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THE STRUCTURE OF ETHNICITY

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OPINION ROUNDUP

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by Nathan Glazer

The Structure of Ethnicity

A few years ago, analyzing surveys and censuses, Andrew Greeley began telling us some surprising things about ethnic groups of European origin in this country. For decades, we had thought of them as strung out along a spectrum of assimilation, education, occupation, and income, with those of English origin heading the procession, the Germans, Scandinavians, Irish, Italians, Poles, and others trailing behind. That was no longer the case, Greeley told us. In terms of education, occupation, and income, the historically later groups, those stemming from the "new immigration" of the period of the 1880s to the 1920s, had not only caught up with (marginally) but surpassed the ethnic groups that originated from earlier settlement and immigration. And the effects on politics were apparent. The later groups had been part of the great Democratic coalition forged by Roosevelt. Urban, working class, and largely Catholic, they added to the Democratic votes of a solid South the major industrial states of the North and Midwest, where they fought out many a close election with voters of English, German, and Scandinavian origin who stuck with traditional Republican allegiances.

No longer: Political tendency follows economic status, and the surprising showing of Italians and Poles in the Census surveys that began gingerly to ask about ethnicity in the late 1960s, and in the surveys analyzed by Andrew Greeley, is now followed by social and political attitudes that scarcely distinguish them from English, Germans, and Scandinavians. Or so one concludes from a survey of the interesting data on ethnicity, values, and political choice that have been brought together in this issue of *Public Opinion*. Rather, the sharpest fault-line in American society now divides the Americans of European origin in general from blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians. Again and again, in the data reported in this issue, one will find blacks and Hispanics showing one pattern, and almost all the other groups—with modest differences—another. Occasionally this pattern varies—and sometimes that represents real differences among groups of different origin, but as often it should alert us to the fact that the categories we use in discussing ethnicity in this country are inevitably crude and inexact. Ethnicity is no formal status, and government doesn't record it, or use it—except for American Indians, and to some extent, owing to affirmative action, for blacks, Hispanic Americans, and Asians.

Murky Categories

Two cautions are in order for the reader. The most important is that the category "East European/Soviet Union" bunches together Poles and Russians and Ukrainians, a significant percentage of whom are Jews (17 percent). The latter, in their great majority, are the children and grandchildren of immigrants who came from Eastern Europe, but who never thought of themselves, or identified themselves, as Poles, Russians, Ukrainians—they were Jews, as different from their neighbors in

ethnic identification as in religion. Unfortunately, the census has no category for Jews since it refuses in its recording of ethnicity to take any response it considers religious. This not only ignores one important ethnic category, but confounds it with some other important ethnic categories. The Roper Center has now run all the data for Jews, and the distributions can be seen in Opinion Roundup. In the category "East European/ Soviet Union," the skilled eye can detect a Jewish bulge in question after question. This group appears to be behaving out of line with other European-origin ethnic groups. Thus, when asked for political affiliation, "East European/Soviet Union" looks more like Hispanic than like Scottish/English/Welsh, Italian, German/Austrian, French/French Canadian, or Irish. A mere 15 percent are Republican; 48 percent are Democrats. Note a similar bulge on "liberal-conservative" questions. The old New York adage, that Jews have incomes like "WASPs" but vote like Puerto Ricans, explains this and other oddities.

A second caution, and this a more general one. Among the European ethnic groups, there has been a huge amount of mixture, to the degree that ethnic identity or affiliation is in large measure a matter of choice. Ethnicity was first probed for by the United States census in 1980. In previous censuses, we had had racial breakdowns; we had had measures of foreign-born, and children of foreign-born, by country; we had had counts of Spanish-surnamed population. But it was only in the 1970s that a number of factors came together to seem to make it desirable to have a count of ethnic origin. One was that the previous census measures, of foreign-born and children of foreign-born, were becoming less and less useful with passing decades—after all, mass immigration from Europe came to an end in 1924, now sixty years in the past. A second was that the civil rights revolution and ethnic politics of the later 1960s and early 1970s made it important to have more accurate counts of some ethnic groups. If "Hispanics" and "Asians" were to be counted for purposes of affirmative action, it was now important that Hispanics be broken down into their constituent parts, and similarly for Asians. What good would it do Filipinos, counted as Asian, for example, if all efforts in affirmative action were directed toward Japanese and Chinese? What good would it do Puerto Ricans, for example, if measures of progress of Hispanic Americans mostly showed the success of Cubans? It was considerations such as these that seemed to make necessary a more precise count of groups by origin. And yet a third factor: a substantial rise in ethnic self-consciousness in the early 1970s inevitably required that if one were going to count groups covered by affirmative action, one would have to count the others, too.

But there's the rub: Intermarriage has become so common among ethnic groups, in particular the groups stemming from the older immigration of the nineteenth century, that ethnicity has become a somewhat murky

category. The question posed by the census was, "What is this person's ancestry?" Any answer—except for religion—was recorded and coded. Fifty million persons reported "English," the largest category—but more than half of these listed other ethnic origins, too. (Many undoubtedly were Scottish or Welsh; the overwhelming majority of those who reported "Scottish" or "Welsh" reported other ancestries, too.) Forty-nine million said "German"—but three-fifths of them reported other ancestries, too. Three-quarters of the 40,000,000 who said "Irish" also reported other ancestries; the same proportion was reported for 4 million Swedes, and a majority of three-and-a-half million Norwegians. Twelve million report Italian ancestry—but of those, only 7 million report only Italian ancestry. The figure for Italian Americans should be somewhere between the two. A majority of the 8 million who report Polish ancestry report some other ancestry, too.

Assimilation of Values

For a long time we believed that the differences between the older immigrant groups (mostly Protestant) and the newer immigrant groups (mostly Catholic and Jewish) were decisive in determining political and value orientations. It is hard to see much of that in the surveys reported. Rather, the key distinctions are between Europeans, whether of old or new immigrant groups (those who immigrated after 1880), and the blacks and Hispanic Americans. Not that the last two major and growing groups always behave the same. But the similarity of economic situation leads to a strong similarity in attitudes and values.

The blacks are overwhelmingly Protestant, the Hispanics overwhelmingly Catholic, but it hardly seems to matter. They are the most Democratic in politics, liberal in orientation, they are the least happy, have the most difficulties in their marriages, least satisfied with their financial situation. Questions trying to get at values are harder to interpret: they stand together in being least approving of punching a man who had hit a child or was beating a woman. Perhaps they approve more strongly generally of corporal punishment—this would be consistent with their class position. They seem to be together in being the most abstemious—which is surprising. They stand out in believing that most people would try to take advantage of you. It is their experience, one assumes, that leads them to believe least that hard work is most important in getting ahead—though a majority still accept this piece of traditional wisdom. They want government to do more, and to do something to reduce income differences. It is not surprising that they would be least willing to allow a racist to speak, but they are also least willing to allow a Communist or a "militarist" to speak—which simply reflects a well-known tendency for those with less education to be less solicitous of civil rights. They also show some similarity on the social issues that so divide the nation. They are the least supportive of the death penalty for murder, and least supportive of legal abortion for any reason. Here they are joined (as they are on many other questions) by American Indians.

It is on questions such as these last that differences among the European ethnic groups, with their divergent religious traditions, should be found. But assimilation has apparently ground down these differences. The most liberal of the groups on abortion, except for a somewhat exceptional finding for French Canadians that I cannot understand, is the East European/Soviet Union, which undoubtedly reflects its Jewish component—but even that group is not far out of line with other European ethnic groups.

The Weakening of Ethnic Ties in Politics

So what has happened to ethnicity in American politics? Does it count the way it did in the elections of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s? There are two reasons I would argue that it counts less, and one I have already suggested: insofar as groups converge in income and education and occupation, the great host of issues that are affected by socioeconomic standing do not differentiate them much. We have been living with the consequences of that change over the past twenty years, as we see the breakdown of the traditional Catholic allegiance to the Democratic party. There is less breakdown perhaps of the traditional Republican allegiance of Protestants—but after all assimilation is to a pre-existing American norm, not the reverse. The opportunities for an alliance of the late-arrival European ethnic groups, in the pattern of Al Smith and Franklin D. Roosevelt, no longer exist. Too many have moved into the middle class. Too many have had college educations. Note in the occupational breakdown in the following charts that only the blacks and Hispanics have large unskilled working classes anymore. The majority of all other groups are in white-collar work. Insofar as the Democratic appeal was to a working class, it is not particularly addressed anymore to the Catholic European ethnic groups. They are not distinguishable in class from the English and German and Scandinavian ethnic groups. An ABC News exit poll on Election Day confirms this point. Seventy percent of those of English/Scottish/Welsh ancestry supported President Reagan, followed by a hefty 67 percent of those of German/Austrian descent, 62 percent of Scandinavians, and 59 percent of the Irish. The size of the Reagan majority decreases with the more recent arrivals. Those who identified themselves as Polish or Slavic split evenly, 51 percent for Reagan, 49 percent for Mondale, reflecting the number of Jews in this group. For each ethnic group, however, support for Reagan was higher this year than it was in 1980.

The second change: the specific passions of World War II and its aftermath, which arrayed ethnic groups on different sides in American political conflict, have

faded—with some exceptions. The fact that Roosevelt brought us into the war on the side of England and against Germany and Italy, we know, helped push Germans and Irish and Italians into the Republican column. But that was a long time ago, and that push is sustained now by other factors. The problem of the captive nations of Eastern Europe made toughness on communism an issue with a special appeal to East European ethnic groups. But who believes now that however tough one is on communism, Poland and the Baltic nations will emerge from behind the Iron Curtain? There remains only one major issue affecting a home country, if we can call it that, that has a bearing on an American ethnic group, and affects American politics: and that is the special problem of Israel and its security in the Middle East. One does not see it in these charts, but I would hazard that no other group reviewed here is affected to the same degree by how a party or its leaders stands toward what we must consider in effect a "home country." American Jews, except for a small minority, have not come from Israel, but they are as passionately concerned about its fate as American Irish are concerned about Ireland, and American Poles over Poland. And since it is a permanently threatened nation, owing to its position surrounded by enemies, inevitably it becomes a permanent issue in American politics, almost the only issue of foreign policy that reverberates significantly on the politics of a major American ethnic group.

Prejudice

There is one other issue that has affected differential ethnic stands in politics in the past, and that is prejudice. Blacks, Catholics, and Jews were victims of prejudice. The Republicans, because of who their followers were —Protestant, small-town, and rural—were suspect of being less committed to the fight against prejudice than Democrats. That issue has declined in importance as Catholics and Jews have risen educationally, socially, and economically, and as prejudice against them has declined. But in the last election it was again resurrected by the greater visibility of fundamentalists in politics, principally Protestant and Republican, on such issues as abortion, school prayer, and more generally the degree to which this may be considered a "Christian" nation. It has turned out, most observers believe, that what the Democrats lost by insufficiently chastising Jesse Jackson and his followers, the Republicans failed to gain because of their embrace of fundamentalist social issues.

One group in these charts, by the way, may be mysterious to the reader. Who are the Protestant Irish, who so often diverge from the Catholic Irish? Note they are much less educated, poorer, more Republican, rather more conservative, more abstemious, want more government help, oppose abortion even more than the Catholic Irish, and are the strongest of any group in their opposition to premarital sex. It would seem clear they are those sometimes called the Scotch-Irish, who settled in the Appalachians, and have increasingly migrated into the Midwest industrial belt. One does not think of them generally as part of the ethnic line-up in the United States, but in their distinctive experiences and attitudes they are. But we do need a more descriptive name for them.

Prejudice in this country, many of us think, is a matter of the past, though we remain vigilant against signs of it. Jews will be among the first to seek refuge with the traditional party of the immigrant, the black, the poor, if they suspect its reemergence. But prejudice is an even greater concern to blacks and Hispanics. Whether it is prejudice, or past prejudice, or something else, that keeps down the blacks and Hispanics, these groups must be, and are, sharply aware of their backward position, and have become the staunchest supporters of the Democrats in their efforts to redress it. We speak of course in shorthand—the Cubans among the Hispanic Americans have not done badly and have both economic and political reasons to be Republican. And even among the blacks one may find a small Republican minority—and a growing number of black scholars and analysts who make arguments that more should be. Nevertheless, the racial and ethnic faultlines in American politics seem today to be less those that divide Protestant from Catholic and Jew, than those that divide all European ethnic groups from Hispanics and blacks. Specific European ethnicity will not matter much in the future—unless some unimaginable political developments remind one or another group of its origins and allegiances, as Israel and its enemies serve permanently to remind Jews.

Meanwhile, yet another curtain rises on a new act of the ethnic drama in the West. Immigration has increased to the point where we may dub it the "new new immigration"—the post-1965 immigration in which the sources of immigrants shifted sharply from Europe to Latin America and Asia. The Latin American (primarily Mexican) immigration comes in with less education than the average American, while Asian immigrants come in with more education than the average American. We have heard a great deal about the significance of the Hispanic component in American politics. The second biggest minority (though itself a congeries of groups), it will make its weight increasingly felt in American politics. But what of the Asians? These are disproportionately professional, educated, socially active, and they will make, I believe, a disproportionate impact on American politics. The census of 1980 showed three-and-a-half million Asians, double the figure of ten years before. The census of 1990 will more than double that. The views, support, and votes of a few hundred thousand Americans of Asian Indian origin already are a matter of concern to some American elected officials. If European ethnicity, for the most part, remains quiescent, we can be sure that in this dynamic and growing country new groups will emerge, indeed are emerging, to set their mark on American politics.

by William C. Adams

Recent Fables about

I don't think the Teflon-coated president is going to have much trouble.

Kevin Phillips

Reagan has a remarkable ability to deflect attack and a lot of that ability comes from the sheer force of personality.

Dan Rather

The polls show that many more people like Ronald Reagan personally than support his policies.

Bill Moyers

A president whose personality deflects substantive attacks and attracts voters who fundamentally reject his policies? Ronald Reagan's escape from the Louisville debate shellacking with most of his popularity intact only reinforced this idea. Yet the "Teflon" notion says more about the power of convenient clichés than it does about the character of Ronald Reagan's popularity. In fact, some of those clichés are little more than myths.

Myth #1: *Ronald Reagan's popularity is immune to the problems of his administration.* This myth assumes that the president got a free ride from an uncritical American public too beguiled by Reagan's charms to notice the sorry state of the economy. Nonsense. With unemployment at record postwar heights by January 1983, President Reagan's approval rating as measured by the Gallup organization had fallen to 35 percent. None of the prior six presidents had sunk this low after just twenty-four months in office. Reagan's scores declined so dramatically, they quickly reached the depths of those given Lyndon Johnson in 1968, Richard Nixon during Watergate, and Jimmy Carter after prolonged economic and hostage agony. This comparison alone ought to debunk the myth of the Teflon president. It has not. Instead, it has given rise to another myth.

Myth #2: *Reagan has an unrivaled capacity to rebound in the polls; Reagan's problems, unlike those of most other politicians, do not stick to him.* Wrong again.

