention.

In fact, though, members of Congress were not excluded. It is true that only a handful were delegates to the party's 1980 convention. But to become delegates, Democratic congressmen and senators had only to go through the regular selection process and take their chances with other delegate candidates.

A good many of the stay-at-homes did not want to get involved in the friction of the presidential campaign, which might have damaged them among their own constituents. But the campaign was where the action was, where the voters were deciding about the Democratic party's future, and where there was an opportunity for elected officials to exercise leadership. By forfeiting that opportunity, Democratic House and Senate members demonstrated a sense of isolation from their party which will take more than the granting of convention voting privileges to overcome.

The best thing that can be said about the Democrats' new deal for their officeholders is that it probably will not make any difference. If, as has been the case in recent campaigns, one contender emerges from the primaries and caucuses as the clear front-runner, few elected officials are likely to put themselves in the position of thwarting the popular will by backing someone else. But if, on the other hand, the nomination is still in doubt at the convention, the new rule could cause considerable mischief. It would be difficult for the elected officials to exercise their franchise in the deliberative and statesmanlike fashion imagined for them, because they would be under intense pressure from their own supporters, most particularly their financial contributors, to vote for one candidate or another.

Along with unions and other interest groups, another potential source of pressure on elected officials is an incumbent president, whose control over federal funding and appointments has a strong tendency to influence judgment. An incumbent's power, even when he is not an active candidate, was demonstrated at the pre-reform 1968 Democratic convention. Desperate for support of the anti-Vietnam War forces in his campaign against Nixon, the convention's nominee, Hubert Humphrey, wanted to accept a compromise plank on Vietnam, which was also acceptable to the antiwar leaders. But the chairman of the convention platform committee was the late Hale Boggs, a longtime Louisiana congressman and a longtime ally and confidant of Lyndon Johnson, who opposed the compromise. "The Congressman's position was clear and also immovable," Humphrey later wrote. "If the President would not accept the plank, then he, as chairman of the platform committee, would resist it, send out the word that the plank was unacceptable." The compromise died and Humphrey was forced to spend much of his campaign trying to win the backing of the opponents of the war.[8]

The behavior of elected officials at conventions is part of the syndrome that afflicts their party, the presidency, and the entire political system. "We have become a disconnected party," Glenn Watts, president of the Communications Workers of America, warned members of the Hunt Commission in words that could be applied to the Republicans as well as the Democrats. "The elected officials aren't grabbing for power, they're running for cover. We ought not allow them to avoid responsibility for selecting a nominee, writing a platform and organizing a party. We must bind their fate to ours in a common undertaking."

Watts defined part of the problem. But its solution demands change more fundamental than the alteration of national convention procedures.

In searching for a way to bridge the gap between politics and government, one needs first to look back at James Madison's use of human nature to help mold the Constitution. Determined to ensure that the separate branches of government would restrain each other, Madison devised a system that made checking and balancing a function of individual self-interest. His design thus ensured a perennial clash of ambitions which has been heightened by the social and technological dynamics of the past twenty years.

If the legislature, the executive, and the party are to agree to bind their fates, as Glenn Watts envisaged, a comparable powerful incentive of common self-

(Continued on page 57)

The Freeze Framework

by Everett Carll Ladd

In recent months there has been a growing debate and protest over nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war. At its center is an effort to get the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union for an immediate halt in the testing, production, and further development of nuclear weapons. Calls for a "nuclear freeze" have been endorsed in cities and towns around the country, and sufficient signatures have been gathered to place a "freeze" initiative on at least five ballots this November.

All of this activity raises some important questions about what the American people actually mean to say. What are the key points in their message to elected officials? In particular, has there been a recent shift in attitudes on the place of nuclear arms in the national defense? To answer these questions, we examined hundreds of questions on nuclear weapons reaching back to the beginning of the "atomic era" in 1945.

See Opinion Roundup pages 33-40

"Americans Assess the Nuclear Option"

The most striking finding that emerges from this extensive review is that *American opinion on nuclear weapons and war has changed scarcely at all over nearly four decades.* The nuclear freeze campaign of 1982 has *not* been prompted by some recent change in the public's thinking or concerns.

Americans are concerned about atomic weapons, and they would like to see steps taken to curtail nuclear proliferation. But this commitment isn't new. From the onset of the nuclear age, the public has had grave doubts about the very essence of a development which, as nuclear physicist Edward Teller has remarked, is the only great discovery of modern science to be announced by a bomb which wreaked massive destruction.

In 1945, Americans by a large majority approved of the decision to drop atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and recent polls show they still think that decision was right. This does not mean, however, that they were comfortable about nuclear weapons. Around a fifth of the U.S. public, from the beginning, categorically opposed making, much less using, the bomb. In November 1946, Gallup found that 21 percent of the populace thought their country "should stop making atom bombs and destroy all those we have now." Only 42 percent of Americans believed in October 1948 "that in the long run atomic energy will do more good than harm."

A prime reason for these doubts has been an ample appreciation of the bomb's awful destructiveness. In an April 1958 Gallup poll, Americans gave

(Continued on page 41)

UPDATING EMILY POST

MANNERS OF DRESS . . .

Question: How important or unimportant do you think a man's physical appearance is in determining how successful he is in a business career? (Read list)



Note: 48% of men and 51% of women said a man's physical appearance is "very important" in determining success in a business career.

Question: How important or unimportant do you think a woman's physical appearance is in determining how successful she is in a business career? (Read list)



Note: 53% of men and 64% of women said a woman's physical appearance is "very important" in determining success in a business career.

Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, November 17-22, 1981.

UNDRESS . . .

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of women wearing slacks in public?

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of women wearing shorts in public?

1961



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, October 19-24, 1961.

Question: In general, do you think that the bathing suits worn by most young American women today are too revealing, too concealing, or just about right?

1982



Note: 63% of women compared to 34% of men thought that bathing suits today are "too revealing."

Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, April 19-22, 1982.

AND ADDRESS

Question: Some women prefer the use of "Ms."—that is "m" "s" —instead of "Miss" or "Mrs." Do you approve or disapprove of the use of the title "Ms." for women instead of "Miss" or "Mrs."?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, June 14-15, 1982.

Crudeness and Rudeness

Question: Do you think that men should or should not maintain traditional manners toward women—such as holding doors, helping women get seated and standing when introduced?



Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, March 1982.

CUSSING

Question: How do you feel about the use of profanity in public by women as compared to men? Would you say it is much worse for a woman than a man, somewhat worse for a woman than a man, no worse for a woman than a man?



Source: Surveys by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, May 3-6, 1982.

Question: Would you disapprove if you heard the following people swear, or wouldn't it make any difference?

Iowans' response:



Note: All types of response categories not shown. The "makes no difference" response for the categories shown was 19% (public school teacher), 22% (clergyman), 32% (president), 32% (your mother), 41% (your father), 66% (truck driver). Sample size = 605 Iowa residents.

Source: Survey by the Des Moines Register and Tribune Company, November 28-December 1, 1979.

PUFFING

Question: Do you ever ask people around you to stop smoking? (Asked of nonsmokers = 65%)



Source: Survey by R. H. Bruskin and Associates, April 1981.

Question: If . . . someone were to ask you to stop smoking, would you do it? (Asked of smokers = 35%)



Source: Survey by R. H. Bruskin and Associates, April 1981.

WHAT ANNOYS

Question: Do you find yourself getting annoyed a lot, getting somewhat annoyed, or hardly getting annoyed at all by any of the above?

Women's response:



Note: Sample size = 3,007 women. In 1970, 31% of women were annoyed a lot/somewhat by "a man talking about you as a girl and not as a woman," 32% were a lot/somewhat annoyed by "jokes about . . ." and 43% were a lot/somewhat annoyed by "pictures of nude women in men's magazines."

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, late 1979.

AND GIRLS CALLING BOYS

Question: How do you feel about women calling men for a date? Do you approve or disapprove?



Note: 61% of the total sample approved of women calling men for a date, 40% disapproved.

Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, September 14-19, 1981.

AND WHAT WE THOUGHT FORTY YEARS AGO

Question: Do you agree with him (Governor Dickinson)* that liquor is what usually causes the downfall of young girls?

	Total	Men	Women
Liquor causes downfall of young girls	46%	39%	53%
Qualified yes	1	1	1
No	43	51	36
Don't know	9	9	10

Note: *Governor Dickinson served as Lt. Governor of Michigan from 1915 to 1921, from 1927 to 1933 and from 1935-39. He served as Michigan's Governor from 1939 to 1941.

Question: The recent public charges made by Governor Dickinson of Michigan have raised the question of whether businessmen and politicians in the East often have immoral relations with their secretaries. Do you think this is so?

	Total	Men	Women
Businessmen and politicians in East have immoral relations with their secretaries	19%	21%	16%
Do not	38	39	37
Don't know	43	40	45

Source: Surveys by Elmo Roper for *Fortune* magazine, November 1939.

On the Beach

TO SEE,

Question: Which one of the following is the main reason men go to the beach? (Read list)

Men go to the beach...



TO BE SEEN

Question: Which one of the following is the main reason women go to the beach? (Read list)

Women go to the beach...



Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, June 8-13, 1982.

BUT NOT OBSCENE

Question: Do you think all major public beaches should or should not reserve an area for nude bathers?



Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, June 8-13, 1982.

AMERICANS EVALUATE THE COURT SYSTEM

SYSTEM NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

Question: Now I'd like to ask you about four specific aspects of American life. Our political system, our system of administering justice, our system of business and industry, and our system of organized labor. . . . Which of the descriptions on the card do you feel best applies to our system of administering justice?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-3), February 14-28, 1981.

PERMISSIVENESS OF COURTS A MAJOR CAUSE OF COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS

Question: Here is a list of possible causes of some of our problems in this country. (Card shown respondent) Would you call off the ones you think are the *major* causes of our problems today?



Major Cause of Our Problems

	1973	1974	1975	1977	1979	1982
Lack of good leadership	49%	57%	54%	34%	52%	44%
Permissiveness in the courts	39	47	51	50	51	53
Permissiveness of parents	43	40	43	47	42	43
Selfishness, people not thinking of others	51	47	46	52	50	50
Wrongdoing in government	51	64	56	47	51	50
Radical attempts to force change	19	21	26	19	19	20
Growing conservatism	6	7	6	5	7	10
Too much emphasis on money and materialism	46	40	36	42	41	41
Too much technology	6	8	8	9	9	7
A letdown in moral values	50	53	53	57	56	57
Too much commitment to other nations in the world	48	54	52	38	49	51
Too little interest in other nations in the world	6	5	5	6	7	9

Note: "None" or "Don't know" not shown. Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-3), latest that of February 13-27, 1982.

What the Problem Isn't

JUDGES ARE MOST SELFLESS

Question: Now I'm going to show you a list of some different groups of people, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think most people in that group tend to act more in their own self-interest or more in the public interest. Here's the list. (Card shown respondent) First, do you think most federal court judges tend to act more in their own self-interest, or more in the public interest?



Note: When subgroups in the federal court judges category were analyzed, some differences appeared. 32% of non-high school grads thought judges acted more in self-interest and 53% in the public interest; 15% said "don't know." Among those with college degrees the percentages were 19%, 76%, and 5%. 19% of executive/professionals felt judges acted in their self-interest, compared to 27% of blue collar workers. 31% of those with incomes under $10,000 felt they acted in self-interest compared to 16% of those with incomes over $30,000.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-8), August 15-22, 1981.

AND GENERALLY FAIR IMPARTIAL, AND HONEST

Question: Do you think that judges have assumed too much power these days, or not?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

Question: Do you think judges usually base their decisions on their interpretation of the law, or do you think they usually allow their personal beliefs and political opinions [to] play too great a part in their rulings from the bench?



Note: Sample size = 1,047. In another *Los Angeles Times* question in this same survey, 81% of those surveyed felt that "judges do a good job." 19% said they do not.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

Question: Do you think that judges deal fairly with everyone, or do you think that they tend to be biased against minorities and the poor?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

PUBLIC USUALLY AGREES WITH VERDICTS

Question: Thinking about the court cases you have personally followed, do they usually come out the way you think they should, or not?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

Question: Does the U.S. Supreme Court permit or does it forbid a woman to have an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy, or haven't you been following this closely enough to say?



What is your opinion? Should a woman be permitted or forbidden to have an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, March 11-15, 1982.

What It Is

CRIMINAL COURTS NOT DOING THEIR JOB

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the criminal courts are doing their job?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, January 18-22, 1981.

PUBLIC WANTS TO GET TOUGH



Question: Generally, do you feel the courts have been too easy in dealing with criminals, too severe, or do you think they have treated criminals fairly?

	Courts have been too easy	Too severe	Fair	It varies (vol.)
1967	52%	1%	16%	31%
1970	67	3	20	9
1973	67	2	18	13
1975	71	2	18	9
1977	77	1	13	9
1978	80	1	10	8
1981	83	1	14	2

Note: Sample size = 1,250 in 1981.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of January 22-25, 1981.

SOLID MAJORITIES FAVOR HARSHER PENALTIES

Question: Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear-cut side that people take, and also frequently solutions on controversial issues are worked out by compromise. But I'm going to name some different things, and for each one would you tell me whether on balance you would be more in favor of it, or more opposed to it? . . . Harsher prison sentences for those convicted of crimes.



Note: * "Opposed" = 0. In a 1981 Harris question, "From what you know or have heard, do you feel that our system of law enforcement works to really discourage people from committing crimes, or don't you feel it discourages them much?" 79% said it "does not discourage." In 1967, 53% gave that response. In 1981, 16% thought the system "really discouraged people. . . ." In 1967, 26% felt that way.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

THROW THE BOOK AT THEM, OR REWRITE IT

Question: In August, a federal task force on crime submitted to the attorney general a list of recommendations to deal with the rising crime rate in this country. As you probably know, some of the recommendations have been controversial. Here is a list of some of the key proposals made by the task force. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each one tell me whether you personally favor or oppose it? First, permit judges to deny bail to persons where there is reasonable evidence they are a danger to the community?