Ronald Reagan

Although Reagan rebounded 20 percentage points in the Gallup poll—from 35 percent back up to the 57 percent approval rating he had in late September 1984—there is nothing novel about that. Jimmy Carter enjoyed a 33 percentage point resurgence and more than doubled his approval rating from a low of 28 percent in June 1979 to a high of 61 percent in December of that year. Harry Truman made a 28 point comeback, from 32 percent to 60 percent approval in the second year of his presidency. Gerald Ford twice made 14-15 point recoveries (from 37 to 52 percent and 39 to 53 percent).

How did Ronald Reagan "walk away" from Beirut? The same way John Kennedy walked away from the Bay of Pigs. Reagan has no magical, heretofore unknown, powers of resilience.

Myth #3: *Reagan's personal popularity is overpowering and unique.* Most Americans are honestly eager to like their president, regardless of politics. Except during Watergate, presidents have invariably topped Gallup's "most admired" lists, for example.

Gallup also attempts to measure personal popularity using a "scalometer" ranging from +5 for very favorable to −5 for very unfavorable. Reagan's scores are good, but not extraordinary. In August of 1984, 42 percent of those interviewed gave Reagan "highly favorable" marks of +4 or +5. In 1972, 40 percent of those surveyed gave the same most favorable evaluations to the surely less lovable Richard Nixon. Eisenhower set Gallup's record with 66 percent ranking him highly favorable personally.

Reagan has looked strong in part because his immediate predecessors did not fare as well. In 1976 only 28 percent gave Ford a +4 or +5, and in 1980 just 20 percent rated Carter that high.

Ronald Reagan *is* genuinely liked by most Americans. All of the survey evidence confirms that he is personally popular. But his popularity has neither attained particularly historic proportions, nor has it been so awesome that it could overshadow his performance.

Consider Patrick Caddell's assessment of a survey taken at the end of Reagan's first year in office, when his approval rating was plummeting: "He may be viewed as likable and genial and nice, but that doesn't translate into political popularity." This survey, taken by Caddell and three other top Democratic pollsters (Peter Hart, William Hamilton, and Hugh Schwartz) for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, shows that personal popularity can be quite independent of approval, and that Americans are capable of making those distinctions.

A question posed by ABC News and the *Washington Post* five times between April 1982 and May 1984 provides evidence that many citizens are capable of liking the man but not the message. Also sobering is the reminder that in each of these surveys there is one small group that likes the message but not the man (see table 1).

Table 1

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion? A) I like Reagan personally and approve of most of his policies; B) I like Reagan personally but I disapprove of most of his policies; C) I don't like Reagan personally but I approve of most of his policies; D) I don't like Reagan personally and I disapprove of most of his policies.

	April 1982	September 1982	August 1983	January 1984	May 1984
Like Reagan personally, approve policies	41%	35%	38%	40%	39%
Like Reagan personally, disapprove policies	28	33	30	25	28
Don't like Reagan personally, approve policies	9	7	9	13	11
Don't like Reagan personally, disapprove policies	20	23	21	18	18

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of May 1984.

Most people said they liked the president, but a substantial number of that group said they did not approve of his policies. Many Americans have not been lured into his policy fold, suggesting that there are serious limits to the power of personality alone.

At the same time, more than one-third of those who didn't like Reagan personally said they actually liked his policies. How ironic, after all the talk about the magnetism of Reagan the Telegenic, that some of his margin of victory may well have come from voters who liked his policies and not his persona.

Myth #4: *Reagan has manipulated the news media into uncritical coverage, leaving his image unscathed.* Systematic content analyses have refuted this idea. Michael Robinson, Maura Clancey, and Lisa Grand counted a ratio of thirteen negative policy-related stories for every positive one about Reagan on the nightly television news during the first 100 days of 1983. They observed that "the White House press has neither flacked for Ronald Reagan nor ignored his shortcomings—personal or policy related."

An extensive study by Professor Fredric Smoller of 4,883 presidential news stories on CBS Evening News since 1968 found that Reagan's treatment was more negative than that given his predecessors after the same number of years. The press corps has not been an accomplice in preserving the president's image.

Myth #5: *Reagan is more popular than his foreign or domestic programs are.* Actually, the president's overall ratings have been only modestly higher than the discrete verdicts on his economic and foreign policies. Along with asking opinions about "the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president," Gallup asks for assessments of his handling of economic conditions and foreign policy.

Reagan's ratings on handling economic and foreign policy have averaged about seven points less than his overall approval rating. During his first term, his ratings on handling the economy proved to be an extremely accurate predictor of Reagan's overall approval rating; the correlation was a powerful .95. Evaluations of Reagan's foreign policy showed a weaker relationship to overall popularity; the correlation was .64.

The fact that Reagan's overall approval is usually slightly higher than his foreign or economic policy ratings is often portrayed as remarkable. It is not. Historically, the overall Gallup ratings of recent incumbent presidents running for reelection have surpassed the distinct ratings of their economic and foreign policies. In early 1980, for example, when 55 percent of the public told Gallup they approved of Jimmy Carter's job performance, only 40 percent approved of his handling of "domestic policies," and only 33 percent liked the way he was "dealing with the Soviet Union." Similarly, 75 percent said they approved of Lyndon Johnson's general performance in early 1964, 70 percent approved of his domestic policies, and only 61 percent liked his foreign policy. There is nothing unusual about this pattern.

Myth #6: *Reagan is popular, but many of his specific policies are not.* This may be partially true, but it is not unique to Reagan. Most Democrats, for example, disagreed with Mondale on school prayer, busing, and tax increases. Unlike Reagan, most Americans oppose efforts to overturn the Supreme Court decision on abortion (although they are by no means enthusiastic about the practice), and they support an Equal Rights Amendment. But that is a selective reading of survey data.

The argument cuts both ways. It is worth remembering that Reagan's overall job ratings have actually been lower than public support for a variety of policies he advocates. For example, solid majorities of Americans support a constitutional amendment on school prayer, think federal income taxes are too high, believe the courts are not harsh enough with criminals, favor the death penalty, oppose busing, and reject racial quotas (see *Public Opinion*, October/November 1983, p. 29; February/March 1983, p. 31). On these issues public agreement with particular Reagan policy directions is substantially greater than support for his presidency—precisely the opposite of what is usually trumpeted.

Results on other specific issues vary, and of course question wording matters: Yankelovich asks about "keeping our defenses strong," while Harris asks about "controlling defense spending," for example. Nevertheless, endorsements of Reagan in certain areas fall below generalized support given his presidency.

In this vein, only 28 percent told Gallup they approve of Reagan's handling of "the situation in Central America," and only 22 percent were happy with his performance on the federal deficit. The fatal flaws in this approach were that (a) the particular topics may have been a low priority for many respondents and (b) displeasure with a Reagan performance did not signal a preference for a liberal alternative. (See Myth #7.)

Myth #7: *Only 22 percent support for a Reagan*

policy must have meant 78 percent support for a Mondale policy. Contrary to early analyses, public dissatisfaction with a Reagan policy did not necessarily mean that voters thought the Democrats would be better. When pollsters got around to asking comparative questions ("Which candidate would do a better job on . . ."), this myth was challenged.

Even though Reagan had gotten low marks for the deficit, for example, he was still considered a better bet than Mondale to reduce it (46 to 32 percent in a September 6-9 Gallup-*Newsweek* poll). And even though Reagan had never rallied the public behind his Central American activities, he still beat Mondale for "dealing with the situation" there (41 to 35 percent in Gallup, August 10-13). On many topics, Americans who had been quite willing to criticize Mr. Reagan registered even harsher evaluations of Mr. Mondale.

At the same time, majorities sided with Mondale on social welfare and fairness issues, and on selected international matters. Why was Mondale unable to exploit these advantages? Simply put, some issues count more than others—and the economy counts most of all. In a late October survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, 58 percent of Reagan supporters and 53 percent of Mondale supporters said the economy was more important than military or foreign policy in their voting choice: only 16 percent of Reagan supporters and 21 percent of Mondale supporters named "military/foreign affairs."

Myth #8: *Reagan won from personal style.* Reagan's heralded abilities to wield a teleprompter, to produce moist eyes and a lump in the throat, and to project sincerity, conviction, and confidence certainly help him politically. And, in a close election, personal style could help account for a slim margin of victory. Yet the 1984 election campaign was not a referendum on personality.

From the day Reagan was first inaugurated, Americans judged him by his stewardship of the economy—not on the basis of his emotional anecdotes, genial manner, or well-pitched voice.

He benefited from inflation's rapid decline, but was then plagued by the unemployment half of the "Misery Index." The unemployment rate turned into a nearly perfect predictor of Reagan's popularity. For every one point increase in unemployment, Reagan's popularity decreased six points. Changes in joblessness in the civilian labor force can account for about 80 percent of the changes in Reagan's job ratings. Figure 1 plots this relationship, using the *employment* rate (100 minus the unemployment rate).

So, though style probably helped endear Reagan to the public, it was his performance on the economy that brought him the greatest rewards. Having presided over the first postwar economic boom to simultaneously bolster real disposable personal income and reduce unemployment without igniting inflation, he earned handsome boosts in popularity.

Republicans who have convinced themselves that their hero has a permanent public seal of approval are quite mistaken. The bad news for the Republicans is that Reagan wears no shield of invulnerability. The bad news for the Democrats is that Reagan was able to win big without it.

Figure 1

PERCENT EMPLOYED IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S APPROVAL RATING (GALLUP)



Note: Employment rate = 100 minus the unemployment rate. Reagan ratings from the Gallup poll.



by Nick Thimmesch

The Editorial

Since 1932, *Editor & Publisher*, the newspaper industry's weekly journal, has polled the nation's dailies about their editorial support, or endorsements, for presidential nominees. Only once in all those elections did a majority favor the Democratic candidate—Lyndon B. Johnson when he ran against Senator Barry Goldwater in 1964. In that year, even the solidly Republican *New York Herald-Tribune* broke precedent and backed the Democrat.

In 1984, this longstanding pattern of newspaper endorsements of the GOP candidate again ran true to form. Of 714 papers responding to *E & P*'s survey, 394 were for Reagan, 76 backed Mondale, and 244 reported being "uncommitted" or "no endorsement." Of the papers polled, Reagan got 51.3 percent of the circulation, Mondale 22.2, and 27 percent were neutral. The *E & P* survey was the fourteenth it had conducted since 1932.

The *E & P*'s polling shows that in thirteen of those fourteen elections, the overwhelming majority of dailies supported the Republican candidate, though the Democrat won eight times. This record leads many political observers to shrug off newspaper endorsements as irrelevant. Is it fair to conclude that the *E & P* results show only that the majority of newspaper publishers are conservative businessmen who impose their presidential preferences on their editorial page editors or editorial boards?

The quick answer is yes, but there are notable exceptions and some fascinating aspects to the endorsement business. In this year's election, the *Miami Herald* endorsed President Reagan "with reservations," declaring his ticket superior to the Mondale-Ferraro team. But the *Herald* also published a column by editor Jim Hampton, who said most editorial board members wanted to recommend Mondale, and that the Reagan endorsement "represents Publisher Dick Capen's exercising of his authority to override the board's collegial decisions."

In 1968, the late Captain Harry Guggenheim, then president of *Newsday*, had his paper endorse Richard M. Nixon. His publisher, Bill D. Moyers, a Democrat, disagreed, so Guggenheim graciously allowed him to write an editorial endorsing Hubert H. Humphrey and ran it alongside the paper's official endorsement.

Nonalignment

If there is one trend in this game, it is for publishers and editors to split on the endorsement questions, either disagreeing on the candidates or on whether there should be an endorsement at all. The *Los Angeles Times* had an unbroken record of endorsing the G.O.P. candidate stretching from the nineteenth century to 1972. But since that election, the *Times* policy has been not to endorse, and it hasn't.

The *Baltimore Sun*, which had endorsed someone for every presidential race since 1936, decided not to endorse this year. Observed the *Sun*:

> We believe that in presidential elections, as in no others, there is an avalanche of information and commentary, of debate and analysis, that should satisfy the public's right to know. The voter has no need for the newspaper guidance that might be helpful in races for state and local office, for Congress, and in deciding ballot and judgeship questions.

The *Sun*'s decision grouped it with *E & P*'s fastest growing category, those papers expressing themselves as "uncommitted or undecided."

In 1932, *E & P* listed 511 dailies for the Democratic candidate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 656 for Republican Herbert Hoover, and 94 (8 percent) neutral. By 1940, with about the same number of dailies operating, 171 (13.5 percent) declared themselves uncommitted in the presidential race. By 1952, even with the popular "Ike" running, 18 percent of the dailies were neutral. Between 1952 and 1976, about one-fourth of the dailies designated themselves as neutral.

In 1980, with a third major candidate (John Anderson) in the race, a whopping 42 percent of the papers opted for the neutral stance, about as many as supported Ronald Reagan. But Reagan's 443 papers represented 48 percent of the circulation of those papers responding,

Endorsement Game

and the 439 papers indicating "uncommitted" or "do not endorse," accounted for only 26 percent of the circulation.

Without checking the charts, some Republican partisans claim that while the majority of dailies have endorsed the Republicans over the years, the influential papers with big circulations have more often endorsed Democrats. The aggregate circulations of the smaller papers endorsing the G.O.P. candidates, they say, hardly matches that of the big papers.

The facts don't bear out such conjecture. In every election except 1964, the aggregate circulation of the dailies endorsing the Republican far exceeded that of the Democratic or third party candidate.

Editor & Publisher's findings for the 1932 and 1936 elections, which Roosevelt won by landslides, show that the majority of the dailies' aggregate circulation went for the Republican candidate.

In 1940, Willkie had 59 percent of the circulation endorsing him, compared with Roosevelt's 19 percent. In 1944, Dewey had 64 percent of the circulation, and FDR only 14 percent (22 percent were unannounced). In 1948, Dewey got 79 percent, compared to Harry S Truman's meager 10 percent.

Eisenhower swamped Adlai Stevenson by an 80-11 percent score on circulation in 1952, and 73-13 in 1956. Richard M. Nixon, no darling of editorial writers (but approved by many publishers), won endorsements from papers having 71 percent of the circulation in 1960, 70 percent in 1968, and 77 percent in 1972.

President Gerald R. Ford received 62 percent of the circulation in 1976, almost three times Carter's number. In 1980, Ronald Reagan's 48 percent represented a big drop for a Republican, but Jimmy Carter received only 22 percent. John Anderson had to scrape along on only 4 percent of the circulation.

Of the two papers regarded as the most influential, the *Washington Post* most often declared itself neutral. While favoring Republicans four times since 1932, the *Post* was neutral seven times, and backed Democrats three times—Lyndon Johnson (1964), Jimmy Carter (1980), and Walter Mondale (1984). As for the *New York Times*, the other big endorsement politicos yearn for, its support of Walter Mondale in 1984 marked the ninth time since 1932 that it had blessed a Democrat. Its Republican endorsements were for Wendell Willkie in 1940, Thomas E. Dewey in 1948, and Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. The *Times* was neutral in 1944, when FDR made his bid for a fourth term.

Republican Media Elite?