Note: All "don't know" responses were less than 10%, except "make illegally seized evidence . . ." which was 14%. They were calculated out.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-9), September 19-26, 1981.

Justice Not Served in Hinckley Case

PUBLIC SAYS NO TO INSANITY DEFENSE IN 1981 AND 1982

Question: When people are put on trial for murder, do you think the courts should continue to allow them to plead "not guilty by reason of insanity" or do you think the rules should be changed so that people charged with murder cannot use an "insanity" defense?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, September 28-29, 1981.

Question: As you probably know, the law now says that a person can be found not guilty if proved insane at the time of a crime. Do you approve or disapprove of laws which allow someone to be found not guilty of a crime because of insanity?



Note: Sample size = 505.
Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

AND NO TO HINCKLEY VERDICT

Question: As you know, the jury decided yesterday that Hinckley was insane and therefore NOT legally responsible for having wounded Reagan and three other men back in March of 1981. Do you think that justice was done in the trial of John Hinckley or not?



Note: Sample size = 505. In a July 12-15 survey conducted by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, 71% of those surveyed said the Hinckley verdict "weakened (your) faith in this country's system of justice," 3% said strengthened, and 26% said it had no effect.
Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

HE SHOULDN'T GO FREE, BUT HE PROBABLY WILL

Question: If it is later determined that John Hinckley has recovered from mental illness, do you think Hinckley should be allowed to go free or not?



Note: Sample size = 505.
Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

Question: Just your best guess, do you think John Hinckley will ever be allowed to go free again?



Note: Sample size = 505.
Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

ELECTION '82 PREVIEW

OVERALL PARTY STANDINGS GOING INTO THE 1982 ELECTIONS

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

	Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
Total	245	289	1
House	192	243	0
Senate	53	46	1

GOVERNORS

Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
23	27	0

STATE HOUSES, CONTROL BY PARTY

	Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
National	35	63	0
By region:			
Northeast	8	10	0
North Central	12	10	0
South	1	31	0
West	14	12	0

STATES WITH BOTH HOUSES OF LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR OF SAME PARTY

Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
7	17	—

MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES**

Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
2,918 (39%)	4,483 (60%)	11 (*)

Note: * = less than one-half of one percent.

**Excludes one vacancy each in lower house for Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin, and two vacancies each for Indiana and New Hampshire; excludes one vacancy each in upper house for Connecticut, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Texas, and two vacancies each for New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Nebraska is excluded from legislative house calculations because it is a unicameral nonpartisan legislative system.

Source: Members of Congress: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 484. Governors: *U.S. News and World Report*, November 17, 1980. Members of State Legislatures and State Houses Control by Party: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 494. States with both Houses and Governor of Same Party: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, pp. 493-494.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROPORTION OF POPULAR VOTE 1932-1980



	Democrat	Republican
1932	55%	41%
1934	54	42
1936	56	40
1938	49	47
1940	51	46
1942	46	51
1944	51	47
1946	44	53
1948	52	46
1950	49	49
1952	50	49
1954	53	47
1956	51	49
1958	56	43
1960	54	45
1962	52	47
1964	57	42
1966	51	48
1968	50	48
1970	53	45
1972	52	46
1974	58	41
1976	56	42
1978	54	45
1980	50	48

Source: 1932-1970: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970; Part 2.* U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975), p. 1084. 1972: *Statistical Abstract*, 1977 (p. 500). 1974-1978: *Statistical Abstract*, 1979 (p. 505). 1980: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 484.

Party Identification

GALLUP

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" and "No opinion" calculated out.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 25-28, 1982.

HARRIS

Question: Regardless of how you may vote, what do you usually consider yourself—a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" = 2% and "Not sure" = 4% calculated out.
Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, July 9-14, 1982.

TIME/YANKELOVICH, SKELLY AND WHITE

Question: Are you a Democrat, Republican or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" = 7% and "Not sure" = 2% calculated out.
Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, June 8-10, 1982.

NBC NEWS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Question: In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" = 2% and "Not sure" = 4% calculated out.
Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, June 14-15, 1982.

CBS NEWS

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: Sample size = 1,174. For comparison purposes, "Don't know" = 6% calculated out.
Source: Survey by CBS News, June 26-28, 1982.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

Question: Regardless of how you have voted in the past, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?



Note: "Independent" includes "Lean toward Democratic," "Lean toward Republican," and "Lean toward neither." Sample size = 1,004. For comparison purposes "Other" = 3% and "Don't know" = 4% calculated out.
Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, June 27-July 1, 1982.

ABC NEWS

Question: Do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat or Independent?



Note: Sample size = 1,018. For comparison purposes, "Other" = 4% and "Don't know" = 2% calculated out.
Source: Survey by ABC News, May 24-June 1, 1982.

ROPER

Question: Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other specific party" = 1%, "Refused" and "Don't know/No answer" = 3% calculated out. Independent includes "Independent" (vol.) and "No particular party" (vol.) = 14%.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-7), July 10-17, 1982.

IF THE ELECTIONS W

Question: If you were voting for congressman today, would you be most likely to vote for the Democrat, the Republican, or the candidate of some other party? (1946) If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party would you like to see win in this state—the Republican party or the Democratic party? If "undecided" ask: As of today, do you lean more to the Democratic party or to the Republican party? (1950, 1954, 1958, 1962)[1] Here is a Gallup Poll Secret Ballot. Now, suppose the elections for Congress were being held today. Which party would you like to see win in this congressional district? Will you please mark the



	Democrat	Republican
July 27-30, 1946	50%	50%
August 17-20	52	48
August 31-September 3	52	48
September 14-19	49	51
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	44	53
July 11-14, 1950	53	47
July 30-August 4	53	47
August 21-24	62	38
September 18-21	54	47
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	49	49
July 17-20, 1954	59	41
August 6-9	59	41
August 27-30	57	44
September 16-20	55	45
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	53	47
July 11-14, 1958	63	37
July 30-August 4	58	42
August 20-25	60	41
September 10-15	61	39
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	56	43
June 28-July 3, 1962	64	36
July 26-31	59	41
August 23-28	63	37
September 20-25	62	38
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	52	47
July 8-13, 1966	62	38
July 29-August 3	64	36
August 19-22	57	43
September 8-13	61	39
September 30-October 6[2]	59	41

	Democrat	Republican
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	51	48
July 10-13, 1970	58%	42%
August 1-4	61	39
August 25-September 1	58	42
September 11-14	58	42
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	53	45
August 2-6, 1974	68	32
August 16-19	65	35
September 6-9	64	36
September 27-30	65	35
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	58	41
July 21-24 and August 4-7, 1978	57	43
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	54	45
February 29-March 3, 1980[3]	59	41
June 13-16	58	42
August 1-4	59	41
August 15-18	63	37
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	50	48
June 16-19, 1981[3]	52	48
September 18-21	57	43
October 2-5	55	45
October 30-November 2	59	41
January 8-11, 1982[3]	54	46
January 22-25	57	43
February 5-8	60	40
April 2-5	61	39
April 23-26	61	39
April 30-May 3	58	42
May 14-17	58	42

ERE HELD TODAY...

Secret Ballot and then drop the folded ballot in the box. If "undecided" or "refused": Well, would you please mark the ballot for the party toward which you lean, as of today? (Secret Ballot, September 1966) If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party would you like to see win in this congressional district—the Republican party or the Democratic party? If "undecided" ask: As of today, do you lean more to the Republican party, or more to the Democratic party? (1966-1982)[1]



Note: In some years, the order of the parties is reversed in the questions.

[1] Slight variation of question wording—in some years the "lean to" portion of the question was asked if the respondent answered "undecided" or "refuse to answer" to the first portion of the question. (September 1958-1970)

[2] September-October 1966 data shown is a combination of the Secret Ballot Poll and the Non-Secret Poll.

[3] 1980 and 1982 figures based on registered voters.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1982. For Actual Democratic and Republican Vote: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2*, p. 1084 (for 1946-1970); *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977*, p. 500 (for 1972); *1979*, p. 505 (for 1974-1978); *1981*, p. 484 (for 1980).

LATE RESULTS

GALLUP, June 26-30: Democratic = 55%, Republican = 37%, Other = 1%, Undecided = 7%. (For comparison with above chart, when "other" and "undecided" are calculated out, Democratic = 60% and Republican = 40%.)

HARRIS, August 5-10: Democratic = 50%, Republican = 41%, Other = 2%, Not sure = 7%.

PENN + SCHOEN, August 21-22: (Among registered voters) Democratic = 43%, Republican = 31%, Other = 3%, Don't know = 23%.

Sizing up the Parties

Question: Now I'm going to read you a few phrases. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you think that phrase accurately describes the national Democratic party and its leaders, or not. How about the phrase "well organized"—does that accurately describe the national Democratic party and its leaders, or not? (Read statements and record below.) Now I'd like you to tell me whether these phrases accurately describe the national Republican party and its leaders, or not? How about the phrase "well organized"—does that accurately describe the national Republican party and its leaders, or not? (Read statements and record below.)



Note: For comparison purposes "Don't know" and "No opinion" calculated out. Highest "Don't know/No opinion" = 12%.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 17-22, 1981.

"NO DIFFERENCE" WINS

Question: Do you feel that the Democratic party or the Republican party can do a better job in handling (Read first item on list) or don't you think there is any real difference between them?

Registered voters



Note: Sample size = 1,010 registered voters.

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, June 8-10, 1982.

Readers should be aware that different questions produce very different results on the matter of which party is better able to handle a given problem. For example, the *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White question asked in early June and shown above, finds 19% of those surveyed saying that the Democratic party could better handle inflation; 24% chose the Republicans. Gallup asked a very similar question at about the same time and found that 37% thought the Democratic party would do a better job, 27% the Republicans. 11% had no opinion. What is significant on many of the "party best able" questions is the number of respondents who say "no difference." 58% of those in the *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White survey gave that response. In the Gallup question, where respondents were not given the option of a "no difference" response, 36% still volunteered it.

PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE NOT KEY IN CONGRESSIONAL VOTING CHOICE

Question: In general, because of President Reagan's performance in office, are you more likely to vote for a Democrat for Congress, most likely to vote for a Republican, or does his record not affect your vote?

Registered voters



Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters. 46% of Democrats, 49% of Republicans, 67% of Independents and 65% of those Democrats who voted for Reagan in 1980 said President Reagan's performance would have no effect on their vote.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for The Garth Analysis, June 12-14, 1982.

AMERICANS ASSESS THE NUCLEAR OPTION

American opinion on nuclear weapons has changed very little since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All of the dimensions of the public's belief today—awareness of the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons, recognition of Soviet intentions and position, desire to preserve and use the nuclear option—existed thirty-seven years ago. What follows is an historical look at these dimensions. On page 20, Everett Carll Ladd describes the public's posture in more detail.

MEMORIES OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of using the new atomic bomb on Japanese cities?

1945



Note: When asked in 1946 by the Gallup Organization "Should the United States continue to manufacture the atom bomb?" 67% of those surveyed said "yes," 33% "no." To the question, "Do you think that the U.S. should stop making atom bombs and destroy all those we now have?" 73% said "no," 21% "yes," 6% "qualified."

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 10-15, 1945.

Question: Do you feel it was necessary and proper for the United States to drop atomic bombs on Japan during World War II, or do you think we were wrong to drop the bombs?

1971



1982



Note: Responses differed substantially by sex.
Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates for the *Asahi Shimbun*, latest that of March 5-21, 1982.

But Awareness of

THE NUCLEAR PERIL

Question: If there should be another world war, do you think the H-bomb will be used against us?

1963



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, February 7-12, 1963.

Question: If another world war were to break out, do you think nuclear bombs and weapons are likely to be used, or not?

1973



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 21-24, 1973.

HOW LIKELY?

Question: Do you think a limited nuclear war is possible, or do you think any use of nuclear weapons would lead to a full-scale world war?

1982



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, May 10-11, 1982.

Question: How likely do you think we are to get into a nuclear war within the next ten years—very likely, fairly likely, fairly unlikely, or very unlikely?

1982



Note: In a June 1981 Gallup poll, 20% said nuclear war within the next ten years was very likely, 29% said fairly likely, 27% fairly unlikely, and 24% very unlikely.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982.

WHO WOULD PUSH THE BUTTON?

Question: Some people say it is unthinkable that any nation, knowing the consequences of such a decision, would venture into nuclear war. What do you think? Do you think that . . . would start a nuclear war or not?

Question: Do you think that the United States would start a nuclear war or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 14-17, 1982.

Awesome Destructive Power

CHANCES OF SURVIVAL NOT GOOD

Question: Do you think you and your family would be likely to live through an atomic war?



Note: When asked by Gallup in 1958, "If there is a world war between Russia and the West, and nuclear weapons like the H-bomb were used, out of every ten people in the United States, how many would you expect to survive?" the median response was three individuals out of ten, seven in ten would be killed.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 15-20, 1956.

Question: If we should happen to get into an all-out nuclear war, what do you think your own chances would be of living through it— very good, poor, or just 50-50?



Note: In response to a September 22-24 Gallup/*Newsweek* question, "If we should get into a limited nuclear war in which the Soviet Union attacked some of our military bases and installations with nuclear weapons, what do you think would be your chances of living through it—good, poor, or just 50-50?" 9% of those surveyed said "good," 45% "poor," and 45% "50-50." (1981)
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of June 19-22, 1981.

The Realities of U.S./U.S.S.R.

AMERICANS SEE RED ON SOVIET MOTIVES

Question: Suppose the United States stopped making atom bombs and destroyed those already made. Do you think Russia would then agree to let a United Nations committee check to see that Russia does not make atom bombs?

1946

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 15-20, 1946.

Question: Do you think such an attempt to work out an agreement with Russia (to control the atom bomb before we try to make a hydrogen bomb) would be successful, or not?

1950



Note: In the same survey, respondents were asked, "Do you think we should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the atom bomb before we try to make the hydrogen bomb?" 48% said we should, 45% we should not. 7% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 28-February 2, 1950.

Question: Premier Khrushchev has said that he will agree to a ban on the testing of H-bombs if that ban is part of a program for total disarmament. Do you think Khrushchev is bluffing or do you think he sincerely wants total disarmament?