Rare indeed is the politician who doesn't welcome and express gratitude for a newspaper endorsement. "When you get an endorsement for Mondale from prestigious papers like the *New York Times*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the *Louisville Courier*, and the *St. Petersburg Times*, that carries weight," says Scott Widmeyer, deputy press secretary in the Mondale-Ferraro campaign.

But Widmeyer adds that "endorsements don't deliver votes." He is quite right. Consider the eight winning Democratic presidential candidates since 1932, and the weight of the editorial support for their opponents.

Franklin D. Roosevelt won large victories each time he ran—from the depth of the Great Depression through the worst of World War II—and each time his Republican opponent won a comfortable majority of those newspapers making endorsements or statements of support.

Harry S Truman was literally swamped in the endorsement game. Truman won approval from only 15 percent of the papers *E & P* polled, while Dewey won 65 percent. The largest, most powerful, and influential papers were for Dewey: the *New York Times*, the *New York Daily News*, the *Chicago Tribune*, every paper in Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, and San Francisco. The list went on. The *Chicago Sun Times* backed Truman, but both St. Louis papers, including the Democratic-tilted *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, favored Dewey.

John F. Kennedy had nearly as rough a time as Truman. Kennedy gleaned endorsements from only 16 percent of the circulation, whereas Nixon's endorsements came from 58 percent of the papers representing

71 percent of the circulation. Jimmy Carter was no favorite of publishers, either. His endorsements came from 12 percent of the papers with 23 percent of the circulation. In fact, in Carter's home state, Georgia, Ford won twelve daily newspaper endorsements, compared to Carter's eight. But in Michigan, Ford won 14 endorsements, and Carter got one—the *Detroit Free Press.*

The sole Democrat to win a majority of editorial endorsements was Lyndon B. Johnson. His contest with Goldwater moved a total of 445 dailies to endorse him, while his opponent, the New Apostle of Conservatism, got 368. It was apparently so difficult for publishers to endorse a Democrat that 238 marked themselves as Independent in 1964, and 639 indicated no choice in that lopsided election. Interestingly enough, many traditional Republican papers—the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Washington Star* being prime examples—endorsed the 1964 Democratic nominee to protest the Goldwater candidacy. At that, Johnson got 62 percent of the circulation; Goldwater, 21; and 17 percent were uncommitted.

Democrats shouldn't be optimistic about acquiring presidential endorsements from the nation's dailies. But Republicans shouldn't expect to get their customary lopsided margins of support, either. With the present strong trend for papers to be neutral on presidential endorsements, it is unlikely in the near future that G.O.P. candidates will enjoy the 80 percent of the circulation support that Eisenhower did in 1952 (933 papers), or the 77 percent that Nixon did in 1972.

The Kings and the Power

Newspapers have simply become less partisan and predictable. A look at *E & P*'s compilations shows that a large majority of dailies in the South consistently backed Roosevelt and then Truman, when he ran in 1948. Even publishers in the Old Confederacy harbored misgivings about Yankee Republicans until Eisenhower and Nixon came along.

In recent elections, the majority of Southern papers have endorsed the Republicans. The *Atlanta Constitution,* unequaled as a major voice in that region, is a notable exception. It has endorsed the Democratic nominee in twelve of the fourteen presidential elections since 1932. This year, it was right in form, and endorsed Mondale.

There was a time when a "chain" or "group" of newspapers followed the divinely issued order from its president or president/tycoon on whom to endorse. Thus, the Hearst newspapers, on orders from William Randolph Hearst, enthusiastically backed FDR in 1932. But by 1936, Bill Hearst was disillusioned with his hero. The word went out to endorse Landon, and the obedient Hearstling editors did.

As long as Colonel Robert R. McCormick was publisher of the *Chicago Tribune,* there was no need to look at the editorial page for the presidential endorsement. It was automatically Republican. Nowadays, the *Tribune* endorses many Democrats for state and local offices, and its endorsements of Republican presidential aspirants are often tentative.

In endorsing Reagan in 1984, the *Tribune* criticized his "refusal to accept a linkage between the federal deficit and economic instability as threatening to bankrupt America and severely damage the free world economy." The *Tribune* also said Reagan's "ignorance" about the Soviet Union and his "air-headed" rhetoric on foreign policy issues was an "embarrassment" to the U.S. and "a danger to world peace." Some endorsement. The *Tribune* explained that it favored Reagan only because his philosophy of government results in less government growth, hence, less government intrusion than would Walter Mondale's.

The Chicago Tribune Co. owns several other papers, therefore it is a group. But there is no telling whom these other papers would endorse, because each has editorial autonomy. The same holds true for even larger collections of dailies owned by Gannett, Newhouse, Knight-Ridder, Times-Mirror, and Scripps-Howard. Once, Gannett's papers seemed to endorse the Republican presidential candidate uniformly, but no more.

The McClatchey newspaper group, particularly its "Bee" papers in California, have steadfastly endorsed the Democratic nominee. Thus, they are an anomaly.

Plenty of Nothing

One wonders why newspapers endorse at all? After all, there must be some discomfiture when the newspaper is out of tune with the electorate, and that is the case more often than not. The *New York Times* has ridden with seven winners and the same number of losers since 1932, but right or wrong, it is the *New York Times* speaking.

The reason newspapers continue the practice probably lies in the deep-rooted notion that an industry protected by the First Amendment should express its opinion on public interest matters, including the selection of the president.

"Newspapers endorse as part of their watchdog role," says John Consoli, who monitors endorsements as *E & P*'s news editor. "They feel they watch candidates and campaigns closer than the public does, and therefore have more insight into the election. They feel they are a mediator between the voters and the candidates, and should express their opinion.

"We compile their endorsements as a service to the industry. Publishers are a lot like little kids on this —they want to see what other papers do, and they have a keen interest in our compilation. This year, for instance, there was a rumor going around publishers that the *New York Daily News* might endorse Mondale because its new publisher, James Hoge, leans that way. But the *News* endorsed Reagan."

Still, Consoli acknowledges that "newspaper endorsements don't carry that much weight. People are unlikely in this day and age to turn to the editorial to

read the endorsement, and then vote that way. They did more of this years ago before television. Television forms their impressions of a candidate far more than any newspaper endorsement."

John Buckley, assistant press secretary of the Reagan-Bush campaign, agrees. "Few endorsements influence very many people," he says. "But a few endorsements can make a difference. I'm thinking of the *New York Daily News* because of its concentrated New York readership, and the *New York Times* because of its leadership among papers."

Scott Widmeyer, his counterpart at Mondale-Ferraro headquarters, says newspaper endorsements have been downgraded in impact just as all endorsements have, whether they come from labor unions, organizations, or prominent persons. "People are just more independent these days," he explains.

But hope always lurks in the hearts of even the most jaded politician, and an endorsement can light up that hope. Candidates' voices rise when they mention their endorsements, as if such publisher/editor support certifies and ordains them to the office they seek.

Then there is the claim by John P. Robinson, a University of Michigan journalism professor, that the overwhelming support Nixon received in 1968 by newspaper coverage and endorsements might well have elected him.

"The largely pro-Nixon coverage carried by the newspapers in 1968 was associated with some differential in the vote to the advantage of the Republican candidate."

Robinson's computations, based on a national probability sample of 1,346 Americans 21 years of age and older, showed that voters exposed to pro-Nixon newspapers were six percent less likely to vote for Humphrey, when several other determinants of the vote were held statistically constant.

While conceding that the public ranked television as its most important campaign news source, Robinson noted "far more report having voted for the candidate espoused by the newspaper than by the other media." Robinson concluded that newspapers had their greatest effect on the less committed. In the close election of 1968, the uncommitted vote was crucial.

When Nixon made his well-received speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last spring, he cracked that he had never had the media with him in a single election campaign. *E & P* immediately took issue, and cited the lopsided percentages of editorial support he had enjoyed in his three presidential campaigns. Nixon then clarified his observation (he didn't want to end this new honeymoon too quickly) by writing *E & P* that he was referring "primarily to television reporters and a number of newspaper reporters as well who took a different position from their publishers."

Ah, there's the rub, and perhaps Michigan's Professor Robinson should have made a clear distinction between endorsements and/or support, and day-to-day news coverage and editorial page treatment.

"We don't slant our news," the *Washington Post*'s executive editor Ben Bradlee once said. "We just decide what to cover."

Indeed, a newspaper can focus on one or two dimensions of a candidate and his or her program, and thus provide coverage that the candidate will condemn as biased. The same newspaper's editorial page might also be hammering away at the candidate's views. But on the eve of the election, the publisher or even a majority of the editorial board members might reluctantly endorse that very same candidate.

Beyond Endorsements

Publishers are stellar members of the power establishment. They rub elbows with the top people in business and industry, as well as with educators, labor leaders, and even some social activists. But their exposure is nearly always with establishment people. Publishers also worry about the bottom line, and therefore view with considerable skepticism Democratic proposals claiming to rectify economic wrongs. Small wonder, then, that a majority of publishers consistently go for the Republican candidate.

Some go even beyond that. A small ruckus developed in the newspaper industry this fall over an organization of publishers, calling itself "Newspaper Friends of Reagan-Bush," which disseminated "informational materials" on the G.O.P. ticket to small dailies and weeklies.

"Newspaper Friends" was comprised of about 50 publishers of small community newspapers. It was headed by George Measer, head of Bee Publications and publisher of eight weeklies with a combined paid and free circulation of 35,000 in suburban Buffalo.

"I believe that people should be involved in the political process," said Measer, "and I've heard so many publishers complain about the political process, saying they're afraid of what might happen if Reagan didn't get it for another four years."

Well, before the uproar subsided, there were righteous warnings that the very freedom of the press was being jeopardized by these small-town publisher believers in Reagan-Bush; cherished editorial integrity was at stake. The best argument was that it is one thing for a publisher to endorse, and quite another to distribute campaign propaganda (informational materials) to a network of newspapers, however modest their circulations.

In any case, it is doubtful that "Newspaper Friends" swung the election—regardless of their endorsements and campaign materials.

Given the itch to express opinion that exists in the newspaper industry, the sense of power most publishers feel, and the horserace (tout sheet) aspect of American presidential elections, it is very likely that newspaper endorsements of presidential candidates will continue for a long time, even if their influence is negligible. ☑



by Tom W. Smith and Paul B. Sheatsley

American Attitudes toward Race Relations

Presidential elections are usually occasions for national pride and at least some stirrings of patriotism. Our sometimes unseemly—but usually undramatic—democracy rolls on, replacing president after president without major disruptions. Yet, this year, in certain postelection analyses, we have heard a note that, if true, would subtract from our self-congratulation. CBS's Bill Moyers, for one, bemoaned this election as one of the most racially divisive in recent memory.

In 1960, the Republicans could claim about one-third of the black vote. By 1984, only one out of ten black Americans supported Ronald Reagan, and blacks provided Walter Mondale more than one-quarter of his support, up from about one-fifth in 1980. Reflecting their electoral fortunes at the presidential level, the Democrats have received a majority of the white vote only once since 1948. But what does all this mean? Because blacks and whites tend to vote differently, does this make us a racist society?

In 1942 Gunnar Myrdal finished his seminal work on race relations, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. Up to this point it had been easy for many to live comfortably with what Myrdal described as the contradictions between our noble pronouncement that "all men are created equal" and the segregation of and discrimination against black Americans. As Ronald Reagan noted during the 1980 presidential debate, those years preceding Myrdal's book were a time "when this country didn't even know it had a racial problem." Signalling a new sense of things, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Denver (now at the University of Chicago) conducted the first national survey of white attitudes toward blacks in 1942, and continued investigating race relations in over a dozen different surveys over the next four decades.

Looking over this forty-year span, we are struck by the steady, massive growth in racial tolerance. In the early forties, segregation was deeply entrenched in virtually every important institution and organization from major league baseball to the armed services. These institutional barriers to equality reflected the ignorance, mistrust, and feelings of superiority that generally dwelt in white Americans' minds. Forty years later, we find that every *de jure* and many *de facto* manifestations of racism and segregation have disappeared. Equally impressive have been the changes that have occurred in the sphere of "folkways," which educator and social scientist William Graham Sumner had considered almost impervious to adaptation.

We have only a single attitude measure that spans the entire forty years, but it deals with a crucial area

Table 1

Question: Do you think white students and (Negro/black) students should go to the same schools or separate schools?

	Black/white students should go to the same schools
1942	30%
1956	49
1956	49
1956	48
1963	63
1963	62
1964	62
1964	60
1965	67
1965	68
1970	74
1972	85
1972	83
1976	83
1977	86
1980	86
1982	88
1984	90

Note: White respondents.

of racial attitudes—school integration—and, as we will see, it reflects general changes in race relations (see table 1).

In 1942, only 30 percent of whites thought that blacks and whites should attend the same schools. Since then, support for integrated schools has grown nearly 1.5 percentage points per year. By 1977, a pro-integration consensus of more than 85 percent had emerged. The most striking features of this trend are: (1) its massive magnitude, moving from a solid pro-segregation majority to an overwhelming pro-integration consensus; (2) its long duration, continuing over four decades; and (3) its steady relentless pace.

The trend on school desegregation was echoed by answers to numerous other questions on race relations (see table 2). Acceptance of a black neighbor who has

Table 2

Question: If a (Negro/black) with the same income and education as you have moved into your block, would it make any difference to you?

Generally speaking, do you think there should be separate sections for (Negroes/blacks) on streetcars and buses?

Do you think (Negroes/blacks) should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?

	"Equal" black neighbor okay	Same streetcar, bus okay	Hire equally
1942 (NORC)	35%	44%	—
1944 (NORC)	—	—	42%
1946 (NORC)	—	—	47
1956 (NORC)	52	60	—
1963 (SRS)	61	—	—
1963 (SRS)	65	77	83
1964 (SRS)	64	—	—
1965 (SRS)	68	—	—
1965 (SRS)	75	—	—
1966 (SRS)	69	—	87
1970 (SRS)	76	88	—
1972 (GSS)	84	—	96

Note: White respondents.

'When we pointed out the faults of busing, the government came up with a new plan.'



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

by Everett Carll Ladd

Mitterrand at Midpoint

In 1981, after twenty-three years of center-right rule, France elected a Socialist president—François Mitterrand. Reactions were predictably intense. Stories about capital fleeing France, four-star restaurants closing their doors, and a new solidarity among the working classes (a second French Revolution) filled pages of press accounts about the new regime. Three and one-half years of Socialist rule have done little to temper sentiments. Scion of wealth and power Baron de Rothschild has written an autobiography that excoriates Mitterrand's regime, to the apparent delight of French readers who kept the book on the best-seller list for weeks. French actor Yves Montand—recently converted to politics and to supply-side economics (remind you of anyone?)—now excites wide audiences with his anti-Socialist pronouncements.

These anecdotal indicators aside, how do the French view Socialist rule? A brief review of current French opinion appears on pages 32-37 of this issue.

The data we show point out the extent to which Mitterrand's and the Socialist party's fortunes have declined since they took office. In the face of mounting economic problems, only a fifth of the French public in an April 1984 survey by BVA rated the Socialists' rule as "positive" in its accomplishments, while three-fifths called it negative. Other questions show the same

(Continued on page 41)

The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research has just concluded an agreement with the French survey organization Brulé Ville Associés (BVA). Under this agreement, the extensive and highly regarded opinion studies that BVA conducts will be deposited in the Roper archive and thus be readily available to researchers here in the United States. In the future, we hope to feature additional BVA data in *Public Opinion*, with data from other French survey organizations including the Société Française d'Enquêtes par Sondages (SOFRES) and the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP), and from comparable organizations across Western Europe.

ETHNICITY IN AMERICA

Nathan Glazer analyzes the data in "The Structure of Ethnicity" on page 2.

Question: Were you born in this country?



Note: 1982, 1983, 1984 combined. Jewish responses = 82%, 19%.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Demographic Details

FATHER'S EDUCATION

Question: What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that your father finished and got credit for?



Jewish responses = 39%, 26%, 9%, 26%.

AND ONE'S OWN

Question: What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that you finished or got credit for?



Jewish responses = 8%, 18%, 29%, 45%.

Note: 1982, 1983, 1984 combined.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

OCCUPATION

Question: What kind of work do you (did you normally) do? That is, what (is/was) your job called?



Jewish responses = 25%, 46%, 23%, 0%, 7%, 0%.

Note: * = less than .5%. 1982, 1983, 1984 combined.

INCOME

Question: In which of these groups did your total *family* income from all sources fall last year, before taxes, that is?

By family income:

	Under $10,000	$10-14,999	$15-19,999	$20-24,999	$25-34,999	$35-49,999	$50,000 and over
National	26%	16%	11%	13%	15%	11%	8%
Black	45	16	10	9	11	6	2
English/Scottish/ Welsh	19	15	10	14	16	14	13
Italian	16	13	15	14	22	10	11
East European/ Soviet Union	18	15	10	14	18	16	10
Scandinavian	22	19	12	15	13	11	7
German/Austrian	21	15	12	14	17	13	8
American Indian	28	19	14	11	13	11	5
French/French Canadian	17	15	11	18	17	12	10
Irish	20	19	11	14	15	14	8
Catholic Irish	15	15	10	10	21	16	13
Protestant Irish	22	21	12	17	10	12	5
Hispanic	34	23	10	10	15	5	4

Jewish responses = 15%, 7%, 8%, 7%, 18%, 23%, 22%.

REGION

By region:

	New England	Middle Atlantic	East North Central	West North Central	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	Mountain	Pacific
National	5%	16%	21%	8%	18%	8%	8%	5%	12%
Black	1	16	20	4	28	13	10	*	9
English/Scottish/ Welsh	5	12	16	7	21	9	6	9	16
Italian	15	41	16	3	8	*	4	5	9
East European/ Soviet Union	6	31	36	3	6	1	6	4	7
Scandinavian	3	4	34	26	6	1	1	9	16
German/Austrian	2	17	29	14	13	4	6	5	10
American Indian	2	7	12	7	22	16	15	7	12
French/French Canadian	27	9	18	8	11	2	7	2	15
Irish	6	12	16	9	19	8	11	4	15
Catholic Irish	13	23	21	11	12	4	4	2	11
Protestant Irish	2	6	13	8	25	9	16	6	15
Hispanic	1	21	8	2	5	*	31	9	25

Jewish responses = 3%, 50%, 8%, 5%, 11%, 2%, 3%, 3%, 16%.

Note: 1982, 1983, 1984 combined. * = less than .5%. Interviewer coded region.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Question: How many children have you ever had? Please count all that were born alive at any time (including any you had from a previous marriage).



Jewish responses = 32%, 14%, 38%, 12%, 2%, 3%.

RELIGION

Question: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?



Note: * = less than .5%. 1982, 1983, 1984 combined.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

SOCIAL CLASS

Question: If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?



Jewish responses = 0%, 12%, 78%, 10%.

Note: * = less than .5%. 1982, 1983, 1984 combined.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME

Question: Do you speak a language other than English at home?



Source: Data from the 1980 Census, compiled by Edith McArthur for *American Demographics*, October 1984, pp. 32-33.

Political Beliefs

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?



Note: Catholic German/Austrian = 42%, 21%, 37%; Protestant German/Austrian = 25%, 39%, 36%. For American Indian N = 98. Jewish responses = 50%, 15%, 35%.

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?



Note: 1982, 1983, 1984 combined. Catholic German/Austrian = 19%, 47%, 34%; Protestant German/Austrian = 18%, 43%, 40%. For American Indian, N = 83.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys. Jewish response = 39%, 28%, 33%.

Satisfaction

. . . WITH LIFE

Question: Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?



Jewish responses = 33%, 55%, 12%.

. . . WITH MARRIAGE

Question: Taking things all together, how would you describe your marriage? Would you say that your marriage is very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?



Jewish responses = 61%, 33%, 5%.

. . . WITH FINANCIAL SITUATION

Question: We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?



Jewish responses = 42%, 40%, 18%.

Note: 1982, 1983, 1984 combined.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Cultural

Question: Are there any situations that you can imagine in which you would approve of a man punching an adult male stranger? Would you approve of a man punching a stranger who: . . . Had hit the man's child after the child accidentally damaged the stranger's car? . . . Was beating up a woman and the man saw it? . . . Had broken into the man's house?



Jewish response = 63%. Jewish response = 90%. Jewish response = 87%.

Question: Do you ever have occasion to use any alcoholic beverages such as liquor, wine, or beer, or are you a total abstainer?



Jewish response = 85%.

Note: 1980, 1983, 1984 combined.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Attitudes

Questions: Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Do you believe in life after death?



Note: 1980, 1983, 1984 combined.

Questions: Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?

If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life, would you continue to work or would you stop working? (Asked of those currently working or temporarily not at work.)



Note: 1980, 1983, 1984 combined.

Note: 1980, 1982, 1984 combined.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Role of

Question: Now look at Card OO. Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions in between. . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Jewish responses = 31%, 45%, 24% (N=70).

Note: 1983 and 1984 combined. French/French Canadian = 20%, 36%, 43%. N = 80.

Question: I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at Card NN. Some people think the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5. . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Jewish responses = 29%, 52%, 20% (N=70).

Note: 1983 and 1984 combined. French/French Canadian = 23%, 55%, 23%. N = 84.

Question: Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?



Jewish responses = 33%, 21%, 46%.

Note: 1980, 1983, and 1984 combined. French/French Canadian = 49%, 18%, 33%; American Indian = 44%, 20%, 36%.

Government

Question: Now look at Card QQ. Some people think that (Blacks/Negroes) have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to (Blacks/Negroes). . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Jewish responses = 29%, 52%, 20% (N=70).

Note: 1983 and 1984 combined. French/French Canadian = 13%, 34%, 53%. N = 85.

Question: Look at Card PP. In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Jewish responses = 57%, 25%, 18% (N=70).

Note: 1983 and 1984 combined. French/French Canadian = 46%, 38%, 16%. N = 85.

Question: Do you consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay as too high, about right, or too low?



Jewish responses = 78%, 21% (N=70).

Note: "Too low" and "Pay no income taxes (vol.)" not shown. 1980, 1982, and 1984 combined. French/French Canadian = 61%, 39%; American Indian = 76%, 24%.

Social

1. Would allow racist to speak



2. Would allow Communist to speak



3. Would allow militarist to speak



4. Favor having to obtain a police permit to buy a gun



5. Homeowner can decide to whom to sell house



Jewish responses for question 1. 66% (N=97) 2. 81% (N=97) 3. 67% (N=97) 4. 92% (N=97) 5. 45% 6. 81% 7. 78% 8. 82% 9. 15% (N=81).

1. There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. . . . Or, consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not? (1980, 1982, 1984 combined)

2. . . . Now I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not? (1980, 1982, 1984 combined)

3. . . . Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak, or not? (1980, 1982, 1984 combined)

4. Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun? (1980, 1982, 1984 combined)

5. Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to Blacks. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for? (1980, 1983, 1984 combined)

Issues

6. Favor death penalty for murder



7. Yes, a woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion for any reason



8. Yes, a pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children



9. Premarital sex always/almost always wrong



6. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (1982, 1983, 1984 combined)

7. Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason? (1982, 1983, 1984 combined)

8. Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children? (1982, 1983, 1984 combined)

9. There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? (1982, 1983 combined)

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Opportunity

Question: Here are different opinions about social differences in this country. Please tell me for each one whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. (Read each statement.) . . .

. . . America has an open society. What one achieves in life no longer depends on one's family background, but on the abilities one has and the education one acquires.



. . . In the United States there are still great differences between social levels, and what one can achieve in life depends mainly upon one's family background.



. . . Differences in social standing between people are acceptable because they basically reflect what people made out of the opportunities they had.



. . . Only if differences in income and social standing are large enough is there an incentive for individual effort.



Note: The questions we show here were asked by NORC for the first time in 1984. Because it isn't possible in these cases to combine responses from several surveys we have a very limited number of cases for one ethnic group: there were just 88 respondents of East European/Soviet background.

Question: On these cards are some opinions about the government and the economy. For each one, I'd like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. . . .

. . . All in all, one can live well in America.



. . . In our society everyone must look out for himself. It is of little use to unite with others and fight for one's goals in politics or in unions.



Question: Does everyone in this country have an opportunity to obtain an education corresponding to their abilities and talents?



Question: Here are different opinions about social differences in this country. Please tell me for each one whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. . . . Personal income should not be determined solely by one's work. Rather, everybody should get what he/she needs to provide a decent life for his/her family.



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

FRANCE UNDER THE SOCIALISTS

AN ADMINISTRATION IN TROUBLE

Question: Three years ago, the left came to power. On the whole, would you say that the experience of socialist power in France at the end of three years is rather positive or rather negative?



Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés (BVA) conducted for *Paris Match*, latest that of April 16-22, 1984.

Public Opinion Senior Editor Everett Ladd's article on current opinion in France appears on page 16

Question: All in all, would you say that the election of François Mitterrand was a good or bad thing for . . . France? . . . People like you?



Question: Would you say that the socialists' rule: . . . Unites the French or divides them? . . . Deals first with political and economic realities or tries first of all to impose its ideology? . . .



Source: Surveys by BVA for *Paris Match*, latest that of April 16-22, 1984.

Approval of the President and the Government

Question: Do you have complete confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in François Mitterrand to resolve the problems facing France today? (SOFRES) What is your opinion of Mr. François Mitterrand as President of the Republic? (BVA) Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. François Mitterrand as President of the Republic? (IFOP)



Source: Surveys by Sofres, BVA, and IFOP, latest that of October 1984.

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way France is governed?



Source: Survey by BVA, for *Paris Match*, latest that of October 1984.

What's Ahead?

Question: Among the following personalities, which one would be the best candidate to represent the Majority party in the case of a presidential election?

Government supporters' choice for best candidate



Note: The national responses were 40% Rocard, 14% Delors, 12% Mitterrand, 4% Mauroy, 3% Marchais.

Question: Among the following personalities, which one would be the best candidate to represent the Opposition party in the case of a presidential election?

Opposition party supporters' choice for best candidate



Note: The national responses were 24% Chirac, 23% Barré, 14% Veil, 11% Giscard D'Estaing, 4% Le Pen.

Source: Surveys by BVA for *Paris Match*, latest that of June 23-29, 1984.

Question: Do you think that if he were president of the Republic, (name candidate) would do better, not as well, or about the same as Mr. François Mitterrand?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, June 23-29, 1984.

Question: Suppose that next Sunday new legislative elections would be held and that the following parties would be represented in your district. For which of these parties would there be the greatest probability of your voting if you had to choose next Sunday?



Note: The total vote for the right has gone from 47% in January to 56% in June. The total vote for the left has gone from 51% to 38% in the same period.

Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, June 23-29, 1984.

ENTER LAURENT FABIUS

Question: Do you have confidence in Laurent Fabius? . . . For modernizing France? . . . For uniting the French?



Question: Do you find that Laurent Fabius speaks the traditional language of politicians or that he speaks a new language?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, August 21-23, 1984.

THE DEPARTURE OF THE COMMUNISTS

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the departure of the Communist Ministers?



Question: The new government now includes only socialists and leftist radicals; for you, is this a strength or a weakness?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, August 21-23, 1984.

REGIME STILL STRONG

Question: At present, do you think that the . . . has [have] too much power, not enough power, or just the right amount of power?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, July 19, 1984.

Question: I am going to cite different elements of institutions of the Fifth Republic. Tell me for each one of them if you think it is indispensable to the smooth functioning of our institutions?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, July 19, 1984.

VIVE DE GAULLE!

Question: In your opinion, who was the best president of the Fifth Republic?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, May 10, 1984.

EDUCATION IN FRANCE: THE PUBLIC'S VIEW

Question: In your opinion, who has the principal responsibility for the education of children?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, May 30, 1984.

Question: If you had a choice, would you put your children in a public or private school?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, September 29, 1983.

In 1981, the French Socialist party proposed a law to replace the country's current educational system of public schools and government-supported private Catholic schools with a government-run lay educational system. Although the plan has been modified, it continues to generate intense controversy in France.

Question: Are you for or against the existence of private education in France?



Question: Between public and private schools, which one, in your view surpasses the other concerning . . .:



Question: Are you for or against maintaining public aid to private schools?



Source: Survey by BVA for *Paris Match*, September 29, 1983.