1961



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 11-22, 1961.

Question: For the past few years, the United States and Russia have had a policy of trying to reach agreements which will relax tensions between them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live up to such agreements or don't you think so?

1978

Note: In a June 1978 CBS/*NYT* question, 64% of those surveyed said the Soviet Union would not live up to its share of the agreement if both countries were to sign one to limit nuclear weapons, 21% they would, and 15% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 16-17, 1978.

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . The Soviet Union would try to cheat on any nuclear freeze agreement and get an advantage over the United States.

1982



Note: In a March 14-17 *Los Angeles Times* question, 66% of those surveyed said the Soviet Union "could not be trusted to keep its part of the bargain" on a nuclear weapons agreement reached by both sides, 17% said they could be trusted, 9% hadn't heard enough to say, 7% were not sure, and 1% refused to answer.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982.

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . The U.S. Government would never agree to a nuclear arms freeze. . . . The Soviet Union would never agree to a nuclear arms freeze.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982.

Intentions and Position

SOVIETS ARE AHEAD IN NUCLEAR STRENGTH

Question: At the present time do you think the United States is ahead of Russia in terms of nuclear arms capability, about even with them, or behind Russia in nuclear military strength?

	Ahead	About even	Behind	Don't know
October/November 1977	18%	38%	28%	15%
June 1978	17	36	31	16
January 1979	18	38	31	12
September/October 1980	15	29	43	13
October 1981	16	35	41	9
April/May 1982	12	32	41	15

Note: In a March 1982 *Los Angeles Times* question, 41% said "the Russians have a stronger nuclear arsenal than we do," 7% said that "America has nuclear superiority over Russia," 41% said we were "roughly equal," 11% were not sure/refused. In a May 1982 CBS/*NYT* question, 9% said the "U.S. is superior in nuclear strength," 33% "about equal," 47% "is not as strong as the Soviet Union." 11% had no opinion.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-5), latest that of April 24-May 1, 1982.



IT DOESN'T REALLY MATTER, BUT JUST IN CASE

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . It doesn't matter if the United States or the Soviet Union is ahead in nuclear weapons because both sides have more than enough to destroy each other no matter who attacks first.



Note: In a *Los Angeles Times* March 1982 question, "Do you think the United States needs more nuclear weapons for its defense, or do you think the U.S. now possesses enough nuclear weapons to destroy its enemies?" 50% of those surveyed said the U.S. now has enough, 31% said we need more, 18% were not sure, and 1% refused to answer.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982.

Question: In thinking about the United States's national defense, how important is it to you that the United States produce as many nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union does . . . very important, somewhat important, or not important?

1982



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, May 10-11, 1982.

Preserving the Option

THE SPECTER OF SOVIET DOMINATION

Question: Suppose you had to make the decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under communist rule—how would you decide?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, October 19-24, 1961.

Question: Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the European Values Systems Study Group, 1981.

NO TO NO FIRST USE

Question: Some people say the United States should declare that it would only use nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union uses them first. Others say that would put the United States at a serious military disadvantage. What about you, do you think the United States should declare it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons or not?



Note: In a May 1982 CBS/*NYT* question, "Do you think the United States would *ever* be justified in using a nuclear weapon first during a war against another country?" 26% said "yes," 62% "no," and 12% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982.

Question: Another proposal that has been made to ease nuclear tensions and lessen the likelihood of nuclear war is for the United States to pledge never to be the first to use nuclear missiles, but only to use them in retaliation for an enemy nuclear attack. Some say this would reassure Russia and Europe about our intentions, while still retaining the deterrent power of our nuclear missiles. Others say it would give up an option which would put the United States at a disadvantage to Russia. Would you like to see the United States make a no first-strike pledge, or do you think that would be a mistake?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-5), April 25-May 1, 1982.

THE ISSUE TOO COMPLICATED FOR THE PUBLIC

Question: Do you think the public can understand the issues involved in a nuclear freeze well enough to vote on it, or is the question of a nuclear freeze too complicated for the public to decide?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982.

The Public's Terms

VERIFICATION AGREEMENT ESSENTIAL

Question: The major problem in arms control is the difficulty in verifying whether the other side is complying with the agreement. Some people feel that verification is essential for such an agreement. Others feel that it is more important for the United States to halt the growth of its nuclear arsenal even if we cannot be sure the other side is doing the same. Which is more important in your view? (Gallup/*Newsweek*, March 17-18, 1982)

Verification	73%	Halting growth	27%

GENERAL SUPPORT FOR FREEZE

Question: Well, would you approve or disapprove of a freeze on nuclear weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union? . . . Would you say you approve/disapprove strongly or approve/disapprove somewhat? (ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982)

Approve	79%	Disapprove	21%

Question: Would you favor or oppose a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons in both the United States *and* the Soviet Union? (NBC News/Associated Press, June 14-15, 1982)

Favor	83%	Oppose	17%

Question: Do you favor or oppose the United States agreeing to a "nuclear freeze" with the Soviet Union—that is, putting a stop to the testing, production, and installation of additional nuclear weapons by both sides? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)

Favor	77%	Oppose	23%

FAVOR IF BOTH SIDES EQUAL IN STRENGTH

Question: Let me ask you about some things that have been suggested to control the nuclear arms race. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose such a step. The United States and Russia should agree not to produce any new nuclear weapons, provided both countries have an equal number of such weapons. (Louis Harris and Associates, March 12-16, 1982)

Favor	84%	Oppose	16%

Question: What if a nuclear freeze would result in the United States and the Soviet Union having about an equal amount of nuclear strength, would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)*

Favor	91%	Oppose	9%

FAVOR IF CHEATING COULD BE DETECTED

Question: What if both the United States and the Soviet Union could catch the other country if it were cheating on the agreement—would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)*

Favor	87%	Oppose	13%

FAVOR DESTRUCTION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question: Let me ask you about some things that have been suggested to control the nuclear arms race. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose such a step. All countries that have nuclear weapons should agree to destroy them. (Louis Harris and Associates, March 12-16, 1982)

Favor	62%	Oppose	38%

OPPOSE IF EITHER SIDE COULD CHEAT WITHOUT DETECTION

Question: What if either the United States or the Soviet Union could cheat on the number of its nuclear weapons without being detected by the other side—would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)**

Oppose	80%	Favor	20%

OPPOSE IF FREEZE WOULD RESULT IN GREATER SOVIET STRENGTH

Question: What if a nuclear freeze would result in the Soviet Union having somewhat greater nuclear strength than the United States—would you favor or oppose such a freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)**

Oppose	67%	Favor	33%

OPPOSE IF U.S. FREEZES/REDUCES FIRST

Question: Some people say that the Russians are afraid to cut back on nuclear weapons until we do and that the United States should take the first step. Other people say that one-sided disarmament would only make us more vulnerable to attack. What do you think? Do you think the United States should reduce its nuclear weapons without waiting for the Russians to do the same thing, or do you think we should not reduce our nuclear weapons until the Russians agree to do the same thing? *(Los Angeles Times*, March 14-17, 1982)

Wait for Russians	86%	U.S. first	14%

Question: What if in order to get the Soviet Union to agree to freeze its nuclear weapons the United States would have to freeze its weapons first—would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze by the United States? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)**

Oppose	72%	Favor	28%

OPPOSE IF U.S. HALTS PRODUCTION AND SOVIETS DON'T

Question: Let me ask you about some things that have been suggested to control the nuclear arms race. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose such a step. The United States should not produce any new nuclear weapons even if the Russians continue to produce them. (Louis Harris and Associates, March 12-16, 1982)

Oppose	76%	Favor	24%

Note: In the CBS/*NYT* survey respondents were first asked a general favor or oppose nuclear freeze question—"Do you favor or oppose United States agreeing to a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union—that is putting a stop to the testing, production and installation of additional nuclear weapons by both sides?" The other variations in the freeze question wording were asked of certain respondents, based on their response to the general nuclear freeze question. *Question asked of those who responded "oppose" or "had no opinion" to the general freeze question. Percentages for variation question based on entire sample with the respondents "favoring" the general question included in the "favor" category for the variation question. **Question asked of those who responded "favor" or "had no opinion" to the general nuclear freeze question. Percentages for variation question based on entire sample with respondents "opposing" the general question put in the "oppose" category for the variation question.

Ronald Reagan and the Nuclear Freeze

Question: Do you trust Ronald Reagan to make the right kind of decisions about the control of nuclear weapons?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982.

Question: Generally speaking do you think the policies of the Reagan administration are reducing the chances of a nuclear war, or increasing the chances of a nuclear war or do you think the policies of the Reagan administration are not changing the chances of a nuclear war?



Note: Sample size = 1,102. In a June 1982 Gallup/*Newsweek* question: "Generally do you think the defense policies of the Reagan administration are reducing the chances of nuclear war, increasing the chances of nuclear war, or not changing the chances of nuclear war," 22% said reducing, 44% said not changing and 34% said increasing. A March ABC News/*Washington Post* poll conforms more closely to the *Los Angeles Times* poll shown above: 55% Reagan policies have made no difference, 25% increased and 18% decreased.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, July 4-8, 1982.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the Reagan administration's policies towards nuclear disarmament, or don't you know enough about them to have an opinion? (If disagree, ask) Do you think the Reagan administration is not going far enough in seeking reductions of nuclear weapons, or do you think the Reagan administration is going too far in seeking reductions?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, March 29-30, 1982.

LADD

(Continued from page 20)

the average guess that, in the event of an atomic war, seven out of every ten of their fellow citizens would be killed. Recent polls show that the public still believes that a nuclear war would likely entail a staggering loss of life.

From this fear of the bomb there has sprung widespread support for efforts to minimize its destructive potential. Thus, a plurality of the public in 1950 favored efforts to reach an agreement with Russia to control the atom bomb "before we try to make a hydrogen bomb," and in 1958, a plurality endorsed a U.S.-Soviet treaty banning nuclear weapons testing. This same impulse led 77 percent to tell CBS News/*New York Times* interviewers in May 1982 that they favored "the United States agreeing to a 'nuclear freeze' with the Soviet Union."

These enduring views are central parts of American opinion on nuclear weapons, and yet they are only half the story. For, as appalled as the public is about nuclear weaponry, it sees no realistic alternative to a heavy reliance on such weapons in the country's defense. The main reason for this is that the public considers the Soviet Union an untrustworthy adversary that would use its own nuclear superiority—or any other military advantage—against vital U.S. interests.

At no time since World War II have Americans shown any confidence that the Soviet Union could be trusted to uphold the spirit and letter of a nuclear arms limitation agreement. Eighty percent of those polled by ABC News/*Washington Post* interviewers in April of this year maintained that "the Soviet Union would try to cheat on any nuclear freeze agreement and get an advantage over the U.S." This perception explains why 72 percent of the public in a CBS News/*New York Times* poll in May said they opposed a nuclear freeze if "the United States would have to freeze its weapons first," and 87 percent opposed it if the Soviets could cheat without being detected—even though earlier in that survey 77 percent had said that, in principle, they *favored* a freeze. There is overwhelming doubt about Soviet follow-through, except under carefully monitored conditions.

Beyond this, the public continues to believe that a strong nuclear arsenal is needed to block Soviet aggression. Throughout the post–World War II period, Americans have opposed having the United States promise that it would use nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union used them first. In the event a nuclear war did result, Americans by large majorities have asserted consistently—as they did last March in a *Los Angeles Times* poll—that they would be "willing to risk the destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Russians."

The temptation is strong to reduce American opinion on the nuclear issue to simple propositions—such as "'x' percentage favor an immediate nuclear freeze." It should be resisted, for the public's message is a more complex one, as it has been throughout the thirty-seven years since nuclear weapons were first introduced. People don't like the bomb, but they consider it a necessary part of the nation's military deterrence. They want to restrict its development and deployment, and to minimize the chance of its use, but they don't want to do so at the cost of a Soviet military advantage or in a manner that requires the United States to take the Soviets at their word. ☑



by John R. Silber

Apocalypses Then and Now: The Peace Movement and the Antinuclear Crusade

An apocalypse can be a pessimistic document, as exemplified in much of recent environmentalist catastrophe-writing, and it can be fuzzily optimistic, as exemplified by Charles A. Reich's *The Greening of America.* The original Apocalypse, although full of great terrors, was essentially a highly optimistic document, written to comfort the persecuted Church, assuring them that Christ would return and that Caesar would finally have rendered unto him all that was his—that is, his just deserts. But most apocalypses are pessimistic, because modern apocalyptic writers claim to be beyond partisanship—they purport to tell us how bad things are, or are about to be, for everyone so as to persuade us to adopt their particular remedy. The remedy would usually be only marginally more attractive than that which they warn against, and literally intolerable if we were assumed to be well off or at least moderately safe.

From 1960 to 1975, the air was blue with apocalypses. In 1962 Bertrand Russell—having recanted his earlier advocacy of a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union—stood in Trafalgar Square and told us that nuclear war was inevitable within a few months. A few years later the Brothers Paddock taught that a large proportion of the earth would be dead by famine by 1975. At the start of the new decade, there was a burst of activity: Paul Ehrlich and his fellow population controllers claimed that the United States had an urgent need not merely to stabilize, but to reduce its population. Judson Jerome made and communicated the discovery that colleges and universities were dead, never to rise again. Alvin Toffler told us that the future was upon us and that if we tarried with the present, the future would destroy us. Charles A. Reich preached that humanity had become a new species. Not to be outdone, William Irwin Thompson, in 1971, claimed that we had come to the end of history.

In 1970, *Life* magazine reported to its mass audience that there was a probability that by 1980 urban dwellers would have to wear gas masks in order to survive pollution, that by the early 1980s, a smog inversion would kill thousands of people in some major city, that by 1985 the amount of sunlight reaching the earth would be reduced by half, and that new diseases humans couldn't resist would reach plague proportions. And Edwin Newman, in a 1970 NBC broadcast, predicted that by 1980 the nation's rivers would have reached the boiling point, largely because of nuclear power.