SEE HOW

REAGAN VS. MONDALE TRIAL HEATS

	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH		APRIL	
GALLUP (registered voters)						
Trial	48R 47M	52R 42M	50R 45M	52R 44M	54R 41M	52R 44M
Margin	1R	10R	5R	8R	13R	8R
Date	(1/13-16)	(2/10-13)	(3/2-6)	(3/16-19)	(4/6-9)	(4/11-15)
HARRIS (likely voters)		54R 42M 12R (1/12-15 + 2/9-11)	55R 41M 14R (3/1-3)	57R 37M 20R (3/15-17)		
ABC News/ *Washington Post* (registered voters)	49R 46M 3R (1/12-17)	50R 45M 5R (2/13-15)				
PENN + SCHOEN/ *GARTH ANALYSIS* (registered voters)		54R 38M 16R (2/8-12)				
CBS News/ *New York Times* (registered voters)	48R 32M 16R (1/14-21)	49R 37M 12R (2/21-25)	50R 33M 17R (3/5-8)	51R 31M 20R (3/21-24)	48R 35M 13R (4/23-26)	
ROPER (certain registered voters)			47R 40M 7R (3/17-24)			47R 40M 7R (4/18-28)
Los Angeles Times (registered voters)		50R 42M 8R (2/4-9)				53R 41M 12R (4/28-5/3)
TIME/ YANKELOVICH (registered voters)		51R 41M 10R (1/31-2/2)				
GORDON BLACK/ *USA TODAY*		57R 35M 22R (2/17-21)	54R 34M 20R (3/2-6)	54R 35M 19R (3/13-17)		54R 39M 15R (4/26-5/2)
GALLUP/ *NEWSWEEK* (registered voters)			54R 42M 12R (3/1-2)			
NBC News (likely voters)			60R 34M 26R (3/8-11)			

THEY RAN



				DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION JULY 16-19		REPUBLICAN CONVENTION AUGUST 20-23		
MAY		JUNE		JULY		AUGUST		SEPTEMBER
50R 46M 4R (5/3-5)	53R 42M 11R (5/18-21)	53R 44M 9R (6/6-8)	56R 37M* 19R (6/22-25)	53R 39M 14R (7/13-16)	53R 41M* 12R (7/27-30)	52R 41M* 11R (8/10-13)		55R 40M* 15R (9/7-9)
		56R 41M 15R (6/7-11)		52R 44M 8R (7/2-7)	50R 48M* 2R (7/20-24)	54R 42M* 12R (8/5-9)	55R 40M* 15R (8/24-25)	55R 42M* 13R (9/5-9)
51R 43M 8R (5/16-22)				51R 44M 7R (7/5-8)				56R 40M* 16R (9/7-11)
		52R 39M 13R (6/12-17)						
			50R 35M 15R (6/23-28)	52R 34M 18R (7/12)		54R 38M* 16R (8/5-9)		57R 35M* 22R (9/12-16)
	48R 40M 8R (5/29-6/3)			49R 40M 9R (7/7-14)				52R 37M* 15R (9/15-22)
						59R 36M* 23R (8/25-30)		
						53R 39M* 14R (8/7-9)		61R 31M* 30R (9/11-13)
	58R 35M 23R (5/29-6/1)							57R 35M* 22R (9/4-11)
				49R 43M* 6R (7/12-13)	46R 48M* 2M (7/19-20)			57R 39M* 18R (9/6-9)
				60R 33M* 27R (7/8-10)		58R 35M* 23R (8/12-14)		62R 32M* 30R (9/9-11)

Note: Unless otherwise noted, samples were of adults nationwide and question referred to Reagan vs. Mondale.

* = Reagan/Bush vs. Mondale/Ferraro.

	SEPTEMBER*			OCTOBER*			NOVEMBER*	
Gallup	57R 39M 18R (9/21-24)	56R 39M 17R (9/28-30)		58R 38M 20R (10/15-17)			57R 40M 17R (10/26-28)	59R 41M 18R (11/2-3)
Harris	55R 42M 13R (9/21-25)			53R 44M 9R (10/12-14)		56R 42M 14R (10/22-23)	58R 40M 18R (10/26-29)	55R 43M 12R (11/1-3)
ABC/*WP*		55R 37M 18R (9/22-10/2)	55R 37M 18R (10/2-7)	56R 41M 15R (10/8-9)	54R 42M 12R (10/12-16)	54R 42M 12R (10/22-23)		57R 39M 18R (10/29-11/1)
P+S/Garth								54R 40M 14R (11/3-5)
CBS/*NYT*		59R 33M 26R (9/30-10/4)	58R 38M 20R (10/9)	59R 33M 26R (10/14-17)	56R 40M 16R (10/21)	56R 37M 19R (10/23-25)		58R 37M 21R (10/31-11/3)
Roper								53R 43M 10R (10/27-11/3)
LAT			57R 39M 18R (10/4-6)	56R 39M 17R (10/12-14)				
Time/YSW						54R 30M 24R (10/22-24)		
GB/*USAT*		60R 35M 25R (9/25-10/1)		61R 36M 25R (10/14-18)	61R 34M 27R (10/21)	59R 36M 23R (10/25-27)		60R 35M 25R (11/1-4)
G/*N*						57R 40M 17R (10/22-24)		
NBC				60R 35M 25R (10/14-16)			58R 34M 24R (10/26-28)	

Note: There are two additional Gallup points not shown on this chart. In June and early July they were 51R 43M (6/29-7/2) and 54R 38M (7/6-9).
*All questions on this page included vice presidential candidates.

(Continued from page 16)

level of criticism. Sixty-three percent of those polled last April said that the Socialists had served to divide the French, while only 18 percent thought Socialist rule had been unifying. Opinion polls taken over the last three years show a sharp, largely uninterrupted decline in President Mitterrand's personal popularity or standing with the French electorate—a decline that has continued into this fall (see page 33).

The flip side of the government's weakness is the opposition's strength. In June 1984, BVA asked a national sample how they would vote in an election for the French Parliament if one were to be held immediately. Fifty-six percent said they would vote for one of the opposition parties of the right, and only 38 percent for the Socialists, Communists, or a minor left party. More people would vote for the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR, the Gaullist alliances led by Jacques Chirac), than for any other party.

The Communists have experienced a long-term loss of support, and now their backing in the French electorate is just half as great as it was during the Fourth Republic (1946 - 1958). Their losses among blue-collar workers are striking. According to data from the big national exit poll taken by BVA following the June 1984 vote for representatives of the European Parliament, only one-fourth of the workers would vote Communist in the next elections for Parliament (see table 1). More is at work here, of course, than just a decline of Communist sentiment in France. In general, class lines in voting are weakening. Only 60 percent of the workers interviewed in the June exit poll said they would vote for *any* party of the left in the next parliamentary election. A similar disintegration of working-class solidarity is evident in recent elections in Britain, where the Labour party has seen a marked erosion of its working-class, trade union base.

Looking to shift direction in economic policy and convey a new face to the electorate, Mitterrand appointed a number of new ministers in the spring of 1984. The most important change was to install Laurent Fabius as prime minister instead of Pierre Mauroy. Just thirty-seven years old, and speaking the language of managerial expertise rather than that of traditional Socialist ideology, Fabius was initially well received by the French public. Sixty-seven percent told BVA interviewers in August of 1984 that his youth was an advantage, compared to just 14 percent who felt it was a handicap. Fabius is the first French head of government to be born after the war. By a margin of two-to-one, respondents felt that Fabius spoke a "langage nouveau" rather than a "langage traditionel des hommes politiques." Vive la différence!

The most interesting finding of the polling on the recent controversy over education and church schools in France (see page 37) is the similarity of the French response to what we see in the area of public versus private education here in the United States. French citizens certainly aren't unsupportive of public education, but they think the public schools just aren't doing as good a job as they should. Majorities or pluralities of the French give an edge to the private schools in discipline, in the quality of teachers, in instruction on ethics, and in overall achievement.

Table 1

BULL/BVA EXIT POLL

VOTE INTENTION FOR NEXT LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN FRANCE

Would vote:	Extreme left	Communist party	Socialist party	M.R.G.	Ecologie	R.P.R.	U.D.F.	Extreme right
Total	2.1%	11.9%	25.2%	1.9%	4.5%	33.4%	14.6%	6.4%
By sex:								
Men	2.6	14.4	24.7	2.0	3.8	30.6	13.9	8.0
Women	1.6	9.5	25.7	1.9	5.1	36.2	15.2	4.9
By age:								
18-24 years old	2.3	11.0	26.1	1.5	9.4	26.4	16.0	7.3
25-34	3.8	—	—	1.9	5.1	28.0	11.6	6.2
35-49	2.3	12.9	—	2.2	5.0	32.4	13.8	7.1
50-64	1.3	—	—	—	3.8	36.3	14.4	6.9
65 and older	1.0	—	—	—	—	38.9	18.4	4.8
By profession:								
Farmer	1.7	7.6	11.4	1.4	2.1	49.7	17.3	8.9
Self-employed	1.1	4.5	15.6	2.1	4.3	42.7	19.8	9.9
High level professional/managerial	4.6	5.1	23.1	3.1	3.4	37.6	17.0	6.1
Middle management	3.7	8.7	28.6	2.3	5.3	30.7	13.6	7.1
White collar	3.1	13.3	27.7	1.6	4.2	29.2	12.7	8.1
Blue collar	2.5	24.4	33.5	1.6	4.6	20.1	8.1	5.2
Service	1.6	18.6	32.2	1.5	7.3	22.9	6.5	9.4
Student	1.9	9.4	25.3	2.0	10.4	25.9	17.9	7.1
Retired	1.0	11.3	23.6	2.2	2.7	38.1	16.2	5.0
Unemployed	1.2	9.2	23.2	1.3	5.3	36.9	17.3	5.5
By vote in last presidential election:								
Mitterrand	3.7	23.3	50.8	2.9	4.8	7.4	3.1	4.0
Giscard d'Estaing	0.5	1.0	2.1	0.8	2.5	59.7	26.3	7.2
Did not vote	1.8	9.5	14.3	2.7	11.0	33.8	14.1	12.7

Note: 7,500 randomly chosen voters as they left 250 representative polling places in metropolitan France on the day of the vote for the European Parliament.

Source: Survey by BULL/BVA, June 17, 1984.

by Andrew Kohut and Nicholas Horrock

Generally Speaking: Surveying the Military's Top Brass

For many American professional military officers, a federal courtroom in New York City has become another battlefield of the Vietnam War. In this room, four-star General William Westmoreland, a former paratrooper with decorations from three wars, is trying to convince a jury that CBS damaged his reputation. The network charged in a January 1982 documentary that Westmoreland had manipulated intelligence reports on enemy strength.

The legal issues of the case are relatively narrow. Two years ago, more than a decade after United States combat troops left South Vietnam, CBS aired a program in which a group of military and Central Intelligence Agency analysts said that estimates of enemy troop strength made at Westmoreland's Saigon headquarters were intentionally reduced in 1967 and early 1968 to make it appear the war was going better than it was. Indeed, according to several of these officials, the figure for Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces being reported to Washington was only half—about 275,000—of the more than half a million fighters they estimated the Communists had in South Vietnam.

Several of these officers said they believed General Westmoreland wanted these figures held down so as not to erode public and administration confidence that the United States could win the war. Westmoreland filed a $120 million libel suit, claiming the CBS charges were untrue, that CBS had known them to be untrue, and that his reputation and honor as an American officer had been tarnished.

In American officers clubs, wardrooms, and Pentagon staff meetings, however, the case has taken on a far broader meaning. The men who run the United States military today were the battalion commanders, squadron leaders, and flotilla officers of General Westmoreland's command a decade and a half ago. They have carried the onerous burden of having fought the only war America lost, even though they had won battle after battle.

To many of them, a victory for William Westmoreland in that New York court will go beyond simply proving that CBS was in error; it will substantiate their belief that most American news reporting during the war itself was misleading, hostile to American interests, and contributed to the loss of the American people's confidence.

Last February, *Newsweek* magazine set out to study beliefs of the American officer corps in the 1980s. As part of the project, the magazine commissioned the first private independent poll of active military officers. Between June 18 and 24, 1984, the Gallup organization interviewed by telephone 257 generals and admirals, more than one out of every four active flag officers stationed in the United States. Generals and admirals from all four service branches participated—93 Army, 56 Navy, 94 Air Force, 14 Marines. The survey covered 110 officers with one star, 113 with two stars, and 34 with three or four stars.

This landmark study quantifies two important phenomena: First, the nearly three million members of the armed forces (including 300,000 officers) are now headed almost exclusively by Vietnam War veterans; 88 percent of the top military echelon served in Vietnam.

Perhaps as a consequence, 59 percent of the officers interviewed in this poll had an unfavorable view of the news media, and disapproval was stronger among men who have "operational assignments," that is, those who would deal with combat.

The *Newsweek*/Gallup poll painted a rich and detailed picture of these top military executives. Though a military commission has long been viewed as a road to upward social mobility, it was still stunning to find that 75 percent of the admirals and generals reported that their social class today is higher than that of their parents' family.

Not unexpectedly, these top military executives were satisfied with the military as a profession. Majorities said they were "totally satisfied" with the amount

of access to superiors (69 percent), the occupational training they receive (70 percent), the opportunity for higher education (58 percent), and their training and preparation for carrying out wartime assignments (61 percent).

But graduates of the military service academies registered less job satisfaction than their colleagues from other educational backgrounds. Only 25 percent of the academy graduates were very satisfied, while 45 percent rated the military as less satisfactory. This seemed to underscore several impressions about changes in the professional military: the service academies have lost some of the lock they once had on the higher echelon posts, yet they still imbue their graduates with greater expectations of success than officers coming from civilian schools.

The poll found military executives dissatisfied with their pay (70 percent), the amount of time they must spend on routine tasks (69 percent), the amount of job stress they experience (53 percent), and the reliability of the vast new high-tech equipment they must use (42 percent).

They relieved these problems and kept trim by jogging (66 percent), playing golf (38 percent), or a racquet sport (37 percent). Their leisure lives seem to reflect the middle-class, small-town heritage that most of them shared. The admirals and generals preferred "easy listening" music (54 percent) over classical (27 percent) or country and western (19 percent); they read novels (54 percent), worked on home repair projects (55 percent), and got their news from a daily paper (65 percent).

General Views

The *Newsweek*/Gallup survey challenges many popular conceptions about attitudes held by America's military leadership. In the post-Vietnam era, the stereotype of the military's thinking on politics and public affairs has been a blend of Curtis Lemay and M*A*S*H 4077's gung-ho generals. In contrast, what emerged from the poll was a right-of-center Republican group that made temperate political evaluations and expressed cautious, moderate views on military policy.

Of course, like most segments of the population, generals and admirals make political evaluations that reflect their self-interest and professional orientation. The principal gauge of political attitudes was the extent to which they thought a political personality or institution believed in military preparedness and power. The answers ranged from Ronald Reagan at the high end (97 percent favorable rating on his support for preparedness) to Jimmy Carter and the nuclear freeze movement at the low end, rated favorably by only 15 percent and 8 percent, respectively. These extremes are noteworthy, but more surprising were those evaluations that fell in the middle.

The women's movement, a symbol of social change and liberalism, had virtually as many supporters (42 percent) as critics (47 percent) among the military's upper echelon, yet so did a longstanding presumed favorite of the top brass, Richard Nixon. The former president's favorable rating of 46 percent just about tied the 44 percent positive evaluation this basically Republican group gave the Congress. It is not surprising that the news media got low marks (32 percent) from flag-rank officers, but the ultraconservative Moral Majority fared no better (31 percent).

The survey clearly indicated that members of America's military establishment think alike when they evaluate the proponents and opponents of military power, but their views diverge rather surprisingly in other areas. The correlates of the military's sociopolitical beliefs are as surprising as the *amount* of diversity observed. Age does not matter—younger (fifties) and older generals (sixties) differ little in their political views—but rank does. Officers with three or four stars tend to hold more moderate views than their more conservative one- or two-star counterparts. Generals and admirals who were educated at the military academies were apt to be somewhat more liberal in their political thinking than those who received their education at other universities. The notable exception is that academy graduates had a less favorable opinion of the women's movement—perhaps because of its impact on their alma maters.

By and large, generals and admirals who came from more modest family backgrounds were the toughest on liberal political figures and institutions. Interestingly, unlike other branches, Marine generals held a positive opinion of the news media—perhaps because it has traditionally helped the Corps sustain its public image.

Giving Peace a Chance

While the poll portrayed the U.S. military leadership as holding somewhat more diverse political/social opinions than anticipated, it showed a uniformity of thinking on geopolitics and military power.

American generals and admirals shared the Reagan administration's assessment that the country's military defenses are stronger today than they were four years ago. Ninety-five percent believed that was the case. This estimation was much more positive than that of the population as a whole—more positive, actually, than was found among Reagan's most ardent supporters in the population at large.

The nation's highest ranking military officers were equally positive in their belief that there is more support at home for the armed forces (97 percent) and greater respect abroad for the United States (80 percent) than has been the case in recent years.

The Reagan administration's emphasis on strengthening the military has probably also affected the generals' and admirals' view about the likelihood of war compared to four years ago. Forty-five percent believed there is less chance today that American military forces will become involved in a war, and only 8 percent think

Table 1
GENERALS AND ADMIRALS ON NUCLEAR WAR

Scary Attitudes		Wary Attitudes		Mixed
36%		51%		13% *
Feel there could be a winner in a nuclear war and could justify a first strike.	10**	There could not be a winner; could not wage tactical nuclear war; could not justify a first strike.	21	
Could not be a winner but could justify first strike.	16			
Could not justify first strike but feel there could be a winner.	10	Could not be a winner; could not justify first strike but feel we can wage tactical nuclear war.	30	

Note: *Percent expressing "don't know" on one or more questions.
**The true hard core among this group (6%) also feel the horror of nuclear war is exaggerated by the nuclear freeze movement.

Table 2
NUCLEAR WAR ATTITUDE CLASSIFICATION

	Scary	Wary	Mixed	Number of Interviews
All generals and admirals	36%	51%	13%	(257)
Age:				
Under 50	34	51	15	(74)
50 and over	37	51	12	(183)
Rank:				
1 star	35	53	13	(110)
2 stars	40	45	15	(113)
3 or 4 stars	29	65	6	(34)
Branch:				
Army	32	53	15	(93)
Navy	30	63	7	(56)
Air Force	45	42	13	(94)
Service Academy Graduate:				
Yes	27	60	13	(95)
No	41	46	13	(162)
Ideology:				
Most conservative	40	46	14	(115)
Conservative	28	58	14	(102)
Moderate liberal	39	53	8	(36)
Career Satisfaction:				
Most	32	60	8	(84)
Middle	36	50	14	(93)
Least	44	42	15	(80)

that the chances have increased. They also believed that chances of avoiding a nuclear war are better today than they were four years ago. A majority (51 percent) think that there is less chance of a nuclear war today, while only 3 percent believe there is a greater chance.

The comfort taken by the military leadership from Reagan administration policies and from the generally more positive political evaluations of the 1980s was evident in the way the top brass assessed the possibilities of conflict in various trouble spots around the world.

Only the possibility of a major conventional war in the Middle East that draws in the superpowers led a majority (66 percent) to express a great deal or a fair amount of concern. Less than a majority—but still a substantial proportion—said they were concerned about U.S. forces being drawn into open conflict in Central America (42 percent) or a conventional attack against United States and Republic of Korea forces on the Korean peninsula (42 percent). Military respondents to the *Newsweek*/Gallup poll expressed limited concern about a conventional attack by Soviet forces across Europe (26 percent) or a conventional attack by Soviet forces and their Vietnamese allies against their neighbors in the Far East (26 percent).

Concern about nuclear conflict under a variety of circumstances was even more limited. A majority (54 percent) expressed a great deal or a fair amount of concern about only one possibility, a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union growing out of a conventional war at some point. But, the admirals and generals were much less concerned about the possibilities of either a nuclear war resulting from the accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon (15 percent) or a direct nuclear attack by the Soviet Union on the United States (16 percent). Indeed, it is on American-Soviet relationships that generals and admirals most belittled popular conceptions of military thinking. Of the 257 flag-rank officers interviewed, only 16 (6 percent) felt that war with the Russians was inevitable.

Not only do the top brass reject the inevitability of conflict with the Soviets, but also most (58 percent) believe America's military objective should be parity with the Soviets, not superiority (35 percent). Military faith in a balance of power also showed up in the 91 percent who felt the chances of a nuclear war increased more by falling behind the Russians in nuclear weaponry than by escalating the arms race. Demographic breakdowns showed little variation in any of these core attitudes by branch of service, rank, age, political orientation, or any number of other categories. The most basic military geopolitical opinions support a balance of power instead of military superiority (or weakness) vis-à-vis the Soviets.

It is in that light that 88 percent of the top military brass surveyed by *Newsweek*/Gallup rated the nuclear freeze movement unfavorably, while most (59 percent) believed the movement did not exaggerate the horrors of a nuclear conflict (34 percent thought it did).

On other nuclear issues, the vast majority took positions that freeze movement members would either agree with or take comfort from. Most (75 percent) thought there could be no winner in a nuclear war. Sixty-five percent could not imagine circumstances under which they could personally justify a nuclear first strike against the Soviets. Nearly three in four believed the United States and the Soviet Union could engage in

conventional war without resorting to nuclear weapons (73 percent).

The only majority opinion on nuclear war that the freeze movement would object to was about whether a war with the Soviets could be limited to tactical nuclear weapons (57 percent of the military leaders thought it could, while 37 percent thought such a war would escalate to all-out war).

To understand better how the military elite thinks about issues, Gallup constructed a typology of expressed opinions about nuclear war, which arrayed the military elite on a scale ranging from those who expressed very cautious attitudes about nuclear war ("wary" attitudes) to those who took the most hawkish view about the use of nuclear weapons ("scary" attitudes) (see table 1). Only 10 percent of those polled held the most hard-line views—feeling there could be a winner in a nuclear war and also that there are situations under which a first strike against the Soviets could be justified. The majority of the sample held more moderate views.

Some of the same patterns found in sociopolitical attitudes reappeared in this analysis. Three- or four-star officers were more dovish than their subordinates as were academy graduates and those who were raised in upper socioeconomic families. Hawks—those holding the most hard-line opinions on nuclear war—were found in the Air Force and Marine Corps and among generals and admirals who described their family backgrounds as lower middle class. Curiously, among generals and admirals who were more disenchanted with the military as a profession, there was an appreciably higher rate of "scary" or "hawkish" attitudes. The policy implications of this are unclear, but the correlation of job dissatisfaction with extreme nuclear views is so strong that it stands out as a remarkable and perplexing conclusion to the study.

In these times of greater public support for the military, *Newsweek*/Gallup elite respondents appeared more willing to indulge in self-criticism. As many as 27 percent thought that giving medals for the Grenada invasion was excessive, while a 48 percent plurality believed that the blame for the Beirut massacre rested more with the procedures of the military commanders than with the civilian leadership that had put the Marines in Beirut (21 percent). This suggested a degree of candor that may not have been found in a Vietnam era poll of the military, but it also reflected traditional intraservice rivalries. Army generals placed more blame on the Marine commanders in Beirut for the massacre, while Navy and Marine brass were much more critical of the medal giving in the Grenada operation.

Veterans' Day this year saw stunning displays of patriotism, the touching reunion of those who had fought in Vietnam, and the president warmly welcoming these servicemen home. The nation and the military, it seems, are resting more comfortably together than they have for many years, and with the kind of information supplied by the *Newsweek*/Gallup poll, we can begin to understand the military better just at the moment when we have become more willing to accept them.



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by Ivor Crewe

Britain Evaluates

Presidential elections are events of significance not only for the United States but also for Britain. The British economy is crucially affected by American interest rates, trade policies, and the dollar exchange rate. British domestic politics are inescapably tied up with U.S. foreign and defense policy. Imagine that democratic institutions reflected the new realities of Anglo-American strategic and economic interdependence and allowed the British to vote in a presidential election. How would the 51st state have voted? A CBS/*New York Times* poll suggested that it would have been neck and neck in Britain (Reagan 34 percent, Mondale 33 percent). But all the other polling evidence consistently shows that Ronald Reagan's campaign for reelection would have resulted in a landslide—a landslide defeat.

Dividing the British and American electorate's view of Ronald Reagan is an enormous confidence gap. The man who spreads reassurance in the United States spreads alarm in his closest European ally. His most recent "presidential rating" in Britain (August 1984) was a deficit of −24 percentage points: 32 percent agreed that he "is proving a good president" but 56 percent did not (see table 1). His presidential rating in three polls earlier in the year average out at 22 percent. Asked whether their opinion of President Reagan has changed recently, five times as many regularly say it has "gone down" (30 percent) as "gone up" (6 percent). On the specifics of his record, especially on international affairs, a May 1984 poll revealed the British public to be deeply skeptical. Only 21 percent believed that he had "seriously tried to halt the nuclear arms race"; 66 percent did not. Only 31 percent agreed that "President Reagan's policies on nuclear weapons are increasing the security of Western Europe"; 55 percent disagreed. Fully 78 percent believed that he should have taken up the Soviet-supported United Nations proposal for a nuclear weapons freeze. Reagan's October meeting with Mr. Gromyko, however, was greeted with a cynical thumbs down. Only 20 percent believed the meeting was "a serious attempt to help world peace"; 66 percent dismissed it as "mostly an election gimmick." In view of this widespread skepticism it is not surprising that when confronted with the straight choice a mere 22 percent wanted Ronald Reagan to be reelected for another term; 67 percent wanted "someone else to become president."

Ronald Reagan's poor standing with the British public is not the result of any particular event or incident. Anglo-American relations have certainly gone through periods of strain during his term, notably over his opposition to the Soviet gas pipeline; the United States's equivocal attitude to Britain's case during the April-June 1982 Falklands War; the installation of cruise missiles in November 1983; and, in the same month, the invasion of Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth. In all four instances the position of the United States was unpopular, but the impact on Reagan's presidential rating was slight and short-lived. For example, in November 1983 the proportion saying that their opinion of Reagan had "gone down recently" rose to 39 percent compared with 28 percent in the preceding July. But his presidential rating remained the same: −29 percent in July 1983, −27 percent in November 1983. British attitudes toward Reagan have in fact been negative from the very beginning. He had no honeymoon at all: even before his inauguration, in November 1980, his election was regarded as "bad" rather than "good" for America (by 40 percent to 30 percent), for America's standing in the world (by 35 percent to 32 percent) and for peace in the world (by 37 percent to 26 percent) (see table 2). In his first year of office his average "presidential rating" was −4 percent. By 1982

Ronald Reagan

it had slumped to −31 percent, and over the whole of his term it has been −25 percent. There was never a love match in the first place.

Comparison with his predecessors reveals how low Reagan's stock with the British public has fallen. Americans might regard him as more sincere than Nixon, as more relaxed and confident than Carter, but the British, apparently, fail to see those qualities, or if so, regard them as liabilities rather than assets in a president. In November 1972, 60 percent of the British public regarded Richard Nixon's reelection as good for America and 57 percent as good for America's standing in the world; in both cases only 7 percent dissented. Admittedly, these views were given before the full scandal of Watergate emerged. But Jimmy Carter too, on his election, enjoyed more confidence than Reagan among the British. The most telling verdict on Reagan emerges from a longer perspective on American presidents. Asked which presidents, alive or dead, they could name, more mentioned Reagan (76 percent) than any other. But when asked to name the two best American presidents (from a list) Reagan was mentioned by a mere 10 percent, ranking fifth behind not only Kennedy (66 percent), Roosevelt (44 percent), and Eisenhower (26 percent), but even Truman (12 percent), whom only 14 percent could name without prompting. And when asked to name the worst president, the British placed Reagan second only to the disgraced Nixon.

An Unusually Unpopular President

Reagan's very different image on the two sides of the Atlantic presents a puzzle. His most fundamental beliefs are very close to Margaret Thatcher's. Both are committed to rolling back the state; to the free-market economy; to creating an "enterprise culture"; to religion and traditional morality; to a strong nuclear defense; and to national pride and self-confidence. Mrs. Thatcher was reelected only eighteen months ago with a thumping majority, and in the October 1984 polls she remains comfortably ahead of the Labour party. Why, then, should the British reject her ideological twin?

One answer is that the center of political gravity is considerably further to the left in Britain than the United States. If the British gave themselves American party labels, Britain would be a solidly Democratic state. For example, the Kennedy-Nixon contest was a dead heat in terms of the American popular vote, but the British preferred Kennedy to Nixon by a comfortable 56 percent to 44 percent (October 1960). In 1964 Lyndon Johnson won a decisive 61 to 39 percent majority over Barry Goldwater; but in Britain his popular majority was an astonishing 94 to 6 percent (November 1964). Reagan is particularly unpopular among Labour and Alliance supporters in Britain, who between them outnumber Conservatives. But this answer is only part of the explanation. For even among Conservatives Reagan is far from popular: in May 1984 more Conservatives believed that his reelection would be bad than good for America's standing in the world (by 42 to 36 percent) and for peace in the world (by 41 to 36 percent); their presidential rating of Reagan in 1984 averaged a modest +3 percent. And on the crucial test, Reagan fails decisively: by a 57 to 33 percent majority, Conservatives would prefer someone else to be elected president.

A second possible explanation is that the British electorate regards Reagan as good for the United States but bad for Britain. Were that the case there would be no contradiction between the British and American electorate's view of Reagan. But the opposite is closer to the truth. Whereas substantial majorities regarded his reelection as bad for the United States and its standing in

Table 1
BRITISH PUBLIC'S RATING OF REAGAN AND CARTER

Question: Do you think Mr. Reagan (Carter) is or is not proving a good president of the United States?

	Is	Is not	Don't know	Rating
Carter				
1977 (2)	61%	11%	28%	+50
1978 (2)	45	33	22	+12
1979 (4)	38	44	18	− 6
1980 (3)	50	35	15	+15
1977-1980 (11)	47	33	20	+14
Reagan				
1981 (2)	30	34	37	− 4
1982 (4)	27	58	15	−31
1983 (4)	27	60	13	−33
1984 (4)	32	55	13	−23
Feb. 1984	35	55	10	−20
April 1984	29	53	17	−24
June 1984	32	55	12	−23
Aug. 1984	32	56	12	−24
1981-1984 (14)	29	54	17	−25

Note: The number of monthly polls asking the question each year is given in parentheses. The entry for each year is the mean. Sample sizes are 900 to 1,100. The question was first asked in May 1977.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd.

the world, they were much more sanguine about its effect upon Anglo-American relations: almost as many predicted it would be good (36 percent) rather than bad (40 percent).

The third possible factor is anti-Americanism in Britain. It is argued that as the head of state and the single most publicized American, Reagan and his personal popularity will suffer alongside that of his country. Anti-Americanism among the British public has undoubtedly grown since the birth of the "special relationship" during World War II. In July 1942, seven months after the United States entered the war, the majority of the British took a pro-American position on four propositions: the Americans were more democratic than the British; Britain would be better off if it became more like the United States; it was untrue that the Americans adopted a superior attitude; and it was untrue that Americans let others do the fighting for them. By March 1984 the majority of the British public (excluding don't knows) took the anti-American line on each of the identical four propositions.

This shift of opinion against the United States is not a return to normal anti-American prejudice after a brief, exceptional friendship induced by the war. The change of mood is very recent, a product of the Reagan years. About every quarter since 1970 Gallup has regularly asked "How much confidence do you have in the

Table 2

BRITISH PUBLIC'S APPRAISAL OF ELECTION OF NIXON, CARTER, AND REAGAN

Question: As you may know, Richard Nixon (Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan) has been elected president of the United States. Do you think this will be a good thing or a bad thing for . . .