If one were to believe many political orators and writers, the United States trembled on the brink of violent revolution. This idea left its traditional home, the weekly papers of various Marxist sects, and animated the bosoms of people who ought to have known better. In this case, "ought to have known better" is more than a cliché: the plea of ignorance by the learned is never an acceptable reply. And as Granville Hicks has justly observed, ". . . It is no defense whatever for an intellectual to say that he was duped. That is what, as an intellectual, he should never allow to happen to him."

There is some evidence that humanity is simply more attracted—naturally attracted—to doom than to its alternatives. John Milton seems to have known this, and all newspaper editors do. Every so often some naive entrepreneur proposes to publish a newspaper that will print only the good news. And every so often such a naive entrepreneur gets nowhere, human nature being what it is.

The Intellectual Attraction for Apocalypse

Although the taste for apocalypse is not exclusively an

intellectual one, it is largely so. As the English are said to love a lord, we intellectuals love an apocalypse. The reasons are not obscure: we intellectuals are trained to have large, interesting, and complicated thoughts. We are trained to be imaginative. There is little interest in the notion that the future will resemble the past and that life as we know it, far from being doomed, is likely to go on more or less indefinitely, evolving slowly and recognizably. And if one has been trained to study the past and to take the notion of historical period quite seriously, it is not pleasant to suggest that one is living in an age that will not attract the interest of the more sensationalizing historians. How terrible to think that our age might not have attracted the prurient attention of a Suetonius or Tacitus!

And the egotism of the intellectual—that segment of mankind for whom the sin of pride would have to have been invented if it did not already exist—naturally demands that each period be either the best or the worst. Since few ages can credibly be called golden, we intellectuals tend to regard our own as at best of iron if not of merely plastic.

Apocalypticism: A Sunset Industry

If we look around us today, we will see that the level of apocalypticism is markedly down and the number of practicing apocalypticians reduced. The principal home of apocalypticism is the newly resurgent "peace" movement. The movement against nuclear power is another, although it appears to be on the wane. Many of its members may be following the example of Dr. Helen Caldicott who, after several years of opposition to nuclear power punctuated with asides about nuclear war, seems now to have dropped nuclear power entirely in her speeches and concentrates exclusively on nuclear war.

But apocalypticism is a sunset industry. This should not be surprising. The examples cited above do not merely pass the test of nonsense so bad that the man in the street would reject them out of hand; they pass George Orwell's more demanding standard of nonsense, nonsense so bad that only an intellectual would believe it. (You will note that Orwell, pessimist that he was, did not talk about "nonsense so bad that even an intellectual would reject it.")

Eventually nearly all apocalypticians are laughed out of existence. Few survive for long. Most are discredited by their survival beyond the date of their predicted demise, and their numbers and diversity prevent any one school from developing a critical mass. Because their apocalypses are usually in flagrant conflict, they obviously cannot all be true, and if they are not all true perhaps none is. St. John himself has preserved his credibility by sedulously leaving unspecified the date by which the Beast and the Four Horsemen will make their appearance. Generations of his commentators have tried to nail down the time, and have themselves become discredited, but his record is unblemished. Indeed, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, those who tried to unravel the mystery of the time at which the Beast and the Four Horsemen would appear, became something of an international fad. The Beast may make his appearance at any moment, but as yet, the time is not known. Is the decline of apocalypticism a good thing?

The answer to that question depends on what one believes about our present situation. One presumes that the original apocalyptician, St. John of Patmos, would applaud the demise of incompetent secular imitators such as Charles Reich; but presumably he would be as convinced as ever of the world's need to harken to his own apocalypse. He would probably regard his emulators as proclaimers of false apocalypses, and himself as the proclaimer of a true one.

This is a useful distinction: the boy who cried "Wolf!" dispensed a series of false apocalypses followed by a true one. His repeated exposure as a false apocalyptician prevented his being believed when he became a true one, with results that can hardly have been pleasant for him and perhaps for others.

The most striking false apocalyptician of our day was of course Adolf Hitler: his grandiose vision of a Thousand Year Reich was literally chiliastic, and it was founded on a series of revelatory pronouncements that were unfailingly false. Thus, it was the generals, not the politicians, who crumpled in 1918; compared to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that the Germans had imposed on Russia, the Treaty of Versailles was a lenient document; the Weimar Republic was an advanced welfare state whose troubles grew heavily out of the Nazis' own irresponsible opposition; and finally Hitler's vision of the Jews was built of falsehood from start to finish. Yet he was believed, first by the fanatics of the party and eventually by many Germans.

And yet imagine that in late January 1933, someone had told the power brokers who were about to put Hitler in power, "This man will destroy the Republic, launch a war in which Germany will be crushed and its cities bombed into rubble, undo the work of Bismarck by causing Germany to be divided once again and accomplish the near extermination of European Jewry." Such a true prophet would have been dismissed as an insane dispenser of apocalyptic nonsense. Moreover, when, in 1942 and 1943, people began to report on what was going on in the death camps, they were dismissed as alarmists and liars.

The case of Hitler is one in which a false apocalypse was believed, inexorably causing a true apocalypse. This is often the relation between false and true apocalypses: they exist in a kind of dialectic, and happy endings depend on a timely belief in the true apocalypse, which serves as a prophylaxis against the false one. If the true apocalypse is not believed, the false apocalypse becomes the harbinger of a dreadful truth that is different from what it preached, but one no less harrowing.

Today's Apocalypses: Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Freeze

Two pairs of apocalypses are increasingly common today. The first relates to energy. The false apocalypse has at its heart the claim that nuclear energy, besides being unnecessary, is an intolerable threat to our health and safety. The related true apocalypse has at its heart the statement that we may so mismanage our energy resources that we will seriously degrade our environment and leave our descendants without the feedstocks for their essential chemical industries.

The false apocalypse is widely listened to, and its success makes the fulfillment of the true apocalypse increasingly likely. I need hardly set forth the false apocalypse for your attention. Regrettably, it is what almost every proper intellectual believes about nuclear power. Nuclear power is, among intellectuals, an automatic object of hate which everyone "knows," without evidence or argument, to be bad.

If we strip away the cloak of ignorance, we reveal the true apocalypse: the alternatives to nuclear power are themselves dangerous, and nuclear power is much safer than its opponents make it out to be.

Energy from the atom is energy produced from fuels that are otherwise almost useless. Uranium and thorium are essentially trash, and nuclear electricity, if not something from nothing, is a close approximation. If we are to consider our descendants, we will not needlessly burn up coal, oil, and natural gas from which they must make essential petrochemicals ranging from cloth to fertilizer. Utilized in breeder reactors, the waste U-238 already produced from our present reactor program would give us literally centuries of electricity without requiring us to mine another ounce of uranium. And the earth's yet unmined supplies of uranium and thorium have an energy supply that is all but infinite.

The energy locked in the atom is so concentrated, moreover, that the occupational hazards of nuclear energy are very much less than those of its competitors. To generate a given amount of electricity from coal requires the death of approximately 100 times as many miners as would the same amount from uranium. And the evil effects of coal are not limited to the deaths of coal miners or to the thousands of cases of black lung disease. We now kill approximately 50,000 people each year from air pollution caused by the industrial use of coal—one million deaths by the end of this century, a disaster of a magnitude that is exceeded historically only by the Black Death and the automobile. We would expect, by contrast, at most, a handful of deaths from nuclear electricity generated in the same amount over the same span.

Coal-fired generators also pose serious environmental threats. One of these, the so-called acid rain, damages trees and pollutes lakes and has the unfortunate habit of dissolving buildings. There is, in Scandinavia, a pungent irony in this connection. Visit Copenhagen and you will hear the Danish antinuclear activ-



"Wouldn't you know it! Now the Hendersons have the bomb."

ists complain that the Swedes have irresponsibly sited a nuclear reactor at Barsebäck just across the Sound from Copenhagen, thereby threatening the Danish capital but leaving Stockholm safe. Cross the Sound to Malmö, and the Swedes will point out that since the Arab oil embargo, the Danes have been converting their oil-fired plants to coal, and that the coast of Denmark is lined with large coal-fired plants. The prevailing westerly winds drive the pollution from these plants away from Denmark and straight into Sweden, which, without any coal-fired plants of its own, now has a very serious acid rain problem. The false apocalypse of Danish antinuclearism brought the genuine apocalypse of acid rain upon Sweden.

Acid rain is an actual problem. The other environmental threat of coal—and of all other fossil fuels—the so-called greenhouse effect, is a prospective one. Although the matter is still controversial, there is a substantial body of expert opinion that the large amounts of carbon dioxide that are undoubtedly emitted by fossil fuel plants will eventually form an insulating layer in the atmosphere that will raise the earth's temperature by several degrees. Such an increase would at minimum disrupt world patterns of food production, and might begin melting the polar icecaps with a disastrous raising of the ocean level. Although this scenario is disputed, it has substantially more respectable and persuasive scientific support than the disaster scenarios written for nuclear power.

Nuclear reactors have an operating industrial safety record that cannot be matched by any other means

of energy conversion, and by very few industrial activities of any sort. The true lesson of Three Mile Island, almost entirely missed by the media, is that it is easier than anyone had thought to limit the damage in a nuclear accident to the reactor itself.

Where nuclear power really shines over the competition is in waste disposal. A large part of the millions of tons of waste products produced annually by coal-fired power plants is buried in unmonitored landfills, where ground water can leach out a hellish inventory of carcinogens and mutagens. The rest is dispersed into the air, ultimately to rest in our lungs. The one-year wastes of a nuclear power plant, by contrast, can be reduced to a size that would fit under a dining room table, converted into glass and buried in a geologically stable formation. There, within a few centuries, they will decay to the point that they are less radioactive than the uranium ore from which they sprang. Although we often hear it said that "we do not know how to dispose of nuclear wastes," the vitrification process I have been describing is already in commercial operation in France. To adopt it in the United States requires merely the political decision to do so. Although we are often assured that we could not handle the nuclear waste problem, I am inclined to agree with Immanuel Kant that what is actual is possible.

The advantages of nuclear energy are very great, and only the false apocalypse of the antinuclear movement can prevent us from developing it. We hear it alleged, for example, that the fuel from nuclear power plants can be made into bombs. Although it is technically possible to make an explosive device from reactor fuel, it is very badly adapted for the purpose. One is better advised to use a reactor designed for the purpose of making nuclear fuel. That is what India did. The Iraqi reactor destroyed by Israel was widely misreported to have been a power plant, but it was in fact a research reactor whose fuel could have been directly usable in bombs. The difficulty of making bombs from power plant reactors is suggested by the fact that the Soviet Union supplies such reactors and fuel to its satellites.

Nuclear proliferation is a serious issue on its own merits, but it cannot be solved by shutting down nuclear power, any more than bingo can be prevented by shutting down cruise ships.

Under the baleful influence of the antinuclear apocalypse, we continue to threaten our economy and our political independence by buying OPEC oil, to threaten the health of our people by mining and burning coal, and to threaten the industrial and environmental welfare of our descendants by risking catastrophic effects on the weather and by exhausting our chemical feedstocks. It would take substantial time to fully exploit the potential of electricity generated from uranium. The time to begin is now—in fact, it was a decade ago. France and Japan are already embarked on a vigorous program of nuclear development. The French program started under Giscard d'Estaing was so ambitious that even after the cutbacks being considered under Mitterrand, an imposing program remains. Although the Soviet Union has a highly advanced nuclear program, the European Communist parties, including those most subservient to Moscow, oppose nuclear power outside the Soviet Union, testifying to the strategic value of nuclear power and the importance of denying it to the free world. The rest of the industrialized world is developing the breeder reactor while the United States dawdles. There is no reason for us to be backward in this matter. It is largely in the United States—and, derivatively, in West Germany—that the development of nuclear energy is stymied by its apocalyptic opponents. They may not know it, but the false apocalyptic opponents of nuclear power are working to bring on a genuine apocalypse of famine, sickness, and death. That is, they are riding with three of the horsemen of the apocalypse.

The Peace Movement

The other apocalyptic movement I want to talk about rides with the fourth rider. This is ironically named the "peace" movement, sometimes also confusingly called the antinuclear movement. The personnel of the two movements may be largely the same, but the apocalypses are distinctive. In opposing nuclear energy, the activists seriously distort facts about the way in which we gain peaceful energy from the atom. But the members of the "peace" movement, on the whole, describe nuclear warfare accurately. For there can be little doubt as to the hellish nature of strategic nuclear warfare, and it is bizarre for the members of the movement to imagine that they are opposed to it whereas others are in favor of it.

The fact is that everyone is opposed to nuclear warfare, and the disagreement which has recently arisen after a period of dormancy is a disagreement about the best way to prevent such a war.

In Western Europe and the United States, apocalyptic opponents of nuclear warfare propose to prevent it by unilateral disarmament, on the assumption that the Soviet Union, once the democracies had disarmed themselves, would follow suit. In the recent context of proxy intervention by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and its threatened intervention in Poland, fewer people urge the total and immediate unilateral disarming of the West. The suggestion is common, nevertheless, that we should make some major unilateral gesture to set the Soviets a good example. There is no evidence whatever that the Soviets would emulate such an action, and much evidence that they would not. Their rejection of President Reagan's offer to effect a removal of nuclear missiles from Europe was almost instantaneous.

The preferred mode of the "peace" movement is to spell out in detail what everyone already knows: that a nuclear attack on a city is a terrible, diabolical

thing. The United States nuclear policy is founded on a clear appreciation of this fact and a determination to deter the use of nuclear weapons. Since there is abundant evidence that the Soviets' strategic thinking holds that there are situations in which nuclear war is winnable and preferable to the alternative, it is necessary to keep the level of deterrence extremely high.

The present-day apocalyptic opponents of nuclear war had spiritual colleagues in the 1930s. When the Oxford Union voted that "This House will not fight for King and Country," it raised the apocalyptic vision of an intolerable war. In doing so, these Oxford apocalypticians helped not only to rob Europe of its will and its means to resist Hitler, but also to encourage Hitler himself in the belief that he would conquer Europe without substantial opposition. Had Britain and France responded to the plain fact of German rearmament by rearming themselves and opposing Hitler's early moves, there would have been no Second World War. Had the French met the German reoccupation of the Rhineland with military force, the German army would have been forced into a precipitate withdrawal, and the resulting humiliation would probably have led to Hitler's downfall. As it was, the allies allowed him one bloodless conquest after another until no German general could gainsay him.

If we apply to the prewar period the theory expressed by today's so-called "peace" movement we would be forced to conclude that the greatest threat to peace between 1935 and 1939 was not Adolf Hitler but Winston Churchill. The falsity of this idea should now be apparent to all, as should be the falsity of its modern descendant, that the United States is the principal threat to peace today. If the United States were a threat to peace, the hegemony of the Soviet Union would not have survived that period between 1945 and 1960 when the United States possessed a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons and sufficient power to bring the Kremlin to heel at any time it so desired.

The prehistory of the Second World War is extremely instructive about the objective consequences of peace movements: the horrors of the First World War were followed by a vigorous and superficially successful peace movement. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922—that President Harding thought would assure his place in history—put an end to what everyone agreed was a dangerous naval arms race. The advocates of "peace" so prevailed in the democracies that at every turn, Hitler's demands were satisfied without firing a shot. And just twenty-one years after the guns fell silent, Europe was at war again.

Since the end of the Second World War, we have been in a more or less unrelieved arms race. But the world as a whole, thirty-seven years after the guns fell silent, is still at peace. For the first time since the middle of the nineteenth century, the prospect of a general European war seems extremely remote. The reason, as Quincy Wright has persuasively demonstrated in *The Study of War*, is that the balance of power works.

But war in Europe is not unthinkable. Part of the reason for doubting that the Soviet Union is a peace loving state is its massive tank buildup. It is also building up all its forces, but the tank buildup is especially telling. This is because there are few views more widely concurred in by military experts of all countries than the judgment that the tank has no defensive value: it is the weapon of attack, pure and simple. This Soviet force must be developed as part of a plan to invade Western Europe. We cannot know whether the Soviets will carry such a plan into effect, but we can hardly doubt that they contemplate the possibility.

The Western allies could hardly counter this force with conventional weapons short of going through a permanent war alert—and through an industrial mobilization appropriate to it, that is, by converting themselves into garrison states. Anyone who opposes the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent against a Soviet invasion of that part of Europe not now under their control must have decided that a Soviet future for Europe, and ultimately for the United States, is tolerable.

Such a person has perhaps succumbed to the slogan "Better Red than Dead." Better Red than Dead? Of course—who could doubt it? But in the world of slogans we are beginning to hear, "Better Neither than Either." The logical conclusion of the "Better Red than Dead" school of thought would be to try to negotiate generous terms of surrender to the Soviets while they are still unable to dictate their own, and hope that they would honorably carry out their commitments once we disarmed. I would disagree with people who had come to a clear understanding of such a position, but at least people who advocate this would know what they are doing. But the "peace" movement contains many people who have not come to understand the final logic of their positions at all. Nor do I believe that the majority of Americans hold such views.

Maintaining peace is a substantially harder task than going out into the streets and waving placards. It is a difficult and demanding job to calculate the balance of forces and maintain them. The danger of the apocalyptic "peace" movement is that its success would lead either to war or to surrender. This would be a choice between two intolerables. The people of the United States, I believe, will accept neither. The great problem facing us is how to find a constructive alternative that avoids both war and surrender.

The apocalypse then—to use a metaphor that would have probably delighted St. John—is a two-edged sword. When false and given credence, it almost invariably leads to the sort of events that are customarily called "apocalyptic." When true, it gives us a chance to avoid them. Our urgent need is to develop a better ability to know the difference between the two. And on this subject, so far, we intellectuals have not made a major contribution.

This article was excerpted from Bostonia *magazine*




by Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter

The Nuclear Energy Debate: Scientists, The Media and the Public

Public support for nuclear energy has declined sharply in the last several years. In 1956 only 20 percent of those queried by the Gallup Organization were opposed to having nuclear plants located in their communities. By 1977, in a Roper Organization question, that figure had risen to 33 percent and by 1979 to 56 percent. In 1977, 69 percent of Americans polled by CBS/*New York Times* were still in favor of building more nuclear plants. By 1979, the figure had fallen to 46 percent. In fact, by 1980 nuclear energy was the least favored energy source listed. Some 66 percent surveyed by Gallup rated solar energy among the top three energy sources they preferred; 36 percent chose coal; and only 27 percent chose nuclear energy. The accident at Three Mile Island contributed to the decline, but it began earlier. Rising fears about the safety of nuclear energy, and a growing belief that our energy needs could be met by safer energy sources, contributed to the public's heightened concern.[1]

Part of the public's growing unease about nuclear energy is probably a function of the divisions it perceives among scientists. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), a group whose views have been widely reported on television and in the press, argues that the development of nuclear energy can lead to catastrophe. UCS has urged that greater attention be paid to conservation and renewable solar energy sources.[2] Physicist Amory Lovins, biologist Barry Commoner, and other science activists have written popular books on the importance of "soft energy" (solar) paths. Ralph Nader secured the support of five Nobel laureates for a public statement opposing further development of nuclear energy. In response, Nobel laureate Hans Bethe found thirty-two prestigious scientists, including eleven other Nobel winners, who signed a petition *favoring* the development of nuclear energy.[3]

Many social scientists who write about nuclear energy also perceive the scientific community as sharply divided over energy issues, and assume that a significant proportion of scientists believe in the feasibility of "soft energy" alternatives.[4] A 1982 Roper poll which we commissioned found that almost one in four Americans believe that a majority of scientists "who are energy experts" oppose the further development of nuclear energy. One in three believe that solar energy can make a large contribution to meeting our energy needs in the next twenty years.[5]

Until now we have known little about the views of the entire scientific community. We conducted the study reported in this article to supply the missing evidence.

Between March and October 1980, slightly more than a year after the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, we circulated a detailed questionnaire on energy issues to a stratified random sample of scientists listed in *American Men and Women of Science (AMWS)*. This represents a purely random sample of 1,000 supplemented by a stratified random sample of scientists whose disciplinary training should provide them some expertise on energy issues. Our response rate was 74 percent.

We examined separately the views of (1) those sampled at random from the entire scientific community

This essay is part of a larger study of social and political leadership and change in America, directed by Rothman and Lichter under the auspicies of Smith College, the Research Institute on International Change of Columbia University, and George Washington University. The authors wish to thank Robert Cohen for his assistance with this study.

listed in *AMWS;* (2) those scientists in energy-related disciplines, and (3) those in fields closely related to nuclear energy. We included 71 fields listed in *AMWS* as "energy-related disciplines." We defined the concept broadly enough to include such disparate specialties as atmospheric chemistry, solar energy, conservation, and ecology. Within that broader category, "nuclear energy experts" included experts in fields such as radiological health and radiation genetics, in addition to nuclear engineers and reactor physicists.[6] Our questionnaire contained seventy-eight energy-related questions, and additional background questions. Only a few of the key findings are presented here.

Scientists' Views

The questionnaire covered a wide variety of energy-related issues, but one question dealt directly with policy options. Scientists were asked to choose among four alternatives, ranging from rapid development of nuclear energy to the dismantling of existing nuclear plants. As table 1 indicates, 53 percent of all scientists would move ahead rapidly to develop nuclear energy; another 36 percent prefer to move ahead slowly and cautiously; 7 percent would halt nuclear energy development, but retain existing plants, and only 3 percent wish to dismantle existing facilities. Support is even higher among scientists in energy-related disciplines, especially those in nuclear energy-related fields (see table 1).

Table 1
VIEWS OF SCIENTISTS ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY

	Random sample (N=741)	Energy experts (N=279)	Nuclear experts (N=72)
Proceed rapidly	53%	70%	92%
Proceed slowly	36	25	8
Halt development	7	4	0
Dismantle plants	3	1	0

Note: In some cases, percentages in the tables in this article add to slightly more or less than 100% due to rounding.

This high level of support for nuclear energy development was reinforced by responses to several related questions, listed in table 2. For example, two out of three scientists consider the risks associated with nuclear energy to be acceptable, as do three out of four energy experts, and 99 percent of nuclear energy experts. Scientists have enough confidence in the safety of nuclear energy to be willing to locate nuclear plants in the cities where they live. Of those with opinions, almost seven in ten are willing to have plants in their own "backyards" as are eight in ten energy experts and 97 percent of those in nuclear-related fields.[7] When asked to rate the safety of nuclear plants on a one-to-seven scale (where one equals "very unsafe" and seven equals "very safe"), 76 percent of energy experts, and 99 percent of nuclear energy experts chose a rating of five or higher. Finally, most scientists believe that we already possess the knowledge to solve problems associated with nuclear energy.

Why do most scientists support nuclear energy development? Contrary to recent assertions that the energy crisis is over, almost three out of four scientists



He's GROWN A FOOT SINCE I SAW HIM LAST....

Table 2
SCIENTISTS' ATTITUDES ON NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES

	Random sample (N=741)	Energy experts (N=279)	Nuclear experts (N=72)
Risks acceptable	66%	75%	99%
Willing to locate nuclear plants in their cities	69	80	98
Enough knowledge to solve nuclear problems	75	91	100

Table 3
SERIOUSNESS OF ENERGY CRISIS

	Random sample (N=741)	Energy experts (N=279)	Nuclear experts (N=72)
Extremely serious	33%	39%	42%
Very serious	39	40	39
Fairly serious	22	15	14
Somewhat serious	5	5	4
Not at all serious	1	1	1

—and an even higher proportion of energy experts—regard the energy crisis as "very" or "extremely" serious (see table 3).

Moreover, scientific energy experts are far less sanguine than the general public about the short-term contribution of soft energy alternatives. No more than 2 percent of the energy experts look to either biomass or any form of solar energy for a large contribution to meeting our energy needs in the next twenty years. By contrast, 45 percent believe that nuclear fission can make a large contribution (see table 4). Eight of ten experts see fission as providing at least a moderate contribution, while no more than one in three foresee more than a small contribution from the other alternatives listed. Of the sixteen options listed in the questionnaire, energy experts rated the potential of nuclear fission ahead of all energy sources other than coal and oil.

Table 4
CONTRIBUTION OF ENERGY SOURCES TOWARD MEETING OUR ENERGY NEEDS IN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (N=279)

Energy experts	None	Small	Moderate	Large
Biomass	10%	66%	12%	1%
Passive solar	6	68	20	2
Solar heat	4	62	31	2
Solar electricity	33	54	8	0
Nuclear fission	3	15	35	45
Coal	0	1	20	80
Oil	1	9	29	61

Note: "Unsure" not shown.

These data suggest that many scientists support nuclear energy development because they believe that the energy crisis is real and that fission can be among the most important (and relatively safe) sources of energy in the near future. Ralph Nader and other critics of nuclear energy suggest a quite different explanation. They charge that many scientists support the nuclear option primarily because of economic self-interest. As direct or indirect beneficiaries of the nuclear industry, their incomes allegedly depend upon the continued expansion of nuclear energy.[8]

To test the Nader explanation, we created a scale measuring support for nuclear energy from the questions dealing with policy preferences, risk levels, safety, plant locations, and confidence that problems can be solved. We then compared these "nuclear support scale" scores of energy experts who were employed by industry, government, and universities. The attitudes of these groups did not differ significantly. Scientists employed by private industry were slightly more likely to support nuclear energy than were other scientists, but the difference was small enough to be a product of sampling error. We then compared the attitudes of academic scientists who had received financial support from industry or government (consulting contracts, grants, and so on) with those who had received no financial support. By this measure as well, scientists with a possible financial interest were not significantly more pronuclear than those with no such interest.

Enter the Media

If the scientific community is so supportive of nuclear energy, why are public perceptions of its views different? Part of the answer may lie in the channels of communication between scientists and the public. The scientific community does not address the public; particular scientists and groups of scientists do. Further, their messages are transmitted to the public by the print and broadcast media. Two additional factors—scientists' willingness to seek out nontechnical audiences, and the media's receptivity to their messages—also play important roles in determining public perceptions. It is the interaction of these two factors that helps account for public perceptions of scientific opinion on nuclear energy.

First, we hypothesized that antinuclear scientists would be more willing than others to go public with their views. To test this hypothesis, we divided subjects

Table 5
SCIENTISTS SHOULD RESTRICT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON SCIENCE POLICY MATTERS TO AREAS OF EXPERTISE

	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
All scientists N=936	23%	22%	30%	25%
Very pronuclear N=200	21	21	29	30
Very antinuclear N=22	75	13	6	6

according to their scores on the "nuclear support" scale described above. The scale ranges from −15 to +15. We defined our two groups as those scoring from +12 to +15 and −12 to −15. We then compared the views of the most pro- and antinuclear groups on two issues concerning scientists' involvement with the public. The results are shown in tables 5 and 6.[9]

Table 6
RESEARCH FINDINGS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS *BEFORE* THEY ARE REPORTED IN THE POPULAR PRESS

	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
All scientists N=936	8%	12%	33%	48%
Very pronuclear N=200	6	13	33	48
Very antinuclear N=22	31	13	38	19

We asked first whether scientists should restrict their public statements on science policy questions to the specific areas of their training and research. A majority of the pronuclear group agree that they should, as do a majority of all scientists. In sharp contrast, only 12 percent of the antinuclear group agree, and three out of four strongly disagree. We then asked whether research findings should be accepted by professional journals (and hence be reviewed by other scientists) before they are released to the general public. We found the same pattern. Most scientists strongly support this restriction, and the most pronuclear among them are no exception. About four out of five uphold the principle of peer review, and almost half agree strongly. By contrast, only 57 percent of antinuclear scientists agree, and almost one in three strongly rejects prior peer review.

These differing attitudes may explain the quite different publication patterns of pro- and antinuclear scientists. Those most supportive of nuclear energy publish much more in professional journals than do antinuclear scientists. On the other hand, the antinuclear group publishes more on science policy issues in journals read by the general public (see tables 7 and 8).