	Good thing	Bad thing	Don't know	Rating
		America?		
Nixon	60%	7%	33%	+53
Carter	42	19	39	+23
Reagan	30	40	31	−10
		America's standing in the world?		
Nixon	57	7	36	+50
Carter	40	18	42	+22
Reagan	32	35	34	− 3
		Peace in the world?		
Nixon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Carter	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Reagan	26	37	37	−11
		America's relations with Britain?		
Nixon	59	4	37	+55
Carter	44	16	39	+28
Reagan	46	22	32	+24

Note: n.a. = question not asked. The set of three questions (four in 1980) were asked in November 1972, November 1976, and November 1980. Sample sizes are 900 to 1,100.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd.

Table 3

BRITISH PUBLIC'S CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. AS A WORLD POWER

Question: How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems —very great/considerable, little, or very little?

	Very great/ Considerable	Little	Very little/ None at all	Don't know
1970 (2)	29%	28%	27%	16%
1971 (−)	—	—	—	—
1972 (2)	30	25	32	14
Nixon, 1970-1972 (4)	29	26	30	15
1973 (4)	29	26	33	13
1974 (5)	33	25	32	11
Nixon, 1973-1974 (9)	31	25	32	12
1975 (4)	32	26	30	13
1976 (1)	33	27	26	12
Ford, 1975-1976 (5)	32	26	29	13
1977 (2)	49	22	21	9
1978 (2)	36	23	28	13
1979 (3)	28	25	35	13
1980 (4)	29	25	35	12
Carter, 1977-1980 (11)	34	24	31	12
1981 (3)	30	25	35	11
1982 (4)	27	27	40	6
1983 (4)	24	26	44	7
1984 (4)	22	25	48	6
Reagan, 1981-1984 (15)	26	26	42	7

Note: The number of monthly polls asking the question each year is given in parentheses. The entry for each year is the mean. Respondents volunteering the answer "none at all" were categorized separately but have been added to those saying "very little" in this table. Sample sizes 900 to 1,100.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd.

ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?" From the start the British view has been negative: between 50 and 60 percent have answered "little," "very little," or "none at all"; barely a third have answered "very great" or "considerable" (see table 3). Throughout the first Nixon administration, the Nixon/Ford presidencies of 1972-1976, and the Carter administration, British attitudes have been stable (except for a surge of confidence in 1977, Carter's first year). During Reagan's presidency, however, British opinion has clearly shifted to an even more negative position: only a quarter (26 percent) have had confidence in the United States as a world power and over two-thirds (68 percent) have had little or none.

This unfavorable change in the general appraisal of the United States is underlined by a shift of mood on more specific aspects of its role. In foreign policy the proportion believing that the United States "is losing her friendship among Western countries" rose from 60 percent in October 1958 to 79 percent in March 1984 (don't knows excluded). Asked about "the role the United States is now playing in the world," disapprovers exceeded approvers by 38 to 30 percent in 1973 but by 55 to 30 percent in 1983-1984. When asked whether "recent events make you more or less inclined to trust the Americans" the proportion answering "less" rose from 36 percent in April 1975 to 60 percent in April-June 1984.

The question left unanswered by these trends is whether Reagan is victim or villain. What came first: anti-Americanism or anti-Reaganism? There is no sure way of disentangling one from the other. The balance of evidence, however, suggests that Reagan's unpopularity is the producer rather than product of the British public's growing anti-Americanism. First, on Reagan's succession British ratings of the president immediately dropped. Even in his final year, dominated by the humiliation of the Iranian takeover of the American embassy, Carter's presidential rating was, on average, positive (+15 percent), whereas in his first year Reagan's rating was negative (−4 percent) (see table 1). Second, confidence in the United States as a world power did not immediately drop under Reagan's administration; it has steadily declined from one year to the next. In other words, declining confidence in the U.S. appears to be an effect, not a cause, of Reagan's unpopularity.

Reagan's comfortable reelection is popularly attributed to his restoration of a sense of national pride and global strength in the hearts of the American people. But what sends shivers of pride up American backs produces quivers of alarm in British stomachs. The British attitude toward Reagan reminds one of the Duke of Wellington's reaction on first surveying his reinforcements in the Peninsular War: "I don't know what effect these men will have upon the enemy, but, by God, they terrify me."

I am grateful to Bob Wybrow of Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd. for making unpublished poll data available to me. I.C.

(Continued from page 15)

the same education and income, integrated public transportation, and equal job opportunities all moved from less than 45 percent support in the early forties to well over 70 percent support by 1970 (see table 2). In fact, because approval had reached such a consistently high level by the late sixties, and therefore no longer differentiated the white population into two meaningful subgroups, these questions were discontinued from NORC surveys. Each item closely parallels the school integration question trend.

Table 3 monitors racial change from 1963 to the present. The table maps changes in the five-item Treiman scale on race relations. Donald J. Treiman originally developed this seven-item race scale in the sixties, using the school integration and public transportation items discussed above plus questions on integrating public facilities, interracial dining, neighborhood segregation, laws on interracial marriage, and black activism. With the discontinuation of the items on public transportation and public facilities, we had a five-item scale that ran from a score of zero, for someone who opposed all forms of racial tolerance, to a score of five, for someone who favored racial integration and accommodation. This scale also reinforces the pattern illustrated by the single school integration item. The mean value increased from 2.09 in 1963 to 3.50 by 1984. In sum, the NORC series indicates that a massive and wide-ranging liberalization of racial attitudes has swept America over the last forty years.

Table 3

Question: Do you think (Negroes/blacks) should have the right to use the same parks, restaurants, and hotels as white people?

How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a (Negro/black) friend home to dinner?

White people have a right to keep (Negroes/blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and Negroes/blacks should respect that right. . . . Agree strongly, agree slightly, disagree slightly, disagree strongly?

Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/blacks) and whites?

(Negroes/blacks) shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted. . . . Agree strongly, agree slightly, disagree slightly, disagree strongly.

	Treiman Scale*
1963	2.09
1970	2.49
1972	2.91
1976	3.06
1977	3.07
1980	3.22
1982	3.37
1984	3.50

Note: *Possible scores on the Treiman Scale run from zero, for one who opposes all forms of racial tolerance as posed in the questions, to five, for one who favors all forms of racial tolerance. The values in the tables are means.

White respondents.

When Changes Occurred

While the increase in racial tolerance has followed a

Table 4

Question: See table 1.

	Black/white students should go to the same schools	
	North	South
1942	40%	2%
1956	61	14
1963	73	30
1963	75	34
1970	83	46
1972	91	67
1976	89	67
1977	90	72
1980	92	75
1982	93	79
1984	93	83

Note: White respondents.

"Here is a list from Otis Figby. He says that this year he expects affirmative action."

Grin and Bear It by Fred Wagner
© News Group Chicago, Inc.
Courtesy News America Syndicate

nearly linear ascent, there has been some variation by period. Support for integration of schools, neighborhood, and public transportation increased at an average of 1.2 percentage points per year from 1942 to 1956. That average increased to 2.1 percentage points from 1956 to 1963, with the emergence of the civil rights movement and the beginning of bus boycotts, lunch counter sit-ins, and the dismantling of dual school systems. A second period of accelerated advancement occurred around the late sixties and early seventies. (Two other questions, one on school integration with half black enrollments and another about voting for a black for president, showed maximum increases in tolerance from 1969 to 1972 and from 1967 to 1971.) In recent years, growth in racial tolerance has neither stopped nor even slowed. The annual change of .06 points on the Treiman scale for the 1977 to 1984 period is identical to that achieved during the peak of the civil rights movement in the sixties, and it is twice the rate of the early seventies.

Factors Affecting Tolerance

White racial attitudes have not been monolithic. Three major factors determine white attitudes toward blacks: (a) culture, which consists of region, ethnic and religious heritage, and community type; (b) socioeconomic status, which includes education, occupation, and income; and (c) birth cohort. Racial tolerance is highest among whites who are members of recent birth cohorts and who have been raised in liberal cultures, with above average education and social standing. Region has traditionally been the largest divider among whites. In 1942, for example, almost no white southerners (2 percent) endorsed school desegregation, while 40 percent of whites outside the South ("northerners," for short) already endorsed the principle of integrated education. The gap remained virtually unchanged until 1970 to 1972, years that marked a period of rapid growth in racial tolerance (see table 5). Since then, racial differences on school desegregation have continued to narrow slightly as northern attitudes began to hit a ceiling. The Treiman race relations scale shows a similar pattern. In this case, however, the 1970 to 1972 period marked the only time when attitudinal differences between North and South grew significantly closer.

Table 5

Question: See table 3.

	Treiman Scale	
	North	**South**
1963	2.45	1.11
1970	2.88	1.47
1972	3.16	2.17
1976	3.35	2.40
1977	3.35	2.43
1980	3.47	2.66
1982	3.65	2.74
1984	3.70	3.02

Note: White respondents.

Religion shows a similar, though less dramatic, difference. Jews have consistently been most tolerant, Catholics next, and Protestants the least tolerant (see table 6).

Table 6

Question: See table 3.

	Treiman Scale		
By religion:	**Jews**	**Catholics**	**Protestants**
1963	3.61	2.58	1.81
1970	3.79	2.75	2.28
1972	3.67	3.08	2.64
1976	4.04	3.36	2.79
1977	3.94	3.22	2.90
1980	3.75	3.49	3.00
1982	4.08	3.58	3.18
1984	4.15	3.75	3.31

Note: White respondents.

Some of these differences merely reflect the greater concentrations of Protestants in the South, but the same ordering of religions occurs when we look at northerners and southerners separately. (There are too few Jews in the South to study as a distinct group.) Likewise, tolerance is highest in large metropolitan areas and lowest in rural communities. Alterations in classification schemes over the years hinder exact comparisons, but it is clear that rural communities have consistently been the least supportive of racial integration, while large central cities and their suburbs have had the highest levels of approval.

Table 7

Question: See table 3.

	Treiman Scale				
By education:	**Less than high school**	**Some high school**	**High school**	**Some college**	**College graduate**
1963	1.32	1.88	2.32	2.73	3.15
1970	1.69	2.24	2.57	3.06	3.48
1972	1.97	2.56	3.03	3.28	3.88
1976	2.06	2.53	3.14	3.59	4.00
1977	2.06	2.58	3.21	3.56	3.98
1980	2.18	2.68	3.20	3.71	4.10
1982	2.37	2.90	3.36	3.84	4.19
1984	2.38	2.97	3.36	3.96	4.30

Note: White respondents.

As with religion, this distinction prevails in the North as well as in the South. Briefly, racial tolerance has been, and continues to be, lowest in small southern communities among the majority Protestants and highest in large northern metropolitan centers among the minority Catholics and Jews. In effect, these three cultural indicators are tracers of how close one is to remnants of the plantation slave economy.

The second major factor dividing whites is socioeconomic status (SES). Advanced education, greater

occupational standing, and higher income are all associated with racial tolerance. Unlike cultural differences, which show at least some decline, SES differences appear to be quite stable. As we see in tables 7 and 8, the education and income differentials remain virtually unchanged from 1963 to 1982. Education appears to have the most consistent independent effect, but high status occupation and high income also lead to racial tolerance. Besides the humanizing impact of a liberal education itself (explicit emphasis on tolerance, equal rights, and cultural relativism) socioeconomic status adds a margin of generosity that inclines people to think about the common good and also raises them above most direct competition with blacks for jobs, housing, and governmental services.

Table 8

Question: See table 3.

	Treiman Scale		
Income by thirds:	**Low**	**Medium**	**High**
1963	—	—	—
1970	2.09	2.53	2.88
1972	2.41	2.89	3.32
1976	2.66	3.02	3.46
1977	2.71	3.08	3.54
1980	2.86	3.22	3.54
1982	2.97	3.49	3.82
1984	3.12	3.50	3.87

Note: White respondents.

Table 9

Question: See table 3.

	Treiman Scale			
By age:	**Under 25**	**25-44**	**45-64**	**65+**
1963	2.38	2.32	1.93	1.53
1970	3.28	2.72	2.28	2.06
1972	3.61	3.16	2.69	2.19
1976	3.65	3.40	2.80	2.29
1977	3.69	3.41	2.82	2.27
1980	3.70	3.56	2.93	2.54
1982	3.92	3.74	3.13	2.64
1984	4.07	3.85	3.17	2.64

Note: White respondents.

The final major factor contributing to racial attitudes is birth cohort. Younger age groups have always been more willing to endorse integration than members of older cohorts (see table 9). Since racial attitudes have been growing more tolerant for at least forty years, each succeeding birth cohort has been raised in a culture more liberal on race relations, and thus each cohort starts its adult phase at a more liberal intercept than previous generations. This process is augmented by the fact that each cohort is also better educated than its predecessor, though the cohort effect is independent of, and in addition to, the education effect. Both operate in a similar fashion in the North and South.

Opening the Door

If we consider simultaneously the contribution of time, culture, socioeconomic status, and cohort, we can isolate the period of 1970 to 1972 as one of especially significant social change. From the Treiman scale and other race items we can identify the late sixties and early seventies as a period of rapid increase in pro-integration attitudes, especially among a fairly narrow subgroup—the better educated and younger segments of the urban South. We have a major collective shift among the more progressive segments of the South away from the traditional "stand in the doorway" attitude. This shift is perhaps best symbolized by the new George Wallace, who recaptured the Alabama governor's seat in 1982 after abandoning his "segregation forever" statements of the sixties and even carrying a large share of the black vote. This shift is incomplete, since even among the young and better educated, the South remains less racially tolerant. But the North-South gap is smaller among the young and better educated than it is among other groups.

Where the Line Is Drawn

While the broad, four-decade-long advance of racial tolerance has steadily driven out once popular notions of white superiority and practices of Jim Crowism, it has hardly turned Americans into a colorblind society.

Table 10

Question: See table 3.

	Treiman Scale									
	North					South				
By area size:	**Top 10**	**Other Metro**	**Urban**	**Rural**		**Other Metro**	**Urban**	**Rural**		
1970	3.04	2.94	2.86	2.51		1.52	1.38	1.31		
1972	3.42	3.14	2.98	2.75		2.54	2.60	1.48		
By age:	**Under 25**	**25-44**	**45-64**	**65+**		**Under 25**	**25-44**	**45-64**	**65+**	
1970	3.75	3.11	2.66	2.91		2.17	1.53	1.36	1.15	
1972	3.78	3.39	2.42	2.55		3.08	2.37	2.09	1.38	
By education:	**Grade school**	**Some high school**	**High school**	**Some college**	**College graduate**	**Grade school**	**Some high school**	**High school**	**Some college**	**College graduate**
1970	2.09	2.74	2.85	3.36	3.77	1.03	1.17	1.75	1.95	2.33
1972	2.33	2.85	3.15	3.48	4.08	1.30	1.76	2.51	2.80	3.03

Whites have steadily abandoned beliefs in the desirability of segregation and the notion that blacks are and should be second-class citizens, but they have balked at taking drastic measures to implement full racial integration. Some see this as negating the advances in tolerant attitudes, or even as exposing those attitudes as tokenism.