Table 7
NUMBER OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN ACADEMIC OR PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

	None	One to ten	Eleven or more
All scientists N=936	10%	28%	61%
Very pronuclear N=200	11	30	59
Very antinuclear N=22	18	41	41

Table 8
NUMBER OF SCIENCE POLICY ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN NONPROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

	None	One or more
All scientists N=936	89%	10%
Very pronuclear N=200	87	13
Very antinuclear N=22	64	37

To explore these patterns further, we asked scientists whether they had published articles on key nuclear energy issues in either professional or popular journals. We found that scientists who write only for the general public are far more skeptical of nuclear energy than those who write only for their peers, or for both technical and popular audiences.

The publicly oriented group is relatively small. One hundred twenty scientists in our sample have published professionally on nuclear energy. Of these, only ten have written solely for popular journals. Extrapolating from our sample, however, this suggests that between 1,000 and 2,000 scientists listed in *AMWS* are writing articles on nuclear energy for the general public, without having ever submitted their ideas to review by professional peers. Further, peer-oriented and public-oriented scientists differ markedly in their attitudes toward nuclear energy.

Only one out of ten scientists who have published professionally on nuclear energy think that the possibility of an accidental release of radioactivity from reactors is a very serious problem. On the other hand, four of the ten who have published only in popular journals hold this view. Only 15 percent of those who have published professionally believe that there are serious problems with the safety systems of nuclear plants, compared with seven of the ten who write only for the general public. Finally, more than nine out of ten of those who have published professionally are reasonably or very sure that we now possess the knowledge to solve the problems of nuclear energy, as against six of the ten who have written about nuclear energy only in nonprofessional journals. All these differences are statistically significant.

The Inner Club

The relative skepticism of scientists who write only in popular journals may help explain why the public has a distorted view of the attitudes of the scientific community. Yet, it cannot be the whole answer. After all, pronuclear scientists have published many more articles on science policy issues in popular journals than have antinuclear scientists. Further, eighteen scientists in our sample who have published professionally on nuclear energy have also written for the general public on this topic. These scientists were just as optimistic about nuclear energy as their colleagues who had published only in professional journals. We hypothesized

that journalists might pay more attention to the writings and public statements of antinuclear scientists. We attempted to test this hypothesis in a number of ways.

We administered a questionnaire on energy-related issues to the inner club of science writers who work for the major media outlets.[10] This relatively small group of individuals plays a leading role in communicating information about science to the general public. The questionnaire included the same items on nuclear policy, safety, and plant location that we asked the scientists. From these items we constructed a shorter version of the nuclear support scale. Possible scores ranged from −9 to +9, with a higher score indicating greater support for nuclear energy.

We discovered that key science journalists are far more skeptical of nuclear energy than are scientists. As table 9 shows, science journalists score well below both energy experts and scientists in general. This is especially true of science journalists at major national media outlets, including the television networks, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*.

Further, science journalists' attitudes toward nuclear energy are partly a function of political ideology. Among the "inner club," opposition to nuclear energy correlates at .35 with political liberalism, measured by self-descriptions on a scale ranging from "very conservative" to "very liberal." (Possible correlations range between 0, indicating no relationship, to ± 1, a perfect relationship.)

Table 9
SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY AMONG SCIENTISTS AND LEADING JOURNALISTS

	Score on nuclear support scale
Nuclear experts N=72	7.86
Energy experts N=279	5.10
All scientists N=741	3.34
Science journalists N=42	1.30
Prestige press journalists N=150	1.16
Science journalists at *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, TV networks N=15	.47
TV reporters and producers N=18	−1.89
Public television journalists N=24	−3.25

Of course, much reporting on science issues is done by journalists who are not classified as science reporters. In the October/November 1981 issue of *Public Opinion*, we published preliminary results from a comprehensive study of the attitudes of leading journalists in the prestige press—the "media elite."[11] These findings were based on interviews with a random sample which included reporters, editors, producers, and news executives from major national media outlets.

We asked them the same three questions about nuclear energy that we asked of science journalists. Their scores on this version of the nuclear support scale are far below those of scientists and slightly below those of leading science journalists.

Leading journalists' attitudes toward nuclear energy also are correlated with their political ideologies. The more liberal the journalist, the more likely he is to oppose nuclear energy. In the case of these journalists, we can define this issue more precisely. We asked them a large number of social and political questions. The best predictor of opposition to nuclear energy is the belief that American society is unjust.

Given the tremendous impact of television on public opinion, it is interesting to note that television reporters and producers—and public television personnel in general—are even more skeptical of nuclear energy than are other journalists. Our study and others have shown that such people now (as compared with twenty years ago) exercise a good deal of influence over the content of news programs.[12]

Of course most journalists would argue that, whatever their personal attitudes, their coverage of nuclear energy is as objective as they can make it. However, it is not only a question of conscious or unconscious bias. Everyone necessarily develops some world view or paradigm which tells him which facts are relevant and what sources can be trusted in understanding complex public issues. Reporters are no exception.[13]

The Contours of Coverage

We are currently engaged in a large-scale content analysis of the national media's treatment of nuclear energy, to determine more precisely the contours of their coverage of energy issues. In the interim, some evidence on this question already exists. At least two systematic studies have dealt with national media coverage of nuclear energy. One was conducted under the auspices of the Battelle Center, the other by the Media Institute.[14] Both studies simply count pro- and antinuclear statements in newspapers or on television, a procedure which does not yield the information necessary for a fully adequate evaluation. Nevertheless, the evidence they present appears quite accurate.

The Battelle study details increasingly negative treatment of nuclear energy from 1972 through 1976 in four national periodicals including the *New York Times*. In 1972, slightly more pronuclear than antinuclear articles appeared; by 1976, negative articles outnumbered positive ones by a two-to-one margin.

The Media Institute study documents the negative treatment of nuclear energy on evening network news broadcasts during the 1970s. The clearest evidence concerns the networks' use of "outside sources." By far the most widely quoted source on nuclear energy in the

period between 1968 and 1979 was the Union of Concerned Scientists.[15] Ralph Nader was the most widely quoted "nuclear expert" on television news during this period, although the views of scientists with negative attitudes toward nuclear energy were also widely publicized. For example, Dr. Ernest Sternglass, a well-known radiologist and critic of nuclear energy, was the only outside individual scientific "expert" quoted on television during the month following the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island. Neither in the eleven-year period before Three Mile Island, nor during the month after, were any pronuclear "outside experts" among the ten top quoted sources. The only pronuclear sources in the top ten were spokesmen for utility companies and the nuclear industry.

The air time given the Union of Concerned Scientists is particularly interesting in light of our findings. Our random sample of 741 scientists contained only one who listed any affiliation with UCS. On that basis, we estimate that fewer than 200 scientists among the 130,000 listed in *American Men and Women of Science* were affiliated with UCS when we conducted our study. The Union of Concerned Scientists would not provide the information we needed to poll its membership, so we have no data on the training or background of its members.

Missing Links

In summary, the scientific community is highly supportive of nuclear energy development, regards nuclear energy as relatively safe, and is not persuaded of the short-term viability of various forms of solar energy. Moreover, support is strongest among those scientists best qualified to deal with the factual questions involved in energy issues. On the other hand, journalists in the prestige press are far more skeptical of nuclear energy, and this attitude is correlated with a more general skepticism toward American social and political institutions. Their reporting of nuclear energy issues may have been influenced by the fact that antinuclear scientists publish more heavily in popular journals than do pronuclear scientists. Nonetheless, this is clearly not the only factor. A reasonably large number of scientists who do publish professionally on nuclear energy also publish popular articles.

Nor is mere ignorance the culprit, as frustrated scientists sometimes suggest.[16] Ignorance may explain the superficiality of coverage; it does not explain its direction. During the fluoridation controversy of the 1950s, when there were fewer well-trained science journalists than today, the prestige press generally supported fluoridation and discounted alarms raised by its few scientific opponents.[17] The same analysis can be applied to arguments that journalists are drawn to disasters because these appeal to mass audiences. Many disasters or near disasters received less attention during the 1970s than did accidents at nuclear facilities. Further, supporters of nuclear energy have their own catalogue of disasters which, they argue, include social tensions and conflicts resulting from lowered economic growth.[18]

On the basis of our work we cannot be sure to what extent journalists' reporting on nuclear energy has influenced public opinion. Nor can we be certain about the relationship of public attitudes to the decline of the nuclear industry.[19] And we cannot judge whether the shift away from nuclear energy development in recent years has been wise or foolish. Too many other social and political issues are involved in that question. Finally, the scientific community may be wrong about the problems involved. Scientists are not infallible, even on technical questions.

For all this, our ability to make informed judgments about highly technical issues necessarily depends in part on accurate knowledge of the views of relevant experts. The experts may be wrong, or their opinions may be outweighed by other factors, but their analyses provide an invaluable resource to policy makers and other citizens in an increasingly complex world. It is important that their views be communicated accurately to larger publics. In the case of nuclear energy, however, some crucial links in the chain of information leading from the scientific community to the public seem to be missing.

1. Roger Kasperson, Gerald Berk, Alan Sharaf, David Pijawka, and James Wood, "Public Opinion and Nuclear Energy: Retrospect and Prospect," *Science, Technology and Human Values*, Spring 1980, pp. 11-23.
2. In 1975 UCS sent a petition containing several thousand names to the president and Congress urging extreme caution in the development of nuclear energy. The petition received a great deal of publicity.
3. *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1975, pp. 4-5.
4. For examples see Lewis J. Perlman, "Speculations on the Transition to Sustainable Energy," and Robert E. Goodin, "No Moral Nukes," *Ethics*, April 1980, pp. 392-416 and 417-449.
5. The full results of this poll, the questionnaires, and tapes of other surveys mentioned in this article will be deposited with The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for examination by interested scholars once our study is completed.
6. A complete listing of the disciplines included is available on request. We expect to publish this listing in various technical articles.
7. We have eliminated "unsures" from the calculation. Fourteen percent of scientists gave this response as did 10% of energy experts and one percent of nuclear energy experts.
8. Ralph Nader and John Abbots, *The Menace of Atomic Energy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).
9. A document outlining the basis upon which this division was made is available upon request, and will be published in technical articles.
10. We based our sample largely upon the analysis of Sharon Dunwoody, "The Science Writing Inner Club: A Communication Link between Science and the Lay Public," *Science, Technology and Human Values*, Winter 1980, pp. 14-22.
11. S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman, "Media and Business Elites," pp. 42ff.
12. For a discussion see Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, "The Media and Business: A Question of Bias?" *The Public Interest* (forthcoming).
13. Ibid.
14. Stanley Nealy and William Rankin, "A Comparative Analysis of Print Media Coverage of Nuclear Power and Coal Issues" (Seattle, Washington: Battelle Human Affairs Research Center, n.d.); The Media Institute, *Television Evening News Covers Nuclear Energy* (Washington, D.C.: The Media Institute, 1979).
15. The Union is generally treated as relatively authoritative by the *New York Times* as well as by the nonscientific academic community. For example, see the *New York Times*, January 27, 1979; March 18, 1979; March 29, 1979; April 4, 1979; July 9, 1979; September 18, 1979; October 10, 1981; see also Robert E. Goodin, "No Moral Nukes."
16. For the view that journalists report nuclear energy issues badly, partly because of their ignorance of science, see John G. Kemeny, "Saving American Democracy: The Lessons of Three Mile Island," *Technology Review*, June/July 1980, pp. 65-75.
17. For a discussion of the controversy see Harvey M. Sapolsky, "The Fluoridation Controversy: An Alternative Explanation," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1969, pp. 240-248.
18. "The Real Energy Crisis," *The Economist*, December 29, 1979, p. 8.
19. For the fact of that decline and some of its consequences see the *New York Times*, April 11, 1982, p. E 5.

by Amitai Etzioni

Making Interest Groups Work for the Public

If there is one subject which divides political scientists and the public, it is interest groups. An overwhelming majority of the public is dismayed about the power of interest groups, and sees them as perverting public policy. Political scientists counter that interest groups are inevitable and, on balance, useful. Oddly, one might take the position that both sides are right. Political scientists may be correct in suggesting that interest groups were always with us, that they cannot be suppressed without doing away with our constitutional freedoms, and that they enhance representation in a pluralistic society and help conduct public business, much of which occurs between elections. The public may be right in sensing that interest groups have gotten out of hand. It is *not*, as we shall see, business as usual for special interests.

The Public versus Special Interests

Survey researchers regularly tap public feelings of alienation. Their polls include such "agree-disagree" items as "in this country the rich get richer and the poor get poorer," and "the people in Washington, D.C. are out of touch with the rest of the country." The tone of the statements is harshly "anti," yet a surprisingly large segment of American society agrees with them. Other data, such as people's responses to questions concerning trust in institutions and their leaders, reflect the same dissatisfaction.

Of the alienation measurements frequently tapped by survey researchers, none elicits more agreement than "special interests get more from government than the people do." Eighty-four percent in May 1980 agreed; 10 percent disagreed (ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates).

In this context, the public's well-known feelings about government bigness take a new twist. In recent years, a majority have come to see big government as the prime source of our difficulties. Typically asked, "Which of the following do you think will be the biggest threat to the country in the future?" 46 percent listed big government, 22 percent big labor, and 22 percent big business (Gallup, 1981). However, when people were asked, "Which of these reasons, if any, do you think is the main reason our system of government doesn't work better than it does?" one reason led all others by a hefty margin. Forty-two percent in an October 1978 Roper sounding agreed that "there is too much influence on government by special interest groups and lobbies." Next on the list was "too many people vote without thinking"; that drew 19 percent.

Asked about political action committees (PACs), the newest and most popular tool of interest groups, the public answered that they "are pouring too much money into the whole political process." (71 percent agreed, 19 percent disagreed, 10 percent were not sure in an ABC News/Harris survey, January 1980).

Political Science "Conventional Wisdom"

Political scientist Harmon Zeigler cites numerous critics of special interests, beginning with James Madison in *Federalist* 10. Since the founding of the republic, Zeigler claims, there has been an assumption that pressure groups are "evil because they conflict with the fundamental attributes of democracy." [1] Criticism of interest groups as a threat to democracy, Zeigler concludes, is "based upon a concept of democracy which is both inadequate and naive." [2]

An often-cited study of Washington lobbies by Lester Milbrath points out that:

> . . . the public and the press have a very lively distrust of lobbying. . . . Yet evidence gathered for this study suggests that the public is misinformed about lobbyists and lobbying. The press tends to focus on the sensational and to expose the unsavory aspects of lobbying. . . . [T]he evildoers constitute only a small percentage of the persons engaged in lobbying and . . . lobbyists often provide valuable services to the political system.[3]

Noted political scientists Arthur F. Bentley and David B. Truman have concluded that interest groups are

"benign," "beneficial," and "functional."

The Functions of Interest Groups

Political science has often identified the following as contributions of interest groups to pluralistic democratic politics:

- *Interest groups provide a mechanism for political representation which supplements the electoral process.* Elections are infrequent and each voter has but one vote. Interest groups can represent citizens who seek to express their views more frequently and on more issues than the electoral process can accommodate. In that sense, the more voluminous and encompassing the public business becomes, the greater the need for interest groups.
- *Interest groups join social-economic power concentrations and the polity.* The one person/one vote electoral system, which is relatively egalitarian, does not reflect the society's more extensive social and economic power concentrations. Interest groups allow the political process to be more responsive than the electoral process to the "realities" of social and economic power differences, and thus to protect the government from forming policies detached from what society will support.
- *Interest groups provide a bridge between the administrative and legislative arms of government,* especially valuable when the two branches check and balance each other into a stalemate. Interest groups, less confined by the institutional strictures which limit executive/legislative maneuverability, can alleviate the excessive separation of the legislative and executive branches by approaching both with the same advocacy.
- *Interest groups constitute one major source of "mediating structures"* which stand between the state and the individual, protecting the individual from undue control by the state.

Recent American History

In the last two decades (1960-1980) the level of cohesiveness of the American national political system and the effectiveness of its institutions seem to have diminished. In the same period, the power of interest groups —of all kinds—has grown. The result is a system much less able to contain them and to digest their contributions. Interest groups, then, have become more potent but less functional.

The developments which resulted in a lower level of national integration and political effectiveness are well known. Sociologists have pointed out that the heterogeneous American people find it more difficult to share positive political beliefs than to oppose a set of values—such as communism. In 1960, the majority were still united by a world view which saw expanding communism as a sinister worldwide force and the United States as the leading power entrusted to contain it. The Soviet threat provided the United States a rationale for specific foreign policy acts and a host of domestic activities.

This "anti" consensus was much weaker by 1980. Division within the communist camp and the nation's emphasis on peaceful cooperation diminished ideological consensus and commitment.

The Rise of Alienation

Since 1966, pollsters have regularly published data on the trust Americans put in various institutions. In 1966, 43 percent said they had "a great deal of confidence" in leaders of the major institutions of American society; by 1981 only 22 percent said they felt that way (Harris, October 1981).

The political institutions in particular were big losers. Confidence in Congress stood at 16 percent in 1981 and in the executive branch at 24 percent. The index of alienation feelings rose from 27 percent in 1966 to 56 percent in 1982.

Everett Carll Ladd called attention to the difference between a sense of loyalty to America and commitment to its basic political system, and a sense of its performance and competence. The public, the data show, has lost little of the former but much of the latter.

Decline of Voter Participation

The percentage of the voting-age population not voting for any candidate in presidential elections has increased steadily over the last two decades. In 1960, 37.2 percent didn't vote; in 1980, 47.5 percent didn't. Both Carter and Reagan were elected by parts of the electorate much smaller than the nonvoting "party." It is widely agreed that a significant part of rising voter apathy is due to a rising disaffection from the national polity.

Economic Trends

A rapidly expanding pie is commonly viewed as more conducive to conflict settlement within a community than one which is growing slowly or not at all. Yet our GNP has been shrinking, as has our GNP per employed worker. The result is fewer resources to be allotted, and increasing strains between competing demands.

Ironic Reforms

Congressional reforms and the decline of the political parties had a double effect—they weakened the national political system, and they increased the power of interest groups. Certain reforms—abolition of the seniority system in selecting committee chairmen, and the proliferation of subcommittees creating numerous autonomous power centers—increased fragmentation and decreased the ability to act in unison.

The Rise of Interest Groups

While the system weakened, the number, scope, and power of interest groups rose. Histories of democracies have often been told in terms of expanding voting

rights, introducing into the polity groups which previously did not have access to the system, for example, slaves, women, and men without property. During the era under review, black Americans in the South gained an effective vote, followed by a very substantial increase in black participation in elections and as elected officers. Youth voting rights were extended when the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1971.

Sociologically more significant, large, previously politically inactive social groups were mobilized and became politically involved. These included various minority groups, women, environmentalists, and welfare clients, among others.

Later, especially after 1975, there was a sudden and considerable growth in corporate interest groups and an increase in trade and industrial groups. The number of political action committees sponsored by corporations rose from only 89 in 1974 to 1,415 in 1982. In addition, trade association PACs brought the total of all business-related PACs to 2,028 in 1982, up from 1,235 in 1978.

Congressional reforms increased interest groups' access to and power over individual members. The reforms broke down the seniority system by which chairmen kept committee members in line. Instead, each member became much more autonomous, freer to make deals with other members and to respond to direct pressure from interest groups.

The identification of citizens with the political parties has diminished in recent years. As a result, members of Congress are freer to deal with interest groups and under less countervailing pressure from the broader, more widely representative parties. Everett Carll Ladd, reviewing the situation, summarized it: "As the parties withered, candidates for Congress and other elective offices were left to operate as independent entrepreneurs." [4]

The state of the American polity as of 1980 can be summed up briefly: as the bonding factors diminished, the forces of fragmentation were enhanced. Lost is the balance between pluralism and unity.

Toward a Corrective

Numerous specific suggestions have been made to curb interest groups and return them to their more limited, balanced, and presumably less damaging status. A certain amount of caution is necessary because many reforms have worsened the situation rather than improved it.

The current PAC boom resulted, ironically, from a series of efforts to curb the influence of wealth on the electoral process. A $1,000 limit was placed on the amount an individual could give to congressional candidates in either primary or general elections. With the end of unlimited contributions, wealthy individuals and business executives sought new ways to channel their money into the political process.

Reforms in other areas also backfired. Another amendment made in 1974, ironically advocated by labor unions, loosened the regulations concerning PACs run by industries and organizations with government contracts. Corporations still hesitated to use PACs, however, until after the Federal Election Commission ruled in the 1975 SunPAC case to allow corporations to use corporate funds to administer PACs, and to funnel solicitations of both employees and stockholders. With that decision, the PAC boom was on.

The seniority system in Congress was overthrown to limit the power of special interests. With the loosening of the seniority reins, however, numerous autonomous power centers were created that were less responsive to traditional party leadership, less accountable, and *more* open to influence by the various special interests.

Some reforms now favored might violate the Constitution. One suggestion requires that a government official approached by a lobbyist file a report on the encounter. This might have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech of organizational representatives, not to mention the avalanche of paper work that would be created.

Whatever reform measures come to mind, by themselves they will not suffice unless supplemented by a revival of political parties. Political parties are hardly popular these days. Indeed, numerous Americans see them as interest groups—and not particularly attractive ones. Parties tend to be partisan and to bicker with each other and hamper the presidency. The recent tribulations over the federal budget have surely not endeared either party to the public, which blames both.

Politics is, though, often a matter of choice between two imperfections—to put it mildly. Parties are less troublesome than interest groups because they represent a much wider constituent base than interest groups, articulate a much larger spectrum of issues and needs, and—in America, as far as the two main parties are concerned—tend to moderate their more extreme factions over time. Also, they moderate and digest specific interest groups. Above all, since the system works on checks and balances (with the parties checking interest groups), the erosion of the parties is a major factor in the interest groups' getting out of hand.

There is no specific measure or even a set of measures which can be recommended as ways to restore the political parties—for those willing to embrace this approach. Like other institutions, parties rise and fall due to complex social, attitudinal, intellectual, and economic factors which are neither understood nor controllable. Quite likely, parties, which decline with other institutions, will have to await a general institutional renaissance rather than be rejuvenated on their own. ☑

1 *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 33.
2 Ibid., p. 35.
3 Lester Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 6-7.
4 "How to Tame the Special Interest Groups," *Fortune*, October 20, 1980, p. 67.

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

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Shogan

(Continued from page 19)

interest—now notably lacking—must be provided. To establish this common incentive for the different parts of the system, some of the constitutional structures that work against these goals must be revised.[9]

The most likely possibility is to change the terms of House members and senators to four years and combine presidential and congressional elections. Putting a party's candidate for president, the House and the Senate on the same ballot slot would oblige voters to support all or none of them. This change should be reinforced by awarding at-large seats in both houses to the party winning the presidency. The new unified system would assure one-party control of the White House and Capitol Hill, bolster the ties between the president and his party in Congress, and give us a more effective and more accountable executive and legislature.

Other constitutional revisions that would help: bring members of Congress into the cabinet, to foster interbranch cooperation, and allow special national elections during the regular four-year term as a means of resolving deadlocks and crises in national leadership.

These constitutional changes would pave the way for the parties to strengthen themselves. A party coordinating council should then be created to lay out policy positions and to insist on support for major points from candidates and officeholders. With the establishment of clear party policy goals and tight party discipline, presidential candidates could be nominated by a caucus of elected officials, expanded to include representatives of major constituency groups. Meanwhile, the opposition party should also be strengthened by giving its leaders special status, including heightened access to information from the executive branch agencies and regular public opportunities to question cabinet members and the president.

The fostering of cooperation between the two political branches of government and the stressing of joint policy aims would help to create a climate in which party coalitions could flourish. Candidates would be encouraged to construct alliances around clear alternatives, spelled out in the party platform, and to develop corresponding policies once in office.

One way to gauge the potential impact of these changes on the political future is to reflect on how they might have altered the history of the past twenty years. With a disciplined majority party behind him in the Congress, John Kennedy would not have had to struggle vainly for approval of his legislative program and might have been less inclined to indulge in excessive rhetoric and provocative international ventures.

Lyndon Johnson would not have been pressured to race against the clock and the changing moods of Congress to create the Great Society. His own party, and the opposition, would have been more strongly positioned to force him to justify his escalation of the war in Vietnam.

Richard Nixon would have been spared the burden of trying to lead a divided government. At any rate, his party and the opposition could have monitored his use of executive power and probably prevented the abuses of Watergate. If a Watergate occurred, Congress could have forced a special national election which would have produced a new government, avoiding the two years of stalemate and division of the Ford presidency.

Jimmy Carter would probably not have been nominated for the presidency in 1976, because it is unlikely that a party caucus would select a candidate so unfamiliar with the national government and so alien from his own party.

As for Ronald Reagan, his polished nonchalance and skill as a television performer would not have been decisive in a campaign focused on issues. If he had been elected, his economic policies would have been subjected to more careful scrutiny by his own party and to a more effective challenge from the opposition than he had to face.

Certainly no change, no matter how far-reaching, will be a panacea. The European democracies which operate under parliamentary systems, with strong parties, have plentiful problems of their own. The most that can be expected from any constitutional reform is that it would allow the political and governing system to respond more quickly and rationally to public problems. But that in itself would represent a critical improvement.

Besides, the United States has advantages over other countries—a long tradition of freedom, egalitarianism and political stability, a heterogeneous pool of human talent, a relative abundance of natural resources—which should enable this nation to get more satisfaction out of its government. For all the shocks and setbacks that have marked the past twenty years, the United States is still strong in body and spirit—strong enough to risk a fundamental change in its Constitution. The greater risk is in avoiding change and allowing the present system to undermine our heritage and our hopes for the future. ☑

1. Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 629.

2. For a discussion of the Framers' views on parties and governments see James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy* (rev. ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 14-32, and Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 10-25.

3. Thomas E. Mann, "Elections and Change in Congress," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981).

4. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 212.

5. *Washington Post*, November 17 and November 24, 1981.

6. In 1979-80, the Federal Election Commission reports, PACs laid out $57.4 million in contributions and spending for congressional candidates. The comparable figure for the Republicans was $16.9 million, for the Democrats $6.6 million.

7. Democratic National Committee, "Report of the Commission on Presidential Nomination," adopted March 26, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1982).

8. Hubert H. Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), pp. 389-90.

9. Proposals for constitutional change are discussed by Lloyd Cutler, "To Form a Government," in *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980; James L. Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981) and Charles M. Hardin, *Presidential Power and Accountability* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

Snapshots

By Karlyn Keene

Minors, Parents and Contraceptives

The Department of Health and Human Services has received thousands of letters concerning a proposed regulation which would require federally funded family planning clinics to notify within ten days parents of a minor (seventeen years of age and under) who would receive prescription contraceptives. When Audits and Surveys posed the question this way, "Do you think that parents should or should not be notified if they have an unmarried female child under eighteen who is provided birth control devices or pills by public agencies or clinics?" 60 percent opted for notification, 30 percent said the parents should not be notified. Those over fifty were most in favor of notification (70-17 percent), while those eighteen to thirty-four years of age favored notification by a smaller margin (51-45 percent). People earning less than $15,000 favored notification (67-22 percent). Those earning over $25,000 favored it by a smaller margin (58-29 percent). This question was asked May 3-6 for The Merit Report. CBS News/*New York Times* posed the question in a different way in its March 1982 survey. "There is a proposed government regulation which would require clinics to inform the parents of children under eighteen when those children request birth control devices. Do you think this regulation would result in more, less, or about the same number of teen-aged pregnancies?" Thirty-two percent told the surveyors the proposed regulation would result in more pregnancies, 28 percent felt there would be fewer, and 32 percent felt there would be the same number. Republicans, Independents and Democrats expressed very similar views on the question.

Astin on Student Aid

College students across the country have sounded the alarm about cuts in student aid. Yet in the largest nationwide survey of college freshmen's attitudes, conducted by a research team headed by Alexander Astin at UCLA, there appeared to be no significant increase in concern about college financing between the fall of 1980 and the fall of 1981. When asked in the fall of 1981 how much concern students had about financing their college education, 32 percent expressed no concern, 52 percent expressed some concern, and 16 percent said it was a major concern. The percentages were virtually identical to those recorded in 1980 (32 percent, 52 percent, 15 percent). Students at predominantly black colleges were more likely to have concerns about paying for college. In 1981, 25 percent had no concern, 48 percent had some concern, and 26 percent said it was a major concern.