School integration illustrates some of the contradictions. By 1982-1984, 89 percent of whites opposed separate schools for whites and blacks, but in 1983 only 23 percent of whites favored racial busing (see table 11).

Table 11

Question: See table 3.

	Treiman Scale
	Percent completely opposed to busing (7 on 7-point scale)
1972 (SRC)	75%
1974 (SRC)	70
1976 (SRC)	69
1980 (SRC)	61
	Percent favoring busing
1970 (Gallup)	14%
1971 (Gallup)	18
1971 (Gallup)	17
1972 (GSS)	20
1974 (GSS)	20
1975 (GSS)	17
1976 (GSS)	16
1977 (GSS)	16
1978 (GSS)	20
1982 (GSS)	19
1983 (GSS)	23

Note: Black and white respondents.

Similarly, in 1983 only 6 percent of whites objected to sending a child of theirs to a school with a few blacks, but 26 percent objected to their child attending a school that was half black, and 62 percent rejected the idea for a school that was mostly black. Whites are willing to accept school integration in principle and in practice when it does not put their children in the minority, but they strongly oppose busing. Yet it is noteworthy that, even in this area, white opposition to busing has slightly diminished over the last decade and a half.

Table 12

Question: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups even if it means giving them preferential treatment. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

	Government help blacks				No special treatment
	1	2	3	4	5
1980	—	—	—	—	—
1984	6.5%	8.6%	30.5%	19.5%	34.9%

	Government help minorities						Minorities help themselves
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1980	3.0%	4.3%	10.5%	24.7%	18.6%	16.2%	22.8%
1984	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Note: White respondents.

Whites are firmly opposed to favoring whites in educational and occupational opportunities but draw the line at compensating blacks for past discrimination and disadvantaged backgrounds by applying racial quotas or other preferential treatment. Majorities opposed special assistance to minorities in 1980: 23 percent placed themselves at the extreme "no help" position, on a seven-point scale, while only 3 percent were at the extreme "help" position. On a related 1984 question about blacks, the "anti-special treatment" extreme (five-point scale) tops the extreme "pro-special treatment" position by 35 percent to 7 percent. Yet, it is not the notion of helping blacks that whites appear to reject, but the anti-egalitarian principle of special treatment itself—the idea of reversed discrimination. Over 32 percent of whites favor more government spending to improve the condition of blacks as opposed to only 19 percent who want less spending. These 1984 figures represent the highest level of support since the series of spending questions began in 1973. Compared to other spending preferences, support for helping blacks falls in the middle—near support for mass transportation, parks and recreation, and assistance to cities. There is more support for an increase in spending for blacks than for space exploration, foreign aid, welfare or defense. Yet the demand falls below that for increased assistance to the poor, solving the problems of big cities, crime, drugs, health, social security, the environment, and education.

Whites are willing to take certain steps to further racial tolerance and equality, such as government spending to improve the conditions of blacks, without going so far as endorsing ideas like preferential treatment and quotas. Whites frequently object to various strong types of implementation, but these rejections do not appear to amount to the actual negation of racial egalitarianism.

In the forty years since Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* appeared, the very nature of the racial dilemma he referred to has changed. He wrote of the often sharp contrast between the lofty moral and political principles of the American Creed and the suspension of that Creed when race relations were concerned. Today, whites are increasingly willing to apply the principles of the American Creed—democracy, equal protection, and liberty and justice for all—to blacks. The dilemma today is whether what most whites still consider to be extreme measures—busing, preferential treatment, racial quotas—are needed to achieve full, functional equality for blacks, or whether such measures are counterproductive and may even violate the principles of equality they seek to achieve.

REAGAN-MONDALE TRIAL HEATS

QUESTION WORDING FOR PAGES 38, 39, 40

GALLUP

(Suppose the 1984 presidential election were being held today.) If President Reagan were the Republican candidate and Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate, which would you like to see win? (If undecided January 13-16, 1984—May 3-5, 1984, ask:) As of today, do you lean more to Reagan, the Republican, or to Mondale, the Democrat?

Suppose the presidential election were being held today. If Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate and President Reagan were the Republican candidate, which would you like to see win? (Those who were undecided were asked:) As of today, do you lean more to Mondale, the Democrat, or to Reagan, the Republican? (May 18-21, 1984—July 6-9, 1984)

Now I'd like to get your honest opinion on this next question. (It doesn't make any difference to me how you vote . . . I only want to record your opinion accurately.) If the presidential election were being held today, which would you vote for—the Democratic candidates, Mondale and Ferraro, or the Republican candidates, Reagan and Bush? (Those who were undecided or who named other candidates were asked:) As of today, do you lean more to Mondale and Ferraro, or to Reagan and Bush? (July 13-16, 1984 through November 2-3, 1984) For September 7-9, 1984, October 15-17, 1984, and October 26-28, 1984, the order of the candidates was reversed.

Note: Sample size for March 2-6, 1984 = 1,008; April 11-15, 1984 = 1,005; May 3-5, 1984 = 1,004; June 6-8, 1984 = 1,011; June 22-25, 1984 = 1,195; September 7-9, 1984 = 938; September 28-30, 1984 = 946 registered voters; October 15-17, 1984 = 1,029 registered voters; October 26-28, 1984 = 997 registered voters.

HARRIS

Now suppose (in 1984/this November) the election for president were between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and former Vice President Walter Mondale for the Democrats. If you had to choose (today), would you vote for Reagan or (for) Mondale? (January-February 1984, June 7-11, 1984—July 2-7, 1984)

Now suppose in the November (1984) election it is between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and Walter Mondale for the Democrats. If you had to choose right now, would you vote for Reagan or for Mondale? (March 1-3, 1984—March 15-17, 1984)

Now this November, the choice is between Ronald Reagan and George Bush for the Republicans and Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro for the Democrats. If you had to choose, would you vote for Reagan and Bush, the Republicans, or Mondale and Ferraro, the Democrats? (July 20-24, 1984—September 21-25, 1984)

Now this November 6th, the choice for president and vice president is between Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro for the Democrats, and Ronald Reagan and George Bush for the Republicans. If you had to choose, would you vote for Mondale and Ferraro, the Democrats, or Reagan and Bush, the Republicans? (October 12-14, 1984—November 2-3, 1984)

Note: January/February survey results from two surveys conducted January 12-15, 1984 (sample size = 1,251 of which 972 were likely voters) and February 9-11, 1984 (sample size = 1,262 likely voters; March 1-3, 1984 = 1,227 likely voters; March 15-17, 1984 = 1,270 voters; June 7-11, 1984 = 1,251 likely voters; June 2-7, 1984 = 1,259 likely voters; July 20-24, 1984 = 1,620 eligible voters of whom 1,264 were likely voters; August 5-9, 1984 = 1,627 eligible voters of whom 1,287 were likely voters; August 24-25 = 1,988 adults of whom 1,230 were likely voters; September 5-9, 1984 = 1,999 eligible voters of whom 1,211 were likely voters; September 21-25, 1984 = 2,121 adults of whom 1,326 were likely voters; October 12-14, 1984 = 1,998 adults of whom 1,393 were likely voters; October 22-23, 1984 = 2,003 adults of whom 1,296 were likely voters; November 2-3, 1984 = 2,672 adults of whom 1,409 were likely voters.

ABC NEWS/*Washington Post*

If the 1984 presidential election were being held today and the candidates were Ronald Reagan the Republican, and Walter Mondale, the Democrat, for whom would you vote? (January 1984—July 1984)

The candidates in the November presidential election are Reagan and Bush, the Republicans, and Mondale and Ferraro, the Democrats. Suppose the election were being held today, for whom would you vote, Reagan and Bush—or Mondale and Ferraro? (If don't know ask:) As of today, do you lean a little more towards Reagan and Bush, or a little more towards Mondale and Ferraro? (September 7-11, 1984—November 3-5, 1984)

Note: Sample size = 1,206 for February 1984; July 5-6, 1984 = 785 registered voters; September 7-11, 1984 = 1,507 registered voters; September 22—October 2, 1984 = 11,807 registered voters; October 2-7, 1984 = N/A; October 8-9, 1984 = N/A; October 12-16, 1984 = 1,505 registered voters; October 22-23, 1984 = 1,081 registered voters; October 29—November 1, 1984 = 8,969 registered voters; November 3-5, 1984 = 2,212 registered voters.

PENN + SCHOEN/THE GARTH ANALYSIS

(In 1984, there will be a presidential election) If the candidates were Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Walter Mondale, for whom would you vote?

Note: Sample size for February 1984 = 1,008 registered voters; for June 1984 = 1,005 registered voters.

CBS NEWS/*New York Times*

If the (1984) presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan, the Republican, and Walter Mondale, the Democrat, would you vote for Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale? (January 1984—July 1984)

If the presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan for president and George Bush for vice president, the Republican candidates, and Walter Mondale for president and Geraldine Ferraro for vice president, the Democratic candidates, for whom would you vote? (If undecided) Well, as of today, do you lean more toward Reagan and Bush, or more toward Mondale and Ferraro? (August 5-9, 1984—October 31-November 3, 1984)

Note: Sample size for March 21-24, 1984 = 1,217; for April 23-26, 1984 = 1,367; for July 12, 1984 = 747 registered voters; for September 12-16, 1984 = 1,135 registered voters; October 9, 1984 = 515 registered voters; October 14-17, 1984 = 1,253 registered voters; October 21, 1984 = 494 registered voters; October 23-25, 1984 = 1,068 registered voters.

ROPER

Now suppose the presidential election were being held today with Walter Mondale as the Democratic candidate and Ronald Reagan as the Republican candidate. Which would you like to see win? (March 1984—May/June 1984) (If undecided or don't know) As of today, which candidate do you lean to more: Mondale the Democrat or Reagan the Republican? (asked only in March 1984)

Now, suppose the presidential election were being held *today*. If Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate and Ronald Reagan were the Republican candidate, which would you like to see win? (July 1984)

As you know, the choice for president and vice president this year is either Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro on the Democratic ticket, or Ronald Reagan and George Bush on the Republican ticket. As you feel right now, will you *definitely* vote for the Mondale ticket, or *probably* vote for the Mondale ticket, or *definitely* vote for the Reagan ticket, or *probably* vote for the Reagan ticket? (If unsure, ask:) Well, if you had to vote for one, which way do you think you would lean as you feel right now—toward the Mondale ticket or the Reagan ticket? (September 15-22, 1984 and October 27-November 3, 1984)

Note: For March 17-24, 1984; May 29—June 3, 1984; July 7-14, 1984; and September 15-22, 1984, the question was asked of only one-half of the sample. For October 27—November 3, 1984, the question was asked of the full sample.

Note: We have noted only those sample sizes that were less than 1,500 or that were unusually large. In a few cases, we were unable to obtain sample sizes. In those instances, we recorded the interview dates and marked them "N/A" (not available)

Los Angeles Times

If the November general election for president were being held today, which candidate, if any, would you vote for, former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, or President Ronald Reagan, the Republican? (February 4-9, 1984)

If the November general election for president were being held today and these were the candidates, which one, if either, would you vote for: former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, or President Ronald Reagan, the Republican? (April 28—May 3, 1984)

If the November general election were being held today, and these were the candidates for president and vice president, which ticket, if either, would you vote for, former Vice President Walter Mondale and Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro, the Democrats, or President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush, the Republicans? (If not sure or refused, ask:) Well as of today, do you lean more toward Mondale and Ferraro, or Reagan and Bush? ** (August 25-30, 1984 through October 12-14, 1984)

Note: ** In the August asking, the sample was split. October 4-6, 1984 = 904 registered voters; October 12-14, 1984 = 506 registered voters.

Time/YANKELOVICH, SKELLY and WHITE

Supposing the election for president was being held today, and you had to choose between Walter Mondale, the Democrat, and Ronald Reagan, the Republican, for whom would you vote—Mondale or Reagan? (January-February 1984)

If the election were held tomorrow, who would you vote for? Would it be Reagan and Bush, or Mondale and Ferraro, or are you sure? (If not sure or not going to vote, ask:) Even so, who do you lean toward at this moment—is it Reagan and Bush, or Mondale and Ferraro? (August 1984)

If the election were held tomorrow, who would you vote for? Would it be Reagan and Bush, or Mondale and Ferraro, or are you not sure. (If haven't made up mind, ask:) Even though you haven't made up your mind yet, do you lean toward supporting either Reagan-Bush or Mondale-Ferraro? (September 11-13, 1984, and October 22-24, 1984)

Note: Sample size for January/February 1984 = 1,021 registered voters; August 7-9, 1984 = 1,000 registered voters; September 11-13, 1984 = 1,000 registered voters; October 22-24, 1984 = 1,000 registered voters.

GORDON BLACK/*USA Today*

If the election for president were held today, for whom would you vote, President Ronald Reagan, the Republican, or former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat? (May 29—June 1, 1984)

If the election for president were held today, for whom would you vote, the Democratic ticket of former Vice President Walter Mondale and Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro or the Republican ticket of President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush? (September 4-11, 1984—November 1-4, 1984)

Note: Sample size for May = 1,465 registered voters. Sample size for September 4-11, 1984 = 1,032 registered voters. For that September asking, sample was split and the order of Democratic and Republican tickets switched. September 25—October 1, 1984 = 1,064 registered voters; October 14-18, 1984 = 1,287 registered voters; October 21, 1984 = 850 registered voters; and October 25-27, 1984 = 1,375 registered voters.

GALLUP/*Newsweek*

If the 1984 presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote in each of the following races? . . . Reagan vs. Mondale? (March 1984)

If the presidential election were held today, which ticket would you favor? . . . Reagan/Bush or Mondale/Ferraro? (July 12-13, 1984)

As the convention ends, whom would you like to see win the 1984 election? . . . Reagan/Bush or Mondale/Ferraro? (July 19-20, 1984)

If the presidential election were being held today, which ticket would you vote for? . . . Reagan/Bush or Mondale/Ferraro? (September 6-9, 1984)

If the presidential election were being held today, would you vote for the Republicans—Reagan and Bush—or the Democrats—Mondale and Ferraro? (October 22-24, 1984)

Note: Sample size for March 1-2, 1984 = 980 registered voters; July 12-13, 1984 = 750 registered voters; July 19-20, 1984 = 1,006 registered voters; September 6-9, 1984 = 1,005 registered voters; October 22-24, 1984 = 1,008 registered voters.

NBC NEWS

If the 1984 presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan, the Republican, and Walter Mondale, the Democrat, for whom would you vote? (March 1984)

If the 1984 presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan and George Bush on the Republican side, and Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro on the Democratic side, for whom would you vote? (July 1984)

If the 1984 presidential election were being held today, would you vote for Ronald Reagan and George Bush, the Republicans, or Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro, the Democrats? (August 12-14, 1984—October 26-28, 1984)

Note: Sample size for March 8-11, 1984 = 927 likely voters.

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