Look for the Union Label

Union members and the general public are likely to feel that the quality of goods made by union and non-union workers is about the same. Sixty percent of those surveyed by the Gallup Organization for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in December 1981 expressed this view. A quarter of union members said the goods they made were superior, compared to 13 percent of the general public who felt that way about union-made goods.

Sixty-four percent of those surveyed, and 51 percent of union members admitted they never look for the union label on goods when they shop. Eighteen percent of union members usually look —twice the number of all consumers.

The Eyes of Texas

Have Texans been spending too much time watching Dallas? The response to one of the questions in a survey of 2,041 Texans' attitudes on problems facing the state suggests a real-life reflection of the tale of corruption and intrigue. When asked by the Graduate School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin, "What do you think will be the single most important problem facing the State of Texas in the coming years?" 17 percent of those surveyed (the largest response in this open-ended question) said, "elected officials." On a more serious note, solid majorities of Texans felt the state government should be involved in each of thirteen areas ranging from improving existing highways (which ranked first) and ensuring an adequate water supply (second) to encouraging crop sales abroad (thirteenth). Texans felt the state should pass laws limiting foreign ownership of land (62 percent) and business (56 percent). The survey was conducted in August 1981.

Public Financing of Congressional Elections

Common Cause, the self-styled "citizens' lobby," won't be overjoyed by the results of the sixth annual study of attitudes toward campaign financing conducted by Civic Services, Inc., for the American Medical Association. It appears the public does not share Common Cause's enthusiasm for extension of financing to congressional elections. In response to the question "It has been proposed in Congress that the federal government provide public financing for congressional campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Would you approve or disapprove of the proposal to use public funds, federal money, to pay the costs of congressional campaigns and how strongly do you feel?" 65 percent disapproved of the proposal and 25 percent approved. Another question in the March 5-19, 1982 survey was asked in a more polemical fashion. "Let's just review in conclusion: public financing of congressional campaigns is being considered by Congress. Some say it's essential to clean up elections, restore competition, remove special interest money, and equalize the power of wealthy candidates. Others say it's unconstitutional, wrong to require taxpayers to support candidates they don't approve of, ignores other government priorities for tax money, and that campaigns should be financed by candidates and their supporters rather than the taxpayers." When asked to approve or disapprove of public financing, 28 percent approved, and 61 percent disapproved.

Grow Old Along With Me

Two major studies of the attitudes of older Americans suggest that senior citizens' lives may not be so gray after all.

In July 1981 the Harris Organization updated a 1974 benchmark study on the attitudes of older Americans. Three thousand, four hundred twenty-seven interviews were conducted, with substantial oversamples of those over sixty-five and those in the fifty-five to sixty-four-year-old group. The survey brought to light striking differences in the public's estimation of problems facing older Americans and the actual experience of those sixty-five and older. Even older

Americans overestimated the prevalence of problems for their age group. Substantial majorities of the public aged eighteen to fifty-four (81 percent) and those over sixty-five (72 percent) think the high cost of energy is a problem for older Americans. Yet only 42 percent of older Americans said it was a very serious concern for them. The same pattern appeared on many other questions. Sixty-eight percent of the public aged eighteen to fifty-four and 50 percent of those over sixty-five felt that not having enough money to live on was a serious problem for older Americans. Yet, only 17 percent of older Americans said it was a serious problem for them. Fear of crime was thought to be a serious problem for older Americans by 74 percent of the public aged eighteen to fifty-four and 58 percent of those sixty-five and older, yet only 25 percent of older Americans said it was a serious problem for them. Other problems such as loneliness, poor health, scarce job opportunities, and insufficient medical care and transportation presented the same dichotomy between public perception and the actual experience. In each case fewer older Americans had actually experienced the problem than thought it to be a problem for their peers.

Another interesting finding in the Harris survey was that elderly Americans are no more likely than younger ones to feel financially strapped. This may be because three out of five of them —in this survey—had bought and paid for their own homes. Only 12 percent of the eighteen to fifty-four age group had done so. Older Americans were also less likely to have dipped into their savings than younger Americans in the last year.

The ABC News/*Washington Post* poll conducted March 3-8, 1982 also found that the elderly are coping with today's problems better than the younger generation. The elderly poor—those with incomes of less than $12,000 a year —are coping more easily than younger people with the same low income. Twenty-eight percent of the elderly in that income group reported that lack of money is a serious or very serious problem for them and 44 percent say it is not a problem at all. Fifty-three percent of the population in that income group say it is a serious (or very serious) problem. Eighty-one percent of the elderly told ABC News/*Washington Post* interviewers that their housing was adequate. Only 68 percent of the general population felt that way. In this survey, the elderly were less concerned about crime, less concerned about having enough money to live, and less concerned about being unemployed than younger members of the population.

Is government doing enough to help older Americans? Seniors split on the question, with 45 percent saying yes to ABC News/*Washington Post* interviewers and 46 percent saying no. Seventy percent of young people believed the government was not doing enough. When Harris asked, "Which of the following do you feel should assume more responsibility than they are now for the elderly?" 54 percent said government, 46 percent children of the elderly, and 23 percent the elderly themselves. Liberals and conservatives split on this question, with 66 percent of liberals saying government should take more responsibility (compared to 43 percent of conservatives). On the question of whether most government programs (excluding social security) should be available to all people over sixty-five or only to those who have little or no income, the population divided 43 percent (for all people) to 51 percent (for the needy). Not surprisingly, liberals disagreed by 52 to 42 percent. Only 34 percent of conservatives felt the programs should go to all older people. Sixty-one percent said only those in need.

All is not rosy for older Americans. Harris found increasing dissatisfaction (since his 1974 study) when he evaluated respondents' answers to eighteen positive and negative statements about their personal sense of optimism.

American Farm Women

Two thousand, five hundred and nine farm women and 569 men (mostly husbands) were interviewed by the National Opinion Research Center in the summer of 1980 for the United States Department of Agriculture. Fifty-nine percent of the women surveyed had grown up on a farm or a ranch.

The researchers used a list of twelve common farm tasks (including bookkeeping, animal care, field work, marketing, and supervising labor) to find out to what extent women participate in running the farm. Women reported involvement in just over half of the different types of tasks. One in five reported involvement in 80 percent or more of the tasks. Very few women made final decisions, though half reported they shared in the major decisions. The surveyors found no evidence that husbands undervalued their wives' contributions to farm work or to making decisions related to the operation of the farm.

When asked for their views on "the most important thing the USDA could do to help farm and ranch people," men and women reported similar answers. Over one-third of respondents focused on the economic issues. Most called upon the USDA to assist producers in obtaining higher prices for their product (41 percent of women, 34 percent of men). In what might be viewed as a contradiction, they also mentioned the need to reduce government regulation and interference in the agricultural economy. (Ten percent of women mentioned this, 18 percent of men.) When asked what the USDA could do to help farm and ranch women, 14 percent mentioned changes in inheritance laws and estate taxes.

The Loo

A British Gallup survey commissioned by Crown Paints found that a surprising 43 percent of adults never lock the bathroom door. One in seven Brits spends more than thirty minutes a day there and 3 percent while away an hour or more. The most popular bathroom pastime is thinking (21 percent), followed by reading (20 percent). Next in line was singing (6 percent). There were regional variations in the term applied to the bathroom. Trendy Londoners called it the "loo" (44 percent) while those in the Northeast used the term "toilet" (83 percent).

Professional Status

Gallup's annual survey of the professions asked questions about public perceptions of "contributions to the general good," "stress or pressure," and "prestige or rank." Fourteen occupations were tested in 1982. Clergymen, medical doctors, and public school teachers ranked 1, 2, and 3 in contribution to the public good; local political officeholders, realtors, and advertising practitioners ranked 10, 11, and 12. For stress and pressure, doctors, public school teachers, and principals ranked 1, 2, and 3; funeral directors, advertising practitioners, and realtors ranked 10, 11, and 12. For prestige and status, doctors, judges, and clergymen ranked 1, 2, and 3; local political officeholders, advertising practitioners, and realtors ranked 10, 11, and 12.

Too Bad for Our Side: War Is A Video Game

by Ben J. Wattenberg

Suppose you were a young military officer or a young diplomat. What would be the right lessons to learn from the recent wars?

It has been said that what's new about these wars has something to do with the devastating French missiles used by Argentina, or with the ingenious Israeli adaptation of American smartware, or with the deficiency of Soviet anti-aircraft technology used by Syria.

But I fear that the real lessons to be taught at West Point or the Fletcher School of Diplomacy will be very different. The most important new weapons are light-weight television cameras and television satellites. They have unwittingly made it more difficult for free nations to operate in the real world.

Consider the string of recent wars: Afghanistan, Iraq-Iran, El Salvador and, more recently, the Falklands and Lebanon. And consider some new rules of the road that every geopolitician and military tactician must now teach.

First Rule: Communist countries can wage long, brutal wars and pay very little for them. It is two and a half years since the Soviets rolled into Afghanistan. The Afghans continue to fight well, but the U.S. grain embargo has been lifted, sanctions were never imposed and the nightly news all over the world ignores the conflict. After all, if you can't get television cameras into a country to witness the poison gas, the dead civilians, the maimed children—then what can you show on television? No access; no horror.

Second Rule: Roughly the same guidelines hold for non-free, non-Communist countries. The Iran-Iraq war began almost two years ago; 100,000 people have been killed, including many civilians. The Iranians developed a new mine detector: young boys run across the battlefield to explode the mines. But there are no television cameras to record the battered bits of young life blown sky high. No cameras; no news. No news; no outrage. No outrage; no penalty. And so, Iraq still hoped to host the Conference of Non-aligned Nations; the United States buys oil from Iran.

Third Rule: A democracy can wage a quick war if it is on an isolated, faraway island—which enables it to control the news. There was plenty of television coverage of the ships leaving England to the tune of "Don't Cry for Me, Argentina." But there was no contemporaneous television film of the deaths of the British sailors in the icy sea or in melting aluminum ships. No foreign correspondents were allowed with the fleet; censorship was tight. In many ways, it now comes out, the British public was purposefully misled. Question: if English television had shown the gore of the war while it was happening, could Mrs. Thatcher have kept the political support necessary to finish the war?

Fourth Rule: Only at great cost can democracies get involved—even minimally—if the battlefield is an open country. America provided military aid and fifty advisers to the civil war in El Salvador. They were outnumbered by television folks; the coverage made us appear at times like conspiratorial, lying butchers. It sometimes seemed as if the war was about four dead nuns. Another big story revealed that an American adviser actually carried a rifle. Television coverage helped to turn the American public sour on a limited, moral enterprise; now U.S. political support for El Salvador is fraying.

Fifth Rule: On non-islands, democracies can wage only short wars, telling the whole truth, all at once and immediately. If the war goes on, if goals change as targets of opportunity arise, if the government says something that is not so—beware of the wrath of the world. Because both Israel and Lebanon host plenty of television crews, because a television journalist can get to the front quickly in a Hertz rent-a-car, because the censorship is porous—every bit of the horror that any war produces is in everybody's living room the next day. In war, access equals horror.

The Israelis are complaining bitterly that Israel is unfairly held up to a double standard. Actually, it is more serious than that. The new rules of media warfare establish a double standard for all open societies. Television will show blood in El Salvador, in Lebanon—in any open country—and civilized people will be shocked and exert political pressure to make it stop.

This is important. The use of force and, more important, the threat of the use of force are still key parts of the global geopolitical equation. That is sad, but true.

The nature of television news demands that it show whatever horror is available. Our horror is available; our adversaries' horror is not. That process unwittingly presents our adversaries with a great gift. They can credibly use the threat of force in a harsh world; it is much more difficult for us. They know that; we know that; they know that we know that. Accordingly, they can be more adventuresome than they might ordinarily be. That is not the fault of television; it is the burden of the glory of a free press.

Of course, all this is not brand new. The same phenomenon was apparent in Vietnam, when only our half of a bloody war was shown in the living rooms of the world. Now it is apparent that it was no accident; it will keep on happening that way. That may be a tough lesson for would-be generals and diplomats to swallow, but it is a more important one than which side has the smarter missiles.

MEETING HUMAN NEEDS: Toward a New Public Philosophy

Edited by Jack A. Meyer

This milestone book published by AEI's Center for the Study of Private Initiative points the way to a revitalized America. ***MEETING HUMAN NEEDS*** spells out programs and processes for solving today's pressing social problems through greater participation of the private sector.



Editor Meyer has put together a team of AEI scholars whose expert analysis cuts through the fog of confusion that has characterized the public dialogue over the "New Federalism." They identify — in case after case — the successful role now being played by private sector groups all over the country. In charting a course between nationally imposed "solutions" and public indifference, the authors not only illustrate the potential for successful private initiative in the local community, but also advance a more promising approach for government policy.

PART ONE of the volume establishes the framework for assessing private sector initiative in meeting human needs and for devising more flexible, efficient, and humane government programs in areas where responsibility properly lies with government. A historical perspective explores the changing balance between the private and public sectors.

PART TWO offers a cross-cutting look at the innovative programs and activities being undertaken by business, labor, and neighborhood groups that encompass a number of problem areas simultaneously.

PART THREE surveys the private sector landscape — its diverse components, its economic framework, and its economic incentives.

PART FOUR presents and analyzes case studies of private sector initiatives in specific problem areas: youth employment, health care, education, foster care, housing, youth crime, and urban transportation. It continues with a review of several social service programs as well as the initiatives of charitable and volunteer organizations to assure the provision of basic human needs of low-income and disadvantaged Americans.

President Ronald Reagan has asked for his copy of this detailed report on private initiatives — reflecting the findings and policy recommendations of the American Enterprise Institute — by June 30. Plan to have this 500 plus page landmark volume on your own reading table this July by placing your order today.

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